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Abstract

“... RIVALRY, HOSTILITY, AND ROMANITÀ.” AN ETHNOGRAPHIC STUDY OF AS
ROMA’S ULTRAS

by

Mark Wayne Dyal

Adviser: Professor Michael Blim
This is an ethnographic study of Italian Ultras, the organized and ritualized fan organizations
associated with professional soccer in Italy. It examines the relationships between their belief and
behaviors, paying particular attention to their political behaviors. The study follows 15 months of
anthropological fieldwork undertaken in Rome, Italy. Its goal is to assess the role that the Ultras’
particular critical understanding of modernity plays in organizing and actualizing their behaviors
inside and outside of sporting contexts. Part of my effort in this study is to examine local reactions
to national and international issues of globalization and liberalization. In following this line of
inquiry, which sets my study apart from recent scholarship on the Ultras, I hope to contribute to a
more anthropologically informed discussion of the Ultras as a critical part of politically extreme
responses to social and political predicaments of the early-21st Century.
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CHAPTER ONE: Introduction to Topic and Methods
I. The Italian Ultras
A. The Ultras of AS Roma
The Ultras chosen for research in this study are organized around their support of the team
Associazione Sportiva Roma (AS Roma). They were chosen for two reasons: first, they are reputed
to be the most well organized Ultras in Italy; and second, because they have made worldwide
headlines in recent years for their violent and destructive behavior. There are material/structural and
ideological aspects of their organization. Materially/structurally, there are no less than 27 groups,
with each having its own hierarchy, leadership, and ideology. They occupy the Curva Sud (South
End Zone) of Rome’s Olympic Stadium. However it is possible at various moments of their history,
including this one, to find Ultra groups in the Distinti Sud (South Stands) and Curva Nord (North
End Zone) sections in addition to their traditional “home” in Curva Sud.

Figure 1. Curva Sud Roma choreography proclaiming “There is only AS
Roma.” 1994
1

Ideologically, AS Roma’s Ultras have been influenced by the shifts toward rightist politics
seen by others studying Ultras in other cities. Their numbers swelled, along with the rise of the right,
in the late-1980s following the political and demographic patterns described by Roversi and Balestri
(2002) (summarized in Chapter 2). However, more so than other Ultras located in the larger cities,
AS Roma’s Ultras are characterized by intra-Curva political divisions, so that groups like Boys Roma,
Fedayn, Ultras Romani, Romulae Genti, and Giovenezza lead the rightists; and groups like LVPI, XXI
Aprile 753 a.C., Orgoglio Romano, and Brigata Bravetta lead the leftists. Each of the 27 groups hold
weekly meetings to discuss choreography, membership, merchandising, and even community
policing. They also act as social clubs that become foundational to youth socialization and allow
older members to remain involved in the sport and community.
Since the growth of the Movimento Ultrà (the early nomination of the Ultras phenomenon by
Ultras themselves) in the 1970s and subsequent crisis of the early-1980s characterized by less
centralized leadership, generation turnover, and increasing violence, AS Roma’s Ultras have been
distinguished by broad and sharp internal divisions organized around political ideology.1 This
division was made visible through the ideologies of the two founding groups of Roma’s Ultras,
Fedayn and Boys Roma in 1972.
While Boys Roma began with and maintains a fascist orientation, Fedayn began as a group
of the radical left (hence the name referencing the Palestinian liberation movement). In subsequent
years, however, Fedayn has shifted its political position toward the right, leaving the left to the

1

Notice the use of both Ultrà and Ultras. The original term was Ultrà. It was prominent until the mid1990s, when, for reasons hard to explain (there is no consensus amongst AS Roma’s Ultras as to why the term
changed) Ultras was used. Most agree that it was part of a generational turnover within the phenomenon, and thus a
way for the younger, somewhat more extreme, generation of Ultras to distinguish itself from the previous generation
of Ultrà. In this project I will use Ultras when discussing plural members and the phenomenon in general and Ultra
when discussing one member, even if in Italian one Ultra is still called un ultras.

2

groups mentioned above, among others. Although all of the separate Ultra organizations support AS
Roma, they are often adversarial, dismissing each other’s activities and needs within the Curva and
city. Because the unity of the Ultras associated with particular teams is often assumed, AS Roma’s
Ultras are understood as an anomaly.
My study will explain the divisions between the Ultras of AS Roma as resulting from the
depth of the various groups’ ideological commitments. Although the idea that the Ultras have these
commitments is not unique to this study, their being studied as the basis of the phenomenon is. Why
this is so will be made clear below. Briefly, though, it must be explained that I began fieldwork
prepared to study political action from a “traditional” political process perspective. That is, to
determine how being an Ultra influenced political behavior such as voting and party affiliation.
Instead, I discovered a world where political action is very much defined by “extra-political”
activities like organizing violent raids on socialist concerts, gay pride parades, and Roma camps.

Figure 2. Roman Ultras of the far right. 2008.
The entire fieldwork period, October 2006 to January 2008, coincided with the second
government of Romano Prodi. Prodi, a center-left politician, defeated Silvio Berlusconi and his

3

center-right coalition in April 2006. Prodi was a popular target of scorn amongst the Ultras with
whom I was embedded. His liberal stances on the rights of cohabitating couples and homosexuals;
Italy’s need of immigration and commercial competitiveness; and even on the rationale of Turkish
membership in the European Union were attacked in the offices of all of the rightist Ultras of AS
Roma.

Figure 3. Roma camp burning outside Naples in 2007.
Domestically, the most explosive political and social issues during my time in Italy were
alleged Romanian and Roma criminality; the inability of the state to properly collect and dispose of
garbage; and, most importantly, violence between the state and the Ultras. Despite the political
distance between Prodi and his government and the fascist Ultra groups, the animosities between the
two did not fully surface until the February 2, 2007 killing of police officer Filippo Raciti during
Ultra violence after Catania hosted Palermo (figure 4). From that evening Prodi’s government, in

4

conjunction with the Federzione Italiana Giuoco Calcio (FIGC - the Italian Football Federation),
began restricting the activities of Italy’s Ultras to the most severe levels in the history of the Ultras
phenomenon. This crackdown on the Ultras culminated in the November 11, 2007 killing of SS Lazio
(Rome’s second soccer team playing in Serie A, the highest level of professional soccer in Italy) Ultra
Gabriele Sandri by Officer Luigi Spaccarotella of the National Traffic Police. It is these two deaths
which defined the actions of the Ultras and their relations with the state during my research.

Figure 4. Ultras attack police in Catania resulting in
the death of Officer Filippo Raciti. February 2007
B. Italian Ultras in General
The Ultras of AS Roma were chosen for study because of their own particular attributes.
Above I mentioned their reputation for being well organized, an advantage for anyone studying the
phenomenon because ideologies and practices are easier disseminated and delineated in larger
conglomerates. AS Roma’s Ultras, I said, made news in the years before this study began for their
violent behaviors. And, while I did not intend to study violence, the nature of their violence, and the
“ethic of violence” they utilize are of great interest to me. However, there are other Ultras which
would have allowed similar opportunities for study. Those of Juventus in Turin, AC Milan, and

5

Internazionale in Milan are also well organized and prone to violence. They also share aesthetic
practices, a wealth of rivalries and agonistic culture with the Ultras of AS Roma.
The Italian Ultras as a whole are less particular manifestations of a general phenomenon than
unique embodiments that share characteristics. They share a sensibility which links them in
opposition with one another and only rarely links them in opposition to an outside force. That being
said, there are shared elements, namely an opposition to Calcio Moderno, or modern, consumerist
soccer (see below), which make the Ultras as a whole a consistent Other to the industry of soccer.
And, there are elements that can be classified as general to the Ultras of Italy.

Figure 5. Inter Milan’s Curva Nord in choreography
proclaiming their proprietorship of Milan. 2007.
Aesthetically, the Ultras share a commitment to tifare caldo, or to be hot fans. In Italy this has
come to refer specifically to the Ultra style of singing, clapping, and sometimes jumping in unison.
Their songs are all highly partisan for their team and ironically or sardonically against the opposition.
The Ultras all display banners (the various types will be discussed below) and flags (of their team,
city, region, political party, or specific Ultra group) during games. Likewise each Italian curva would

6

have created a choreography (a large curva-wide coordinated demonstration of colors and images)
at some time. In Chapter 2 I discuss the personal style of AS Roma’s Ultras. Only rarely do the points
of Roman Ultra style intersect with other Ultras - mainly in the recent habit of wearing hooded
sweatshirts, large sunglasses, athletic shoes, and a scarf around the waste or neck (which can be
easily brought to cover the face in the event of violent conflict).
All Italian Ultras have a well-developed system of rivalries. Later in this chapter I will discuss
the rivalry system of AS Roma’s Ultras. The same rationales are used by others. Suffice it to say that
history, geography, politics, Ultra conflicts, and team conflicts play their parts in generating,
maintaining, and escalating Ultra rivalries. Similarly, the Ultras all share an agonistic culture which
allows them to thrive on opposition, conflict, and warring aggression (to be discussed at length
below). This agonistic culture certainly promotes violence against the state, in the form of the forces
of law and order and the bureaucracy of the Italian soccer federation. However, not all Ultras can be
said to actively use violence against the police.
The Ultras represent themselves as sharing an ethos, culture, or world view which they call
the mentalità Ultras or simply mentalità. This mentalità will be discussed, defined, and explained
later in this chapter, but for now it will suffice to describe it as a set of ideals which provides a moral
and ethical framework in which to be an Ultra.
It might seem that if the Ultras share aesthetics, culture, and ethics, then they must be
somewhat monolithic. In reality, the Ultras are expressions of extreme commitment to local
particularity. As such, the content of their aesthetics and ethics is often determined so close to home
as to be irreplicable and largely irrelevant in other contexts. For example, the shared adherence to
localism, or campanilismo, is unknowable without the content of localism. In Rome, that largely
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takes the form of Romanità, the extreme attachment to Rome and things Roman. However, as
explained below, Romanità was also a discourse used by fascism to promote the Romanization and
fascistization of all Italians during the fascist regime. Thus, the deep commitment of the AS Roma
Ultras to Romanità also exposes them to fascism. In other civic contexts, this would be impossible.
In fact, in a city like Verona, the popular opposition to Rome as capital of Italy often creates the
opposite affection toward Rome. This dissertation demonstrates the depth of narratives and symbols
furnished the Ultras by Rome and its history and the equal depth of commitment to these on the part
of the AS Roma Ultras.
II. The Ultras, An Encounter From Afar
On Saturday, 22 April, 2006, my family and I, all American, attended the soccer match
between AS Roma and UC Sampdoria at Rome’s Olympic Stadium. Both teams were filled with
excellent players and both were having successful seasons in Serie A (the highest professional
division of Italian soccer). Yet, it was the atmosphere in the stadium that was most memorable about
the game. The atmosphere was coming primarily from one area, however, the “end zone” area called
Curva Sud. The fans standing in that section were unlike any we had encountered at American
sporting events. Nor were they like the Italian fans seated nearby in Tribuna Monte Mario
(Grandstand Monte Mario).
For the entirety of the 90 minute game, the Ultras sang and waved flags in the giallorosso (red
and yellow) colors of AS Roma and Rome. At the game’s beginning some of them held aloft
emergency flares and smoke bombs that burned in the same colors as their flags. During the game
there were various homemade banners displayed throughout the Curva. All of this action had little
relationship with the on-field action of the day. That no one scored for their team seemed not to
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dampen the fans’ enthusiasm. Nor did it matter that no one else in the stadium joined in their songs,
flag waving, or any other exhibited behaviors. They stood and cheered on their team from the
opening to closing whistle, resting only during the 20 minute halftime break.
All of this action took place behind a fortress of long banners, each of which displayed the
name of a particular group. More than a curva of thousands acting in unison, what was happening
instead was several groups of approximately one hundred persons each singing as a group - their
group. It was evident that each person holding an emergency flare did so as a member of their unique
group, as these were not universal in the Curva but only in front of or near a group banner. Similarly
the songs were begun by one group and then spread through the Curva, becoming more widely
audible. And, as one looked more closely, the flags being waved, while sharing the colors of AS
Roma and the city of Rome, more often than not glorified the group over which it was being waved.
III. How to Explain the Ultras?
This encounter with the Ultras mirrors that of most persons, whether as soccer fans (rival or
compatriot), journalists, or academics. It notes the most obvious aspects of their behavior: aesthetics,
performance, and organization. However what that brief encounter could not tell us is the “why”
behind their actions. I believe that the political aspects of their behavior allow us to discover that
“why,” but before I explain my rationale, it is important to first address other approaches that
incompletely explain the phenomenon.
A. Aesthetics and Performance
The most visible aspect of the Ultras are their various ritualized behaviors related to the
attendance of soccer matches: the singing of songs for their city and team and against those of their
opponents, waving of flags of city and team, performing large choreographed displays of sometimes

9

remarkable complexity and beauty, lighting of emergency flares and powerful bombs, and displaying
homemade banners with various messages intended for opponents, contiguous fans, and the broader
public.
Christian Bromberger was one of the first anthropologists to study the aesthetics of the Ultras.
He saw the stadium spectacle offered by SSC Napoli’s Curva A Ultras and was convinced that he was
witnessing one of Mauss’ “complete social events” (Bromberger, et al, 1993, pg. 101). He began
studying the relationship between the bombs, flares, flags, and songs, and the social institutions
comprising the Neapolitan poor industrial class, finding close ties between the two. Further, he saw
in the songs and ironic fandom (what is now called tifare contro, to root against) of the SSC Napoli
supporters a metaphor of Neapolitan collective identity as a city deeply committed to its own
(unchanging and counter-to-modern) traditions, long scorned by the rich north (Bromberger, et al,
1993, pgs. 98-99). As for the Ultras themselves, he defined them as intensely devoted, ritualistic, and
creative fan organizations that engage in carnivalesque behaviors with flags, banners, choreography,
smoke bombs, emergency flares, and a catalogue of songs of various levels of devotion and scorn
(Bromberger, et al, 1993, pgs. 89-102).
An approach to the Ultras that focuses on the roles they play and even the rituals and social
dramas of which they are a part is an intriguing prospect. Indeed, their performances are just that,
each with its own rhythm, intensity, subject, and framework. They vary between time, place, and
space (Schechner, 2005, Pgs. 112-117). However, for reasons given below, I decided that such an
approach would not tell me what I wanted to know about the Ultras. It would tell me a lot about their
in-stadium behaviors, but little about the other 166 hours of their week. I have, however, been
influenced in this light by the work of Heidegger and Turner. Both have allowed me to understand
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how the Ultras ritualistically embody a combination of historical political symbols and current Italian
politics through postures, gestures, and choreographed poses or how the extremes of their behavior
lend to the creation of liminal communities (see chapters 5 and 6).2
B. Development, Hooligans, and Violence
If the aesthetic elements of the Ultras are their most visible and superficial, given that most
who experience the Ultras from afar delve no deeper than their in-stadium performances, then my
search for the “why” of the Ultras’ political behaviors demanded another approach. Understanding
the Ultra phenomenon in aesthetic terms of carnival, ritual, performance, and fandom is at best partial
and leaves us wondering how to explain the full set of behaviors witnessed on the evening of
February 2, 2007, when police officer Fillipo Raciti was killed during rioting after a game between
Catania and Palermo. That evening the Catania Ultras targeted the forces of law and order and
engaged them in a relatively contained but deadly guerilla skirmish.
Nor do the Ultra aesthetics, as symbolically violent as they may be, allow one to expect the
larger, but less deadly, war against the state, law and order, and the business of soccer, witnessed in
Rome, Milan, and Bergamo following the police killing of Gabriele Sandri on November 11, 2007.
It is these killings which form the anima ferocia (ferocity of spirit) of this dissertation. Both brought
to the light the relationships between the Roman Ultras and the hegemony of the state and media,
and between the Ultras and a political-philosophical discourse of Counter-Enlightenment ideas. In
essence, I am more interested in how the Ultras come to graffiti a Roman wall with “Enough
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I am thinking here of Heidegger’s “gestell” (framing) as the setting of a framework for the possibilities of
reality. From Heidegger, Martin, 1977, The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays. Trans. W . Lovitt.
New York: Harper and Row. As well, communitas, Victor Turner’s understanding of liminal populations and
belonging through unique experience, from Turner, Victor, 1982, From Ritual to Theatre: the Human Seriousness of
Play. New York: PAJ Publications. Pg. 74
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immigrants, homes and work for Italians,” and sign such a message AS Roma Ultras (thus taking
credit for the sentiment as Ultras) than with the pageantry of their in-stadium experiences (figure 6).

Figure 6. AS Roma Ultras graffiti stating “Enough immigrants, homes and work
for Italians.” Vicolo del Lupo, Rome. 2007.
Other researchers have shared my predilection for the ways in which the Ultras interact with
the larger cultural and historical context. Antonio Roversi (1994, pgs. 359-381), Carlo Podaliri, and
Carlo Balestri (1998, pgs. 88-100) have sought to account for the most extreme aspects of Ultra
behavior by focusing on violence, thereby moving beyond the largely aesthetic understandings of
Christian Bromberger (1993). Unfortunately their results have also been only partially successful.
As I argue below, it is problematic to agree with Roversi’s understanding of the Ultras as examples
of youth deviancy (1994, pgs. 363-364). His and Balestri’s claim that the Ultras are merely fans who
also engage in social and political activity is also problematic, as I will show (1998, pg. 97).
Previous research on the Ultras has been influenced by the hegemony of UK Sociology and
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its studies of the Hooligan phenomenon of England. Eric Dunning and a team of scholars known
collectively as the Leicester School have become the most respected authorities in the field of sports
related violence.3 The Leicester School’s point of departure is Norbert Elias and his model of the
“civilizing process.” This model posits that the specialization of labor and rise of the modern state
have made modern subjects dependent upon one another in ways that prohibit the unpredictable
emotional outbreaks characteristic of Medieval and Renaissance society. Combined with the
efficiency of the modern state (forcing on all a degree of rational behavior), the lengthening chains
of interdependence have diminished the level of interpersonal expressive violence. Eric Dunning and
other Leicester School scholars apply Elias to the study of sports, demonstrating that the
transformation of Medieval folk-football into soccer and rugby entailed a curtailing of violence, at
least until recently (Dunning, 1994; Dunning, 1999; Elias, 1971; Finn, 1994). Positing that
hooliganism occurs among those least exposed to a civilizing process, they perpetuate a class-based
explanation of fan violence (Murphy, Williams, and Dunning, 1990).
There are important differences between hooliganism and the Ultras. Podaliri and Balestri
explain that hooliganism, despite being a universal descriptive of diverse phenomena, refers
specifically to English working-class gangs of often unruly soccer fans who organize primarily to
fight and drink (1998, pg. 88). They utilize particularly English cultural elements like working-class
masculinity (as it corresponds with drinking and fighting), which are less central to the world of the
Ultras (1998, pg. 89). It is with these tendencies that recent anthropological research tends to contrast
most saliently.

3

For a discussion and critique of the Leicester School, see Armstrong, 1998, Pgs. 1-11

13

According to Richard Giulianotti, the delayed entry of anthropology into the study of soccer
is due to the institutionalized overriding concern with policing, controlling, and criminalizing
spectators (1997, pgs. 4-9). This has led to research money being given primarily to studies aimed
at policy against hooligans, in turn advancing the credibility of the sociology and psychology of
hooliganism. These studies focused mainly on classifying working class behavior through theoretical
determinism. What is missing from the study of soccer fans, be they bourgeois consumers, English
hooligans, or Italian Ultras, is ethnographic detail.
Gary Armstrong has begun to provide ethnographic data on the English hooligans. His study
of the hooligans associated with Sheffield United Football Club demonstrates how narratively driven
can be the English hooligans, who are themselves acting as a break against the “capitalist takeover”
of English soccer (Armstrong, 1998, pgs. 123-137). Elsewhere Armstrong and Malcolm Young have
studied the impact of anti-violence laws on the hooligan phenomenon (1997) and the content of
Scottish stadium songs (2000). As yet there have been no extensive ethnographic studies of the Ultras
in English, although the English journalist Tim Park’s A Season With Verona (2002) chronicles his
season spent traveling with the Ultras as well as the team of Hellas Verona Football Club.
Ethnographic data will provide us with a way of understanding not only the aesthetics and
violence of fandom, but also the political behaviors on which I focus. Anthropology, with its highly
local investigative techniques married with global theoretical concerns, can show soccer in cultural
contexts in which heterodox moral and existential issues envelop the game.
C. Fascism and Politics
Taking up Giulianotti’s challenge to study soccer in host communities and in the subjective
terms through which it is locally known, during 15 months of anthropological fieldwork on the
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political behaviors of the Ultras of the soccer team AS Roma, I came to understand them not as
impassioned fans who occasionally take part in the political process as members of a politically
liberal society but rather as an extremely political counter-modern cultural movement which aims to
restore communal, spiritual, and ritual dimensions to modern life. They seek to do so by challenging
the political, ideological, and aesthetic processes of global-market capitalism, which, through global
consumerism, cultural and political pluralism, and individualism, threaten to destroy, as they
understand it, the particularity of Roman cultural forms.
After the February 2007 death of Raciti, many commentators were quick to label the
perpetrators of violence as delinquents out only to cause trouble and commit anti-social behavior.
Even those who tried to defend the Ultras were unwilling or unable to see what happened as part of
a larger project, or as part of a counter-modern conceptual system. Professor Vincenzo Abbantanuono
likened the Ultras to the “disaffected” French youth who burned the Parisian suburbs in the autumn
of 2005. These were people, he said, who acted without a “political conscience.”4
We are left to wonder at his reaction to the news that the young man accused of killing Officer
Raciti was a middle-class member of the fascist party Forza Nuova, who had worked the previous
summer to have a Gay Pride parade cancelled in Catania.5 Elsewhere, in Civitavecchia, an interesting
piece of Ultra graffiti relating to the Catania violence was found. “2-2-2007 Vendetta for Carlo
Giuliani,” it said, referring to the protestor killed at the 27th G8 Summit in Genova in 2001.6
What the details of the Raciti killing demonstrate is that the Ultras’ violence, in this case
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www.football-italia.net/feb03k.html
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www.independent.co.uk/football/news-and-comment/1822753.html
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La Repubblica, Friday, February 9, 2007. Sec. B, pg. 2

15

against the state, is not perpetrated without a political conscience. Roversi and Balestri (2002) have
shown that the Ultras were politicized in the 1990s, even beyond their original class-based political
forms. Actual mob-and-political violence aside, what my work seeks to understand is how these
politicized Ultras use their respective ideologies to create, maintain, and elevate their rivalries and
understandings of Italian soccer and social life. In other words, my work understands, like Antonio
Gramsci, that all aspects of human experience are political and involve the creation of knowledges
(narratives) and counter-knowledges (Wolf, 1999, pg. 44).

Figure 7. Ultras of AS Roma and SS Lazio attack the police after the
death of Gabriele Sandri. November 2007
The political concerns of AS Roma’s Ultras as Ultras are ambivalently related to
contemporary fascism’s most popular parties, Fiamma Tricolore and Forza Nuova. While issues that
concern these Ultras are certainly important to these parties, my research demonstrates that the large
majority of Ultras have become devoted to these concerns without the intervention of organized
fascism. The issues I have in mind range from the political, such as immigration and international

16

trade, to the metapolitical, such as rights movements, cultural protection, and sovereignty. The link
to fascism clouded further by the highly philosophical nature of their own political agenda against
Calcio Moderno, as well as the influence of Counter-Enlightenment political philosophy, both of
which are analyzed in the dissertation. For now, I must say that the ambivalence of the relationship
between organized fascism and the Ultras is such that the latter is considered here more a cultural
than political movement. As such, it has more in common with New Right political philosophy than
with political fascism (Bar-On, 2007, pgs. 6-25). The politics of the Ultras are ultimately less
concerned with the political qua politics than with how fascist-inspired political ideas shape their
vision of Rome, the AS Roma soccer team, and themselves.
Because of this, in no way can the influence of the right on AS Roma’s Ultras be seen as due
to an invasion of the far right parties, as others have argued (see Dal Lago and De Biasi, 2002; De
Biasi and Lanfranchi, 1997; Podaliri and Balestri, 1998). Instead, fieldwork demonstrated that the
Ultras harbor and utilize a moral and ethical system that generates its own political orientation. If
some are fascists it is because of the common elements that exist between the Ultras and fascism most notably squadrismo (organization and activities in the form of paramilitary groups); an ethic
of violence that celebrates engagement and aggression; pageantry as a form of political action; and
a harsh critique of modernity (Griffin, 2007, pg. 181).
Griffin’s work, Modernism and Fascism (2007), continues the earlier analysis of Emilio
Gentile (2003) which showed that, while fascism was a modernist, because modernizing, force, it was
informed by an attack on modernity itself. The question for fascism, as well as Gentile was then, what
form of modernity was fascism to create? While modernizing and attaching itself to Futurism and its
vision of speed, industry, efficiency, and power, fascism also promoted agrarianism, autarchy, and
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the celebration of Italian folkways. It was devoted on the one hand to increasing industrial output,
and to using international warfare as a means of masculinizing populations, but on the other hand to
a philosophical anti-materialism and hostility to political liberalism. Further, Sternhell argues that
while fascism maintained capitalism as an economic model it was horrified, via Nietzsche, of modern
bourgeois values such as universalism, individualism, progress, natural rights, and equality (Sternhell,
1994, pgs. 7-8).
According to Griffin (2007), Gentile (2003), and Sternhell (1994), this contradiction was born
not only from the material limitations of early-20th century Italy but from the ideological and
philosophical influences of fascism. These influences, in the persons of Nietzsche, Ernst Junger, Ezra
Pound, Gabriele d’Annunzio, and, for Hitler, Benito Mussolini, are now called part of the CounterEnlightenment tradition (Wolin, 2004). Today’s Ultras of AS Roma are similarly influenced by these
thinkers, amongst others. They are committed to challenging the hegemony of the current state of
modernity, be it understood as post-modernity, hyper-modernity, or globalized-market capitalism.
Thus, I argue that they, like fascism itself, are counter-to-modern, even if neither are pastoral in
outlook.
Franco Ferraresi has studied the post-war right in Italy and concluded that, although the far
right is often in organizational disarray, Counter-Enlightenment thought is still popular there, as are
the Counter-Enlightenment philosophical traditions of Friedrich Nietzsche and Julius Evola. This
thought carries with it, in his words, “nationalism, chauvinism, ethnocentrism, and xenophobia ...
frequently couched in the terms of rescuing original identities [that are] threatened by the
encroachment of ... globalization [and] the Americanization of culture” (Ferraresi, 1996, pg. 56).
Within the political activities and ideas of the Ultras we find precisely these elements of
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Counter-Enlightenment thought. It was Ferraresi’s work that prompted me to focus on the ideological
elements of Ultra behavior. Knowing from scholarship on the Ultras that the political right became
popular amongst them during the same late-1990s period in which Ferraresi was studying the Italian
far right, I immediately began searching for intersections between the ideology of the one within the
other. The most obvious common links between the Ultras and the far right, as well as between
Ferraresi’s and my analysis, are Nietzsche and Evola, both of which feature prominently in my
research. However, where Ferraresi and I diverge is in his assumption that the only youth
manifestation of rightist ideology is the skinheads, of which Italy is largely bereft (Ferraresi, 1996,
pg. 201).
IV. Ultras Defined, Including Key Concepts
As I have already demonstrated, the Ultras are misunderstood if seen as merely impassioned
fans who occasionally, as members of a politically liberal society, take part in the political process.
When defining the phenomenon, then, one cannot overlook the political nature of how they conceive
and perceive themselves, nor the pageantry and beauty of their public display in and around Italian
(and European) stadiums. The problems others encounter when attempting to understand the Ultras
occur largely because they tend to separate the aesthetic from the political. When one combines them,
however, and refuses to see them as distinct parts of Ultras conception and behavior, who they are
and why they do what they do becomes more clear.
David Kertzer’s study of Italian communist political symbols (1996) provides a model of
analysis that serves the purpose of this study, which seeks to examine political behavior largely from
the perspective of ritual and symbols. It seeks to understand the relations among mental images,
philosophical/historical ideas, and aesthetic principles that express themselves in public rituals and

19

representations (Fugo, 2003, pg. 19). Thus it will at once collapse the division between spiritual and
material, being inclined to search for the micro-historical relations between thought and language.
The relations between class or status and political participation, while also relevant to the material
consequences of the spiritual thrust of the Ultra “form of life,” will be a secondary focus.
Although I am most comfortable with this kind of approach, I feel that the subjects of the
study prompted the methodology I have chosen. The Ultras live as what Victor Turner called “social
anti-structures” because they have withdrawn symbolically and actually from the larger community
in order to fully embrace their “signal mark of identity” (Turner, 1979, pg. 48). While they are aware
of who they are and what is their historical and cultural mission, the terms of which, as will be
explained, come largely from fascism, Futurism, and political philosophers like Nietzsche, Sorel, and
Le Bon who were highly critical of modernity, their political focus is largely “ritual and cultish.” As
Kerzer explains, politics of this kind are not only interested in transforming society, but doing so
strictly within the terms of the cosmological myths that buttress the movement or party in question.
This form of politics is best studied, in my opinion, by concentrating on the role of the “symbol
systems” that “create order” by “reifying symbolic categories” as products of nature rather than the
human (Kertzer, 1988, pg. 13). This focus on the political from the perspective of the symbolic
challenges the division between real (material, power-oriented) elements and symbolic (a sign-driven
“language” constructive of identities) elements, seeing instead a continuum of change and action that
simultaneously engages our emotional and “irrational” centers (Kertzer, 1988, pg. 4; Kertzer 1996).
The focus of inquiry duly shifts, thereby, from the actual workings of liberal politics, per se,
to an understanding of the intellectual and ideational background of a system of politics and its
“reality making” function (Hoberman, 1984), not in a neo-Marxist way to connote a mode of
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deception whereby the ruling class stays in power, but as a system of knowledge (or controlling
concepts and theories) that does not merely describe but creates reality (Pronger, 2002). The
distinction between politics and political ideology, then, is rendered artificial. The categories
“overlap, interpenetrate, and feed from each other, exchange, transform into one another” (Schechner,
1988, pg. 197). This is especially important in Italy, where politics becomes a marker of identity in
highly personal ways, bleeding into other areas of life seemingly unrelated to the political system
(Kertzer, 1996).
Having provided the reader with explanation of the methodological assumptions I hold about
politics, narrative, and human behavior, I will now turn to defining four of the major concepts of this
project: mentalità; Ultras; agonistic, or oppositional form of life; and Calcio Moderno. It is
impossible to comprehend the Ultras without an understanding of these four concepts. The definitions
that follow all point to the political and ideological aspects of being an Ultra, which come to include
the aesthetic aspects as well.
A. Calcio Moderno, A Brief Overview
Calcio Moderno (Modern Soccer) is perhaps the most important concept used by the Ultras
at this particular time - not only because it ties their self-interests to international manifestations of
resistance to globalization, but because it incorporates the other three important concepts identified
above. It is used in the dissertation to denote the postmodernization of fandom and the sports
experience as focus has shifted toward the cultivation of global markets at the expense of, argue the
Ultras, local communities. It also refers to the business of soccer, including the clubs, international
federations (such as FIFA and UEFA), the media, and the system of club owners and player transfers
(trades). Thus, Calcio Moderno provides the view of globalization held by the Ultras, through which
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they come to equate anything harmful to themselves, the Ultras phenomenon, or AS Roma as equally
harmful to Rome and its local culture and traditions. Finally, Calcio Moderno is important for
representing the conceptual “other” to the Ultras, becoming their arch enemy. As I will demonstrate,
when Gabriele Sandri, a Roman Ultra of SS Lazio, was killed by police in November 2007, for many
Ultras he was killed by Calcio Moderno.

Figure 8. The basis of an ethical life: no to
modern soccer. Curva Sud Roma. 2007.
B. Mentalità
i. A Poetic Ideology
I will use a particular (maybe peculiar) vocabulary to discuss the ways in which the Ultras
understand, and interact with, their environment. Anthropology has developed a number of strategies
for explaining this problem. The term “ideology” is still the most popular way of denoting a system
of logic that impacts in some way upon reality. Already in 1973 Clifford Geertz saw fit to perform
a genealogy of ideology, such was the term’s overuse. Marx popularized the concept in negative
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terms, as a bourgeois “discursive sheet” laid atop the reality of proletarian suffering and need for
unity (Hoberman, 1984, pg. 17). Biologist James Danielli uses “ideology” but to denote “the
discursive practices which institute each human society’s field of consciousness” (1980, pgs. 87-94).
The idea of an order of consciousness as part of a cultural system is perhaps still best explained by
Evans-Pritchard, for he shows that the Azande exist within a symbolically coded system of
representation by which consciousness is inscribed. This system, as he says, is “the very texture of
... thought” (1976, pg. 222). The idea of “texture of thought” moves us closer to how “ideology” will
be used in this study. Geertz correctly critiqued the term as inexact and suffering from a lack of value.
However, his idea of a cultural system as a “web of meaning” seems closer to how recent scholarship
uses “ideology” (1973, pg. 124).
A student in 2008 experiences “ideology” differently than did previous generations. Verily,
we do so not even as ideology. This is because of the success and popularity of Bourdieu’s “habitus”
and Foucault’s “episteme” as variations on “ideology.” Habitus names the categories through which
we interact with the world. It is “a system of acquired dispositions functioning ... as categories of
perception and assessment” (Brownell, 1995, pg. 17). Foucault’s “episteme”, in contrast to “habitus,”
is less focused on the body and the material conditions of existence. Instead, it is explained succinctly
as an “order of knowledge” and a “general grammar” consisting of language and structures of power
(political and discursive) that create the very “conditions of possibility of existence” (Foucault, 1970,
pg. xxiv).
Even where ideology is used it is understood as a system through which power and ideas
collide. Eric Wolf offers a rich critique of our “metaphysical” tendency to, on the one hand,
acknowledge the cultural nature of conception, without, on the other hand, seeking to understand the
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consequences of conception upon culture (1999, pgs. 279-283). Culture-specific ideologies, he
explains, may share a function - to “orient society to act within the field of its [society’s] operations,”
but they are unique in form, logic, rationale, and effect (Wolf, 1999, pg. 280). Thus we must seek to
pull-back our gaze and incorporate into ideology’s purposes the “material resources and
organizational arrangements” of the world being affected (Wolf, 1999, pg. 280).
Similarly, Antonio Gramsci accentuated the active nature of thought in his understanding of
ideology. He understood ideas to be the moving force of culture, but not at the expense of the
material or oppositional forces also at play in a society (Crehan, 2002, pgs. 99-104). The class impact
on ideas and ideology, he explains, is so pervasive that the lower, or subaltern, classes only come to
self-consciousness by way of a series of negations of the class power and identity of their enemy
ruling class (Crehan, 2002, pg. 100). In this way, Gramsci left no distance between the availability
of self-consciousness and the possibility of class warfare, as well as theorizing the power central to
all workings of culture.
Later scholars also sought a liberatory model of idea formation. “Episteme” is used by Sylvia
Wynter as an alternative to “ideology” because it lends itself to an understanding of each culture’s
specific “system of symbolic representation,” or “mode of subjective understanding.” However, even
as she searches for clarity and power from concepts, she also uses Fanon’s “sociogeny” or
“sociogenic principle” to explain culture-specific behavior-orienting criteria (Fanon, 1967, pgs. 2-14;
Wynter, 1995, pgs. 5-57). Both Wynter and Fanon stress the creation of knowledge inherent in
ideology and central to all cultures. They did so not to understand this process on its terms but to
connect it with the failings of modernity to provide an ecumenical basis of knowing the human
species. As such they point to a deeper understanding of the role of concepts and ethics in cultural
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processes.
Similarly, Allan Young maintains the discursive theme in describing the “practices,
technologies, and narratives . . . of various interests, institutions, and moral arguments” constitutive
of reality (1995, pg. 5). Paul Kroskrity goes further, but also resorts to using “ideology” in explaining
the “language ideologies” that “represent the perception of language and discourse that is constructed
in the interest of a specific social or cultural group.” This includes “notions of what is ‘true,’ ‘morally
good,’ or ‘aesthetically pleasing’” (Kroskrity, 2000, pg. 8). What these scholars point to is a
methodology that accounts for the reality producing power of knowledge. But, as I hope to make
clear, so do the subjects of this study.
ii. Fascism and the Problem of Morality in Social Science
This study seeks to explain the relationship between ideology and behavior through
ethnographic data. The specifics of my fieldwork and data collection are presented below. For now,
however, let it suffice to say that I completed 15 months of participant observation fieldwork as well
as almost 200 questionnaires and seven long interviews. In the field, I was constantly aware of the
things being said around me: the justifications, insults, greetings, introductions, explanations,
anecdotes, language lessons (which included the Roman dialect and how it can be used to situate
oneself in a group or social setting). These were recorded either in a small journal that I used for
gathering interesting quotes, or as voice/video memos with the video function of a digital camera.
The voice/video memos were especially helpful in reminding me of places, situations, and contexts.
And, the accompanying videos allowed my transcriptions to include visual cues that often went
unobserved in live settings. Approximately three nights a week were spent transcribing notes and
voice/video memos into proper fieldnotes. As well, the particular situations and settings of discussion
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were important in determining the precise ways in which Ultras present themselves (or perform, as
Richard Schechner explains) (Schechner, 1988, pg. 117). But perhaps most importantly, I was
attentive to who and what the Ultras spoke about.
Therefore, I was less concerned with researching a Foucaultian genealogy of terms and
concepts and the ways meaning is produced historically. Nor was I prepared to produce a model of
the classificatory system used by the Ultras, following Levi-Strauss. Instead, it was the nature of my
research that prompted me to concentrate on the “discursive” elements of Ultra life. Just as Kroskrity
speaks of “regimes of language” I present the Curva Sud, the domain of the Ultras, as a “kingdom
of the word” because of the primacy of place it affords language and narrative (Koon, 1985, pg. 4).
The Ultras of AS Roma not only speak about a mentalità and a form of life disconnected from, and
at odds with, the modernity of the liberal global-market, but they act upon this disconnection. In
acting, they express a deep and conscious commitment to the ideas and ideals around which they
cohere.
For instance, I passed an evening with a small group of Ultras discussing the Arditi (The Bold
- Italian assault infantry of WWI) and their relation to the Brigate Nere (Black Brigades - Special
Forces of the Italian Social Republic [RSI] at the end of World War II). Aside from the oddity (from
the perspective of an American) of a group of young men (each younger than 30) casually discussing
an obscure history, the scene was valuable because they spoke about both with reverence and an
understanding that in these soldiers there was a model of proper contemporary behavior. This was
furthered by their attempts to equate themselves with the Arditi and Brigate Nere. “The Ultras,” said
Massimiliano, “are today scorned like the Arditi after the first world war - and demonized like the
fighters of Salò [alternate name for the RSI]. It is only right, though, because we all wanted the same
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things.” Among the romantic list of common desires was “to live according to values - bravery,
strength in the face of any opposition, brotherhood ... .” Eventually, the conversation became less
solemn and concluded with the participants celebrating their identity as “bastardi neri” (black
bastards, or hard men).
After leaving the bar, I witnessed these Ultras holler mild insults at African purse sellers
packing away their sack of merchandise for the evening. If I witnessed, or more importantly, noted
and described, only the insults - which asked the Africans to do something more substantial
(significativo) with their lives (and to do so away from Rome) - or worse, chose to disconnect them
from the evening’s discussion, this dissertation would be far less valuable as a description of the
Ultras and their behaviors. While using terms and concepts that encapsulate a wide variety of
behaviors, like mentalità and agonistic culture, I also tried to move away from terms like racism or
xenophobia because these tend to mask the motivation and even humanity of those so labeled.
Instead, as is apparent from this vignette, the subjects of this study forced me to understand
the moral aspect of creating social science. Most of the respondents to my questionnaires consider
themselves to be fascists. Indeed, the “air one breathes” amongst the Ultras is thick with the memory,
examples, and folklore of the fascist period. Recent scholarship on fascism has rehabilitated the
phenomenon as a valuable subject of study, but there are still consequences of the moral and political
aversions to the phenomenon, including misleading accounts of policy and personalities. RJB
Bosworth is praised for his biography of Mussolini (2002) and his history of Mussolini’s Italy, yet
the latter text is littered with words like “wicked,” “evil,” “intrusive,” “racist,” “henchmen,”
“corrupt,” “lies,” “neurotic,” and “gullible” (Bosworth, 2005, pgs. 4-5).
The political aversions should not be separated from the moral, but nevertheless, Claudio
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Fogu explains that one must often take drastic methodological measures to circumvent the
assumptions of leftist scholars that there was/is no cultural component to fascism. “[This] practice
. . . consigns cultural events to that all-encompassing, all-equalizing, and most uncritical rubric of
‘propaganda’ and considers them . . . peripheral to either a historical or theoretical explanation of the
fascist phenomenon” (Fogu, 2003, pg. 14). Methodologically, recent scholarship has turned toward
the intellectual foundations of fascism. Gregor (1999, 2001, 2005) and Schnapp (2000) re-examine
structural components of fascism, such as Corporatism and racial ideology, in light of the thinkers
and technocrats within the phenomenon, while Sternhell (1994) examines the intellectual antecedents
that motivated the fascist critique of modernity. Elsewhere, Fogu (2003), Falasca-Zamponi (1997),
Emilio Gentile (1996, 2003), Griffin (2007), and Farrell (2003) have turned toward discursive
analyses that feature close readings of texts, rituals, and images to present fascism’s cultural and
social critiques of liberalism as they relate to Counter-Enlightenment traditions.
Carlo Ginzburg has shown that micro-histories, with a greatly reduced scale of observation,
allow one to challenge the “polarizations between social and cultural history, [and] analysis and
narrative.” Micro-histories focus on individual cultural acts, events, or reproductions, thereby
repositioning macro-historical studies and, in the case of fascism, their moralizing tendencies.
Though I do not resort to micro-history, the method does lend itself to understanding the relationship
between words and grammar - or experience and its narrative structures (Ginzburg and Poni, 1991,
pg. 8).
Like Ginzburg I use the sources that my subjects use to describe and explain themselves. Alas,
these sources, like fascism, are all morally and politically tainted. Though Nietzsche, Sorel, Le Bon,
and Evola are attacked for lacking a commitment to a liberal democratic or egalitarian social order,
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they are popular and widely discussed and analyzed in Ultra circles (see Appel, 1999, pgs. 1-15;
Hansen, 2002, pgs. 95-104; Stone, 2002, pgs. 1-61). It is fitting, then, that Ultra ideas and vocabulary
be used to explain aspects of Ultra behavior and thought. In this spirit I conducted my fieldwork,
notwithstanding that fascism and the Counter-Enlightenment are considered unsavory, morally
objectionable moments in history (MacDonald, 2002, pgs. v-lxx; Wolin, 2004, pgs. 2-4; Bar-On,
2007, pgs. 21-30). The criminalization of the Ultra phenomenon in moral terms by the Italian press
and general population (the uninitiated, in Victor Turner’s language) made it imperative that I seek
to understand the distance (morally) between them and the Ultras.
iii. Mentalità and Myth
Having presented the need for a “poetic” usage of ideology, we may now turn to the reason
for the previous diversion: the mentalità of the Ultras. Like ideology, mentalità connotes many
things. Mentalità translates normally as mentality, but according to the Harper Collins Sansoni
Unabridged Italian Dictionary (2007) it can also denote a cultural worldview, so as to extend beyond
the individual mind-set which it denotes in English. The Ultras, who use the word perhaps more
consistently than any other when discussing the world and themselves, mean it in this broader sense.
Hence, the way it is defined here is important. Before doing so, I want to briefly discuss how the
Ultras’ use mentalità. I will then turn to the basis of my thinking of a definition. This comes not only
from those who study weltanschauung but also consciousness, narrative, and myth
Mentalità is most commonly used by the Ultras as an explanation of what makes them
different from others. Usually, the “others” in question are the bourgeois fans glorified by the Italian
media as “real” or “true” soccer fans, or the bourgeoisie in general. The distance between the Ultras
and the bourgeoisie is guaranteed by behavior - violence, aggression, and extreme commitment to
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rivalry and hostility; but also, according to Pasquale, a longtime Ultra, honor, commitment, and
“unfailing steadfastness” (fermezza). However, the Ultras explain their own commitment to these
behaviors as a product of mentalità. This is an important element of the Ultras phenomenon because,
as I will demonstrate, the majority of Ultras could be classified economically as bourgeois, yet speak
of the bourgeoisie as living a life that is empty and fatuous. That they do not live such a life is, again,
a product of their mentalità.
It is also interesting that the Ultras use mentalità as an explanation of their difference from
others, as the concept is common amongst Italians as a way to understand, not only individual
personalities, but social and political aggregates as well. For instance, while one may posses a
mentalità infantile (childish outlook) or mentalità chiusa (closed-mind), there is also the possibility
of a mentalità dei popoli latini (Latin worldview). It is commonly said, pejoratively, that a mentalità
del Sud (Southern personality/form of life/culture/mentality) may explain the underdevelopment of
the southern Italian regions.
When used to discuss social and political aggregates, it seems the larger the aggregate, the
more negative becomes the mentalità said to be in use. For example, both Barzini (1996) and De
Martino (2005) posit the existence of something peculiar to either Italy, Italians, or certain Italians.
Barzini’s text is, in essence, a list of features of the Italian mentalità - almost all of them negative and
parochial. Moe (2002) studied the creation of the Southern Question, the idea that the south is
somehow culturally and morally different from the rest of Italy, and, in the end, explains that foreign
authors discerned a spiritual difference between Italians and other Europeans (of the north and west).
Conversely, the mentalità of townspeople, political parties, or phenomenon like the Ultras,
is usually discussed as the basis of extremely positive co-identification. In Rome, the Roman
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mentalità was given as rationale for a refusal to eat peanut butter. When presented with the decidedly
American sandwich spread, a friend in Monteverde, the neighborhood in which I lived, declined a
taste on the grounds that, “it is not part of our mentalità to eat something like that.” Returning to the
Ultras, mentalità was most commonly invoked during games away from Rome - or in discussing
these games - when engaging with opposing Ultras. “The thirst for feelings of raw electricity,” I was
told by Stefano, a 41 year old Ultra of the group Monteverde, “is something particular to the Ultras.
You either have it or you do not; and those who do not would never do what we do. Our mentalità
seeks these encounters.”
It is important to understand how diffused amongst AS Roma’s Ultras is this idea of mentalità
as something that promotes aggression, violence, and a defensive posture toward a variety of foes
(discussed below). Every Ultra I encountered in Rome spoke of the Ultras as, if nothing else,
completely and utterly different from others. On the occasions when mentalità was invoked, it was
consistently presented as the basis of that difference. Often it seemed that what the Ultras meant was
an earned credibility or honor, in the sense of Campbell’s (1964) understanding of how threats confer
manliness in honor based societies. We might think of it thus as a spirit - as a common indicator of
responsibility and expectation. However, mentalità was also given as an indescribable sensation of
connectedness to other AS Roma Ultras created during important AS Roma games, as if one could
sense mentalità in the air. In this way, the mentalità could incorporate the tension and hostility with
the elation and camaraderie - sensations of the heart - felt during and after games.
One can see that their usage of the concept leaves us unable to codify it in any meaningful
sense. To the American reader, it might seem that culture is a good translation and way towards
understanding mentalità. However, it too becomes just a metaphor when faced with the wide range
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of usages of mentalità. This confusion is compounded by the fact that many of these same Ultras only
use culture to connote physical/material goods and cuisines. Otherwise, mentalità was used.
Therefore, I created my own definition of mentalità drawn from its usages and features. I will begin
the discussion of that definition with myth.
Augustine described consciousness as a process of “expectation, attention, and memory.”
“The future, which [the mind] expects, passes through the present, to which it attends, into the past,
which it remembers” (Saint Augustine, 1961, pg. 277). As Kirsten Hastrup (1995) explains, through
memory of the past and anticipation of the future we use cultural symbols and institutions to create
a bridge between these two and the present. In the present, action and experience meet.
This connection of past, present, and future is critical to the way the Ultras engage life
experience. Like others, they use narrative to weave a “conscious self,” but they do so with great
emphasis on myth, martyrs/heroes, brotherhood, and place (Rose, 1997, pgs. 224-248). Therefore the
construction of personal meaning is an especially conscious process amongst the Ultras, especially
given the collective and public nature of the “language,” myths, or narratives used (Rapport, 1998,
pgs. 81-101).
Myth is central to the Ultras’ mentalità. How it is used lends itself to being studied from the
perspectives of the anthropological pillars on myth: Durkheim, Malinowski, and Levi-Strauss. Myth,
according to Durkheim (2001), strengthens social cohesion and unity by inscribing norms of social
order via ritual and ritualized institutional behavior. Malinowski (1992) focused instead on the value
of myth, especially as a tool in the legitimation of a particular social structure, thus connecting myth
with power, morality, and social mores. Levi-Strauss (1990) searched for meaning not in the
narratives of myth but in their subconscious structure, thus understanding myth as an objective,
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universal mode of thought. Together, these three approaches all offer insight into the purpose and
functioning of myth in the Ultra mentalità. That it is cohesive and constructive of distinction between
groups of people, that it is connected to morality and has value in justifying social structure, and that
it operates as a self-standing phenomenon will become clear in the chapters that follow.
The Ultra mentalità operates as an ideal against modern liberal market-driven understandings
and expectations of the human. The myths that the Ultras are the only bastion of purity left in Italian
soccer, and that they are the “keepers of the faith” on guard against the victory of Calcio Moderno,
motivate them to critique consumerism as an end and, more importantly, to seek to establish or
maintain structures, in the form of both Ultra groups and political organizations that undermine the
democratic and egalitarian foundations of the liberal market. Nietzsche urged the pursuit of a life in
which myth acted to offset modernity’s “common-currency humans” and the absence of mystery
(2004, pg. 36). He attacked the modern life in which the utilitarian pursuit of money and career had
defeated the heroic life spent in creative and dangerous pursuits of nobility and honor. Likewise,
Sorel understood myth as a “supra-ordinate goal,” as the foundation of motivation and action (1999,
pg. 20). He explains that the collapse of myth (as motivator of behavior) in the modern world has
contributed to the victory of a limited historical outlook (with no belief in glory) and atomistic
individualism (with no understanding of or desire for collective greatness) (Sorel, 1999, pg. 27). The
Ultras understand myth as do Nietzsche and Sorel - as a goal and a motivating force to a very
particular form of life that is aggressive, violent, and martial.
iv. Mentalità Defined
Moving beyond an understanding of mentalità that is limited to an individual’s outlook
personality type, I am stressing its connections with consciousness or weltanschauung. I do so
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because mentalità provides not only an impetus to behavior but an orientation toward behavior.
Geertz differentiates weltanschauung from ethos in order to distinguish cognition from evaluation
(1973, pgs. 126-127).

Figure 9. Classic Ultra sweatshirt proclaiming “Our world
view knows only hatred and rivalry.” Empoli. 2007.
Weltanschauung refers to the picture of the actual social conditions of a group - “their concept
of nature, self, and society,” while ethos is the group’s moral-ethical, aesthetic, and evaluative
structures (Geertz, 1973, pg. 127). This division occurs at the level of culture and it ensures cultural
stability, assuming the weltanschauung is an accurate representation of the culture’s ethos. If one
takes the division of weltanschauung and ethos as a given then I am proposing, based on the strong
ethical content in much Ultra behavior, that through mentalità they are rejoined.
The ethical component of mentalità must be stressed. As the Ultras construct what I call an
agonistic form of life, in which all social relations reflect a will to opposition and rivalry, they also
develop an emic personality that revels in the distance between themselves and others. Thus, their
character clearly reflects the milieu in which it is formed. The tension between the Ultras and the
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larger social context with which they must interact in order to attend soccer games, and crucially, in
which they are judged, impacts the ethical content of their mentalità. In other words, there is
reciprocity between state and media power and the Ultras’ mentalità (Wolf, 1999, pgs. 252-257).
Seeing themselves largely outside the state, or as a pure critique of the Italian state, the Ultras
often seem a contained universe where the discourse of strength and honor interact with a will to
violence and rivalry. Upon closer inspection, however, it becomes clear that the content of the
mentalità is a response, or counter, to the power of the state to impact upon the freedoms of the
Ultras. With the advent of new bureaucratic means of excluding the Ultras from soccer games their
feelings of repression have never been more pronounced. Thus they possess a seething bitterness
toward the state and the forces of law and order (to be discussed below). Additionally, however, the
state and media have the power to morally condemn the Ultras and, until the wide availability of
internet access and cell phones, to control information and public discourse about them.
When the state prohibits the Ultras from attending games they find other spaces to watch or
participate, be they spaces of consumption or of protest. In some cases Ultras would watch AS Roma
play in bars or in homes. Following the prohibition against fans in certain stadiums enacted after the
death of Raciti, Ultras traveled to these same stadiums to protest against the restriction of personal
freedom in Italy, but from the outside. The tendency amongst the Ultras of AS Roma is to subvert
state repression by restricting their in-stadium performances and at the same time aggregating in
smaller numbers in alternative spaces.
When the hegemony of the state is displayed through the creation and dissemination of a
moralist discourse of Ultra criminality, the Ultras incorporate such discourses into the content of their
mentalità (Wolf, 1999, pgs. 44-45). This makes the relationship between the Ultras and the media
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complex and dynamic. Although from Counter-Enlightenment sources the Ultras embrace an
agonistic form of life, the terms of their agon - conceptual and violent oppositions and a sense of
worth correlated to how deeply one is aggressive and oppositional - the media attacks against the
Ultras for being too violent and focused on rivalry seem to fuel even higher levels of hostility.
Similarly, the media uses a highly moralistic language to condemn the Ultras. This language in turn
is central to the Ultra mentalità. Because of this fluidity the discourse of the media often matches that
of the Ultras week-to-week. Further, this keeps the mentalita` relevant and active for the Ultras
because the world condemns them on the same terms in which they condemn the world.
Thus I define mentalità as a systemic narrative of beliefs, attitudes, and values that motivates
behavior and provides a particular moral-ethical orientation to behavior. It links the present to past
and future through myths and cultural symbols that enable groups to cohere and construct distinctions
between them and others.
Much of what constitutes the mentalità of today’s Ultras comes from Italian political history:
namely, fascism, and the other counter-modern movements that either contributed to, or coexisted
with, fascism. Thus, it has taken as its own the intellectual components of these prior movements.
Like the fascists the Ultras maintain a desire toward strength, honor, discipline, order, valor, heroism,
memory, and tradition. Like fascism and Futurism they also celebrate war and a militarism that
consists of warrior attributes. At the level of their mentalità and political motivations, the Ultras
harbor a vision of the future and a strong critique of modernity. At the level of their culture there is
a desire to embrace the mythic and spiritual dimension of life - a life built on communal and spiritual

36

principles: a life with a clear nonos (Berger, 1967, pg. 74).7
Like mentalità, which is used by all strata of Italian society, the Ultras’ use of honor connects
them to other Italian and Mediterranean forms of life. Despite the fact that honor is as varied in its
uses throughout the Mediterranean as is mentalità in Italy, anthropology made it the basis of the
creation of the Mediterranean cultural area. Peristiany (1965) identified an ideal of honor operating
in the majority of Mediterranean cultures that is pursued at the expense of material advantage. At a
civilizational level, this contributed to economic underdevelopment and material backwardness. On
a personal level, honor is a virtue - the virtue even - but one that is functional only within an
environment of competition and competitiveness. Individuals assert themselves against others, coidentified as equal protagonists, in a system of honor and dishonor (Peristiany, 1965, pgs. 1-11).
Peristiany understands honor as a moral sentiment but also as a “fact of repute and precedence,”
attesting to its systemic nature (Peristiany, 1992, pg. 5).
Although below I assert that the Ultras are an agonistic form of life, which also connects them
with a concept central to the creation of a southern or Mediterranean anthropology, I do so only as
a metaphor for a life defined by rivalry and hostility, which puts them at odds with the prevailing
form of modern life in contemporary Italy. I have taken the concept from Friedrich Nietzsche and
intend it to be used as a point of distinction from what Gianni Vattimo calls the contemporary
“neutralization of culture and politics” (Vattimo, 2011, pg. 174).
Likewise, here, I discuss honor not as a characteristic given the Ultras by a metaphysical
Mediterraneanism, but as part of a set of behaviors they have taken from fascism and Counter-
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Nomos, as used by Peter Berger in his description of the “sacred canopy” is a suprahuman organizing
principle that is used as a “shield against terror.”
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Enlightenment philosophy. Indeed, while honor as I have just presented it fits perfectly within the
Ultras’ rejection of capitalism and Calcio Moderno (the business of soccer) for the sake of something
more primordial, it is possible that the fascists were also influenced by honor in a Mediterranean
context. However, if, as Herzfeld (1985) explains, poetics must be locally contextual, I have relied
upon the Ultras’ own discussions of honor (within a system of other traits discussed at length below)
in placing it so prominently in this dissertation. In other words, while it may be demonstrable as a
Mediterranean character trait, it is unquestionably central to fascism and its critique of modernity.
Mentalità is for the Ultras their proof of having a deeper agenda than just being “delinquents”
or “fans.” It is used as a guiding structural principle, much as anthropologists use “culture.” And, like
culture itself, mentalità is the ground of reality - as I said above, both ethos and weltanschauung. It
is not only the “why” that drives their behavior in a grand scale but a set of ethical values that also
acts as a break on behavior. It is, in effect, the “content of their character.” Through mentalità an
Ultra can be shown to act in accordance with “being Ultra” or not. Thus, without a commitment to
the mentalità one, according to the Ultras, is simply not an Ultra.

Figure 10. Romulae Genti Ultra gesturing to those outside Curva Sud.
2007.
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C. Ultras Defined
Taking all of this into consideration, the political and ethical components of the Ultra
phenomenon, the depth of the symbolic field that animates their public spectacles, and even the
particular elements of their general history, I define the Ultras as a type of fan organization
originating in the late-1960s that brings, along with carnivalesque behaviors with flags, banners,
choreographed displays, flares, bombs, and a catalogue of songs of various levels of devotion and
scorn, a high level of social and political thought and action into the act of fandom.
The Ultras understand themselves, as do I, often as a movement, an ideology, and/or a culture
which seeks to restore communal, spiritual, and ritual dimensions to modern life. They seek to do so
by challenging the political, ideological, and aesthetic processes of modern industrial culture, which,
through global consumerism, cultural and political pluralism, and individualism, threaten to destroy
the particularity and uniqueness of Italian (and in the case of AS Roma’s Ultras, Roman) cultural
forms.
The Ultras are a social phenomenon. They aggregate in groups ranging from 3-5 people to
as many as 2,000.8 Despite the myriad divisions between the groups, which often leads to conflict and
strife within the Ultras, there is no impetus to enter the Curva or go to away games alone. Soccer
provides the context for the Ultra phenomenon for reasons that are unclear. According to Roversi,
the leading scholar of Ultra origins, the Ultras began in the curvas because those who formed the
original groups were already there (1994, pg. 360). That the AS Roma Ultra groups have maintained
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The larger conglomerate groups, such as Commando Ultra Curva Sud and AS Roma Ultras, both
discussed at length in Chapter 2, can have as many as 12,000 members. The numbers above represent the normalized
groupings of Ultras - some in small and selective groups, others such as Boys Roma and Fedayn in larger but
selective groups, and others still, like Ultras Romani, who open themselves to anyone who will pay their
membership fee. These differences will be discussed in Chapter 2.
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their connections to Curva Sud is mainly because of the bleeding of the AS Roma soccer team into
an idealization of the city and its history.
Of course, each generation of Ultras have been fans of the game and the team. However, just
being fans opens them to other avenues of consuming the game and team that do not involve the
sacrifices, dangers, and discipline of the Ultras. Hence, there must be another seduction of the Ultras
beyond the game itself. I understand that other seduction to be the mentalità and the ethical
opposition to the modern bourgeois form of life. To whit, as the state has become more hostile to
Ultra in-stadium behaviors we are finding groups - Padroni di Casa, discussed in Chapter 2, is one that are willing to aggregate as Ultras but to operate primarily beyond the in-stadium milieu that has
defined the Ultras up-to-now.
The Ultras can be categorized as a movement form of what Roger Griffin calls “political
modernism,” in as much as they seek an “alternative modernity and temporality” (a limited social
order in open revolt against the values of modern liberalism) that is incompatible with liberal
conceptions of the human and society (2007, pgs. 181 and 201).
D. Agonistic Form of Life
In the aftermath of the February 2007 game and riot in Catania, Palermo manager Francesco
Guidolin complained that the Catania fans had created the atmosphere of a “war zone.” Dal Lago and
De Biasi identified “war” as the most dominant metaphor in the Ultras mentalità (1994, pg. 85). The
Ultras’ self-understanding is produced by an ever-present system of antagonisms. Rivalries between
and within town, region, geopolitical boundary, political affiliation or ideology, and historical rivalry
form the basis of the Ultra involvement with soccer, so much so that it is nearly impossible for them
to engage the game without the presence of one of these forms of opposition. I conceptualize these
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as “natural oppositions” because they are components of Ultra interaction with soccer that can
potentially only involve other Ultras. The Ultra oppositions to the media and the state I think of as
“meta-natural” because they address the larger political issues of the Ultra war against Calcio
Moderno.
In his essay “Homer’s Contest,” Friedrich Nietzsche explains that the Greeks lived a life of
“combat and victory” in which warring competition, and pleasure in victory, were acknowledged;
they even colored their ethical concepts like eris (2007, pgs. 174-181). To battle was a means of
salvation, not just for one’s people or city but against the very chaos of the natural world. Perpetual
peace, a very modern utopia according to Nietzsche, would not have been desirable to the Greeks
because their lives were given meaning by the struggles and victories associated with war and contest
(Van Boxel, 2005, pg. 80).
However, for contemporary scholars of “agonistic pluralism,” a deconstructionist theoretical
movement which seeks to explain the irreducibility of difference in democratic societies, the enemy
is largely ourselves. Agonism for these scholars, such as Samuel Chambers, Bonnie Honig, and
Chantal Mouffe, does not apply to the foundations or possibilities of greatness of a cultural system,
as posited Nietzsche, but instead to the nature of democracy which is pluralist and designed to
maximize debate (Chambers, 2001; Honig, 1993; Mouffe, 2005).
Where agonistic pluralism seeks a mutually affirming, largely discursive struggle between
multicultural or political combatants, Nietzsche understands the agonist to actually compete or fight
in order to elevate his self-status, and the status of the protagonist’s city at the expense of others. For
AS Roma’s Ultras, pluralism is an impossibility. Their commitment to agon is so deep that there is
scant possibility of unity within their own curva, let alone amongst Ultras representing other teams
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and cities.
While the agonism of the Ultras contains elements of both the Nietzschean and pluralist
understandings of agon, the Nietzschean is central to the Ultra phenomenon. They understand
themselves as agonists who fight for the honor of their city, their team, their curva, and their group.
They compete during games through songs, banners, and choreographed displays for a sense of pride
and victory that is felt just as strongly as the victories gained on the soccer field or in the streets
through fighting.
However, as Calcio Moderno, the idea and system of an industry of soccer that places the
utmost importance on profits and revenues, has begun to be the hegemonic conception of the game
in Italy, the Ultras have been forced to limit themselves to a form of agon which is closer to the
“moralistic” option offered by pluralism. In the post-Raciti world of soccer, insulting banners or
songs now lead to games being played behind closed doors. Game-related violence, which was
virtually non-policed until Raciti’s death, now leads to time in jail.
The new social barriers to Ultra agonism have done nothing to limit the oppositional nature
of their mentality and self-understanding, however. “Being an Ultra,” I was told by Massimo, a
former member of the fascist group Monteverde, “is embracing rivalry, hostility, and Romanità
(extreme attachment to Rome and things Roman). Without these, one is not an Ultra [of AS Roma].”
i. Agon and Altruism
Agon is an important way to begin to understand the Ultras because of the way it connects
with their extremely limited modes of altruism. During my research period it was often put to me that
“Roman culture was the most beautiful in Italy,” but that the culture was being diluted by foreigners
and foreign influence. This understanding of political and social forces working to promote the
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degradation of Roman “traditional life” was uncovered as well by Michael Herzfeld (2009) as he
studied the impact of gentrification on the Monti neighborhood of Rome. I was repeatedly told that
the Romans must do something to protect themselves from dilution. Given statements like this, I was
pressed to understand the implications of having such a narrow, protected, and antagonistic sense of
self or inclusion.
If, as Sunic and others have argued, the altruism of liberal globalization is driven by a
morality of total inclusion, wherein the universalization of man is made complete in a global
marketplace, then the altruism of the Ultras can be described as one of exclusion, exclusivity, and
local particularity (de Benoist and Champetier, 2000, pgs. 40-41; Sedgwick, 2004, pg. 100; Sunic,
2007, pgs. 5-8). Their inter-altruistic co-identification is exaggeratedly restricted. And, I am
suggesting, their narrow boundaries between us and them are related to their aggressive and militarist
morality. The Ultras utilize not only a highly moralized critique of modernity but one rich with the
words of Counter-Enlightenment thinkers like Nietzsche and Evola. They blame cultural
degeneration on the values celebrated by liberalism. As Evola explained, “what is needed is a new
radical front with clear boundaries between friend and foe. The future does not belong to those of
crumbling and hybrid ideas but those of radicalism - the radicalism of absolute negations and majestic
affirmations” (2002, pg. 113).
ii. Natural Oppositions
AS Roma’s Ultras utilize history, geography, and politics to create an ever-evolving system
of rivalries. Their closest rival is SS Lazio, the second team of Rome. Only three other Italian cities
are home to more than one high-level soccer club. The clubs in each of these, Turin, Milan, and
Genova, share one another as central rival. However, the more interesting aspects of hostility
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formation occur beyond intra-city rivalry.

Figure 11. Flyer portraying the Ultras as legionaries in formation against their
enemies. 2008.

AC Milan is the most hated enemy of AS Roma’s Ultras, SS Lazio aside. This is because of
the killing of Roman Ultra Antonio De Falchi by his AC Milan counterparts outside Milan’s San Siro
stadium in 1989. Since his death, AS Roma’s Ultras dedicate their fandom and aggression to De
Falchi each time the two teams meet. Somewhat more abstractly than killings between curvas, AS
Roma’s Ultras maintain rivalries based on Roman and Italian history. One of the most bitter, if rarely
contested, given the small stature of the team involved, was with AC Perugia. The rivalry with the
small (now defunct) Umbrian team stemmed from a centuries old rivalry between the two cities, as
Perugia stood on the fringes of Roman dominion for most of its early history. Similarly, the Ultras
share common hatred with AC Fiorentina of Florence because of that city’s status as a Guelph
stronghold during the late-Middle Ages, when the rival Ghibellines led the Pope’s enemies in Rome.
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For the same reason there is rivalry with Genoa FC of Genova. Modern political history has given
a deeply felt hatred to the games contested between AS Roma and both Atalanta BC of Bergamo and
Brescia Calcio of Brescia. These rivalries are based on the rise of the Lega phenomenon and its
opposition to Rome as capital and symbol of Italian corruption. Meanwhile, AS Roma’s Ultras share
a special rivalry with the South’s other large club, SSC Napoli of Naples, as discussed in later
chapters. To AS Roma’s Ultras, SSC Napoli is the “team of the South,” a region stereotyped for
poverty, underdevelopment, and organized crime (see Schneider, 1998).
Finally, politics proper is a common motivator of Ultra rivalry. AS Roma’s Ultras tend toward
the far right politically and thus are aggressively opposed to curvas which gravitate in the opposite
direction. The main example of a leftist curva in Italy is the Curva Nord of AC Livorno’s Ultras. Like
the rivalry with SSC Napoli (and with Naples in general), this one will be discussed at length below,
but it is notable here as a rivalry which is felt only by the Ultras. There is no rivalry between the
teams, as AC Livorno only rarely play in Serie A, out of which AS Roma has only spent one season.9
When the two teams do play, the opposing curvas more closely resemble extreme political rallies than
groups of soccer fans. Before the post-Raciti crackdown, AS Roma’s Ultras would display numerous
Nazi flags, neofascist celtic cross banners, and banners with various anti-communist messages.
Lately, these have been replaced by Roman Salutes and chants of “Duce!” “Duce!”.
iii. Meta-Natural Oppositions
The Ultras’ soccer rivalries I have labeled “natural” because they “make sense” within the
world of soccer. One could argue, as do many of the leftist Ultras within Curva Sud Roma, that
9

Serie A presently consists of 20 teams (historically it consisted of 18 but was recently changed to reflect
the 20 teams of the English Premier League - the best example of Calcio Moderno in the world of professional
soccer [discussed at length below]). Each season the three teams finishing in positions 18-20 are relegated to Serie
B. The top three finishers in Serie B are likewise promoted to Serie A.
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political rivalries are unnatural to the Ultras. While I agree that a rivalry that is not also played on the
field between the teams is out-of-place in the world of soccer, it is difficult to examine the history
of the Ultras and not conclude that political affiliations have played a part from the beginning (see
Chapter 2). Further, while the political warfare between the far left and far right can explode into
violence in any Italian city at any moment, I found it unlikely that AS Roma’s fascist Ultras would
travel to Livorno to engage its communist Ultras unless a game was also taking place.
In contrast to these oppositions we must also be aware of the hostility that exists between the
state, the press, and the Ultras. These oppositions I have labeled meta-natural because they exist
beyond the natural soccer related rivalries, but also because they offer a commentary on the natural
rivalries as well. As I explained above, the Ultras’ mentalità contains a moral critique of modern
bourgeois life. It presents itself, and the Ultras’ form of life, as an oppositional cultural model guided
by commitments to strength, honor, aggression, brotherhood, and spiritualism. But it also presents
itself as an opposing model of virtue which is created by action, occasional violence, shared
exhilarating/traumatic experiences, and courage. I found these characteristics to have been imported
into the Ultras by group leaders influenced by fascism, Roman history, and the political philosophy
of Nietzsche, Evola, and Sorel. However, I also found that the Ultras celebrated these characteristics
most often after they had been attacked by the media and the state for having these very
characteristics.
There is a correlation of power between the Ultras and the state and media. This power is not
only political but moral, as the hegemonic media is, for all but the Ultras themselves, able to control
the discourse and the terms of debate on the Ultras. Apart from bemoaning the criminality of the
Ultras, the media uses a moralistic language to condemn the Ultras as “delinquent” “animals” who
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engage in barbaric behavior attached to a misguided and misplaced sense of rivalry. The media is
helped in this by spectacular newsreel footage of the Ultras violently engaging one another and the
police. Before returning to the criminalization of the Ultra phenomenon I must turn to the hostilities
between the state and the Ultras.
From the perspective of AS Roma’s Ultras the state is ambiguous. Even for the fascists, the
state is not the goal of fascism’s redemptive powers but only the city of Rome. The Ultras with whom
I conversed for hours about Nietzsche’s critique of liberalism, Evola’s reconceptualization of
Romanità, and Sorel’s understanding of the role of political violence never moved their arguments
to the Italian state. However, if one was asked who or what is the greatest threat to the Ultras and
their form of life, the answer would be quick and consistent: the police (usually referred to as “la
guardia,” the guard, or “l’infame,” the infamous) or Calcio Moderno. The Ultras understood the
police primarily as the guardians of the business interests of soccer, not of the state. Similarly, the
Ultras seek to make life difficult for global capitalism, in the form of advertising, foreign investment,
and commoditization, associated with soccer. By extension, though, they understand the state to
represent the same interests, so that the state is subsumed as well into Calcio Moderno.
That being said, there is true hostility between the Ultras and the forces of law and order,
hereafter referred to as the police. This hostility pre-exists the killings of 2007, reaching back to the
mid-1990s and the turn to the right of many of Italy’s curvas (Podaliri and Balestri, 1998, pg. 89).
Giorgio Agamben has provided an enlightening way to understand this hostility and the relations
between the Ultras and the state. Agamben (2005) argues that liberal states are able to utilize what
he calls a “state of exception” or state of emergency to diminish individual rights in order to
strengthen the security of the state. In such a state of exception, suspicion and surveillance are
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increased and legitimized as protective measures of the general well-being of the state (Agamben,
2005, pgs. 32-40). I argue that such a state of exception is the normal context of interaction between
the Ultras and the state. Each Ultra is under suspicion and surveillance (as CCTV systems are
required in Italy’s stadiums) and each game is militarized with hundreds of riot police in highly
visible formation. One of my most vivid fieldwork memories is of state police officers setting atop
a mini-tank complete with machine-gun turret outside the guest section of Florence’s Artemio
Franchi stadium. I was forced to wonder what the Ultras would have had to do for them to open fire.

Figure 12. Ultras in Genova attack police after the killing of Gabriele
Sandri. November 2007.
For most citizens of liberal states, the state’s power is largely invisible. Policing is not simply
an act of repression but one of complementary exchange. The goals of the state are merged with those
of the (bourgeois) citizen. Thus, the prosperity of one is grounded in adherence to the ideals and, in
the words of Schmitt, friend-enemy relations of the other (Crehan, 2002, pg. 100). The night of
Sandri’s murder saw Ultras in Rome attack police stations in addition to the offices of the Italian

48

Olympic Committee. In response, members of Romano Prodi’s government labeled the Ultras
“terrorists” who were seeking to rest control of the state. This language was buttressed by the
condemnations of journalists and, in turn, by non-Ultra Italians with whom I interacted daily. The
highly moral language used by the media, when analyzed in this light, is perfectly suited not only to
demonize the Ultras but also to present them as beyond the moral and political responsibility of the
state.
E. Calcio Moderno Revisited
Earlier I spoke of Calcio Moderno as the idea and system of an industry of soccer. It is better
understood as the postmodernization of fandom and commoditization of soccer. Calcio Moderno acts
as one of the most important signposts in the world of the Ultras. It is an organizing principle that has
no peer in their world view, and as such it interacts with their world in a variety of ways (Podaliri and
Balestri, 1998, pg. 98). Most importantly for the scope of this project is its relationship with the rise
amongst the Ultras of a discourse of counter-globalization.
The concept itself began as a critique of the industrialization of soccer in the late-1990s, as
changes to the format of UEFA’s Champions League competition gave the impression of UEFA
being desirous of creating a TV-based European “super league” (Williams and Giulianotti, 1994, pgs.
8-9). The Ultras feared that the game was becoming a malleable form of entertainment rather than
a deeply ingrained manifestation of local cultures. Similarly, they feared that the game was becoming
a nexus of multinational corporations which would reduce it to a vehicle for selling advertising
(McGill, 2001, pg. 29).
As their fears began to be realized, opposition to Calcio Moderno became a counter-ideology
to globalization. The Ultras believe that television audiences and the revenues generated by
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advertising are more highly valued by clubs than local fan support; and that fans are now understood
merely as consumers. Indeed, American-style merchandising is openly touted by FIFA and UEFA
as a progressive generator of income for the clubs under their jurisdiction. While the sporting aspects
of Calcio Moderno are worrying enough for the Ultras, including the creation of world-wide fan
bases and the power of television executives to determine game times, it is more so the sterilization
and standardization promoted by Calcio Moderno on which the Ultras have declared war (Sandvoss,
2003).
This aspect of the discourse of Calcio Moderno, and even globalization, is perhaps the most
active but also most elusive. The Ultras declare themselves “non omologati” (non-standardized) and
utilize a highly moralized language that seeks to negate what they see as the encroachment of a
foreign, corporate friendly morality of inclusion, tolerance (of racial, sexual, ethnic difference), and
multiculturalism. While the Italian media attacks the Ultras for existing beyond the bounds of this
morality, the Ultras counter-attack by accusing the media of attacking them only because they are
beyond bourgeois liberal morality.
The Ultras demonstrate what anthropology is so well designed to explain about globalization:
that for all of the technological brilliance of the encroaching American culture and theoretical flare
of its academics, the processes of imposition can produce cultural dispossessions of an ugly and
destabilizing kind (see Creed, 2011). As Neil Smith succinctly explained, “deterritorialization
actually involves the diminution of territory” (Quoted in lecture, CUNY’s Graduate Center, 2005).
What is at stake for the Ultras is apparent when Joseph Maguire explains that the world is
“compressed” via a world economy, global technology, transnationalism, and global division of labor
(Maguire, 1999, pg. 13).
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Figure 13. Monteverde Ultras graffiti. Monteverde, Rome. 2007.
The idea of protecting the game and those with whom it is entwined (the Ultras themselves)
from processes of globalization and postmodernization is an important aspect of Ultra life. Calcio
Moderno motivates behaviors that center on protecting the sport from forces that would divorce it
from its local particularities. And, because the sport, clubs, and cities in which they take place are
conflated within Ultra thought, I argue that their behaviors, by extension, are designed to protect their
cities from the destructive standardization of globalization.
V. Research and Methods
A. Anthropological Practice
The research that led to the production of this dissertation proceeded with an eye toward
creating what John Lofland called an analytic ethnography (Lofland, 2005, pg. 27). That is, one that
combines description with explanation. And while the analytic element of the project will date it as
coming after the rise of postmodernism and post-structuralism in American anthropology, this study
was inspired by the desire to create a classic ethnographic study - one that is thoroughly based in
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anthropological methods like participant observation.
As the Comaroffs (1992) and Michael Herzfeld (1987) demonstrate, methodology does not
take place in a vacuum. Any work that is theoretical, philosophical, or ethnographic must also be
political - in that method will invariably be positioned in time and place. Because anthropology is
aware of this it allows its practitioners a great deal of freedom and demands their responsibility to
approach method as seriously as the subjects of research. I have chosen ethnographic methods and
concepts that will best explain the Ultra phenomenon. By attempting to use their own words and
concepts, I demonstrate my faith that the Ultras can explain themselves better than I. By using their
concepts, I demonstrate that concepts are never arbitrary but always part of a system (Nietzsche,
2002, pg. 20). They grow in concert with other concepts and within epistemic and cultural environs.
Thus, I am consciously writing an ethnography that mixes the conceptual and contextual in the hope
that the text embodies the spirit and mentalità of its subjects.
Participant observation allows the fullest of involvement in the lives of anthropological
subjects. Without this form of information gathering this project would not have been possible, as
it was only through constant contact with the subjects of research that an adequate level of trust and
mutual respect was developed. For although Ultras regularly seek publicity, their structure and
functioning is usually known only to those within the movement and organizations (Roversi 1994,
pg. 379).
In addition to participant observation, 180 questionnaires and 7 long/in-depth interviews were
used to gather qualitative and quantitative data. Quantitative research was carried out between months
six and eight of a thirteen month period between October 2006 and January 2008. Because trust was
such an important element of my research design, I felt the need to wait until my presence was no
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longer obtrusive before having the Ultras commit to being subjects. The seven long interviews proved
most useful for gathering information that has depth but that can be codified. They were sought only
after the highest level of trust was established, but those which occurred in the final months of my
research period, particularly after the December 2007 protest at the Circo Massimo (discussed at
length in Chapter 9), were given voluntarily and at the urging of the Ultras themselves.
Subjects for this project were actively recruited in two ways. One, at the stadiums where AS
Roma plays, either in or away from Rome. And, two, in the meeting places, such as cafés, stores and
offices maintained and frequented by the Ultra groups being studied. In both cases, fliers were
distributed asking for participants. However, the large majority of subjects were gathered by way of
word-of-mouth and recommendation from friends and cohorts who had previously participated. Most
of these recommendations came from Ultras who witnessed my commitment to being a fan of AS
Roma. I carried a flag, sang the songs, cursed defeats, and shed tears after victories.
Being seen as someone committed to AS Roma and respectful of the Ultras’ ideals allowed
me access that no journalist could achieve, as did being seen by Ultras in the bars, cafés, markets, and
places of business of Monteverde, the neighborhood in which I lived, discussing AS Roma, Italian
and world politics, and giving insight into the United States - particularly its popular culture. (I will
describe Monteverde in more detail in Chapter 2.)
Granted, this did not happen overnight. My “currency” gained value amongst the Ultras
mostly after being seen long distances from Rome in order to cheer-on AS Roma. For the Ultras it
is a question of honor to suffer long distances and an amount of discomfort to support the team.
Therefore, trains from Udine, Turin, or Reggio Calabria to Rome; the overnight ferry to and from
Cagliari; and airplanes from Palermo and Lisbon were great places to be seen. I enmeshed myself in
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their world and was often approached and invited to talk, instead of having to approach people.
B. Research Amongst Curva Sud Roma
The nature of the Ultras and Curva Sud Roma in particular made some research goals
unattainable. The Ultras are highly distrustful of, and thus hostile to, the media and the academic
community. They are purposely unavailable and unreliable to these bodies, seeing both as too willing
to sensationalize Ultra experience in order to increase either their own profits or simply to demonize
the Ultras. Care had to be taken in the field, then, to be introduced to others by their friends and
acquaintances. As well, bodily harm was threatened on more than one occasion, the most serious
instance being in Florence when I was reproached by the leader of the fascist group Arditi (named
after the Italian assault infantry soldiers of WWI) for filming the curva. The depth of the divisions
within Curva Sud created serious impediments to the gathering of subjects. It is difficult to move
from one political extreme to the other within the Curva, unless one is making a commitment to the
political form to which one arrives.

Figure 14. Me in Curva Sud with Romulae Genti. January
2010.
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As a short-term researcher, it was impossible to make such a commitment (and still be taken
seriously). Because of the extreme disparity of outlooks on the far right within Curva Sud, it was
decided to make deeper connections with these groups - even at the risk of alienation from leftist
respondents. Further, because the radical left within the Curva is particularly sensitive to the Ultras
being exploited, it was often impossible to gain their trust and understanding. Even within a group
like Fedayn, which has moved toward the right from its far-left roots, there are still many members
who refuse to help anyone who may profit from studying the Ultras.
These same concerns buttress the divisions within the Curva. There are stark political
contrasts between the various groups, as discussed briefly above. But often these divisions are seen
as natural, in that they are found within the larger societal context. It is instead the issue of profit that
divides groups most clearly. Therefore, the two biggest groups in the Curva, Ultras Romani and Boys
Roma, both of which sell merchandise in order to fund their activities, are vilified amongst others in
the Curva who see such behavior as akin to capitalist exploitation.
VI. Conclusion
Above I have defined the Ultras as a type of fan organization which conceives of itself as a
movement, an ideology, and a culture seeking to restore communal, spiritual, and ritual dimensions
to modern life; sketched its mentalità and agonistic form of life; and introduced its opposition to
Calcio Moderno. Having also delineated some of the theoretical and philosophical assumptions at
the heart of this dissertation, I feel the reader is ready to more deeply understand the phenomenon.
Chapter 2 describes the social organization of Curva Sud Roma. Chapter 3 explains what it is like to
be amongst the Ultras on game, and non-game, days. Chapter 4 discusses the deaths of Philippo
Raciti and Gabriele Sandri and how these relate to the Ultras’ war against Calcio Moderno. Chapter
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5 explains more thoroughly the values and mentalità of the Ultras. In so doing it discusses how
Nietzsche instructs Ultra belief and behavior, the moralistic nature of Ultra oppositions, and violence.
These themes are continued in Chapter 6 on Agonism. Chapter 7 explains the Ultras’ Romanità, the
extreme attachment to Rome and things Roman. Chapter 8 describes the political behaviors of the
Ultras, while Chapter 9 is a first-hand account of the protest of the 2007 at Rome’s Circo Massimo.
Chapter 10 concludes the dissertation with a discussion of its merits in relation to other approaches
to the topic.
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CHAPTER TWO: The Social Organization of Curva Sud Roma
Gli Ultras della Roma siamo noi (We are AS Roma’s Ultras)
Quelli che combattono per voi (Those that fight for you)
In un calcio che non ha bandiere (In a soccer without flags)
Siamo solo noi vecchie maniere (Only we do things in the old ways)
Non c’è stadio che non ci vedrà (There is no stadium that will not see us)
Non c’è gruppo che c’affronterà (There is no group that will oppose us)
Siam tornati forti più di prima (We have returned stronger than ever)
Sul cuore la Lupa Capitolina (On our hearts the Capitoline she-wolf)

The anthem of the AS Roma Ultras is one of the most important songs sung by today’s Curva
Sud. Not only because it is a microcosm of the Ultra mentalità, explaining as it does the Ultras as
the preservers of a past tradition and representatives of a culture with deep oppositions and
hostilities, but also because of its history. AS Roma Ultras was the most recent attempt to merge the
various groups found in AS Roma’s Curva Sud. It’s break up during the 2004-2005 season has
shaped the Curva one finds today.
Despite the fact that the group collapsed amid a swirl of confrontations, suspicions, and
hatreds, the anthem is sung during every game played by AS Roma both at home and at away games.
For those who supported AS Roma Ultras (during its dissolution), it is sung as a statement of
defiance and longing. For those who sought liberation from the coalition, it is simply a good and fun
song to sing.
As with many aspects of Ultra behavior, the anthem of AS Roma Ultras works on many
levels. It is a broad statement directed at those outside the Ultra phenomenon, or, as it was originally
intended, at those standing against Curva Sud, but it is also a specific attack on particular people
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within that very Curva. In short, it is a monument to the divisions that define today’s Curva Sud.
This chapter will provide the historical and demographic background of the more theoretical
and ideological components of the dissertation that follow. First, the Ultra phenomenon in Rome
will be addressed, including the demographic trends that were visible in the Curva I entered in 2006.
This will be, as the chapter’s first section heading explains, Curva Sud Today. The next section,
Ultra Dynamics, explains how the ideological commitments of the various groups within Curva Sud
shape its content and terrain. Then, a detailed account of the dynamic processes of change with the
curva will be presented. That section is titled Fission and Revision Within Curva Sud Roma. The
chapter concludes with Ultras - Hatreds and Commitments, an explanation of how the major fault
lines between the Ultras help us to understand the phenomenon.
What follows is more than a presentation of the background and history of AS Roma’s
Ultras. It is a social history of Curva Sud in that it is a narrative devised completely from the
explanations and accounts of the Ultras by whom the Curva is formed. It was written as what Carlo
Ginzburg called a micro-history (1980, pgs. xxii-xxvi). It strips away, literally and figuratively, the
story of the Ultras created by the Italian press and sports publishing industry to reveal a separate
moral and cultural space - one dominated, as this dissertation demonstrates, by a mentalità that
consciously regulates and motivates the behaviors and narratives of its adherents.
In the Ultras’ eyes, their lived history, even when narrated as briefly as this, is invisible to
those beyond the phenomenon. While they have no desire to be known by outsiders, a more
complete understanding of who they are and how the phenomenon became what it is, it is felt, will
assist the Ultras who are being criminalized and convicted of crimes in Italian courts of law.
Besides, although they might not want to be known by outsiders, they certainly desire notoriety.
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I. Curva SudToday
Important Groups Mentioned in Chapter Two
Fedayn. 1972. Far Left until early-1990s, then slightly of
the right. Mainly non-political since 2006.
Boys Roma 1972. Extreme Right. Merchants.
Commando Ultra Curva Sud. 1977-1987. Not a political
group but gradually became a rightist group because of
Boys’ influence.
Opposta Fazione. 1989-2003. Extreme Right.
Arditi. 1992. Extreme Right..
AS Roma Ultras. 1999-2006. Organized to unify the
political elements of the Curva.
Tradizione Distinzione Roma. 1995-2007. Extreme
Right.
Monteverde. 1995-2005. Extreme Right.
Padroni di Casa. 2007. Extreme Right.
Ultras Romani. 2001-2009. Extreme Right. Merchants.
Antichi Valori. 2002-2006. Non-political.
.

Figure 15. Curva Sud Roma. October 2006.
When fieldwork for this project commenced in October 2006, Curva Sud Roma was a
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fractured collection of infighting groups. While demographically Curva Sud is consistent with other
Italian curvas, its level of division, and the hostilities that buttress them, are unique. As I explained
in the introduction, there are no less than 27 organized groups in today’s Curva Sud. The largest of
these groups (Boys Roma 1972, Fedayn, Padroni di Casa, Ultras Primavalle-San Lorenzo, and
Ultras Romani) have close to 1,000 members each.
There are also many groups with around 20 members each and many more with between 4and-10 members. Each of them have their own ideological commitments and often unique vision
of what the Curva and the Ultras are optimally to be (see below). These groups account for less than
half of the 16,000 seats in Curva Sud. Thus, they share the space with a large number of unaligned
fans of AS Roma. When one views the Curva from the outside it is possible to discern this divide,
as the Ultras tend to wave flags and display banners while the other fans do not (figure 15 and 17).
Differences and tensions between groups and between the groups and these fans define the dynamics
of the Curva.
A. Demographics
i. Age, Gender, Class, and the Curva Groups
Antonio Roversi’s 1994 study of FC Bologna’s Ultras revealed a group that was almost
homogeneously Italian and male, but mixed in terms of class (1994, pgs. 375-380). Specifically, his
survey of 264 Ultras consisted 82.9% of males whose average age was 19. Of the 17.1% females
the average age was 24 (Roversi, 1994, pg. 376). 80% of the FC Bologna Ultras were workers and
20% were students. Of the workers, the vast majority were employed in service, construction, or
repair-shop work. The students attended either university or vocational (high) school (Roversi, 1994,
pgs. 377-378). They were, thus, no “sub-proletariat,” as Roversi remarks, but instead working-class

60

and petit bourgeois (1994, pg. 377).
These numbers are supported by my survey of 180 AS Roma Ultras. The average age of male
respondents was 20. They made up 95% of respondents. The few female respondents averaged the
same 20 years of age. While my small sample size is not representative of the curva as a whole, it
does represent the 3 large groups who cooperated with my study (Boys Roma, Ultras Romani, and
Padroni di Casa), the largest and most influential in the Curva, Fedayn aside. Along with
questionnaires I was able to gather data through participation in group events, thereby understanding
the groups’ internal distinctions, such as leadership and age.
Boys Roma 1972 (henceforth Boys or Boys Roma) Ultras range in age from 17 to 37.
Amongst the normal members the age ranges were between 19 and 26. Amongst the four leaders of
the group, excluding the 17-year old son of former leader Paolo Zappavigna, the ages range from
25 to 37. The group of around 950 is 96% male and 4% female. Although the group’s office is
located in San Lorenzo, a working class zone of the Castro Pretorio neighborhood nestled between
the Termini train station and Piazza Bologna (north-east of the historic center of Rome), the Boys
Ultras live in various areas of Rome, ranging from Monti, Testaccio, Monteverde, and Cinecittà in
and near Rome’s center, to Frascati, 20-miles from Rome in the Castelli Romani (figure 16). (Boys
Roma’s presence in San Lorenzo will be explained below.) 90% of them were born in or near Rome.
The majority of those not born in Rome were born in the Lazio or Campania regions. There is also
a Boys Ultra from Greece and two brothers from Albania. Each of them came to Rome to attend La
Sapienza University.
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Figure 16. The neighborhoods and zones of Rome.
90% of the Boys Ultras are employed, either in the service industry or doing clerical/office
work. Amongst the latter, one works for TIM, the national telecom company and another for Grifo
Latte, a dairy distribution company based in Perugia. 45% of Boys Ultras are students, either at the
University or in the latter stages of high-and-vocational school, which means many of the students
also work.
Ultras Romani’s average age is 24. It’s leader, William “Spadino” Betti is 35 while the three
Ultras comprising the group’s direttivo, or management board, are between 25 and 18. The group
of 800 is 80% male. The large female element is due to girls who join their boyfriends in the group.
In other words, there is no section specific for female membership. The Torino FC Curva contains
a female-exclusive group named Girls. It is unique in Italy. Amongst the groups in Curva Sud Roma
the 20% female membership in Ultras Romani is an anomaly. In the other large groups not central
to this study, Fedayn and Ultras Primavalle-San Lorenzo, there are very few females.
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Ultras Romani draws from a wide range of territory in-and-near Rome. Most of their
members live outside the city, with 18% coming from Ostia, the original home of the group, as well
as Latina, Castelli Romani, and Nomentana. Within Rome, Cinecittà, Prati, Flaminio, and Esquilino
are home to sizable numbers of Ultras Romani Ultras (figure 16). No one in the group was born
outside Italy. Like Boys, most members were born in Campania or Lazio.
80% of Ultras Romani Ultras are employed in service industry, clerical, and manual labors.
Among the latter there are several commercial fishermen and state trash collectors. Only 10% of the
group’s members are students. The high number of students in both Boys and Padroni di Casa
accounts somewhat for the greater presence of those groups, along with Fedayn, in Rome.
Padroni di Casa seems a mix of Boys Roma and Ultras Romani. It has smaller membership,
at approximately 550, but it entered the Curva only in 2007. Most of its members came from a
formerly dominant Curva Sud group named Tradizione Distinzione Roma (Tradition and
Distinction) which controlled the lower section of the Curva from the mid-1990s until its demise in
2007. Other members have come from the group’s activities amongst the far right (explained below
and in various chapters that follow). Like Boys and Ultras Romani, the leadership of the group is
older than its general membership. The three leaders are between 37 and 29 years old. The average
member age is 22. The group is male dominated with only 2% female membership. These few
women, unlike Ultras Romani, are not simply girlfriends of male members, but often members of
the far right in Rome who have entered the Curva because of Padroni di Casa’s politics. The
group’s office is called Casa Pound, in honor of Ezra Pound. Opened in 2006, it is now part of a
national network of the far right movement known as Casa Pound Italia. Although its Curva group
is largely male oriented, there were several females present at Casa Pound each time I visited. Only
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one of these did I recognize from game attendance.
The group’s office is located in the Casal Bertone zone of Prenestina, a neighborhood
southeast of Rome’s center. As the former home of Tradizione Distinzione Roma, most of its
members live nearby, being pulled from Testaccio, Cinecittà, Celio, Monteverde, Trastevere, and
even Campo Marzio and Colonna in Rome’s center (figure 2).
A full 65% of Padroni di Casa Ultras are students. 90% of these are at the University and
are active in Blocco Studentesco, the university manifestation of Casa Pound Italia. Otherwise, 80%
of the group’s members are employed. There are full-time political activists in addition to service
and office workers in the group. Of the latter, two are friends who together opened a paninoteca
(sandwich shop) in Monteverde, one works for Alitalia, and another is a barista (bar man) at Tazza
d’Oro near the Pantheon.
ii. Age, Gender, Class, and the Unaligned Fans in Curva Sud
When compared to the organized groups, the unaligned fans in Curva Sud are a younger and
less homogeneous crowd. As I have explained, I cannot claim to have representative data for this
wide mass of people. However, I received questionnaires from 35 of these fans and was able to have
several long interviews with them. Additionally, I experienced many games with them, so that I feel
I came to know many of them just as well as I did the Ultras of the groups. As research progressed,
though, it became clear that I would need to focus upon group members in order to best understand
the Ultra phenomenon.
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Figure 17. Curva Sud Roma in 2006 showing location of groups.
While these fans were committed to AS Roma and in some cases to Rome in the same
measure as the Ultras, they did not possess the same ardor for these as the group members.
Demographically there are differences between these fans and the Ultras. 80% of my respondents
were male with an average age of 17. The females were slightly older averaging 19 years of age. As
the groups tend to deny membership to fans under-18, this swath of territory in the center of the
curva tends to be the proving ground for young fans. It has also become the domain for many small
groups. It has been shown in other curvas that the generational turnover in the late-1990s saw a shift
away from older established groups and toward smaller units banded together by more violent
behavior, pre-existing friendships, or a desire for independence (Roversi, 1994, pg. 374; Roversi and
Balestri, 2002, pg. 134). The females visible in the area are often seen with male counterparts but
can also be seen in small cohorts (5 or less), cheering-on AS Roma.
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In general my respondents were students, either in college or highschool and living at home
with parents. Only 7% of them were employed. These worked in service industry jobs in their
neighborhoods, selling gelato, waiting tables in restaurants, and cashiering in stores and pharmacies.
Similar to the Ultras, they were born in or near Rome. Several of them claimed family in
Puglia, Sicily, Campania, and Abruzzo. They lived in diverse neighborhoods in Rome - Monteverde,
Ostiense, Prati, Pigna, and San Lorenzo. Unlike the older Ultras, none lived outside Rome.
What makes this group interesting in relation to the Ultras is not their age or length of
residence, but the distance between how they view themselves within Curva Sud and how they are
viewed by the Ultras. 80% of the unaligned fans who completed questionnaires consider themselves
Ultras. Many more of those with whom I associated during research discussed issues of the Curva
or Ultras as if they were their own. In other words, the vast majority of the unaligned fans that I
encountered in Rome consider themselves Ultras. Fully 100% of group-affiliated Ultras with whom
I interacted in any way consider the unaligned fans not to be Ultras. In fact they consider them to
be among the main reasons that the Curva was in difficulty (the other reasons will be explained
below). How does one explain this divergence of perception and conception?
98% of the Ultras travel away from Rome to attend AS Roma games. Those who did not
suggested it was only work obligations which kept them from traveling. Each of those who did not
travel expressed remorse as well as their fondness for traveling to away games. Amongst the
unaligned, only 30% travel to attend games. And, while 85% of the Ultras are willing to travel long
distances (specified as Turin, Sicily, or outside Italy) to attend games, only 5% of the unaligned fans
are so willing. Further, only 25% of them admitted to attending Ultra rallies or functions beyond the
stadium (such as lectures, dinners, masses, and funerals).
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B. Beyond Ultra Demographics
This contrast is informative as to how the Ultras conceive of the themselves. If examined
sociologically, so as to discern what it is that the Ultras do, or even who they are, the answers are
clear. They are young men who devote much time and energy into attending soccer games.
However, even quantitative data gathered in Curva Sud Roma demonstrate that they are much more
than that. It is unwise to expect an awareness of systemic classification amongst research subjects,
as participants often find reasons for acting as they do self-evident. However, the Ultras possess a
discourse that is loaded with behavior-inducing ethical imperatives and an awareness of “being
Ultra.” Thus, they have reason to suspect that the unaligned fans are simply not Ultras.
I have already stated that the unaligned fans do not wave flags during games. In the years
before the state repression of the Ultras’ in-stadium behaviors (begun following the death of Filippo
Raciti in February 2007) there were six visible elements to their form of fandom: constant singing,
emergency flares, smoke candles, flags, large choreographed displays, and the homemade banners
called striscioni. Unaligned fans tend not to take part in this style of fandom. They will sing and help
with Curva-wide choreography but otherwise they refrain from these displays. That being said, the
data revealed two major cleavages between the Ultras and the fans in the curva.
To be an Ultra, one simply must travel away from Rome to attend games. Indeed, I witnessed
a core of supporters in Portugal, Sicily, Sardegna, Turin, Udine, and Reggio Calabria. I also know
of others who traveled to Manchester, Greece, and Ukraine all in two seasons (2006-2008). The
trasferta, or away game, is central to the Ultras’ ideal of suffering for AS Roma (to be discussed at
length in the next chapter). As a favorite Curva Sud song reveals, “we grind up the kilometers, we
overcome the obstacles, with AS Roma deep within our hearts.”
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Figure 18. AS Roma’s Ultras in Lecce. 2000.
As well, to be an Ultra one must devote time and energy to one’s group beyond attending
games. For the most committed Ultras, the groups are an extension of their families. It was common
to meet Ultras who were always, whether at dinner, a midday café, an Ultra office, or a print shop,
with the same group of fellow Ultras. Within their mentalità, the group is the vehicle through which
one is an Ultra. Thus, it is to be an object of devotion, just as Rome and AS Roma. This is evident
when an Ultra carries the group’s banner to an away game (also discussed below) and arrives at a
stadium hours before kick-off so that the banner can be hung in the most strategic (i.e. most visible)
location (figure 19). For if the banner is present, the group is present.
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Figure 19. Ultras hanging a small banner in Parma.
2007.
i. Leadership and the Curva Sud Groups
Roversi and Balestri (2002) identified a leadership crisis amongst Italian Ultras beginning
in 1995. This crisis saw the Ultras moving away from hierarchical groups with well-developed
leadership structures and strict rules of conduct toward smaller groups without centralized
leadership. They give two reasons for this shift. First, the Ultras became the domain of a more
hedonistic and violent element. Thuggery became rationale for action for many of the new small
groups (Roversi and Balestri, 2002, pg. 140). Second, the state began policing the Ultras more
harshly after a series of episodes brought Ultra violence into the general Italian consciousness. The
most severe of these was the 1995 killing of Genoa Ultra Vincenzo Spagnolo by his AC Milan
counterparts. The state began cracking down on the large, well-organized groups, those which
actually had a code of ethics and the ability to police their own members, while leaving alone the
“stray dogs” that tended to commit the most violent of acts. By 1998, the major groups in the most
important curvas were largely bereft of leadership (Roversi and Balestri, 2002, pg. 140).
In Curva Sud Roma, the dating used by Roversi and Balestri coincides not so much with a

69

leadership crisis brought about by police repression as with an intra-curva fight amongst the various
groups for supremacy of the Curva. In fact, the most influential Curva Sud groups of the time, Boys
Roma, Fedayn, and Opposta Fazione (Opposing Faction) all benefitted from strong leadership. It
was only after the 2005 disintegration of the conglomerate AS Roma Ultras (discussed below) that
lack of leadership became an issue amongst Curva Sud Roma.
Nevertheless, when I arrived in Rome in October 2006, I found a Curva Sud that was
dominated by one very powerful group with a single leader (Ultras Romani); a former behemoth
with no leader (Boys Roma); and two legendary groups with leadership but which refused to lead
the Curva as a whole (Fedayn and Tradizione Distinzione Roma). There were also numerous small
groups and the large but benign Ultras Primavalle-San Lorenzo. To best illustrate the importance
of leadership amongst Ultra groups, I will briefly examine Ultras Romani and Boys Roma.

Figure 20. Spadino (in center with tattooed left arm
raised) and some of Ultras Romani. Empoli 2007.
Ultras Romani was founded in 2002 by William “Spadino” Betti, a longtime member of
Fedayn (figure 20). Spadino, as he is known by all in the Curva, sought the permission of thenleader of Boys Roma Paolo Zappavigna to create a new group in Curva Sud, and with Boys’ backing
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he was able to take the space occupied by the group XXI Aprile, 753 a.C.. Although the group is
hated by most of the other Curva Sud groups (for reasons which will be made clear below), it is the
most powerful and active in today’s curva. This is because of Spadino’s authority and notoriety.
Unlike other Ultras, Spadino seeks relationships with the club and even the players of AS Roma. He
seeks to make the Ultras an integral part of Italian soccer, instead of the adversarial element they
have been and are.
There are three Ultras who operate below Spadino in the Ultras Romani hierarchy. These
have responsibilities from running the group’s offices and organizing travel to and from away games
to carrying the group’s banners in and away from Rome. These three, along with Spadino, form the
direttivo, or managing board, of the group. While Spadino, at 35, has over ten years of experience
in Curva Sud, each of the others is 25 or older and have between seven and eight years of
experience. This style of leadership was the norm for early Curva Sud groups like Fedayn, Boys
Roma, and Commando Ultra Curva Sud (CUCS) and it allowed these groups to survive the shifting
loyalties and animosities of the curva. Because of the short history of the group there has been no
generational turnover of leadership.

Figure 21. Paolo Zappavigna demonstrating with Boys.
2004.
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The same cannot be said of Boys Roma. Begun in 1972 by Antonio Bongi and several of his
friends, Boys is the oldest Ultra group in Rome. Bongi was actively involved in the group until 1994.
After having groomed two longtime members to replace him and his generation as leaders, he retired
from the group. These two, known amongst the Ultras as Pinuccio and Armandino, succeeded in
making Boys the largest and most powerful group in Curva Sud. The group boasted a membership
of 1,800 Ultras during their reign. In 1999, however, a Boys members named Paolo Zappavigna was
named sole leader of the group (figure 21). He had been accepted into the group by Pinuccio and
Armandino two years earlier and, having shown a gift for organization and lack of fear of violence,
quickly made himself an unofficial leader of the group.
Zappavigna controlled Boys Roma until his death in 2005 following a motorcycle accident.
From 1999 to 2005 he was the most influential group leader in the history of Curva Sud Roma, able
to single-handedly determine the fates of all the other Curva groups (Fedayn excluded). Being just
39 and having an almost messianic following, Paolo had no able successor in waiting. Unlike the
two previous generational turnovers for Boys, Paolo’s death left a dire lack of leadership in the
group.

Figure 22. Entering Milan’s San Siro Stadium behind the Boys
leaders. 2007.
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In October 2006, Boys was lead by a council of four Ultras, each between 25 and 37 (figure
22). Lacking the charisma of Zappavigna, they were reduced to keeping the group alive until a
proper successor could emerge. In fact, one had done so before Zappavigna’s death, but was
prohibited from attending soccer games for three years (from 2003 to 2006) for his part in the
suspended SS Lazio-AS Roma game of 2003 (discussed in Chapter 9). It was not until the beginning
of the 2007-2008 soccer season that the leader, affectionately known as “il Duce” by the Boys
Ultras, was able to take control. Even then, however, the group was barely visible during games in
and away from Rome. Another potential leader, the son of Paolo Zappavigna, was being groomed
by the current leadership of the group to take control in the near future.
Through all of this, the Boys membership was diminished by 50%. Whereas they had been
a ferocious group of around 2,000 fascist Ultras before and during Zappavigna’s control, they were
barely 1,000 Ultras in 2007. Amongst these there was infighting between those loyal to Forza Nuova
and Fiamma Tricolore, the two Italian neo-fascist parties.
What these examples demonstrate is the importance of recognized leadership. Even amongst
the groups not discussed here there is a definite leadership structure in place. In the cases of Fedayn
and Ultras Primavalle-San Lorenzo, which have a commitment to democratic leadership, there is
a system in place which allows decisions to be made. In the smaller groups there is often no leader
but a small group of equals comprising not only a leadership council but the entirety of the group.
These groups of between four and ten people, however, have no intention of attempting the
magnitude of public display of which the larger groups are capable. Choreography, the most
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grandiose form of Ultra expression, is simply too large a task for a small group.1 Further, because
the groups also function as political, cultural, or social entities beyond the stadium, disorganization
and weak leadership are a burden that can sink an Ultra group.
II. Ultra Dynamics
We have seen that there are at best subtle differences of demographic composition between
the Ultra groups and the unaligned fans in Curva Sud; age, gender, and occupation look quite
similar. It is instead inter-group dynamics related to leadership and political ideology that determine
the longevity or visibility of a group. Before the mid-1990s proliferation of smaller groups in the
curva, neighborhood representation would have been an important point of distinction between the
large groups. However, as my data demonstrate, today most large groups are populated by Ultras
from various areas in and around the city of Rome, while the small groups tend to be populated by
Ultras from the same neighborhood. None of these small groups have made the neighborhood central
to their group, though.
The distance between the Ultras and the unaligned fans provided a better way of
understanding the Ultras than did the demographic data. From the behavioral and ethical dimensions
of the Ultras’ self-understanding, as people who believe and act in certain ways prescribed by their
self-conscious dedication to “being Ultra,” we saw the potential for several vectors that intersect to
create a dynamic Curva Sud Roma. Of these, political ideology and affiliation are the most
important. Also influential are the territorial and spatial constraints within the Curva, and the strife
between groups caused by the desire of some of them to sell merchandise. While the first is often

1

W hile there is no English equivalent of how coreografia is used in Italian to refer to a large choreographed
display, I will henceforth use choreography when discussing the large choreographed displays of the Ultras. Think of
one performing a choreography, full-stop, without adding what act is being choreographed.
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an issue of alignment and alliances, the second is embroiled with the very conception of what is an
Ultra. Further, each of these alliances and conceptions will also intersect with competing
expectations of what type of space the Curva is - Ultra or free? These will be addressed in the
remainder of the chapter.
A. Mentalità and the Curva
The mentalità or worldview of the Ultras, as I explained in the previous chapter, is a deeply
ethical will to opposition and rivalry. Much of what I studied amongst the Ultras I relate to their
mentalità, not only because I feel that a proper understanding of their worldview is crucial for
understanding the Ultras, but because they use the concept to explain so much of their behavior.
Later chapters will explain the content of the mentalità and how it relates to specific situations in
an Ultra’s life experience. Now, however, I will demonstrate how the Curva has been and continues
to be shaped by the Ultras’ commitment to a “mentalità Ultras.”

Figure 23. Rome’s Olympic Stadium alongside the
CONI offices and Stadio dei Marmi.
As I briefly demonstrated above, there is a behavioral distance between the group-belonging
Ultras and the unaligned fans in Curva Sud. The Ultras are adamant that if one does not support AS
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Roma in the Ultra style (flags, songs, flares, smoke torches) and does not travel to support AS Roma
away from Rome, then one is not an Ultra. Their mentalità works in the same fashion, providing a
template for how an Ultra understands soccer, the Curva, Rome, and the world. It makes an Ultra
a political actor, although not necessarily a fascist or communist. It gives the Ultra an understanding
of Calcio Moderno and how it infiltrates the curva through merchandising. It also gives the Ultra
an expectation of what kind of space is the Curva, be it an organized and hierarchical space or one
that is more anarchic and hedonistic. There are other elements of the mentalità which will be made
clear throughout the pages that follow. However, these are the main elements that make the Curva
a dynamic space and a space rife with division and hatred.
B. Curva Sud Roma: A History of Political Ultras
The curvas of Italian soccer stadiums had been populated since the post-war period with a
young and hardscrabble crowd. Violence and aggression was normal in or near these curvas long
before the Ultras made them their homes (Foot, 2006, pg. 325). However, while rivalries and
willingness to act aggressively pre-existed the Ultras, it was the Ultras who made these the basis of
a mentalità and form of life. The Ultra phenomenon was born in Milan. The first group in AC
Milan’s Curva Sud, Fossa dei Lioni (Lions’ Den), was created in 1968. One year later Boys SAN
(Boys Squadra d’Azione Nerazzurre - Boys Black and Blue Action Squad) became the first group
in Internazionale (Inter) Milan’s Curva Nord.
The two groups are of interest to the history of Curva Sud Roma because each was the
prototype for the Ultra phenomenon in general. Both laid similar foundations for a style of fandom
that still defines the Ultras (flags, flares, organized clapping and singing, and drums). But more
importantly, each became emblematic of organizing the Italian curvas in line with principles that
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transcend soccer - in this case, politics and the traditional class and political associations of the clubs
themselves. As such, Fossa dei Lioni celebrated the working-class traditions of AC Milan and
leaned toward the political left, while Boys SAN was founded with the political symbols and
ideologies of the far right, using Inter’s traditional association with the city’s industrialists as a base.
While these two large groups were unimpeded within their curvas, laying the foundation for political
affiliations that have lasted until today, Curva Sud Roma’s groups were divided between left and
right leaning Ultras.

Figure 24. Seating plan of Rome’s Olympic Stadium.
i. Fedayn and the Radical Left2
As one can surmise given their choice of name, Fedayn was until the late-1990s associated
with the radical left. Unlike AC Milan’s Fossa dei Lioni, which adopted a radical stance only after
its founding, Fedayn was committed from its beginnings to a radicalized left. This is because

2

The group summaries that follow were largely taken from member accounts. In the case of Fedayn, which
refused to cooperate with my study, their portrayal comes from members of Antichi Valori (Antique or Classical
Values), a sister group of Fedayn.

77

Fedayn’s founding came after the radicalization of youth politics that swept from universities to
popular manifestations from 1969 into the early 1970s. The founding members’ awareness of the
Palestinian terrorist organization stems directly from their involvement in campus activities at
Rome’s La Sapienza University.
Fedayn was started by Roberto Rulli and a group of student friends. It was intended to be
a social club for young radical fans of AS Roma in the Quadraro zone of the Prenestino
neighborhood, located between Rome’s historical center and Cinecitta` (figure 16). From this club,
originally meeting at a bar on Piazza Numidio, Fedayn intended to make Curva Sud an extension
of the historically leftist working class found in Quadraro. This close association between
neighborhood and group was an original feature of AS Roma’s Ultra groups; until 1977, all of the
groups in the Curva were associated with one of the city’s neighborhoods.

Figure 25. Fedayn Ultras in 1982.
In that year Commando Ultra Curva Sud (CUCS) was created with the merger of several
small groups. Its Curva-wide displays of choreographed fandom quickly made ideal the large
conglomerate, given the size of Rome’s Olympic Stadium and Curva Sud (figure 24). In today’s
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Curva Sud, one still finds vestiges of this tradition, with the collection of smaller groups known
collectively as Testaccio (in homage to the neighborhood just south of the Aventine Hill where AS
Roma was founded and where the team played in its early years), the group from, and called, Tor
Bella Monaca, and the Ultras from San Lorenzo who compose half of the Ultras Primavalle-San
Lorenzo group (figure 16).
Until the 1977 entrance of CUCS, Curva Sud Roma was known as a curva rossa (red curva)
because of the pervasive Communist influence. Along with Fedayn were Fossa dei Lupi (Wolves
Den), Pantere Giallorosse (Yellow-red Panthers), and Panthers, smaller groups comprised of radical
leftists and student activists - even if their first commitment while in Curva Sud was to AS Roma.
While both the neighborhood and leftist connections of the original Curva Sud groups have largely
been relegated to history, Fedayn has not suffered for influence among AS Roma’s Ultras. Although
it too has lost its association with radical leftist politics, it is still a signpost for a type of Ultra that
puts club support and group loyalty above political ideology.

Figure 26. The heart of Fedayn’s section remains empty in
protest of the post-Raciti crackdown on Ultras. AS Roma-SS
Lazio 2007.
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ii. Boys Roma and the Extreme Right3
Boys Roma is an icon amongst all of Italy’s Ultras. It is the oldest Ultra group in Rome,
being born two months prior to Fedayn. It is perhaps misleading to talk about the early years of
Fedayn and Boys as a struggle for control of Curva Sud. This is because Fedayn’s control over
Curva Sud was such that Boys began in Curva Nord. Even there, they caused a stir amongst the fans
of AS Roma, as they attended each game with megaphones, drums, and bugles (the first Roman
group to make their presence known in this form). The drums and megaphones quickly became
standard for all the groups, making both curvas of the Olympic Stadium a cacophony of noise,
especially given the lack of unity of the performers.
It is not only the style and method of fandom introduced by Boys that makes them iconic.
They were also the first in Rome to organize with a rightist political position. Instead of battling to
enter the leftist atmosphere of the early 1970s Curva Sud, Antonio Bongi and a small group of
affluent friends congregated in Curva Nord (figure 24). Coming together from wealthy
neighborhoods like Parioli, Vigna Clara, and Baduina, the Boys founders sought to form a “fascio
d’azione” ([fascist] action group), that is, something that would be active in Rome as not only a
social club but one ready and able to engage the left in “action” beyond discourse (figure 16).4 From
the beginning the Boys members wore uniforms, or at least matching shirts and scarves, to the
stadium. The uniforms were motivated by the desire to emulate squadristi (members of fascist
3

Boys Roma was named after a mistranslation of The W ho’s 1965 song “The Kids Are Alright,” of which
the chorus announces, “if the kids are united then we’ll never be divided.” Kids is translated ragazzi - Italian for
kids, children, and boys. The chorus becomes “se iragazzi sono uniti non saranno mai sconfitti. In addition to Inter
Milan’s Boys SAN, there was also a Boys ultra group associated with FC Torino in Turin that predated Boys Roma.
Founder Antonio Bongi claimed that the name was taken from that group, as he and his friends were fascinated with
the Torinese ultras.
4

In a December 2007 interview, Fabio, a leading member of Boys, used “fascio d’azione” specifically to
connote the inter-war fascist action squads.
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paramilitary squads), not so much in style, but in world view. Their tight organization, even when
entering the stadium, was spectacular and quickly copied by all of AS Roma’s Ultras.

Figure 27. Boys Ultras in 1976
Although Fedayn and Boys represented opposite ends of the political spectrum, there is a
sense looking back that, at least in the early years of the Ultra phenomenon in Rome, the political
differences were less dramatic than they would become as more extreme fascist groups like Opposta
Fazione (Opposing Faction) and Tradizione Distinzione Roma (Tradition and Distinction) came on
the scene in 1989 and 1995, respectively. Boys members from the Curva Nord years are proud of
their fascist leanings and that they founded something with lasting value. They are more proud,
though, that they “brought the fascist history of Rome to light for four generations [sic] of Romans,”
said Fabio, amongst the current leaders of the group. “But,” he acknowledged, “neither Boys nor
Fedayn would have engaged the other purely based on political differences at that time.”
Back then, to be a fan of AS Roma was enough. From the perspective of the Ultras involved,
the political differences in the early Curva were largely irrelevant. It was at most a secondary issue,
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something that was important outside the stadium but of little salience inside. That being said, there
was very little contact between the groups. “Fascisti per fascisti, comunisti per cani,” (Fascists for
fascists, communists for dogs) was the saying at Boys. And given their lack of desire to engage the
communists, the distance between Curva Nord and Curva Sud suited Boys fine.
iii. Boys, Commando Ultra Curva Sud, and the Origins of Fascism in Curva Sud
In 1977 Boys moved to Curva Sud in order to take part in Commando Ultra Curva Sud, the
original blanket Ultra organization in Rome, known by its acronym CUCS.5 Already by that date AS
Roma’s Ultras were great in number and woefully unorganized. With better organized Ultras,
especially those of Torino FC, making weekly headlines for their choreographed displays and
thunderous support, the various leaders met and decided, under the direction of a man known only
as “Geppo,” to unite behind one banner and to coordinate all support. Thus was born the largest
Ultra organization in Italy.
CUCS made Roma’s Ultras a household name. They became not only the symbol of Curva
Sud, but also of AS Roma, and Italy’s Ultras in general. They made discipline and organization an
Ultra trait; communication and mid-week meetings became a necessity. Despite giving the
appearance of tight organization (the CUCS-led Curva was often a 10,000 person wall of
coordinated color, song, clapping, and beating) there remained great heterogeneity within (figures
28 and 29). For one, Fedayn was only loosely associated with the group. They still held considerable
weight as an Ultra group but refused, as Federico of Antichi Valori put it, “to submit to the oath of
another group, to put aside their own particularity, even for the good of the Curva or AS Roma.” In

5

CUCS is pronounced as if one word in Rome, like “kooks”, and the Ultra will often say “the CUCS” in
English instead of “il CUCS.”
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contrast, Boys’s popularity exploded within CUCS, mostly because they acted as the group’s muscle.

Figure 28. Ultra according to CUCS. 1984

Figure 29. Ultra according to CUCS. 1984
In the early years of CUCS there were very few violent episodes, but by the early 1980s it
was common for the more well-organized opponents to engage. Boys ultimately used their notoriety
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within CUCS as rationale for leaving the organization, doing so in 1984, although with a
commitment to defend the CUCS as they would defend themselves. The move toward aggression
within Boys did not signal a general move within Curva Sud, but by now Boys was full of the most
radical element of the Curva and perhaps the city.6
In the mid-to-late-1980s Boys Roma became synonymous with squadrismo, holding a
nationalist and rightist position that not only looked back to Mussolini’s fascist party, but forward
to a new fascist Rome. Becoming more and more organized (given the impetus to do so from CUCS)
Boys in these years brought the far right into Curva Sud. A new generation of leadership coming
from Rome’s La Sapienza University, but more importantly, from within, also added a new
intellectualism.
This generation of Ultras was the bedrock for the explosion of the phenomenon in the 1990s.
For groups like Boys it was responsible for a radicalization of the mentalità Ultras. No longer was
being an AS Roma fan enough. There was also a long and glorious Roman history and iconography
that had to be incorporated into the Ultra experience. With the money, numbers, and organization
to dominate the Curva, Boys began staging their own Curva-wide choreographies. These
choreographies were laden with Romanità (a deep commitment to Rome and things Roman), using
a vision of fascist Rome to create an Ultra Rome - one that, according to those who were there, was
instrumental in guiding the general shift toward a rightist Curva Sud.
iv. Opposta Fazione (Opposing Faction), Politics, and Violence in Curva Sud
In 1987, CUCS split into two groups over the right of the Ultras to be hostile to AS Roma.

6

According to Fabio, one of the current leaders of Boys, in this period the group even attempted to contact
the Roman publisher of many Julius Evola works about a possible speaking engagement. He also claims that leading
neo-fascists involved in the far right in Rome often frequented events sponsored by Boys, among them Giovanni
Alemanno.

84

The schism erupted when the club signed a former player of SS Lazio and FC Juventus (AS Roma’s
and Curva Sud’s biggest rivals) named Lionello Manfredonia. Two years later, in 1989, the largely
pacific Curva Sud that CUCS and Boys had dominated for ten years was preparing to become the
domain of violently fascist groups.
The benchmark date for the political takeover of Curva Sud is debated amongst AS Roma’s
Ultras. Some say it was always a politicized space. Others say it is yet to be so. For those who give
examples, the founding of Fedayn and Boys, from the left and right respectively, laid the foundation
for politics in the Curva. Or, it occurred when Boys left CUCS in 1984 to pursue its own fascist
agenda. These explanations suggest that the Curva has been a politicized space since 1972, and that
the CUCS split merely made existing differences impossible to ignore.7 It is said, as well, that,
instead of long-standing division dominating the history of the Curva, there are only brief moments
of sharp exchange, smoothed over by long periods of common purpose. What few argue about,
however, is the change in the Curva effected by the 1989 addition of Opposta Fazione.

Figure 30. Rightist
CUCS Ultra. 1983

7

This is my position on the matter as well as that of Boys and Padroni di Casa, the most fascist of the
current curva groups. Those on the left tend to deny the importance of politics within the history of the curva.
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Figure 31. Boys Ultra.
1987.
Opposta Fazione came into being after the youngest and most radical element of CUCSGruppo Anti-Manfredonia (CUCS-GAM) decided to form their own group. They sought something
different - literally to be the hardest, most uncompromising Ultras that Rome had yet seen. They
were opposed to having relations with other groups and the club, much like Fedayn. But unlike the
leftists, Opposta Fazione was of the far right. They did not seek to mimic squadristi, as the early
form of Boys had done, but aimed at being squadristi. They wanted to be a paramilitary organization
that went to AS Roma games. As such, they rarely traveled without arms, often going to away games
with a cache of clubs, brass knuckles, and bombs.

Figure 32. Opposta Fazione marching in Florence.
1990

Unlike previous Ultras, who thought more about choreography and spectacle than fighting,
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Opposta Fazione sought out confrontation with opposing Ultras. They made it a normal part of game
day to await traveling Ultras outside the guest section, or in other parts of Rome, to attack them.
Until the early 1990s, when other Ultras began to match Opposta Fazione’s methods, they were
vilified for having betrayed the Ultra movement. The calls of betrayal came from the areas of the
Curva that were still of the left, and from the sizable remainder of CUCS.

Figure 33. Opposta Fazione. Turin 1994.
Not only was Opposta Fazione actively seeking confrontation and fights, but they were the
most radically fascist of any group in the Curva. Boys understood Opposta Fazione as camerate
(fascist comrades). Having an agenda to make the Curva fascist, Boys used Opposta Fazione’s
constant threat of violence to help create two new rightist groups in the early 1990s - Arditi in 1992
and Frangia Ostile (Hostile Fringe) in 1993.
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Figure 34. Opposta Fazione graffiti. “Our motto: Make
Violence! Signed with a fasces. Via Gailia. Rome. 2007

Elsewhere, the right was well-represented by the group called Monteverde. From 1995 to
2005, Monteverde was one of the most visible and famous groups in the history of Curva Sud. It was
composed entirely of Ultras from the wealthy Roman neighborhood of the same name, located on
the western side of the Gianicolo hill (figure 16). It was also one of the most aggressively fascist
organizations in Curva Sud’s history, using as its symbol the two-headed axe affixed to a crusader’s
shield, and being one of the first to utilize squadrismo (the form of thuggish community based
policing most associated with the origins of Fascism) in ridding their neighborhood of vandals, drug
dealers, and stranieri (strangers).8

8

The two-headed axe, or bipenne, are connected specifically with Greek nationalism and fascism and lately
with European nationalism. The shield of the crusades, or scudo della cruciata is the fascist Ultras’ contribution to
recent fascist symbolism. It is a short flat-topped shield resembling the Croatian national symbol, but with its top left
corner hollowed.
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Figure 35. Monteverde Sticker.

Antonio Roversi (2006) included Monteverde (along with Boys, Opposta Fazione, and
Tradizione Distinzione Roma) in his study of the most feared and important fascist Ultras in Italy.
Although he made no mention of their squadrismo, other Curva Sud Ultras knew Monteverde above
all because of their legendary exploits in the streets of their neighborhood. “In the late-1990s,” said
Fabio, one of the leaders of Boys in 2007, “the fascists were the kings of the Curva. We used to beat
anyone who confronted us. But there was only Monteverde that was courageous enough to take that
attitude to their neighborhood.”
Diego, a 39 year-old Ultra who was active in the group from 1995 to 2001, when he stopped
going to games in order to spend more time with his new family, gave a better sense of what
Monteverde was doing. “We weren’t ‘straightedge’ or anything,” he said in 2007, referring to the
American youth movement against drugs and alcohol, “but we understood drug dealers to be bad
for our community. There was a club on Via Barrilli that became a magnet for cocaine dealers. All
night there would be cars coming into the area to get drugs. We didn’t want this. So we confronted
a few of them and put a stop to it. After that success we began looking out for anyone who didn’t
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belong. Roma panhandlers we pushed down to (Circonvallazione) Gianicolense. I remember,” he
continued, “there was a rash of scooter burnings sometime before the Jubilee (year 2000). We started
investigating after Giorgio, a good member of the group, had his burned. We never found out who
did it but once word got out that Monteverde was looking for the culprit the burnings stopped. It got
to the point where we just put our stickers on signs at the end of ‘our’ streets and no one went near
them without good reason.”

Figure 36. Monteverde. AS Roma-AS Livorno
2004
Monteverde was intended to be more than a group in the Curva Sud; members used their
resources to create a well-heeled and largely well-read movement, small but politically-extreme.
They were not alone among Curva Sud groups to be connected to a particular neighborhood, and to
seek to bring the experience of their neighborhood to the stadium. But they were extreme in the way
they returned from the stadium invigorated with a sense of responsibility and grandeur, thereby
investing their neighborhood with the spirit of community and collective responsibility that guides
many of the Curva’s groups.
v. Boys, Tradizione Distinzione Roma (Tradition and Disntiction), AS Roma Ultras:
The Most Extreme Ultras Yet
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Throughout the 1990s, Boys continued to lord it over Curva Sud, consistently maintaining
around 1500 members (Garsia, 2004, pg. 81). At the height of their power in 1997 Boys opened an
office, the first Ultra office in Rome. Instead of seeking a location near the group’s roots in Parioli,
Vigna Clara, or Baduina, they chose to set up shop in the neighborhood called San Lorenzo (figure
37).

Figure 37. Boys Roma’s office. 2007.
San Lorenzo lies between Termini, Rome’s main train station, and Piazza Bologna. It has the
distinction of being the zone that sustained the most bomb-damage during WWII, thus it is largely
post-war in architecture and plan (figure 16). It houses the La Sapienza University and the
Aeronautical Ministry, both in large complexes of bold fascist neoclassical design. But, other than
these and the Boys office, it is home to little else fascist. Boys desired to be a conquering, colonizing
army in San Lorenzo, making no attempt to integrate into the traditionally leftist working-class
neighborhood.9 With this same arrogance, Boys (with Arditi, Opposta Fazione, and other smaller
groups) marched through Curva Sud and the rest of Italy - the most aggressive Ultras in AS Roma’s
history. Because they also had a benevolent attitude toward the other AS Roma fans and a true love
9

Below I explain the founding of the Boys office in detail, including how they operate today in assumed
opposition to the other occupants of the neighborhood.

91

for AS Roma they were unchallenged. That is until the beginning of the 1999-2000 season.
In the summer of 1999, Opposta Fazione aligned with a band of smaller groups that had been
congregating in the basso, or lower section, of Curva Sud to form AS Roma Ultras. This new group
consciously recruited members from both the left and right, seeking to curb the recent dominance
of politically based groups in the Curva. Boys refused to join, but others, like Antichi Valori, a
break-away section from Fedayn (but which still stood behind the historic Fedayn banner) embraced
the attempt to unite the Curva behind one banner. Opposta Fazione was involved, many believe,
because by then, after too many battles with Ultras and the police, they were simply burning out.
Their desire to act as new Roman squadristi had never truly materialized (even if the idea was taken
up by younger Boys members as well as Monteverde and others) and their leadership was faltering.
AS Roma Ultras stabilized the Curva like no group had before. They gave voice to all
political ideas and made space for even the smallest of groups. The group took advantage of many
older Ultras returning to the Curva, as well as new technologies like internet and cell phones to
revolutionize how Ultras communicated and organized.10 Soon, however, the leadership of Opposta
Fazione abandoned the wider coalition (which still included the membership of Opposta Fazione),
to merge with Boys.
By this time, 2002, Boys was under the direction of Paolo Zappavigna, a 15-year veteran of
the Curva, who had experienced its previous unities and schisms. He had seen CUCS rise and fall,
seen the left decline and the right ascend, all the while safely ensconced in Boys. Thus, he had no
real allegiance to anyone else in the Curva, with the exception of Opposta Fazione. With Paolo’s
10

The group created the www.asromaultras.org website, which continues to operate, even in the absence of
the group itself, as the premier ultras website in Italy. Cellular telephones allowed Ultras to communicate more
openly on game days. This was especially important with large groups traveling to away games. In 2007 cell phones
allowed Ultras around Italia to learn of the killing of Gabriele Sandri before the media began reporting the event.
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backing (at that time, like having Papal authority) a minority within Boys united with the defected
leadership of Opposta Fazione to re-create Tradizione Distinzione Roma, a small group dating to
1995 but destined to become the last of the great ideologically based groups in Curva Sud. It was
renamed Padroni di Casa (Masters of the House) in 2007.

Figure 38. AS Roma Ultras leads the curva. 2004

Tradizione Distinzione Roma, like Boys and Opposta Fazione before it, had designs on
creating a separate movement within the Ultras. Instead of using the Ultras as a platform for what
may be called a generic fascism (hanging Celtic crosses or the Italian national flag over their group
banner, performing Roman salutes), however, they focused more on the Roman elements of
fascism’s history (from fascism’s desire to connect itself with Classical Rome to its impact on the
modern city of Rome). This was especially evident in Tradizione Distinzione Roma’s banners and
group iconography.
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Figure 39. Tradizione Distinzione Roma banner. “Lazio-Livorno.
Same Initial, Same Oven.” AS Roma-AS Livorno 2004.
At the same time, Tradizione Distinzione Roma focused less on confrontation and more on
the act of fandom - a contrast with Opposta Fazione. Despite the group being radically committed
to, and associated with, fascism, during AS Roma games they joined with any groups interested in
supporting the team. They sang, co-signed banners, and helped create and pay for choreographies
with each and all. They were motivated by “love of AS Roma, love of our city, [and] of its history.”
But, Tradizione Distinzione Roma (and later as Padroni di Casa )was also actively involved in their
office in intellectualizing not only the Ultras phenomenon, but also fascism “and its tradition as a
heroic reference point for those of us who are convinced that in this modern age of dissolution it is
impossible to escape and realize yourself according to just ideals.”11
Of those ideals, one was more prominent than others: the superiority of Rome to all other
cities and civilizations in human history. If defending the honor of Rome meant attacking police or

11

Quote from Mario, a 7-year member of Tradizione Distinzione Roma.
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other Ultras then it was right to do so. More than just the world of soccer was at stake for Tradizione
Distinzione Roma. “If Western Modernity has inverted the celebration of strength, honor, and
greatness that were truly Roman, then the Ultras, through their mentalità and brotherhood will create
a new revalued way of being.”12

Figure 40. Tradizione Distinzione Roma . 2005.
Tradizione Distinzione Roma’s, or Padroni di Casa’s most important contribution to the
history of AS Roma’s Ultras was to make radicalization a part of being in the group. They
understood themselves as part of a long-range attack on modernity and used the words of Friedrich
Nietzsche, Ezra Pound, and Julius Evola to convince themselves and others. As I explained in
Chapter 1, these writers, along with Georges Sorel, are understood and discussed in the offices of
this and related groups such as Boys.
According to Lorenzo Contucci, the foremost authority on Curva Sud Roma (as creator and

12

Ibid. “Revalued” is used here purposely, as this part of my conversation with Mario was focused on how
the Ultras used the Nietzschean critique of morality in their attacks on the media’s criminalization of the Ultras
phenomenon.
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curator of the AS Roma Ultras website - a veritable compendium of information about AS Roma’s
Ultras), before Tradizione Distinzione Roma no groups had thought of using “critical philosophy”
as justification or explanation of the Ultras phenomenon. “The older generation, like the CUCS,”
he explained, “were aware of Nietzsche, for sure, and even Evola, who was popular amongst Boys
and the MSI [Movimento Sociale Italiano] crowd, but no one used them as a part of being an Ultra
until Tradizione Distinzione Roma. It’s the same as what they’ve now done with Pound. If you want
to be in Padroni di Casa you have to study Pound and know how what he says relates to the Ultras
as Padroni di Casa understands it.”13
C. Calcio Moderno and Merchandising in Curva Sud Roma
i. Merchandising, Purity, and Self-Sufficiency
Merchandising is a contentious issue amongst AS Roma’s Ultras. For some in today’s Curva
Sud, like Ultras Romani, Boys Roma, and Lupi, it is a means toward self-sufficiency. This is an idea
with long roots in the Ultra phenomenon. Because travel and choreographies are expensive
undertakings, many groups in Italy sought to fund their activities by selling items bearing their, and
their teams’, logos. Even if this practice violated copyright laws (a point finally to be enforced in
the wake of Filippo Raciti’s killing in 2007, when the government forced the soccer clubs to distance
themselves from the Ultras both formally and symbolically) and often put club symbols in league
with those of political extremism, the clubs were unwilling to be seen as greedy or hostile to the
Ultras and the public.
These groups operate offices (like Ultras Romani in Ostia and Quadraro and Boys in San

13

Ezra Pound’s influence on the Ultras seems largely confined to Padroni di Casa. Pound is understood as
a fascist thinker amongst the Ultras who form the core of this project, but none were overly interested in him beyond
those of Casa Pound and Padroni di Casa.

96

Lorenzo [figure 37]) or display their merchandise outside the Curva Sud on game days (Ultras
Romani, Boys, and Lupi). Through the selling of scarves, t-shirts, sweatshirts, stickers, hats, and
even books they fund their curva-based activities and political and social initiatives (explained in
detail below and in succeeding chapters).
To other groups in the Curva Sud, like Fedayn, Ultras No Profit, and all of those comprising
Basso Sud (a loose collection of groups occupying the lower part of Curva Sud), the selling of
merchandise cheapens the idea of being an Ultra. While Fedayn produces items of clothing for its
members, these are never for sale. If a member is caught selling an article of clothing marked with
their logo he or she is immediately expelled. This happened in early 2007 as a long-time member
in need of money was identified selling a rare Fedayn sweatshirt from 2002 on ebay for over 200
euros. Although the Ultra was dismissed from the group, he was given 300 euros collected from the
group’s other members as a way to ease his financial hardships.
Fedayn’s history in the Curva Sud has been as a stabilizing force. Despite the shift from the
political left to the right within Fedayn - the largest and most important group founded on the left
that navigated this switch in loyalties - its name and presence have consistently pointed to an Ultra
that is “unflappable and infallible:” unflappable because always present; infallible because never
bowing to the whims of fashion. More specifically, it is because “Fedayn Ultras wear no uniform.”
The idea of denying a uniform is linked with a commitment to being Ultras in a form that is least
connected with the material culture of modern society.
Fedayn understands the Ultra in a pure form, as literal guardians of AS Roma and the Curva
Sud. Thus, their theory of action is based on one sole motive: to defend the honor of the club, Curva
Sud, and Fedayn. Defending the honor of Curva Sud means engaging enemy Ultras in a courageous
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and aggressive way. It also means condemning and fighting anyone who attempts to profit
financially from the Ultras, either from within or without. For Fedayn, a group like Ultras Romani,
which has multiple offices, a website, and a catalogue of merchandise, is just as much a part of
Calcio Moderno as foreign ownership of clubs and global television coverage.
As said Massimo, a 7-year Fedayn veteran, “Ultra is a mentalità above all, a way of being.
It is not something one can acquire by buying a scarf. It is a commitment to one’s brothers and to
AS Roma, in good or bad times. Especially bad times.” Until 2007 (again because of the killing of
Raciti), the selling of merchandise was often accompanied by the selling of tickets to away games.
The classic relationship between clubs and Ultras is one of mutual dependence.
The clubs depend on the Ultras for unconditional support. In turn, the Ultras expect the
various players to play “per la maglia,” shedding blood, sweat, and tears for the jersey - the symbol
of the club - instead of personal fame or, worst of all, money. The idea that one plays with proper
respect and pride for the colors of the club is also expressed as playing “per i colori,” for the colors.
One need not be the most skillful player to be adored by the Ultras as often it is enough to play for
the shirt. Conversely, even the most skillful player who is seen as lazy (and therefore taking
advantage of the club and the Ultras) may be vilified for failing to play for the shirt. The Ultras
further expect the manager to be willing to succeed even without the most talented and able squad
and the club to spend money wisely while always deferring to its traditions and symbols. The
relationship is fraught with potential trouble generated by disillusioned Ultras, of whom the clubs
are wary.
The Ultras depend on the clubs for access to the stadium before home games, in order to
hang their banners and sometimes bring in items frowned upon by the police; to ensure a lack of
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serious policing by colluding with the Prefect of Rome (Prefetto della Provincia di Roma) to keep
the police from entering the curvas; and to provide free tickets for away games. These tickets are
offered to groups in good standing with the club. Distributing them is a way for AS Roma to
discipline the activities of different Ultra constituencies, as well as ensure enthusiastic support.

Figure 41. Police search the banners and flags of AS Roma’s Ultras
as they enter Curva Sud. February 2007.

Perhaps needless to say, away game ticket distributions amplified divisions within Curva
Sud. When Fedayn and other not-for-profit groups received their tickets they distributed them
amongst the group’s members and gave them to children and teens unable to buy tickets. The group
would then rent a coach or arrange a train car for travel to and from the game. Travel with the group
was a privilege of being a member. For the other groups who sold merchandise, their ticket
allotment would be distributed amongst the group leadership, often 10-15 persons, and the rest sold
at face value, a 100% profit for the group. Further, game tickets would be bundled with a seat on a
coach or train car for an additional profit to the group. There was no legal prohibition against the
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Ultras selling the tickets or space on transports, so it was left to other Ultras to keep them from
exploiting the situation, at least according to Fedayn and like-minded groups.
To Ultras Romani and Boys, leading culprits of such commercialized arrangements, the sales
were merely a way to ensure their independence and readiness to act, via choreography and proper
organization, on behalf of the Curva Sud at large. And, there were always many people eager to
travel under the auspices of these groups, as there was safety in numbers as well as cache acquired
from being seen with them. Nevertheless, those who sold organized away game travel were vilified
by large areas of the Curva Sud for exploiting their fellow Ultras.
ii. Merchandising and Calcio Moderno
For Fedayn, the selling of merchandise (and away game tickets and travel) is tantamount to
practicing Calcio Moderno. It is a betrayal of the Ultra mentalità and the expressly written
manifestoes of almost every group in the Curva. There is a righteousness in the voice of those who
speak against merchandise (bearing a group’s name and/or logo for sale to the general public) in the
Curva that one does not witness when discussing any other topic. Not only does the selling of
merchandise reduce the Ultra to vulgar capitalists, say Fedayn members, but it also cheapens the
experience of being an Ultra. If a stadium of 60,000 can all hold aloft a Boys scarf, what is the value
of committing oneself to the group and sacrificing oneself for the honor of wearing one? Without
this honor, according to some, the Ultras are decadent.
The crux of the issue, though, is found in the metaphor most used to describe the practice:
si mangia dalla Curva (one eats from the Curva). To be seen as eating, or desiring to eat, from the
money of other Ultras is to be seen, as Gianluca, a longtime Fedayn member explained during a
game with bombs and flares alight all around us, as “reducing the Curva to a marketplace and the
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Ultras to vulgar consumers.” Upon asking members of one Ultra group about another in Curva Sud
or even elsewhere in Italy, frequently one is told before anything else, “they eat from the curva.”
Of course, for those groups who sell merchandise, the practice is understood as a means toward selfsufficiency.
From the perspective of Ultras Romani, they are not a group seeking enrichment from Curva
Sud, but merely a new way of being Ultra. Adriano, one of the most energetic and committed Ultras
I have met, explained to me that the group was not as far removed from Ultra traditions as other
groups think, despite their being the only group in the history of Curva Sud that one pays a
membership fee to join. In response to charges of “eating from the curva,” he told me that Ultras
Romani is more involved with charity and fund raising initiatives (such as money for imprisoned
Ultras, memorials for deceased Ultras, helping children’s hospitals in Rome, and helping sick and
needy AS Roma fans) than any other group in Italy.
These types of benevolence are common place in Curva Sud and other Italian curvas, but
because Ultras Romani maintains relationships with the club and players, theirs are given more
attention than other efforts. Federico of Giovinezza (Youth, but also the title of the Italian national
anthem under fascism), one of the purist (and most fascist) groups, countered by reminding me that
all the groups work in their communities, and do so without commercializing being an Ultra.
Ultras Romani is also attacked because it operates multiple offices, a website, and offers
many items for sale bearing its name and logo. It organizes charter buses and even planes for every
away game. In doing so, Ultras Romani seeks, in Spadino’s words, “only a small profit, which [they]
use to keep the website and offices available for all Ultras to use.”14 They also use their profits to
14

I spoke with Spadino about this before 2007 AS Roma’s Champions League match against Sporting
Portugal in Lisbon.
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organize choreographies. Since 2006 they are the only group which has performed choreography
in Curva Sud - one of which, for SS Lazio-AS Roma, involved the entirety of the curva.

Figure 42. Ultras Romani. Flags and flares. December 2006.
The other charges leveled against Ultras Romani were less enthusiastically parried by
Adriano. The most egregious of these concerns relations with the club and even law enforcement.
Spadino can often be seen on the sidelines of AS Roma games, and even sitting alone on the team’s
chartered buses and flights. His relationships with law enforcement, Adriano explained, stemmed
from personal friendships - not at all rare in the Ultras community.15 Regardless, Ultras Romani’s
detractors pull no punches on the matter. The police, I was told and heard repeatedly, are infame
(infamous) and enemies of the Ultras’ form of life.16 Yet according to Adriano, “Spadino uses these

15

Indeed, I met numerous former-Ultras working in law enforcement at various levels. They maintain their
former friendships from the curva and often know more about today’s curva than the Ultras themselves.
16

The only English many Ultras seemed to know was four words: All Cops Are Bastards, a popular refrain
imported from England. The relationship between law enforcement and Ultras will be discussed in subsequent
chapters.

102

relationships to give the Ultras a better image and receive better treatment from the police.”
D. Curva Sud Roma Should Be What Type of Space?
While many of AS Roma’s Ultras point to Calcio Moderno and the reduction of the Curva
to just another space within the global marketplace as the reason why merchandising is largely
frowned upon, the issue points to another fault line within the Curva. Along with politics and
merchandising there exists a question about what type of space Curva Sud should be. Those on the
left envision a curva that is non-political and thus unspoiled by the mundane issues of society. The
right, conversely, envisions a curva that is highly political, organized, and hierarchical.
The left in-and-of-itself is almost inconsequential in Curva Sud. This is because the vast
majority of the Ultras and unaligned fans who consider themselves leftists desire a non-political
curva. Even Fedayn, which is now of the right, also desires a non-political curva; that is, a curva in
which political affiliation and ideology do not factor in the act of fandom. As we have seen, though,
Fedayn’s non-political stance does not influence the political aspects of the Ultras’ war against
Calcio Moderno. The unaligned fans with whom I spoke and experienced games are far more lenient
than Fedayn. According to Gabriele, an unaligned fan who considers himself an Ultra, “in the curva
we should be able to do what we want. We have no fear of police reprisals. We can come, drink, be
with friends, show our support for AS Roma, and no one should be able to tell us otherwise - the
groups included. We who are not affiliated with a group,” the 16-year veteran of Curva Sud and
away games continued, “are far more free than the organized fans [Ultras]. They are just like
soldiers who unthinkingly follow whatever their bosses tell them.”
The groups, by contrast, feel that the Curva should be a militarized zone, with Ultras
standing in formation whether in supporting the team or in making statements, through song or
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banner, about the society of which the Curva and Ultras are a part. Coordination, suffering for the
team and Rome, singing and clapping even when AS Roma is losing, and taking part in the ritualized
traditions of Curva Sud are necessary for the Curva to represent itself in an honorable fashion. Those
fans who come to games only to spectate are seen as a hindrance to a unified and disciplined Curva.
“If one makes complaints against [Boys] because we sell merchandise,” explained Fabio, one of the
group’s leaders in 2007, “they should be far more concerned with the fans who enter the Curva
unwilling to be Ultras. The Curva is not an anarchic utopia but a hierarchical and mechanical space.
We come here with a job to do. If they want to hang around and get stoned with their friends they
should do so outside this hallowed ground.” I asked Fabio if the Curva was ultimately a fascist
space. “Absolutely,” he said, “one should have the mentality of a squadrista when entering the
Curva. Relax at home. Come here as a militant marching into battle.”
Interestingly, Ultras on both sides of this question talk of the Ultras as a movement. To the
groups the Curva is a place of fraternity, bonding, becoming conscious of the world, a place to
demonstrate one’s political ideology and to make connections between sport and society (Ginsborg,
2003, pg. 119). To them, the Ultras are a movement with a particular understanding of soccer and
society - even if that understanding can vary greatly depending on one’s position within the
phenomenon. The Ultras are a collection of young, aggressive, like-minded individuals who, for all
their differences, desire a soccer that is pure and symbolic of only the communities its teams
represent (Ginsborg, 2003b, pgs. 112-119). To the unaligned fans, the Curva is and should remain
neutral in every way except in its devotion to AS Roma. It is a space best left devoid of politics; a
place where black, red, white, and green hold no power - where instead the red and yellow of AS
Roma are the only colors that matter. To them the Ultras might very well be a movement, but it
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should be one only at game time and in relation to the game.
III. Fission and Revision Within Curva Sud Roma
Each of the issues discussed above, politics, merchandising, and the question of anarchy or
organization within the Curva, create their own fault lines across which Ultras must navigate. The
dynamism of the Curva is made visible by these divisive issues. This is certainly so when they are
able to influence the formation and dissolution of groups. Although the political divide between left
and right is potentially the most explosive issue amongst AS Roma’s Ultras, it has been rendered
less so by the overwhelming majority of the Curva’s groups organizing around the right. Political
rivalries are instead played-out across curvas, such as when AS Roma plays AS Livorno.
Nonetheless, within groups of the right, there are differences and rivalries that often lead to conflict.
Although there has yet to be an explosion between the two, Boys and Padroni di Casa are affiliated
with opposing neo-fascist political movements beyond the Curva. As well, not all groups on the right
sell merchandise or away game tickets. Thus, an open sense of hostility permeates the air between
these groups. Finally, the utopian vision of Curva Sud’s purpose is also far from benign. It might
not lead to conflict but it certainly creates hostility and distrust.
Consider the demise of AS Roma Ultras. It was not only the most important conglomerate
of Curva Sud groups in history, but was also destroyed by the issues that organized this chapter:
politics, merchandising, and vision of the curva. From 1999 to 2004 AS Roma Ultras was the most
powerful and influential Ultra coalition in Italy. It had organization, broad membership, powerful
alliances, and the respect of the entire Italian Ultra community. Under its guidance Curva Sud was
creative. The majority AS Roma’s games played in Roma began with choreography, one of which
was chosen the most beautiful Italian choreography ever by tifonet, a popular Ultras website (figure
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43).17

Figure 43. AS Roma Ultras choreography chosen most beautiful in the history of Italian
Ultras. SS Lazio-AS Roma. December 2000.
Within Curva Sud, AS Roma Ultras was rich in Romanità. Vecchie Maniere (The Old Ways),
its “fanzine,” or monthly magazine with low production values distributed at a group’s office or
place in the curva, featured a regular column on Rome’s history.18 And, many of its choreographies
glorified not AS Roma but Rome itself. It was also political. Because of its core membership, which
included Tradizione Distinzione Roma, it tilted toward being a rightist group, but it was also a voice
17

www.tifonet.com is a website which serves as a common site for all Italian Ultras. It posts photos, news,
or press releases by any curva or individual group. After the deaths of Raciti and Sandri it also collated articles from
various Italian newspapers.
18

Fanzines are primarily an English phenomenon. In England they are likely to have team news and
columns written on games and team events from the perspective of the fan. They are not necessarily “hooligan”
vehicles. In Italy, the fanzine is strictly an Ultras phenomenon. Instead of a fan’s perspective on their team, they are
an Ultras perspective on being Ultra - going to away games, attending group meetings, and the place of Ultras in
their city.
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for all of Roma’s Ultras against Calcio Moderno (Cacciari, 2004, pg. 18). And yet, it was unable to
maintain its position as the organizational centerpiece of the Curva.
A. Antichi Valori (Ancient Values) and the Fate of AS Roma Ultras19
i. Antichi Valori Goes To Brescia
In September 2002 Ultras Romani and Boys co-organized travel by train to a game in
Brescia. The two groups shared a common history, as in 2001 Spadino had asked for, and received,
the backing of Zappavigna in order to break from Fedayn to start Ultras Romani. Interestingly, it
is assumed by other groups that the Boys leader was not sought as a rightist political ally but as a
merchant ally. In truth, Zappavigna was far and away the most powerful Ultra leader in Curva Sud
Roma and with his backing anything would have been possible in the Curva.
Accompanying the Ultras to Brescia were two uniformed Carabiniere officers, something
never-before experienced by AS Roma’s Ultras. When Spadino and Zappavigna, respective leaders
of Ultras Romani and Boys, were sought for explanation, it was discovered that they were not taking
the train but Zappavigna’s car to the game. It was later confirmed that Spadino and Zappavigna had
asked the state police to “escort” the group along the journey and to the stadium.
This event marked Ultras Romani and Boys as infame (infamous), the most negative status
marker issued by the Ultras.20 After that, no one who used either group for away game travel would
be considered an Ultra by the other groups in the Curva. Because it is too difficult and expensive
for most smaller groups to organize travel to away games, it is common that they use the services
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W hat follows was explained to me by Federico, a founding member of Antichi Valori and the most
committed Ultra I met in Rome. It is certainly biased but it is also the only written explanation for the fall of AS
Roma Ultras, arguably the most important moment in the history of the Ultra phenomenon in Rome.
20

Infame is often reserved for police, to the point that if someone speaks of l’infame, they are speaking of
law enforcement.
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of larger groups. On this day, the Fedayn offshoot and AS Roma Ultras member group Antichi
Valori was on Spadino’s train to Milan.
Being of the “purist” of values, refusing even to wear scarves marked with a name or logo,
members of Antichi Valori were furious. They were a group of 35 students, service industry workers,
and professionals from the area around the Vatican. While not “professional intellectuals,” they were
known for the scathing wit and satire of their banners and contributions to Vecchie Maniere (The
Old Ways - the fanzine of AS Roma Ultras). One member was on the staff of the Vatican Library.
Consequently they were believed to be the brains behind AS Roma Ultras.
While many of them were of the right, the group was not politically designed. They
embraced the fascist element of Rome’s history, but just as much the Classical and Baroque as well.
They were a group with many friends amongst the Ultras who stood most firm to the idea that the
Ultras are a movement against capitalist modernity. Therefore, they also had many enemies. By the
time the train reached Brescia, they had, via cellular phones, alerted all of the other AS Roma Ultras
groups, plus Fedayn, to what was happening.

Figure 44. Antichi Valori banner illuminated by flares.
2003.
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ii. Antichi Valori v. Calcio Moderno and Curva Sud
The fate of Antichi Valori was tied to the fate of AS Roma Ultras. What happened to these
two groups, one small and fanatically ideological, the other a super-collective with more power than
any other group, is demonstrative of the pressures faced by Ultra groups and the fragility (by way
of its great combustibility) of the Curva Sud.
The repercussions of the trip to Brescia were not immediate for most. Because Antichi Valori
was a small group, it was not expected to take a physical stand against Boys and Ultras Romani
alone. But because it was aligned with Fedayn and a part of AS Roma Ultras, it would not have to.
For 25 years Boys and Fedayn had existed in Curva Sud without engaging one another. Both groups
agreed long ago to pretend that the other does not exist. With Boys and Fedayn mutually estranged,
Ultras Romani was left with the charge of eliminating Antichi Valori. However, Ultras Romani had
ties with AS Roma Ultras, and was thus unwilling to escalate the situation. This physical stalemate
allowed for calm, but it also allowed the tension to rise between Antichi Valori, Boys, and Ultras
Romani.
Antichi Valori began displaying banners against the “merchant Ultras” at every home game,
the most representative of which was unfurled during the 2002 game between SS Lazio and AS
Roma: “per passione non per contanti, al muro gli ultra$ mercanti” (For passion, not money. To
the wall the merchant ultra$) (figure 45). It was a message not only to Ultras Romani and Boys,
however, but one designed to connect these groups with the largest and most influential of SS
Lazio’s Ultra groups, Irriducibile, who also sell merchandise.21

21

Irriducibile: invincible, relentless. W hen searching for examples of Ultra thought being ecumenical or
universal in scope, one more often than not finds only negative examples, as in this case when Antichi Valori is
speaking of all Ultras in Italy who engage in capitalistic behavior.
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Over the course of the next year, barbs were traded between Ultras on either side of the issue.
Against the merchant Ultras, Antichi Valori and Fedayn became examples of virtue and honor within
the Curva. A new group calling itself Ultras No Profit was formed, as well as an Ultra organization
(not a proper group but a collective, or think-tank) called No al Calcio Moderno, both of which
considered anyone seeking to exploit the Ultras for profit, be they authors, journalists, industrialists,
or even other Ultras, to be infame, or personae non grate.
By the summer of 2004, Zappavigna and Spadino had seen enough. They met in the Cutty
Sark Bar, a notorious fascist hang-out near Piazza Bologna, and decided not only to get rid of
Antichi Valori, but AS Roma Ultras as well. To do so, they enlisted Boys’ old friends, AS Roma
Ultras member group Tradizione Distinzione Roma. With Tradizione Distinzione Roma aligned with
Ultras Romani and Boys, an aggressive and dynamic triumvirate was formed that would rule the
Curva for the subsequent years.

Figure 45. Antichi Valori banner against merchant Ultras.
AS Roma-SS Lazio 2002.
At this turn of events, Antichi Valori turned to Fedayn in hopes that they would help restore
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order to the Curva, even if only by counseling a meeting with the other groups. According to those
present, Fedayn capo Massimo, a legend in the Ultra community, chaired the meeting at which it
was decided that Fedayn would not get involved with the conflict, except as the patron of Antichi
Valori. It was also decided that if moves were made to disband AS Roma Ultras, neither Fedayn nor
any other group would attempt to save it. This is because the groups sought autonomy above all.
They were not interested in controlling the Curva Sud, only their own memberships. Much like
Boys’ rationale for dissolving their association with CUCS in 1984, the groups wanted to be able to
pick and fight their own battles.
To begin the 2004-5 season Antichi Valori decided no longer to unfurl their banner in Curva
Sud. This was a sign of defeat. There were too many forces aligned against them to warrant their
continuing as a small autonomous group. It took until January 30, 2004 for AS Roma Ultras to fold.
After doing so, the same people who had created and populated the group stayed in Curva Sud. But
by not standing behind a banner they were essentially removing themselves from the battle to control
the Curva. This left Boys, Ultras Romani, and Tradizione Distinzione Roma on one side, and Fedayn
on the other, with the first three in proper control of Curva Sud. Their control would be short lived,
however.
iii. Ultras Romani Briefly Wins the War
In July 2005, just after the previous season’s conclusion, Paolo Zappavigna was killed in a
traffic accident. As the leader of Boys and patron of Ultras Romani and Tradizione Distinzione
Roma these groups went into shock. The death was especially disastrous for Boys, as the entirety of
their leadership was now disconnected from the group. Zappavigna was dead and his two assistants
were diffidati (legally prohibited from attending sporting events) for three years for their part in
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having the SS Lazio-AS Roma suspended at half-time in March 2004 as a protest against Calcio
Moderno and the corporate take-over of the game.
Meanwhile, Tradizione Distinzione Roma never made much of an attempt to take control of
the Curva. In fact, their own place in the lower section of the Curva was under attack, as the smaller
groups there attempted another alignment similar to AS Roma Ultras called Curva Sud 1973 (the
year in which it was decided between Ultras of AS Roma and SS Lazio that the former would
primarily inhabit Curva Sud and the latter Curva Nord of Rome’s Olympic Stadium). Their only
desire, however, was to keep the lower section free of merchant Ultras. Tradizione Distinzione Roma
would eventually dissolve in 2007, reconstituting itself as Padroni di Casa. Finally, in 2008 Ultras
Romani was forced out of Curva Sud by a former Fedayn leader named Riccardo. In a showdown
shrouded in mystery the common consensus is that he brutally beat Spadino and thus won the right
to expel him and Ultras Romani from the Curva. The group which took its place in Curva Sud,
Royalist, is non-political but is committed to ensuring that no new merchant groups form in the
Curva.
IV. Conclusion: Ultras - Hatreds and Commitments
The Curva that I entered in 2006 was dominated by Ultras Romani and the issue of
merchandising in Curva Sud. The fallout from AS Roma Ultras’ disintegration was still settling as
well, with many of the most respected Ultras in the Curva relocating to the Tevere grandstand. In
somewhat subdued form, given the spectacular Curva Sud demonstrations arranged by AS Roma
Ultras, fandom continued. As did the legacy of political groups in the Curva. Padroni di Casa
brought a level of political activism and sophistication never before seen by AS Roma’s Ultras. And
yet, if one studied just the aesthetic elements of the Ultras, thereby ignoring the political and
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ideological fault lines of the Curva, such a study would yield data that is deep and enriching to the
study of the Ultras. In the chapters that follow the mentalità, agonistic form of life, and the political
ideologies of certain groups take center stage. It was the purpose of this chapter to provide the
explosive context in which much of what follows took place.
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CHAPTER THREE: The Everyday Life of the Ultras
The previous chapter presented a history of the most important and contentious events that
have combined to create the Curva that I entered in 2006. The chapter was created by combining
accounts of those events given me by the Ultras themselves. The purpose of the chapter, then, was
to provide the reader with two things: knowledge of the groups and the context in which they exist
within the Curva and the ultras phenomenon; and an understanding of the Curva as a space in which
all relationships and places are contested.
In the coming chapters, the most important elements of the Ultras will come into focus,
including their relationships with violence, fascism, and Counter-Enlightenment political
philosophy. This chapter will instead present the more mundane aspects of the Ultra experience:
namely, the game-attending experiences. Based on what we already know of the Ultras and their instadium behaviors, it might seem incongruous to describe game attendance as mundane. But, given
the unpredictability of so much of the beyond-the-stadium life of the Ultras - the involvement of
soccer-and-state-related authorities in their activities (see Chapter 4), and the extreme nature of their
political activities (Chapters 4-8) - going to a game often appears as the most normal activity in their
lives.
The chapter will be divided between Ultra experiences in trasferta (before, during, and after
away games) and in their home stadium, Rome’s Olympic Stadium. I will present a detailed account
of an away game to Palermo so that one may know exactly what goes on when Ultras travel for
hours to see AS Roma play, and in order to explain why doing so is important to the Ultras. Then,
I will present the reader with game experiences in Rome’s Olympic Stadium. I will begin, however,
with a brief examination of the personal style of the Ultras.
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I. The Personal Style of the Ultras
A. Hooligan Style
Like the Hooligan phenomenon in England, the Ultras have a particular style of dress and
comportment that has changed over time. Phil Thornton identified the origins of hooligan fashion
in the 60s counter-cultural movements of skinhead and “suedehead” (Thornton, 2003, pgs. 14-17).
The former was a working-class response to the bourgeois aesthetic of the popular music of the day.
In place of pencil suits and bohemian hippie garb, the skinheads sought a more masculine, strippeddown aesthetic of old blue jeans rolled-up above or tucked into ten-hole Doc Martens (work boots),
tight fitting t-shirts, a scarf (if attending a soccer match), and, of course, a shaved head.
The “suedehead” movement grew out of skinhead. As Thornton describes, “the skins had
mutated into bootboys, longer-haired versions of their former selves, the fashions inspired by a
peculiar mish-mash of 70s styles such as flares, Doc Martens, and three-star jumpers” (Thornton,
2003, pg. 16). These two styles dominated “terrace” fashion in England until the early 1980s when
the Casual aesthetic was born.
Casual is a style based on mass-produced sports wear. It ranges from athletic track suits to
polo shirts and madras pants. There are two constants though to Casual style. One, sneakers are the
most prized piece of the wardrobe. And two, a Casual never wears the colors of the team they
support, especially when attending games. Casual has had the biggest impact on the Ultras
phenomenon.
B. Ultras Style
i. Beginnings
As I described in the previous chapter, the original Ultras appropriated the style of political
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radicals (from students to factory workers) in the late-1960s (Podarliri and Balestri, 1998, pg. 90).
This style consisted of green parkas, blue jeans, sneakers, and, most importantly, the full-face
covering balaclava mask. It is possible that this style was originally influenced by the radical
Marxism that dominated the student movement and factory struggles after 1968, both of which were
reactions to the neo-capitalist and American Dream models of consumption that defined the postwar
Italian Dolce Vita (Ginsborg, 2003a, pgs. 300-309).
ii. Mid-80s Borrowing from the Hooligans
From these beginnings inspired by Italian radicalism, the Ultras came to borrow from the
English hooligans as well, especially after Liverpool FC played the European Cup final in Rome in
1985 (Roversi, 1994, pg. 368). In the meantime, though, Ultras developed a style all their own,
incorporating the parka and balaclava of the earliest years of the phenomenon with flared pants,
work boots or sneakers, and polo shirts.
The 1985 European Cup final in Rome had a huge impact on AS Roma’s Ultras. Amongst
England’s hooligans, those who followed Liverpool had a myriad of unique styles. The two most
visible amongst these were the Mods and Casuals. The Mods’ style was based on that of the
“droogs” of Stanley Kubrick’s adaptation of A Clockwork Orange (1971): tight fitting pants, work
boots, dress shirts, suspenders, and dinner jackets (Thornton 2003, pgs. 147-150). The Mods were
inspired as well by the Kubrick film, moving away politically from both leftist socialism and rightist
fascism into the realm of anarchism (discussed in Chapter 4). The Casuals, as I said above, wore no
colors associated with Liverpool but wore instead fashionable sportswear.
In the years following that 1985 game, in which Liverpool beat AS Roma (the game
coincidently being played in Rome’s Olympic Stadium), the Curva Sud groups began to attach style
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to their senses of identity. Boys and Fedayn were still associated with the political radicalism on
which they were based, and thus maintained the parkas and balaclavas, as did CUCS. However,
more and more of the smaller groups springing up in the lower section of the curva were either Mods
or Casuals, including the groups MODS and Roma Casual Firm, the latter group using the English
word for a UK hooligan group, firm.
iii. Into the 1990s with a Style of Their Own
Just as a series of lines can be drawn between the politics, ideologies, and economics of the
groups (i.e. if they sell merchandise), one could now draw a line based on style. Leftist groups
maintained, as they still do, the late-60s iconic styles, but were joined by the Mods, whose political
anarchism was far closer in affiliation to the left than right. On the right, however, parkas were shed
in the 1990s in favor of the felpa, or tight fitting zip-front sweater, and hooded sweatshirt. When one
wore the felpa a balaclava was worn as well, and when the hooded sweatshirt was worn, the hood
was deployed. Ultras did so in response to the state’s use of Closed Circuit TV (CCTV) to identify
perpetrators of “soccer related violence.”1 Typically the lower part of the face was covered with a
scarf. Boots, blue jeans, or, as the 1990s progressed, camouflage pants completed the look.
Other parts of the right, including Monteverde and Opposta Fazione, adopted the Casual
style, but only because it afforded them some anonymity on game days. It is these two looks, the
head covered storm trooper and the innocuous bourgeois sight-seer that came to represent Ultra-style
entering the 2000s.

1

Ultra violence and the state’s attempts to police it will be discussed at length in the following chapters.

117

Figure 46. Ultra wearing balaclava. Genova
2010.
iv. Style in Today’s Curva Sud
In today’s Curva Sud there are a few Mods, some parka-wearing leftist radicals, many
Casuals, and many rightist storm troopers. The one style-constant that unites these tendencies is that
the clothing choices are also worn everyday. In other words, the Ultras who take up these modes of
dress do so in their daily lives as well as at the games. More to the point, most will don only a scarf
of their Ultra group or AS Roma to mark their affiliations on game day. On days when no game is
being played, it is rare to find an Ultra wearing AS Roma’s colors (red and yellow), whether in the
form of a scarf, hat, or shirt. Ultra style is not fundamentally about team colors
The most recent additions to the Roman Ultra wardrobe are Munich brand sneakers and
bomber jackets with fur-lined hoods. These are worn on any day the weather allows or demands, and
by Ultras across the political spectrum. Sneakers of any kind are the most popular footwear amongst
AS Roma’s Ultras. Munich, a type of indoor-soccer shoe, Nike Shox, and Adidas and Puma training
shoes are all equally popular. Unlike amongst the UK hooligans, Doc Martens and other work boots
are worn only by the most ideologically committed members of extreme right or left groups.
Interestingly, almost all of the females associated with Ultra groups wore the same fur-trimmed
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bomber jacket and sneakers as their male counterparts.
Another visible trend among the rightists in Curva Sud is short sleeved button-front shirts
of small blue checked pattern. I am unaware as to why this style of shirt was popular, but Fabio, one
of the popular leaders of Boys, was never seen without one (figure 22). It is possible that his high
visibility in Curva Sud inspired others to emulation.

Figure 47. AC Milan Ultra wearing a felpa and head covering.
Bergamo. November 11, 2007.
The other leaders of Boys were fond of wearing official team gear of the New Zealand
national rugby team, the All Blacks. Those with whom I spoke had some knowledge of the team,
or at least the haka (a ceremonial Maori dance) which they performed before some matches, but
none considered themselves fans of the team. Instead, the name referred for them to the camicia nera
(black shirt) and general spirit of fascism (a popular refrain is “ho il cuore nero” - “I have a black
heart”). Although it is beyond the scope of this project to dissect this appropriation, I can say that
it was a rare example amongst AS Roma’s Ultras. Later chapters will discuss how the Ultras utilize
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symbols of fascism and Romanità (a deep commitment to Rome and things Roman), but these are
understood as being much “closer to home” for AS Roma’s Ultras, who deeply associate with both.
Contrary to De Biasi and Lanfranchi, I did not find that the political symbols used by the
Ultras are devoid of their original meaning; when combined with their political agendas they are,
to the contrary, entirely consistent with those meanings (1997, pgs. 87-104). If groups on the right
displayed fascist and Nazi symbols during games, it was with explicit knowledge of the power of
those symbols. Likewise the leftists, such as the Ultras of AS Livorno, displayed symbols of
international socialism with the direct intent of displaying their own allegiance to those symbols.
Even the aesthetics inspired by A Clockwork Orange hardly qualify as being “recontextualized,” as
the political anarchism (and ethics of violence) of the “droogs” also made their way into the Mod
Ultras (De Biasi and Lanfranchi 1997. Pg. 96).
It is possible to say that, generally speaking, AS Roma’s Ultras are highly conscious of style.
Some use style as a way to maintain the traditions of the Ultras. Others use it to mark themselves
politically. Still others use it as a means of camouflage against police detection. In each case, the
mode of dress chosen by each Ultra links him or her with other Ultras in their group, and when at
away games with AS Roma’s Ultras in general.
II. The Ultras in Trasferta2
Even a writer as quantitatively focused as Antonio Roversi has acknowledged “war” as the
principle metaphor in the Ultras’ self-understanding (1990, pg. 70). Dal Lago agreed with this idea
and applied it to the in-game theatrics of the Ultras. His study, Descrizione di Una Battaglia (1990),
treats these theatrics as part of a larger cultural milieu in which symbolic plasticity and the

2

At an away game.
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movability of signs (such as the decontextualized political symbols adopted by the Ultras) bring the
Ultras closer to the “festival” described by Georges Bataille.
Simply put, Bataille’s “festival” is an event in which prohibitions are transgressed and
servility is contested, thereby limiting the distance between the profane and the sacred or forbidden
aspects of human life. The festival is often violent and transgressions seemingly verge on the
animalistic (Bataille, 1997, pgs. 248-252). When the festival, or moment of transgression, is
completed, the boundary between the profane and sacred is shattered, thus giving life a deeper and
richer course (Bataille, 1997, pg. 251).
According to Dal Lago, the Ultras understand soccer as a world strictly divided between
friend and foe, and matches as a series of ritualized, and symbolic, confrontations between foes. The
stadium, it follows, is transformed into a setting for these “festive” confrontations. I say “festive”
because Dal Lago implies that this takes place in a “liminal zone” in which the overweening order
of profane life is momentarily cast off, allowing the Ultras to discharge the frustrations inherent in
that life (Dal Lago, 1990, pg. 143).
While maintaining the central thrust of Bataille’s understanding of the festival as a moment
in which the forbidden is achieved and thereby enriches the experience of life, I question Dal Lago’s
assumptions that this moment takes place in a location wherein Ultras leave behind, or unchain
themselves from, their “daily” or profane lives (Dal Lago and De Biasi, 1994, pg. 77).
Instead, my research shows that the Ultras are Ultras because of an exaggeration, rather than
a transcending, of the cultural systems that make up “profane existence.” In other words, the
rivalries and oppositions that fill soccer with meaning for the Ultras are brought into the stadium
from other arenas, be they political, mythical, geographical, or historical. It is their willingness to
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live every day according to these rivalries (and other aspects of the mentalità- to be discussed at
length below) that ultimately makes them Ultras and not just highly interested fans. Thus, we should
not be surprised, as was John Foot, that two of the AS Roma Ultras arrested for getting the 2003-4
SS Lazio-AS Roma game suspended at halftime worked as a “cameraman and a financial
consultant” (Foot, 2006, pg. 307).
Nevertheless, there is value in using Victor Turner’s theoretical constructions of “the
liminal” to explain Ultra behavior. Certainly, the trasferta (away game) experience acts as a rite of
passage through which an Ultra comes to be ultra. More than liminality, though, it is the idea of
communitas made popular by Victor Turner that best explains something about the Ultras.
Communitas is a form of “social anti-structure” through which persons who share biology, culture,
or even extreme personal experience unite in opposition to the larger social structure to which they,
nominally at least, belong (Turner, 1979, pgs. 237-238). Later in the dissertation the Ultras use of
war, as an example of what I am calling their agonistic culture, will be demonstrated as the basis of
their communitas. The extreme behaviors they share give them a rationale for severely limiting the
scope of their altruistic horizons.
It is with this in mind that we now move to a description of Ultra behaviors before, during,
and after away games. It is away from Rome that AS Roma’s Ultras are best able to play-out one
of the central tropes of war, and the Ultra phenomenon: redemption through struggle and sacrifice.
A. The Away Game
One of the most simple but most common areas of Ultra behavior in which sacrifice is a
guiding principle is their devotion to travel long distances and to overcome all obstacles to witness
and participate in AS Roma’s games. One accrues special status among the Ultras if seen in the
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guest sections of stadiums far from Rome. For example, at the end of the 2006-2007 season, AS
Roma played a practically meaningless game at Palermo. Because the team’s final standing in the
championship was essentially already determined, there was no “sporting” reason to go to the game.
However, for the Ultras it was an important opportunity to sacrifice and, more importantly, to suffer
for the colors of the team and city.
After years of following AS Roma away from Rome the experience of doing so acquires a
certain rhythm. The following sections describe some of the most important or meaningful aspects
of the away game experience. Rightly, it begins the week before a game and the search for tickets.
It continues through the travel to and arrival at the stadium, and concludes with the game and return
to Rome.
i. Buying Tickets
Every away game begins the week prior with a hunt for tickets. Before the Amato Decree,
a set of laws passed in the days following the February 2007 death of Officer Raciti which severely
restrict the actions of the Ultras, those in the groups that received tickets from AS Roma merely
reported to their leader or leadership council their desire to attend the game. Otherwise, one needed
only go to an official AS Roma store with a ticket office to buy away game tickets. Even as
identification papers were required, so that each ticket holder’s name could be printed on each ticket,
one person could carry all of the papers for his group and make a group purchase. Unless the game
was of an importance that made availability an issue, one could easily acquire tickets to any AS
Roma away game. However, after the Amato Decree, as a way to extinguish the ties between Ultras
and the clubs, the latter were forbidden to sell tickets to away games; and tickets could no longer
be sold in groups. Thus, acquiring tickets now requires Ultras to struggle and sacrifice, which they
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see as “doing their duty to the Curva.”
The tickets for Unione Sportiva Città di (USC) Palermo are distributed by Ticket One, a
service similar to America’s Ticketmaster. To buy tickets for the game, AS Roma fans could go to
any locale serving as a Ticket One ticket office. However, it was normal to arrive at one of these
locales, usually a bar or tobacconists, only to be told that, in fact, they had no blank tickets for USC
Palermo and, therefore, could not sell tickets. Given that there would normally be only one or two
designated ticket offices in Rome for each sporting club, it made purchasing tickets difficult.
Some teams, like the two teams from Milan, used Milanese banks as ticket offices. One or
two branches in Rome would sell tickets to various sporting or cultural events. These banks, though,
were notorious for refusing to sell tickets to Ultras. On one occasion, my wife and I purchased
tickets to a game against Inter Milano. While waiting at a nearby bus stop an unfamiliar AS Roma
fan asked us the location of the bank. Moments later he returned saying that he was told the bank
did not sell tickets.
In other instances a team would use a local retailer as ticket office. Livorno’s team, for
instance, used a perfume store on the northern edge of Rome. Others were linked to List Ticket, who
had only one branch of Banca di Roma near the Termini train station that sold tickets. All told it
took time and effort to buy tickets, especially from the banks, because, their prejudice against rowdy
fans aside, their hours of operation usually prohibited anyone with a job from easy access.
Difficulties buying away game tickets became regular conversation on Lorenzo Contucci’s AS Roma
Ultras website in 2007. Anyone, myself included, who found a bank branch or otherwise that would
actually sell them a ticket invariably posted that information online.
Because of the hardship suffered merely to buy tickets, the Ultras have incorporated this into
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their conception of what one must do to be or become an Ultra. There is no distance here between
the in-game behaviors and the mundane everyday life of the Ultras. If one does not sacrifice oneself
during the week then it matters little what one does on game days. In the past, day-to-day sacrifice
might have meant community service or being present at group meetings. Now it includes hunting
for tickets, which they use as an example of the distance between themselves and normal fans.
The Ultras assumed that the state was making it difficult to purchase tickets to away games
because it did not want them to travel. Instead of banning travel, which would be unconstitutional,
the state would ensure that very few Ultras would make it to the games. Given the difficulties I faced
in acquiring tickets, regularly having to travel from one side of Rome to the other in search of a
vender who was willing or able to sell tickets, I feel confident in expressing the Ultras’ idea of
sacrifice as a part of the away game process. For most of my subjects, free tickets were a given until
February 2007. Free tickets were replaced by a maddening system of confusion that might take
someone two days to acquire one ticket.
Ticket costs were usually minimal, between 12 and 18 euros. This allowed access to the
guest section, the only section an Ultra would enter. The premise of the away game is to be with
one’s group or friends, amassed in the small guest section against the superior numbers of the home
fans. To be mixed with the home fans, as will be explained later, was seen as a sign of vulgarity and
pointlessness.
ii. Transportation
After acquiring tickets, one must arrange transportation. Even though the Amato Decree has
made this more difficult as well, the options available to most Ultras do not involve the state or the
clubs but other Ultras. To make the trip from Rome to Palermo for a Sunday game starting at 3pm
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takes commitment. To arrive by automobile one needs 9 hours. By train, almost 13 hours. To fly
takes only 2 hours but one expects to pay around 200 euros. Because spending money is not
considered a sacrifice, and because many Ultras refuse to spend great sums of money to follow their
team, most travel by train or automobile. This is true even for Ultras who have jobs and disposable
income.
Although it is more difficult today than in the recent past to take trains without paying, it is
still part of the Ultras’ form of life to travel for free. On numerous away trips I saw Ultras walking
from one train car to the next, and back again, in a constant attempt to avoid the ticket checker.
Another strategy was to lock oneself in the bathroom. I asked Giorgio, an Ultra of 13 years who was
a founding member of Romulae Genti (the Race of Romulus) about the practice. “Our goal is to pay
as little as possible to follow AS Roma. Money should never be a substitute for one’s worthiness to
be in the stadium,” he explained before adding that in the 2006-2007 season he took a 17 hour trek
to Milan by way of small regional trains because these very rarely have ticket checkers. He could
have taken a highspeed train, as I did, and arrived in Milan within four hours. Upon learning that
I simply went to the ticket counter and bought to ticket to Milan, he laughed and said, “you will
never be an Ultra until you sneak aboard a train.” “We never pay,” he reiterated.
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Figure 48. Ultras leaving Rome on a special
train. 2003.
Therefore the idea of using airlines to travel to away games is generally ruled out unless the
game is outside of Italy. Before the 2006-2007 season Ferrovie dello Stato (the Italian state railway,
also known as Trenitalia) would organize special trains to transport large groups of fans to their
destinations and back for free. However, this practice was outlawed, again by the Amato Decree,
in order to curtail the movement of Ultras. It is still possible for Ultra groups to organize private
buses. However, because they do so for profit, and because so few Ultras travel now, most buses are
canceled in mid-week due to lack of interest. Hence most travel to and from away games these days
takes place in automobiles.
For the 2006-2007 Palermo game, however, most Ultras chose to arrive by train. With the
game beginning at 3pm on Sunday, they took the overnight train from Rome, leaving Saturday at
9pm in order to arrive in time. Being on a train with Ultras is a unique experience. One witnesses
fandom, camaraderie, affection, aggression, horseplay, and an array of insults. The trip began as was
usual during my time with the Ultras: with flags and scarves waved from windows and 20-minutes
or so of songs (figure 48). Being unobserved by the authorities someone invariably made their way
to the intercom and broadcast the performance to all of the train’s passengers. After this trip’s
performance, the Ultras found seats and sleepers near their friends and group-mates.
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On the train to Palermo were approximately 100 Ultras. Of these, I only saw 8 females, 4 of
whom were traveling with Fedayn. The group of Ultras as a whole was typical of those that traveled
long distances. There were many leaders from the most important groups in Curva Sud, along with
the most committed of their members. Ages ranged from approximately 19 to 46, the age of
Allesandro, a longtime leader of Fedayn.
iii. Mangiamo! (Let’s eat!)
Within each group, or group of friends, there seems always to be someone who always
travels with food. Each time I enquired about the food’s origin, I was told “mamma l’ha fatto” or
“da mamma” (mamma made it). Normally, when the group arrived at a stadium, the food carrier
would open a backpack and begin distributing individually wrapped sandwiches to his friends.
However, in Parma for a Coppa Italia game, I watched a small group of Ultras share a portion of
perfectly sliced Prosciutto di Parma while discussing its merits relative to Friuli’s Prosciutto San
Daniele.3
Other times food is central to the post-game experience. Returning by train to Rome from
Empoli, a small town near Florence, my hunger was sated by a young Ultra whom I had never met.
He passed sandwiches to his friends and caught me observing intently. He asked me and my wife
if we were hungry. She politely answered “no thank you” while I said “yes thank you.” Seconds later
we were eating a sandwich. Similarly, in one of the buses arranged by the city of Milan to transport
AS Roma fans from the San Siro stadium to the Milan Central train station after a game against
Inter, a group of friends devoured a sack full of sandwiches as a machine-gun toting Carabiniere
observed. They laughed as someone asked his permission to eat.
3

Coppa Italia (the Italian Cup) is a tournament that runs concurrent that of Serie A and features teams from
all four divisions of Italian professional soccer - Serie A, B, C1, and C2.

128

Water and beer act similar to food in being consumed communally. On the bus organized by
Boys Roma to Milan for the second-leg of the 2006-2007 Coppa Italia final, there was constant
circulation of water, chips, and cookies provided by whomever brought or purchased them. On this
trip no alcohol was allowed. While it is prohibited by the state to consume alcohol in automobiles
I was told that it is normal for Ultras’ buses to be awash in alcohol. Boys Roma, however, does not
allow anyone to drink during travel to away games as they demand strict order and discipline. The
water consumed this day was pleasurable but on other occasions water seems an issue of life and
death.
A large group of nearly two thousand Ultras went to Livorno in January 2007 - our last away
game before the death of Raciti and the crackdown that followed - on a treno orginazzato (a special
train organized by Trenitalia). From the station the Ultras were transported by special buses to the
stadium. Once the buses entered the enclosed area beyond the guest section it was impossible to
leave (figure 49). This is standard practice for away games, although Livorno took security
especially seriously, given the political nature of the rivalry between AS Roma and AS Livorno.4
In these situations it is important to have your own food and drink, as there is no guarantee that one
can find food either in the city or stadium. Even when the Ultras are not forced to go directly to the
stadium, as in Udine, Reggio Calabria, and Turin, they normally arrive between 10am and noon on
Sunday mornings when only a few snack bars and cafés are open for business.

4

This rivalry will be discussed below. It is one based entirely on extreme politics. AS Roma’s Ultras are
largely fascist and of the far right while those of AS Livorno are largely communist and of the far left.
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Figure 49. Police in the guest holding area of
Livorno’s stadium. 2007.

The guest section of Livorno’s Stadio Armando Picchi has only one concession stand that
guests can reach only through a small hole in the back wall. Thankfully, Ultras cut this hole in the
chain-link fence surrounding the concession, allowing one to hold out a handful of euros and retrieve
the ordered items, trying not to get snagged on the ragged fence. On my two trips there, the
concession either ran out of food and drink or simply closed well before half-time. This meant that
one had at least an hour until the end of the game with very little to eat or drink. On top of this, it
is also standard procedure for away fans to be held in their section until all home fans, especially
opposing Ultras, have left the stadium area. This usually translates into an additional hour.
Once we were loaded on the buses after the game and post-game wait we faced another 25
minutes of driving to the station. In order to keep us separated from any Livornesi (inhabitants of
Livorno), they drove us to a strip of land behind the station. When the doors opened we sprinted to
the train cars in order to find seats (figure 50). Everyone laughed at the situation and cursed the
police and Livornesi until the train pulled away from the station. It was only when we settled in for
the 4-hour journey that we realized we were thirsty and had nothing to drink.
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Figure 50. Ultras boarding a train in Livorno. 2007.
For most of the Ultras, lack of food and drink was just an inconvenience to be overcome, an
example of their willingness to suffer in order to be present at the game. For two Ultras on the train,
though, the situation seemed more serious. After singing and screaming themselves hoarse for the
game’s 90-minutes and now facing the prospect of a water-less journey back to Rome, these two
almost reached the point of panic. At our first stop in Rosignano an attempt was made to exit the
train, buy water from a vending machine, and re-enter the train. However, the fickleness of the
machine left the Ultras scrambling back on the train without water just as the doors closed and minus
30 cents. Cecina offered no vending machine on our platform. This prompted the Ultras to cease
from insulting the locals and begin asking politely for water. No results. Not at San Vincenzo, either.
Finally, at Campiglia Marittima, an hour into our trip, a young girl handed up through the open
window a partially drunk bottle of water. The two Ultras most desperate for water took excited sips
and then handed the bottle to the person next to them, who passed the bottle not back to them but
on to someone else.
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iv. The Arrival
Returning to the Palermo trip referred to above, after we ate and everyone calmed down and
settled in for the night’s journey we arrived at the Naples central station to make our scheduled
(11:15 PM) stop. Out came the flags and scarves. Then came the anthem of the CUCS and several
rounds of “Odio Napoli” (I hate Naples).5 As we pulled into the station, the platform was populated
by a handful of waiting passengers and perhaps one-hundred policemen. Beyond them, we could see
and hear a small crowd of SSC Napoli Ultras, singing “Romanista pezzo di merda” (AS Roma fan
piece of shit) and “Roma Roma Vaffanculo” (Rome go fuck yourself). Some of the AS Roma Ultras
attempted to exit the train, but as expected were stopped by the police. The scene lasted
approximately fifteen minutes. But after the initial exchange of insults there was only sporadic
singing or yelling. The sizable police presence kept action to a minimum, despite the hostilities.
AS Roma has no such rivalry with Palermo. We faced no opposition from the Palermo Ultras
even outside the Renzo Barbera stadium which lies west of central Palermo. The entrance to the
guest section of the stadium was even opened this day to normal Palermo fans who sat above the
section itself (normally a position advantageous for showering various objects upon the guests).
Perhaps the police felt secure in this arrangement because they understood that only under extreme
circumstances will Ultras engage in violence with non-Ultra fans.

5

The CUCS anthem: Quando l’inno si alzerà, tutto il mondo tremerà, canteremo fino alla morte, inalzando
nostri colori, che ci vien’ dal profondo del cuore, alè alè, alè Roma alè! (Sung to La Marseillaise)

132

Figure 51. Police inspect the possessions of AS Roma’s
Ultras upon entering the stadium. Palermo. 2007.
Or perhaps it was because they were interrogating on video every person who entered the
section wearing giallorosso (yellow and red, the colors of Rome). They asked our names, what time
and how we reached the city, and what time and how we were leaving. Then, another officer looked
through knapsacks and backpacks, I assumed to search for bombs and flares, while another
confiscated all flag poles. Anyone carrying a flag or homemade banner had them inspected and some
were confiscated as well (figure 51).
v. Hold Your Colors High!
Upon entering our cage-like section, two more policemen waited to inform each and all that
absolutely no colors would be permitted to be displayed. Therefore, no flags, no banners, no scarves
could be held aloft. Many of the Ultras immediately removed their shirts just to carry the point
further. Despite the protests of the leaders of Fedayn, Boys, and Ultras Romani a pile of flags and
banners was created below us at field level and the officers stood guard over it throughout the game.

133

Figure 52. Police confiscate the colors
of AS Roma’s Ultras. Palermo. 2007.

To be interviewed on camera, so as to be identifiable on Closed Circuit cameras in the
stadium, was unusual but sufferable. However, to be forbidden to stand behind and under AS
Roma’s (and Rome’s) colors and the names and symbols of the Ultra groups was particularly
stinging for the Ultras. Meanwhile, the detractors of the Ultras use the issue as proof that they are
not true fans but only go to away games to be seen behind their banners. Far from being a mere
vanity or truly the only reason they travel to away games, the banner is the symbol of the group.
English hooliganism developed the “taking of one’s end” as the ultimate humiliation of one’s
opponents. This entailed raiding the “curva” of the opposing team and, after fighting or because of
being uncontested, being able to stay there for a period of time. In Italy the Ultras were never free
enough to move within a stadium as this action requires. Ever since the creation of Serie A in the
1920s, rivalries have been so heated as to warrant segregated stadiums (Foot, 2006, pgs. 302-324).
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Figure 53. Enclosed pathway on exterior of
Palermo’s stadium. 2007.
Thus they stole opponents’ banners as a similar humiliation. These would then be displayed
and sometimes burned in the opposing curva during a game. The most common way for a group’s
banner to be stolen was during fighting before a game. However, since the death of Genoa Ultra
Vincenzo Spagnolo at the hands of his AC Milan counterparts in 1995, the police have made a
concerted effort to keep opposing Ultras separated before and after games (Mariottini, 2006, pgs.
111-127) (figure 53). The banners remain well-guarded nonetheless and, because of the unlikelihood
of being stolen, highly sought-after.
The Ultras place so much value on having their banner seen because it is a form of validation
of the energy expended going to and from away games. As Antonio of Razza Romana told me, he
explained to the police in Palermo that, “we came a long way to be here to feel the pride of hoisting
our colors above our heads in a stadium full of people who will hate us for doing so.” Later that
evening I asked him to elaborate. “Have you seen the Boys scarf?” he asked, referring to their latest
model which reads “odiati e fieri” (hated and proud), “well, that sums up who we Romans are.
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Everyone hates us because we are so proud to be Roman. Going to Palermo shows them that we will
go anywhere and hold our colors high, with pride and dignity.”
I asked about hanging the banners. “The banners are only slightly different because they
belong to the groups; and the groups are the ones who suffer to support la Roma (AS Roma). Yes,
I may go or you may go, but we go as representatives of groups - friends, comrades, brothers, sisters.
When I hang our banner in Palermo I do so for them, especially if they cannot come to the game.”
I then asked him about sacrifice but he misunderstood me. “Exactly!” he said, “it is their sacrifice
to miss the game. They might help me get here, as we help one another always, and I am only here
because of them.” In that vein I asked about the prospects of getting his small banner stolen. “Porco
dio,” he replied in classic Roman style, with the “por” exaggeratedly annunciated, “how could I face
them? Sure, I would have to get a new banner made, but then the history, the kilometers, the blood
and sweat that stained this one would be lost. If this banner is lost our group would probably fold.
In this climate (post-Raciti) it would be too difficult to begin again. There is no way to remake the
memories contained in this banner.” As we spoke he was keeping the folded banner in a backpack,
which he held all the way back to Rome.
In Lisbon for a Champions League game between Sporting Portugal and AS Roma, I
witnessed a fight between a former leader of Opposta Fazione and a well known “club fan” because
the latter had placed his banner over that of the Ultra’s group Brigata Caciara (one of the small,
away-game only groups). The “club fans” are the other form of tifo orginazzato (organized fandom)
in Italy. Instead of being Ultras, they are social clubs, for example “Roma Club Testaccio,” and
consist of older and more bourgeois fans. They are always present at away games and in Rome,
occupying the Tevere grandstand, but do not share the Ultras mentalità or style of fandom (figure

136

54). Given the nature of the combatants, the fight was short, nasty, and ended with the ejection of
the Ultra. Importantly, his banner remained.

Figure 54. AS Roma fans and Ultras intermingle. Lisbon.
2007.
The groups compete to arrive at stadiums earlier than the others so as to have choice of the
best space to hang their banners. The glee of arriving early to find an empty section is matched only
by the horror of arriving late and finding space for neither the banner nor the group (figure 55). This
is one of the main reasons groups create alliances, to save space for one another at away games. For
the 2006-2007 and 2007-2008 seasons, the largest groups (Fedayn and Ultras Romani) worked
together to save space, repeatedly elbowing out many smaller groups who hang banners away from
Rome.6 In their mind, the hundreds standing behind the larger groups’s banners outweigh the 3 to
5 standing behind a small group’s banner. There would be no solution in a group hanging its banner
and standing elsewhere as no one would want to stand behind a banner that was not their own.

6

There are groups, like the small and secretive BRG (whose meaning I was not told), which exist only at
away games. They display no banner during home games, even as the group stands together.
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Figure 55. AS Roma’s Ultras display their group banners in
Livorno. 2007.
Because most guest sections are small, holding less than one-thousand persons, the groups
seek to accommodate one another by hanging smaller versions of their normal banners. To
compensate, the group might carry more flags. Ultras Romani, early in the 2006-2007 season, was
not following this protocol. They consistently carried their large banner, created for their space in
Rome’s stadium, and measuring approximately 20 feet across and 4 feet high. Leaving no space for
the banners of other groups, ths was interpreted as a provocation. Boys, Fedayn, and various smaller
but still substantial groups first conspired to arrive at away stadiums before Ultras Romani in order
to procure the most banner space. Eventually, Fedayn united (on only this issue) with Ultras
Romani. Both agreed to save space for one another, with Ultras Romani carrying their smaller
banner as part of the agreement.
The act of hanging the banner is a serious matter. Each group carries various forms of tape,
twine, and rope in order to be best prepared. The banner is carried by only the most select members
of each group. These are also responsible for having it hung properly. Unless there is no other
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choice, a banner will never be visibly crooked or creased. Often, as in Parma, Messina, and Reggio
Calabria, hanging a banner in the optimal space requires climbing and sitting on a 10 foot partition
topped by jagged metal pieces designed to keep the Ultras from breaching their designated space
(figure 56). In these cases, a human pyramid may form, which the hanger climbs in order to reach
the top of the partition (figure 19).

Figure 56. Luigi of Arditi hanging banners in Parma.
2007.
For as long as it takes - in Reggio Calabria it took 40 minutes for Razza Romana to hang
their banner in this manner - an Ultra will endure pain and fear to get the banner hung. If the
situation is pathetic or comical enough, another group might offer to help. The most adept hanger
of group banners in all of Curva Sud Roma is Luigi, the leader of Arditi. In Parma, he climbed the
partition free-handed and proceeded to hang almost every present group’s banner (figure 56). He
also used his time atop the barrier to harangue opposing players, stewards, officials, photographers,
and TV personalities. Upon returning to earth he was given a rousing ovation by the large contingent
of AS Roma fans.
The cooperation between the groups while away from home gives us a sense of the spirit of
camaraderie and brotherhood that develops amongst those who regularly travel to support AS Roma.
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Arditi has been aligned with Boys Roma since its inception in 1992. In Rome, its leaders and
members converse with a very small number of Ultras, almost exclusively of the right and well
known in the Curva. Yet away from Rome Luigi, the group’s leader, lends his time to anyone who
asks. Similarly, Fedayn, whose members knew of my presence but were instructed not to take part
in my survey, would ignore me in Curva Sud. Yet, away from Rome they would regularly interact
with me and my wife. On two occasions, in Parma and in Milan, I was even commanded to wave
one of their large flags. On the latter occasion, Filippo, a 28 year old veteran of Fedayn who was
known to everyone in Curva Sud, or so it seemed because everyone was familiar with his flags,
called to me over his shoulder, “American Boy vieni (come here).” I climbed down two rows to
where he was waving his flag and he handed it over to me.
I met Filippo during my first away game, which happened to be a long trip by train up to
Udine. He was amongst the Fedayn Ultras I approached about participating in my research. He said
little, as Massimo, the group’s leader told me they were not interested. However, after seeing me in
Milan on a cold Sunday night, cheering on a historic win by AS Roma, and in various other cities,
he began to warm to my presence. By the time that the Coppa Italia game in Parma occurred on a
Wednesday night, he knew I did not take my presence among them lightly. That night I waved his
flag and received the praise of the other Fedayn members (figure 57). A month later in Turin, he
began calling me American Boy, in homage to the 1954 Alberto Sordi movie Un’ Americano a
Roma. It took months, though, for me to be accepted by Filippo. And, because accepted by him, I
not only came to be accepted as a fixture amongst the select Ultras who travel to every away game,
but I also came to understand that one did not enter their brotherhood without a sacrifice.
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Figure 57. Me waving one of Fedayn’s flags
in Parma. 2006.
Incidentally, as a way to explain their understanding of the away game, the week before
Filippo Raciti was killed in February 2007, I received a text message from Filippo. He was again
in Milan, this time on a snowy Thursday night to support AS Roma against AC Milan in the Coppa
Italia. He asked where I was, having noticed my absence. My wife was ill, I explained, but told him
I was watching on TV. “Can you see my flags?” he asked. “Yes,” I said. He then replied with
apparent glee, “there are only 200 of us.” Filippo thought that only the most dedicated Ultras would
regularly travel to AS Roma games. To have that dedication made someone a true Ultra. And, being
present each week, Filippo and a few others knew the faces of their compatriots. They knew who
was only at the games that were easily attended (in Florence on a Sunday at 3pm, for example).
Thus, for the most committed of Ultras, it is not a mass phenomenon but one that involves the very
few who are willing to sacrifice their time and energy to be present.
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The Ultras know that the major press, as well as Ultra publications like Fans Magazine and
Ultrà Tifo, will carry photos of the curvas, which they use for publicity but also as a way of
measuring their worthiness and relative strength within this domain. The press and personal photos
are also a form of memento of the occasion. Upon entering an Ultra office, or even the bedroom of
committed Ultras, one finds less photos of players and game action than pictures of their group away
from, and in, Rome. To go away from Rome and hang, and stand behind, the banner of one’s group,
is seen as a way of immortalizing the group. Someone somewhere will always have a photo.
Thus, to be seen and photographed in Palermo without colors was not only insulting for the
Ultras but also demeaning and, in a way, tragic. To have the colors prohibited defeated what many
had traveled so far to do. And, like many of the other laws passed and enforced after Raciti, the
prohibition was interpreted as having less to do with maintaining public order than with eradicating
the Ultras altogether.
vi. The Game
Along with the police in the guest section guarding over the pile of Roman colors, that day
in Palermo was also hot. Unlike Rome’s Olympic Stadium, Palermo’s stadium has no awning
covering all spectators. We suffered under the afternoon sun. After AS Roma scored to lead 2-0, the
normal fans seated above and behind us began showering us with water and other drinks. Given the
heat most did not complain. And even though by the 60th minute of the game many began thinking
of the return trip that would follow, the Ultras were glad to be there.
They sang the entire first half. Like every game, whether home or away, the Ultras began
with the anthem of CUCS. Then they sang various songs from their “songbook,” a collection of
songs now around 40, with two or three songs added each year. If the away game is against a rival
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of AS Roma or Curva Sud the Ultras will spend most of the game singing against their opponent.7
In Palermo, with no rivalry in either case, they sang only to support AS Roma. Only occasionally
did they sing “Palermo, Palermo, Vaffanculo,” (Palermo go fuck yourself) as they would in any host
city (with that city’s name replacing “Palermo”). It is the goal of the Ultras to sing regardless of
what is happening on the field; “oltre il risultato,” beyond the results, they say. Whether AS Roma
is winning or losing is of no consequence. This goal is becoming more difficult to sustain, however,
because of the spread of unaligned fans in the Curva.
The second half began as the first, but with less urgency for the Ultras. With AS Roma
winning comfortably they began to feel the heat a little more. The small group of Ultras began
singing songs against SS Lazio and for certain AS Roma players. Fedayn eventually began moshing
(a form of gang “play fighting”) amongst themselves in order to reanimate the section. They formed
a loose circle and began singing a Curva favorite called “Tutti allo stadio” (Everyone to the
stadium). As the song progressed, they began pushing and shoving each other through the center of
the circle in order to be pushed back from the other side.
Eventually Palermo scored, cutting AS Roma’s lead to one goal. This brought both sets of
Ultras to full attention, and the game concluded in fiery fashion. They honored themselves and each
other with many rounds of “Curva Sud Alè” (Come on Curva Sud) late in the second half. And
following the game, the team honored them as well, with many players coming “sotto la curva”
(under/below the curva) to throw their shirts and shorts into the crowd, the maximum show of
respect from the players to the fans. The Ultras’ sacrifice, even without their colors, had brought the

7

Very rarely is there a distinction, but it can happen. Livorno, for instance, is a rival curva to Curva Sud
but the team is no rival of AS Roma.
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team glory.

Figure 58. Fedayn Ultras having completed their moshing
in Palermo. 2007.

Figure 59. Ultras get in position to catch jerseys from AS
Roma players. Palermo. 2007.
vii. The Return to Rome
The return trips to Rome are much the same as the trips to the game, albeit more subdued.
Usually the Ultras are tired, thirsty, and hungry after a game. They want to find a comfortable seat,
then eat and sleep. If the trip or game has been particularly nasty, however, this may be impossible.
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An example was the trip to Florence to witness the AC Fiorentina-AS Roma game in 2008, when
a line of AC Fiorentina Ultras attacked the AS Roma Ultras’ cars with stones and bottles as they
exited the enclosed and guarded guest section of the parking lot. Some Ultras had to drive for two
hours in 40 degree (fahrenheit) temperatures without a windshield. I asked one of the Ultras who
had to drive this way about the damage to his car. The driver said little, just shrugged his shoulders
as if to say, it comes with the territory. I myself had been offered a ride back to Rome by an
informant who did not want me journeying back into central Florence to catch a train because I
would be unprotected.
As I will explain in Chapter 6, the act of going to an away game is warlike and militarist. The
groups move “in formation,” always looking out for attack. The singing is far more aggressive and
negative than at home. And, it is only after returning to Rome that the Ultras relax and let down their
guard. However, there is no relinquishing of their “liminal status” because the boundaries between
Ultra and non-Ultra are never crossed. In other words, the mentalità and sense of life in terms of
opposition and heroic struggle do not reign only on game-days. Still, there is a different feeling to
games played in Rome. They are no less serious, but tend to be more festive.
III. The Ultras at Home
For AS Roma’s Ultras, their greatest moments of solidarity and celebration of being Ultra
and Roman occur in Rome. The safety of being at home, where there are no travel restrictions, and
being amongst a large group of AS Roma fans, make home games less warlike than the away games.
At home one might stand with friends who are absent away from Rome, and one’s group will be
more fully present. Nevertheless, the ritualization of violence is still present, and warring action still
takes place, but these are more subtle, and meaningful only within the world of the Ultras. Two are
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highly visible: the choreography - a coordinated display of color, image, message, and fireworks that
is the ultimate expression of the Ultras’ passion for the team, the game, and being Ultra; and the
striscione - a long, hand painted banner with messages of various themes.
A. Game Days
Game days at home tend to begin only on game day. There is no need for the Ultras to buy
tickets because they are, 100%, season ticket holders. According to AS Roma, Curva Sud has been
sold out each season since the Olympic Stadium was restructured in 1990 (for that year’s FIFA
World Cup).8 Although home games are no less structured or ritualized than away games, they tend
to unfold in a more solitary manner for many Ultras. Whereas the away game happens strictly in a
group setting, the Ultra is more likely to arrive at the Rome stadium alone. This is more true for day
games, though; Ultras often meet at the group’s office or at a bar before going to the stadium at
night.
i. Day or Night?
Night games tend to be reserved for more important and “TV worthy” opponents. Games
against SS Lazio, FC Juventus, AC Milan, and Inter FC, the club’s biggest rivals, are usually played
on Saturday and Sunday nights. Aside from fans meeting beforehand to eat, drink, and be social,
these games also carry with them the opportunity for violence. Ultra violence occurs in groups, as
will be explained later. The groups will amass an hour before game time in one of three places: the
River Bar along the Tiber across from the stadium; under the Mussolini obelisk in front of the
stadium; or as close as possible to the fenced in guest section “holding area” near Curva Nord. There
they simply await any groups of opposing Ultras that might come into their midst. If any do so, a

8

http://www.asroma.it/List.aspx?Categoria=52
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group of AS Roma Ultras will run to them, prompting either shameful flight from the opposition or
a quick skirmish of kicks, punches, and whackings with flag poles. If the police have properly
contained the visitors and no one arrives, the Ultras come into Curva Sud. Today it is rare for intercity violence to occur, but in the past, especially before the Spagnolo death in 1995, it was a normal
part of coming to the stadium.
ii. Traffic
Oddly enough, an issue the Ultras face at home that they do not on the road is traffic.
Because they usually have a police escort to away stadiums, they are unencumbered by the worry
of arriving on time. This is always true when arriving by train and often so by bus or car. I arrived
in Milan by bus with Boys Roma and our bus, along with many private cars, was made to stop
outside town before being escorted to the stadium en masse. I was never able to learn how the police
knew we were AS Roma fans, as no colors were visible from outside the bus. In Rome, however,
the Ultras know to allot enough time for idling on the way to the stadium. The time I spent like this
in cars with Ultras was passed listening to pre-game radio shows. However, the most common way
to see Ultras before games is in pairs weaving through traffic on a motorcycle or scooter, with the
Ultra seated behind the driver holding folded flags and banners. Once parked, the Ultras waste little
time making their way to the stadium.
iii. Meeting the Group
Unless there were reasons to meet outside the stadium, such as the opportunity for violence
or a structural issue like transporting props for the choreography (see below, Section B), most
groups will meet under the Curva beyond the turnstiles. There, if the group sells merchandise, as do
Boys Roma, Ultras Romani, and LVPI, they have a small display of items for sale. Coffee, water,
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or beer is consumed along with sandwiches. Otherwise group members socialize and intermix,
although only after the group’s banner and flags have been put in place in the group’s section.

Figure 60. AS Roma fans in traffic. Rome. 2001.

Figure 61. Another image of the Olympic Stadium’s Curva Sud, this one showing
proposed changes to improve security. 2008.

iv. Standing
Even as each seat corresponds to a specified season ticket, no one in the Curva uses their
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assigned seat. Instead the Ultras consider the Curva to be a “general admission” area. In this way,
the groups are able to claim and maintain sections for themselves, regardless of the seats they were
assigned. It is up to the groups to maintain the boundaries of their respective sections. For the larger
groups like Fedayn, Ultras Romani, Boys Roma, Ultras Primavalle-San Lorenzo, and Padroni di
Casa this is not a problem, as everyone in the Curva knows their territory.
For the numerous smaller groups, not to mention the myriad groups of friends who have been
standing together for numerous seasons, the issue is pressing and addressed anew with each home
game. Usually someone from the group will arrive early, approximately two hours before kick-off,
and mark out the group’s section with newspapers or scarves (laid upon each seat). I witnessed a
small 7-person group named Romulae Genti protect its territory on numerous occasions. Gabriele,
the group’s leader, an Ultra of twelve years who was formerly a leading figure in AS Roma Ultras,
once cleared the section of other fans just as a game was beginning (Romulae Genti had been outside
at the River Bar and no one was free to “save the seats”) just by explaining that “this is where we
stand.”
Despite now having no chance of finding room for ten to stand together for the game, the
others vacated the area in question. I asked Gabriele about the incident. His response was a knowing
smile (as if to say, “they know who I am”) and a simple explanation. “I have stood with my friends
in [that] spot [five seats along three rows] for ten years,” he said, “We earned the right to be [there]
by taking care of some bad situations.” From Giorgio, another member, I learned that they had
fought another small group called BVB Ultras for part of their space. They did it during a game so
that everyone nearby would know the victor and rightful holders of the space. The two groups are
now friendly and share a porous border and numerous hugs when AS Roma scores a goal.
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Figure 62. Game-day in Curva Sud Roma. 2007.
v. Fare Tifo (The act of being a fan)
There are now two basic elements of fandom in the Ultra style: singing and waving flags.
In Curva Sud before the 2007 death of Raciti each of the large groups contained a person who
handled a megaphone and directed songs to be sung by large numbers of Ultras at once. The groups
traded turns directing the Curva as a whole. Since Raciti, however, megaphones have been outlawed
- the 2007 Amato Decree (discussed in detail in later chapters) made “organized fandom” illegal and
punishable by three-to-five years banishment from all Italian stadiums - and now each of the larger
groups attempts to begin Curva-wide songs just by singing amongst themselves. When the Ultras
are disciplined the system works well enough. Usually, the Curva has more than one song being
initiated at the same time.
Coinciding with each song may be a coordinated pattern of claps. If not, many Ultras wave
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flags or hold stendardi (banners or standards on two vertical poles in the style of the Roman
vexillum). Flags are a part of the history of the many smaller groups in the lower section of Curva
Sud (discussed in the previous chapter); the larger groups in the upper-Curva use them less (Ultras
Romani aside). In the lower zone, flags of various shapes and sizes fly throughout the ninety minutes
of a game, whereas elsewhere in the Curva, individual Ultras hold aloft their flags as the mood
strikes them. Before Raciti, flares and powerful fireworks were also central to the Ultra style of
fandom. Now, however, they have largely been relegated to history. There are two extreme forms
of Ultra fandom remaining, however, the choreography and the banner.
B. Choreography9
Choreographies are large, Curva-wide demonstrations of coordinated fandom. Thematically
they have focused on three topics since the inception of the Ultras: Rome, AS Roma, and Curva Sud.
Since choreography celebrating these topics will be discussed in other chapters, I am discussing the
structural aspects of making a choreography here.
For the SS Lazio - AS Roma game of 2006-2007 Curva Sud performed a choreography
involving the entire Curva. From left to right the lower sections of the Curva were covered in sheets
with the letters A, S, and R. At the edges of the Curva were small placards of either red, yellow, or
white held aloft by the Ultras. The Ultras standing in the lowest part of the Curva held a long banner
reading “millenovecento venti sette” (1927), the founding year of AS Roma.

9

Chapter Seven describes how Romanità influences the content of many Ultra choreographies.
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Figure 63. Choreography before SS Lazio-AS Roma.
December 2006.
The choreography was the only one of its kind performed during my research period. It was
a nice choreography, but one which some Ultras felt was inadequate. “There was no theme,”
Federico of Antichi Valori told me. “There was no Romanità and the celebration of AS Roma was
nonexistent. It was just a billboard,” he explained. In the days after the game, other Ultras echoed
his critique. Even those who had been instrumental in its creation were unhappy. Fabio of Boys
Roma was disappointed that “we had not enough time to make something memorable and special.
But, given the state of the Curva (divided between the large traditional groups - Fedayn, Ultras
Romani, and Boys Roma - and the smaller Basso groups over the question of merchandising among
other issues) we were lucky to have done anything.”
Nonetheless, the choreography took days of planning and two thousand euros to create. The
leaders of the large groups sent invitations to all the groups in the Curva by way of text messages
to each group leader. They were asked to meet at a bar in Piazza Bologna on the Tuesday before the
Saturday evening game. Only representatives of Giovinezza, Tradizione Distinzione Roma, Brigata
De Falchi, Arditi, Testaccio, and Irish Clan Roma accepted the invitation. Once gathered, the Ultras,
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led by Spadino of Ultras Romani, discussed first aesthetics, then how the Curva would pay.

Figure 64. Me beneath the choreography.
December 2006.
Throughout, Giacomino, the 41 year old leader of Irish Clan Roma, and 20-year veteran of
the Curva, insisted that Ultras Romani and Boys pay for the choreography. “Your groups have all
the money,” he repeatedly said, “because you sell scarves and hats to non-Ultras.” Because of his
seniority, and because of the fact that Boys and Ultras Romani hear this criticism everyday from the
other groups, no one responded in anger. Giacomino continued his assault. “There are groups who
sent me here to insist that you pay for whatever we do. We all have jobs, families, and rent to pay.
You have stores and employees who sell Ultras gear!” he exclaimed. Finally, having heard enough,
Spadino agreed, saying that Ultras Romani would pay for the choreography, even if they had little
money with which to do so. “If we are paying, we are designing. There is no need to continue this
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meeting,” he said. At that it was abruptly adjourned.
Twenty-four hours later Spadino left sketches of what the choreography would look like with
a print shop in Ostia. Each group in the Curva, Fabio of Boys explained, have their preferred printer,
usually in the neighborhood of the group. These would create any large jobs, such as sheets for
choreography, or custom printed stendardi (figure 8) and the banner of the group. The thousands
of small colored sheets or the painting of message banners were handled by the groups themselves.
For this choreography, Ultras Romani purchased approximately 11,000 sheets of colored 8.5 x 11
inch paper and paid to print the A, S, and R, as well as the 1927 banner. In the past the cost would
have been divided equally amongst the groups.
For the merchant groups, money for choreography comes from the profits gained through
merchandising. For the others, a collection is taken in the weeks before a choreography in order to
cover the costs. Striscioni banners, discussed below, are paid for in the same way. Although these
cost considerably less, involving only large rolls of paper and several cans of paint, the costs are
divided between group members. In the occasions that a striscione banner is signed/created by
multiple groups, the members of each group cover the costs. Ultras belonging to AS Roma Ultras
were expected to pay between 25 and 50 euros per choreography, depending on its size and
complexity. Striscioni banners of that collective tended to be paid through a fund, into which Ultras
paid a few euros per week or month. While smaller groups find themselves priced out of
choreography, any group is capable of producing striscioni banners. Further, many Ultras who are
group members pay for their own flags and/or stendardi.
C. Striscioni (Banners)
While the massive choreographed displays have made the Ultras known beyond the realm
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of fans, many remain unaware of the more subtle practice of unveiling banners with various
messages of scorn or devotion. According to Stefano Pivato, the practice was adopted from the
behavior of political protesters in the 1960s and 1970s who would march behind or demonstrate in
front of the long message-filled banners (Pivato, 2000, pg. 173). The Ultras use the banners to
“speak” on any issue on the mind of the writer. Typically, though, they are used to insult, to protest,
to motivate, or to memorialize.
Historically, the most popular use of the banners has been to insult opponents and opposing
Ultras. For instance, against the Milanese Inter fans in 2004-2005: “È una questione di avi, noi
legionari, voi nostri schiavi” (It is a question of ancestry, we are legionaries, you are our slaves)
(figure 65). This is also a good example of the way Ultras use Rome’s classical history as a means
to aggrandize the present. Other “insult” uses of banners can be as simple as the Inter Ultras greeting
Napoli fans in 2007-8 with “Fogna d’Italia” (Italy’s gutter).
The Ultras use striscioni banners to protest against Calcio Moderno and various political
issues. Roma’s Ultras have attacked journalists as the agents of Calcio Moderno. In the semifinal
of the 2006-2007 Coppa Italia against AC Milan, one banner asked: “Scrivete al giornale, parlate
alle radio, ma quando ci venite allo stadio?” (You [all] write in newspapers and speak on the radio,
but when do you come to the stadium?) (Figure 66). This banner was in response to accusations
against the Ultras of destroying soccer by turning it into a war-zone unsuitable for families and
children.
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Figure 65. AS Roma’s Ultras explaining ancestry to the
Milanesi. March 2005.
In 2005 the Decreto Pisanu introduced a set of laws designed to end “soccer violence” by
improving stadium security, having electronically named tickets, assigning stewards to the curvas,
and in making the prosecution of those involved in soccer violence easier and more severe. Although
unenforced, the decree was used to keep AC Fiorentina Ultras from standing together with the same
colored shirt (white) on the grounds that this represented an “unauthorized choreography.” In
response, those Ultras displayed a banner reading “Nessun decreto cancellerà le nostre tradizioni”
(No law will cancel our traditions) (figure 67).
AS Roma’s Ultras use banners to help motivate the squad during an important game, or after
having lost one. In the latter case, after a recent loss to SS Lazio, the Curva displayed a banner
telling Francesco Totti, Daniele De Rossi, and Alberto Aqulani to “Imparate da noi” (learn from us)
after having been less than impressed with the effort of the three Roman players during the loss. The
Ultras wanted the players to put as much passion and hostility into the game as they themselves did.
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Figure 66. AS Roma’s Ultras asking the media
from where they get their information. January
2007.
Finally, another popular use of these banners is in celebrating Rome and memorializing or
monumentalizing Romans. One of the most succinct of these was created by Razza Romana, a small
group in Curva Sud, for AS Roma v. Inter 2006-2007, which read, “La nostra superiorità si chiama
Romanità” (Our superiority is called Romanità) (figure 68). This banner will be discussed in
Chapter 7 as an expression of the Ultras’ feelings of devotion to, and responsibility for, Rome.

Figure 67. AC Fiorentina Ultras explaining the uselessness of laws
against the Ultras. Florence. 2007.
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Almost every week during my research period a group would raise banners to announce the
death or birth of someone close to the group or the Curva. What the Ultras wished to accomplish
with these banners was to keep the recipient of the honor alive in the Curva. They also hoped to
make the readers aware of the issues surrounding the death of the subject, whether it be cancer,
immigrant crime, driving while intoxicated, or, in the case of my last example, the dangers of
playing soccer on improperly cared-for fields.

Figure 68. Razza Romana explaining what makes
Romans special. 2006.
Alessandro Bini was a 14 year-old member of the Cinecittà team in a league sponsored by
AS Roma. He was playing a league game on February 2, 2008 in Cinecittà when he fell violently
upon a pipe used for irrigating the field. The impact to his chest caused a heart attack. He lost
consciousness and could not be resuscitated. Given the proximity of Cinecittà to Quadraro, it was
not long before both Fedayn and Ultras Romani delivered scarves and flowers to the scene. In the
days following the death, the local news was full of explanations and demands for justice. It
emerged that Bini’s favorite player was a former AS Roma player named Vincent Candela. He was
contacted in France and agreed to attend the child’s funeral.
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The funeral took place at San Giovanni Bosco in Quadraro and Ultras hung banners on all
sides of the piazza. Among these were ones saying “Ale piccolo angelo” (Ale little angel) and “Ora
abbiamo 12 giocatori in campo” (Now we have 12 players on the field). Luciano Spalletti, the head
coach of AS Roma spoke, saying that Alessandro would always be remembered as a player of AS
Roma. Vincent Candela wept openly. At the end of the memorial, William Spadino, leader of Ultras
Romani, announced that the entirety of Curva Sud’s activities at the next home game would be
dedicated to Alessandro. No one could remember such an honor being bestowed on anyone before.

Figure 69. Curva Sud Roma honoring Alessandro Bini. 2008.
When AS Roma hosted Reggina Calcio four days later everyone who entered the stadium
was greeted with a banner hung in the hallowed space reserved normally for Brigata Roberto Rulli,
a Fedayn banner which commemorated the founder of the first Ultra group in Curva Sud Roma, and
one of the most sacred items in the world of AS Roma’s Ultras. The banner read, “Nel tuo riccordo
piccolo Alessandro. Il coro della Sud è tutto per te” (In your memory little Alessandro. The chorus
of Curva Sud is all for you) (figure 69). The groups did not hang their banners; instead each held one
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aloft to honor Alessandro. Fedayn’s said, “Piccolo nuovo angelo lasci un grande ricordo. Ciao Ale”
(New little angel you leave a big memory. Goodbye Ale.). Ultras Romani’s said, “Piccolo Ale nel
cielo con gli angeli . . . fai vedere il campioncino che sei noi tutti tifiamo per te. Ciao” (Little Ale
in the sky with the angels . . . you showed us the little champion you are . . . all of us “root” in your
honor. Goodbye) (figure 70).

Figure 70. Ultras Romani honoring Alessandro Bini.
2008.
There were as many tears as smiles in the curva that evening. Two Ultras recounted to me
how their mothers, who had watched the game and ceremonies on AS Roma Channel, hugged them
sobbing upon their return home from the stadium. At half time, Spadino was allowed to exit the
Curva to deliver flowers on behalf of Curva Sud to Alessandro’s mother, who sat with the club’s
directors in the Monte Mario grandstand. In return Daniele De Rossi, an AS Roma player born in
Rome to a former player and current coach on the team, delivered flowers under the Curva.
For the Ultras, honoring Romans goes beyond just a singular memorializing action. The act
itself is full of meaning and reverence because the Ultras take being Ultra and being Roman so
seriously. The honor given Alessandro Bini was not meant to end that day at the stadium. Thus, the
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Ultras were instrumental in helping to establish the Associazione Alessandro Bini per la Sicurezza
nello Sport (Alessandro Bini Association for Safety in Sport). Already by late-summer 2008 the
organization was successful in having new laws for safety in sport for the Lazio region drawn up.
The Ultras used their platform to ensure that no one forgot to act in honoring Alessandro by making
Rome a safer city for other young soccer players.
IV. Conclusion
As we begin to move toward a deeper analysis of the Ultras’ mentalità and the more extreme
aspects of their behavior, it is important to appreciate the mundane aspects of being an Ultra: going
to stadiums to take part in the games of AS Roma. After a brief section on style within Curva Sud,
this chapter has shown that, while there are definitive features of Ultra attire, these tend to change
over time and to depend upon the larger political and social context for meaning. To this end, the
current Ultra trend of a head covered partially by hood and scarf was brought about by a desire to
avoid detection by CCTV cameras inside, and news cameras outside, stadiums.
The trasferta, or away game, was then detailed. I believe the away game is the essence of
the Ultra experience. Away from Rome, AS Roma’s Ultras are far more aggressive and united as
Romans or fans of AS Roma. While there is always time for play, as in transit to and from stadiums,
and occasions for humor, the away game tends to be a serious affair. For one, until 2007 the Ultras
experienced away games as veritable war zones, with the potential for violence existing at every
moment. What’s more, the away game has traditionally been the domain of only the hardest, most
committed Ultras. The away game, then, fosters an elite within the Ultra phenomenon. These elite
Ultras understand themselves as the quintessential Ultras, ready to sacrifice time, energy, health,
safety, and more to support AS Roma in hostile territory. It is not by coincidence that most of the
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Ultras surveyed for this project come from this group. In fact, it was only because of my willingness
to join them away from Rome that my research was possible at all.
Back in Rome, the games are perhaps more grand and festive. The occasional choreography
charges the air of the pre-game period, as does being with a large group of friends and cohorts.
While the away game is given an electricity because of the hostility involved, in Rome it is the
opportunity to be in Curva Sud that does so. As was demonstrated in the previous chapter, however,
being in the Curva is not without its conflicts and dangers, the more so because ideological
differences are always present. Away from Rome, such differences largely disappear, as a more
cohesive group forms. In or away from Rome, the Ultras support AS Roma in the same manner: with
songs, flags, and occasionally flares, bombs, and choreography. Striscioni banners, the traditional
voice of the Ultras, are also displayed in and away from Rome. However, these, like much of the
Ultra in-stadium experience, are being policed into extinction by a government that is increasingly
at odds with the Ultras’ worldview.
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CHAPTER FOUR: Ultra Practices and Their Consequences
In the last chapter I gave a sense of the emotional, temporal, and financial investments the
Ultras make in being Ultras. Whether going to an away game or creating a choreography or banner
for one at home, the Ultras are Ultras “per tutta la vita” (for their whole life) as they say. The
language used in the chapter was designed to ease the reader into the discursive world of the Ultras,
and into the “language regime” through which their mentalità is made real (Kroskrity, 2000, pg. 23).
This was more obvious at the end of the chapter, which examined the creation of banners and the
purpose they serve within the Ultra phenomenon.
The banners and game-day experiences inform the beginning of this chapter, which seeks
to explain the most extreme forms of Ultra behavior and its consequences. I begin by introducing
the Nietzsche of the Ultras, who will take center stage in Chapter 5, and explaining how the Ultras
utilize what he called “monumental history.” This form of history promotes the creation and
celebration of heroes, as well as strictly-defined codes of co-identification, wherein the race or
nation are often diminished for the sake of more particular groupings. Finally, it allows the Ultras
to bask in the importance of their every action, so that the act of following AS Roma away from
Rome becomes a series of opportunities to define oneself and create one’s own value.
The chapter then describes in detail the events surrounding the death of SS Lazio Ultra
Gabriele Sandri in November 2007 and how these relate to the period following the death of Filippo
Raciti eight months earlier. This section takes the form of a newsreel so that the confusion, anxiety,
anger, and compassion of those days predominate. It is written from the perspective of the Ultras,
which I find valuable for presenting their understanding of what transpired.
The section demonstrates what Michel de Certeau (1984) theorized regarding the imposition
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of textual and professional knowledge on the knowability and experience of everyday life. The
Ultras resisted, in his terms, the “view from above” which painted them as terrorists, but in doing
so became thoroughly ensnared in the language of the authorities aligned against them (de Certeau,
1984, pg. 13). Finally, the chapter uses the Sandri murder and subsequent Ultra violence as a way
to introduce the Ultras’ war against Calcio Moderno (the business of football).
I. Ultra Practices
A. Monumentalism and Ultra Practices
In October 2007 Boys Roma elected a new leader. The group had been governed by a
leadership council since the death of Paolo Zappavigna in June 2005. Instead of promoting from
within that group, Boys decided to reward the loyalty and radicalism of a former hierarch under
Paolo. His name is Maurizio, but the Boys Ultras call him Duce because of his physical resemblance
to Mussolini and, now, because he is their leader. I had been invited to the office on the day of his
election, but was asked to wait outside until the ceremony was completed. “We like you and we trust
you,” said Fabio, my main contact with the group, “but you are not one of us.”
As I waited outside, my attention focused on the message painted on the front of the office:
Chi l’ha fatto, aspetta (He who did it, expect [retaliation]) (figure 37). (The exterior of the office
will be discussed in the next chapter.) Later that afternoon I asked some of the Ultras what they
thought of it.1 Maurizio, the Duce, said sternly (in English), “if someone messes with us, we gonna
mess with them,” before smiling and asking if I liked his imitation of Robert De Niro. Of course I
did, I said,
and then asked “this is central to the Ultras mentalità, yes?” He responded, “life is for the purpose

1

It had been explained to me earlier in the year by Jean-Paolo. I will describe that explanation in Chapter 5.
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of fighting. We search for enemies from history and the present, all the same.” I had witnessed in
other Ultras the commitment to having long memories. Fading graffiti tags in Rome had been
explained to me with enough venom to make me think the confrontation which prompted them had
taken place yesterday instead of nine years ago. Locales along a train route were explained similarly,
always in terms of rivalry, confrontation, and someone or some group acting heroically to avenge
its honor.
Maurizio and the others made it clear that for the Ultras, the past is never dead. One must
act unhistorically or suprahistorically in order to keep it alive, but in a city like The Eternal City this
makes sense. The Ultras act unhistorically by seeking a present that changes only by way of the
meanings and will of a highly subjectively understood past. Conversely, they act suprahistorically
by being keenly motivated to maintain distance from others and proximity to their mentalità
(Nietzsche, 1997, pgs. 59-123). In the second of Nietzsche’s Untimely Meditations, “On the Uses
and Disadvantages of History for Life,” he distinguishes between three kinds of history: critical,
antiquarian, and monumental. He implores his readers to “employ history only in the service of life”
instead of “enslaving life” to a particularly modern (in his estimation, decadent) understanding of
history (1997 pg. 116).
Critical history is of use to those who seek to cast off the burdens of the present. It is a
history that judges and condemns the past for its role in creating the present. It is also a nihilistic
history, in that it condemns all that lies beyond the “good” as being unworthy of life (Nietzsche
1997, pgs. 72-76). Antiquarian history is of use to those who aspire to familiarity. It is a history that
preserves and reveres the past. But in doing so, it is Romantic and condemns the present for the sake
of every past triviality. In both cases, life is mummified, because the preservation of life is valued
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above the expansion of life (Nietzsche 1997, pg. 74).
Monumental history, by contrast, is useful for those who aspire to “greatness.” It takes its
cues from heroes, grandeur, warfare, victory, and the value of battle (found in sacrifice, honor, duty,
and commitment). It is a history that uses the past as inspiration to act in the present. Monumental
history is less interested in the study of the past, or in the construction of models of causation.
Instead, its interest lies in affect. It diminishes the “motives and instigations” of an historical act in
order to fully monumentalize its affect “as something exemplary and worthy of imitation”
(Nietzsche 1997, pg. 70). With such a focus on affect, history is made poetic and mythical, just as
myth and poetry themselves become important sources of history. As Nietzsche says, “the past itself
suffers harm” for the sake of those heroes, saints, and vistas that fire the blood of the present (1997,
pg. 71). Monumental history, then, is a history alive in the present moment.
Nietzsche uses this conceptualization of history as a critical way to understand the
relationship between history and culture. The “natural” relation between the two is always to serve
life at the moment; it is never to undermine the present (Nietzsche 1997, pg. 77). The weakness of
modern culture, he explains, is in part due to its lack of monumentality. In critiquing modernity
through its uses of history, in its critical and antiquarian guises, Nietzsche seeks to make us aware
of the dangers of consuming knowledge for its own sake and without purpose or affective base - in
the mode of “culture-less” “career-minded consumers” (2004, pg. 139).
More powerful is the way Nietzsche explains this in Twilight of the Idols: that the modern
West suffers from “atrophy of the spiritual instincts” because of its faith in, and celebration of, the
universal and concurrent dismissal of the particular and unique (2005, pg. 188). This attack on the
universal (and concomitant celebration of “spiritual instincts”) is the key to understanding the Ultras
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in terms of their favorite philosopher, Nietzsche. For as the Ultras act against modernity, they do so
primarily because they critique it (and what it promises) as a promotion of the universalization of
modern-or-global-capitalism.
I discerned this same monumentalism in the banners displayed in the Curva and in the strong
desire to display one’s colors away from Rome. Because, as I explained in the previous two
chapters, the displays of the Ultras are captured in film and published both online and in print, the
Ultras have become cognizant of their ability to influence both public discourse and other curvas.
The groups themselves hire photographers located in other areas of the stadium to take photos of
their banners so that they are recorded for posterity.2 Thus, there is always a sense amongst the
groups that what they are doing is historical and creative, a marker of the Ultra mentalità. A good
example of the monumental use of banners is those which attempted to honor Vanessa Russo.
On April 28, 2007, Vanessa Russo was attacked and killed by two female Romanian
prostitutes while leaving the Metro at Termini (Rome’s central rail station). After arguing in the
subway because the Romanians thought she was looking at them, one, Doina Matei, 16 years old,
jabbed the closed end of an umbrella in Vanessa’s left eye. She died of a massive brain injury. The
city was outraged. It was the first of what would be a long summer filled with accusations and
attacks against Romanians and Roma for alleged criminal behavior (see Chapter 8). From the Ultras’
own experiences they are highly aware of the media’s power to criminalize (see below). Yet, it must
be said, they are roundly uncritical about the same media’s portrayal of Romanian and Roma
immigrants as criminal.

2

These are on display in offices and online. Two examples are the series of binders kept by Boys and the
group photos on the Ultras Romani website.
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The game following her murder was April 29: AS Roma - SS Lazio, the biggest game of any
season for the Ultras and the city. Early in the day, a small group calling itself BD Ultras Roma (the
meaning of BD is unknown) reached the staging area beyond Curva Sud’s entrance. They carried
a banner which said simply “Ciao Vanessa.” As Sandro, the group’s leader, later told me by
telephone, it was meant to show Vanessa’s family, and all the sisters, daughters, and mothers in the
city that what happened to Vanessa would not be tolerated or forgotten.
“For me and my friends,” he said, “the murder of an innocent Roman girl at the hands of
[presumed] illegal immigrants was like a call to arms.” However, the police would not allow the
group to enter the stadium with the banner because it was unrelated to AS Roma or the game per the
terms of the 2007 Amato Decree. The mood in Curva Sud that day was murderous. Hardly anyone
followed the game. Ultras were on cell phones explaining to one another and others beyond the
stadium what had happened to BD Ultras Roma. Giorgio of Romulae Genti roared, “If the
government wants to destroy the Ultras, that is one thing. We are at war with them already. But to
defend murderous zingari (derogatory term for Roma gypsies - plural of zingaro) by disallowing [the
BD Ultras’] salute to Vanessa’s family was treasonous.” As word spread through both curvas, the
AS Roma and SS Lazio Ultras united in protest against the banning of the banner. Both curvas began
taking down all banners and colors. Neither curva displayed any striscioni banners, even though
some Curva Sud Roma groups had been able to enter the stadium with their banners honoring Russo.
The protest of the state’s treatment of BD Ultras Roma demonstrates an interesting aspect
of how the Ultras use fandom. In order to do honor to something, in this case Russo, her family, or
Roman women in general, the Curva creates banners announcing their sentiments and intentions,
and then performs their unique form of fandom. Conversely, when the Ultras are protesting
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something, usually their own treatment by the state, they will deny themselves the act of fandom.
Because the Ultras act as fans for themselves, and for the eleven players on the field, there is no
sense that they are denying the general public the thrill of the spectacle they create. Using history
and creating history as an affective force, then, are inseparably linked, as the Ultras do not assume
that the other fans seated in the Olympic Stadium comprehend their actions or worldview. The
selection of history to use and to make, in other words, is done so to honor Curva Sud, Rome, and
AS Roma, for the sake of Curva Sud and not the non-Ultra audience that may be watching.

Figure 71. Curva Sud Roma begins taking down their banners. AS
Roma-SS Lazio. 2007.
B. The War for Sandri or The Sack of Rome
In the morning of November 11, 2007, Gabrielle Sandri, a 27 year old Roman fan of SS
Lazio, and 3 friends were driving to Milan to support their team against Inter. Sandri was well
known in Rome, and famous amongst Ultras, as one of the city’s most respected DJ’s. His parents
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owned a men’s clothing store in the Trionfale neighborhood which had supplied countless Ultras
with the “casual” clothing that defined Ultra fashion since the 1990s. Through DJ-ing and his
parent’s store, Sandri was also well connected with several SS Lazio players. His entire family was
involved in the Ultras and were fans of SS Lazio in some form.
Sandri had worked until 6:00 AM and was then riding to Milan for the 3:00 PM game. In an
Autogrill parking lot near Arezzo he and his companions encountered a carload of FC Juventus fans
and engaged in taunting and insulting them. The yelling alerted two local police officers assigned
to keep the peace at the Autogrill, as these stops on the autostrade have become among the favorite
meeting places for Ultras traveling to away games. As both cars were pulling away shots were fired.
Moments later the car in which Sandri was riding stopped. He was dead, having been shot in the
neck (figure 72).

Figure 72. Gabriele Sandri lies dead. Arezzo.
November 11, 2007.
Initial news reports said only that a young Roman had been killed in what appeared to be an
accidental police shooting. As midday approached, reports were lengthened to say that the dead
youth was an Ultra of SS Lazio. These reports said nothing about games being cancelled, but most
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Ultras believed that Inter-Lazio would be postponed if nothing else.3 Then it was announced on the
radio that Inter-Lazio would not happen but the other games of the Serie A calender would start after
a 15 minute delay (as a show of respect). Indeed, newly elected FIGC President Giancarlo Abete
said on live television that Inter-Lazio could not be played but that “the other games will be played
in order to avoid problems.” One had to assume he referred to “problems” with the Ultras.
i. In Milan and Bergamo
At the opening of Milan’s San Siro stadium at 1:00 PM (at that time the game was still going
ahead), very few fans entered. The few that did sang songs against the police and Juventus. The most
popular song in Italian curvas, perhaps the only one common to all, is against the Carabiniere: “La
disoccupazione, ci ha dato un gran mestiere, mestiere, di merda, carabiniere” (Unemployment has
given us a great profession, profession of shit, carabiniere [the militarized state police]). It is this
attitude toward the police that truly unites, and creates, what could be called “the Italian Ultras.”
Where otherwise the joys of agon and celebrations of local particularity override common values,
ultimately hindering the Ultras’ ability to unite as a true social movement, the police act as a rare
stimulus to unity (see Chapter 5).
Instead of entering the stadium directly, a group of Inter and Lazio Ultras sought to enter
through the tunnel used by buses carrying the players. They went to secure a promise from the
players that they would not play. When told the players had yet to arrive they left to amass under
Curva Nord. It was there that they learned of the cancellation of the Inter-Lazio game.
Outside the stadium other Lazio and Inter Ultras joined together to smash the TV camera of
a reporter who insisted upon filming their activities and to parade behind two banners. These read,
3

This was the early thinking among the Ultras with whom I spoke, trying to learn the fate of the AS RomaCagliari Calcio game to be played that evening.
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“Amato Dimettiti” (Amato Resign) and “Per Raciti Fermate il Campionato, La Morte Di Un Tifoso
Non Ha Significato” (For Raciti you stopped the championship, the death of a fan means nothing).4
They shouted “assassini” (assassins) and “Un Saluto a Gabriele” (a salute to Gabriele) as they
marched behind the banners to the police headquarters on Via Novara. Once there, the group of
approximately 400 launched bottles and stones against the office. Along with them was also a small
group of Ultras of AS Varese, a small but historic team from the Milan suburbs who, like the Ultras
of Inter and Lazio, are known to be far right politically.
Meanwhile, in Bergamo the Atalanta BC Ultras had a skirmish with the police before the
game between Atalanta BC and AC Milan (around 1:00 PM). The Atalanta Ultras, among the most
active and aggressive in Italy, first attacked a police jeep with rocks; those inside received minor
head wounds. They then began a more serious engagement with the police amassing near the
stadium, raining stones upon them. AC Milan Ultras attacked train guards at the Treviglio station
(between Milano and Bergamo) and then evidently fought with Atalanta BC Ultras outside the
station in Bergamo (figure 47).
In the 2:00 PM hour Atalanta BC Ultras outside their Curva Sud attacked the police with
rocks and sticks. The police responded with teargas. Nearby the Milan Ultras engaged the police but
most were already in the stadium. When they realized the Atalanta Ultras were fighting the police
elsewhere they tried to exit the stadium but were charged by the police and constrained to stay
inside.

4

Giuliano Amato former member of the Italian Socialist Party (PSI) and then Minister of the Interior. He
authored the April 2007 Decreto Amato which outlawed many Ultra traditions.

172

Figure 73. Christiano Doni approaches Atalanta BC’s
Curva Sud. Bergamo. November 11, 2007.
As game time approached the situation calmed, but the Ultras had already decided that under
no circumstances was the game to proceed. As the game started they used a manhole cover to blast
a hole in the partition separating the field from the Curva as an attempt to get the game stopped. The
most popular video of the day is of them smashing a hole in the glass barrier, while Christiano Doni
and other Atalanta BC players pleaded with them to stay calm (figure 73). During the interruption
the AC Milan Ultras exited the stadium and were escorted back to the Bergamo central station. At
the announcement of the game’s abandonment, the Atalanta BC Ultras gave a victory yell. After
exiting the stadium, there were no serious incidents. The Atalanta BC and AC Milan Ultras, as much
as it pained Claudio of Ultras Romani to say of their bitter rivals, “had done their duty.”
ii. In Other Cities
There was Ultra activity in other Italian stadiums, as many acted with fury that the games
had been allowed to go ahead as scheduled. In Florence, a small number of AC Fiorentina Ultras
sang songs against the police, but were drowned out by the whistles and singing of the “other Ultras”
(according to Mediaset’s TG1 newscast). Lorenzo Contucci wrote on the website of AS Roma Ultras
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that this news was actually saying that there are only 200 or so people in Florence worthy to call
themselves Ultras.
Songs against the police were sung in Reggio Calabria and Siena. In Reggio there were no
colors. In Turin the Torino Ultras left the curva in protest, followed in kind by the Catania Ultras.
Initially the Torino Ultras decided against displaying colors in the curva. It was only after the game
started that they decided to leave the stadium. They were joined outside by the Catanesi (people of
Catania), where they too sang against the police.
In Parma, where Juventus was playing, there appeared a banner reading “La morte è uguale
per tutti” (All deaths are equal). As the game began, the Juventus Ultras had all their banners turned
upside-down (a common sign of protest among Ultras). Then, in accord with the Parma Ultras, both
groups followed the game in silence (except to sing against the police).
The Ultras’ reaction was seen also in smaller cities. In Serie C, Taranto Ultras pelted the field
and forces of law and order stationed under their curva with stones and other objects, thus bringing
their game to a halt. The police responded with tear gas. In Potenza, six Brindisi fans were arrested
for violence against a public official. In the Lazio Lega Eccellenza (amateur league) game between
Boville and Latina, three Carabiniere officers were injured by a bomb thrown from the Latina curva.
Otherwise the league’s games were played without incident.
After Raciti was killed in February 2007, I heard no Ultras say they were glad that a police
officer had been killed. No one mentioned his death at all, except to acknowledge its role in the
government’s subsequent crackdown on the Ultras. After Sandri was killed, however, the smoldering
tension created by the months of what they saw as repression exploded into a spontaneous
nationwide uprising. Although not in all cities were the Ultras’ actions violent, but there was still
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a collective will toward expressing grief and frustration. A violent, militant, and militarist
brotherhood, the Ultras’ dedication to a radical anti-bourgeois worldview put them at odds with the
police. Rather than uniting as oppressed victims of injustice, the Ultras exploded in rage because that
was the logical way to express their anger and to honor the sacrifice of Gabriele Sandri. Likewise,
there was no similar night of violence following Raciti’s death. Instead, it was only after Sandri that
cries of “1,000 Raciti’s” could be heard amongst AS Roma’s Ultras (figure 74).

Figure 74. Graffiti calling for 10, 100, or 1000 more
police deaths. Rome. 2008.

Italian Football Association (FIGC) President Giancarlo Abete seemed completely dismayed
at the violence in Bergamo, insisting repeatedly that what was happening had neither a connection
with soccer nor the relationship between the police and some Ultras. He then said that it was not
parallel with Catania, which, in his mind, involved a premeditated attack on the police. This death
was just accidental, he repeated.
iii. Rome
By late afternoon, news began circulating of huge protest marches in Milan and Rome. In
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Rome, AS Roma and Cagliari Calcio were scheduled to play at 8:30 PM. Ultras from SS Lazio and
AS Roma were discussing ways to ensure that the game would be stopped. Word reached the media
around 5:00 PM that the two curvas, Curva Sud Roma and Curva Nord Lazio, were uniting in order
to force the game’s postponement. (I was already aware that Boys, Padroni di Casa, Ultras Romani,
and even Fedayn had pledged unity with the Lazio Ultras, come what may.)

Figure 75. Gabriele Sandri’s family.
Rome. November 11, 2007.
Around 6:00 PM the game was officially postponed. In the minds of the Ultras, though, it
was not abandoned out of respect for Sandri and his family, but out of fear of public disorder.
Meanwhile, at 6:15 PM, Luigi Conti, the lawyer for Sandri’s family, announced on RAI’s TG1
newscast, along with Gabriele’s brother Christiano, that the shooting could not have been accidental
based on eye-witness accounts. He called it a murder and said that, based on early evidence, the
shooting must have occurred “like target practice.” Sandri, he vividly explained, was shot while
seated in the backseat of a car that was leaving the Autogrill. At this time there were already SS
Lazio fans arriving in Arezzo, shouting “assassini” outside the police station.
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Figure 76. Ultras’ shrine to Sandri. Arezzo. November
11, 2007.
a. A Guerilla War in Rome
As the sun fell on Rome, Skynews 24 was reporting that away games would be banned,
possibly forever, as the Ultras were “holding the season hostage.” Accompanied by live scenes near
the Olympic Stadium of Ultras throwing unidentifiable objects at police-lines and passing cars,
Giancarlo Abete now said that the violence was proof of “structural hatred” of the police amongst
the Ultras. The death of Sandri had sparked, he said, “a guerilla war in Rome.”
By 8:00 PM all Ultra websites were shut down. The Ultras use their own sites for news. The
largest of these is Tifonet, which collates news from various curvas. It reads like an hourly update
on the Ultra experience. The most important website for Ultras happens to be associated with Curva
Sud Roma. It is that of the now disbanded AS Roma Ultras. Its webmaster, Lorenzo Contucci, is still
involved in the curva, however, as he is one of the most important lawyers and advocates for the
Ultras in Italy. The sites closed, asking for “giustizia per Gabriele” (justice for Gabriele). They also
closed, I was later told by Federico of Antichi Valori, a close friend of Contucci, because the Ultras
believe that the government monitors the sites for information just as do the Ultras.
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The main body of Lazio Ultras marched to Piazza Euclide, but by 6:00 PM had already
attacked one police station near the Olympic Stadium. According to Il Messaggero, the general
battle was between Ultras with flares and bombs and police with teargas. As they marched, the facecovered Ultras torched scooters and trash bins, as well as a police bus and several cars (figure 7, 77).

Figure 77. A trash bin burns in the wake of the
Ultras. Rome. November 11, 2007.
Elsewhere, twenty Ultras attacked police on Via Bosis, near the stadium, with bottles, bolts,
and pieces of iron. One person from this attack was arrested. Then, the Ultras assaulted the
headquarters of the Italian Olympic Committee (Comitato Olimpico Nazionale Italiano - CONI),
which is located next to the stadium in one of the buildings comprising the Foro Italico. Over one
hundred Ultras broke into the lobby of the building. The unarmed security guards locked themselves
in the offices while the Ultras destroyed the lobby. According to Skynews 24, after one group had
entered the building, another group waited outside, seeking to draw-in the police. They refused the
chase and the Ultras instead entered the building (figure 78).
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Figure 78. The CONI
headquarters after the Ultras
attack. Rome. November 11,
2007.
They ignited a bomb which damaged the marble, destroyed the China Olympics countdown
clock, all the windows, and a computer at the reception desk. After CONI, a group of Ultras entered
the stadium (but did no damage). At this point the Ponte Duca d’Aosta (which spans the Tiber at the
Mussolini obelisk that marks the entrance to the stadium) was barricaded with crowd control barriers
and garbage bins. Many Ultras could be seen armed with iron bars and with their faces covered.
They set about burning the trash bins at the mouth of the bridge before crossing it and moving out
of the area (figure 79, 81, 82). Small groups formed and split from the main group of Ultras. Some
of these smashed car windows and burned cars, scooters, and trash bins (figure 80). The largest
group assaulted police stations.
The biggest attack on a police station occurred on Via Remi, near the Flaminio Stadium.
Around two hundred Ultras amassed in front of the station. They set fire to a bus and a row of trash
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bins. They then broke the windows of the station and attempted to set it afire with flares and bombs.
The tactic was repeated elsewhere. The police station at Ponte Milvio and another on Via Flaminia
were attacked with flaming trash bins, stones, bottles, bolts, and other pieces of iron.

Figure 79. Ultras rampage in Rome. November 11,
2007.
Around midnight, the bulk of the action stopped when the police pulled everyone out of the
area for fear of reprisals. According to Alessandro Marchetti (Secretary of the Sindacato Unitario
Lavoratori Polizia Municipale - the policeman’s union) the pull-out left the city in the hands of the
“teppisti” (hooligans).5

Figure 80. Auto damage. Rome.
November 11, 2007.

5

The Italian language tellingly does not translate Ultra as “hooligan,” as hooliganism is associated with
rowdiness and vandalism - neither of which are general behaviors of the Ultras.
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While walking far enough from the stadium area to find a bus to the center of town I met a
young Ultra who admitted to throwing stones at a police-line and a few passing cars near the
stadium. He was an AS Roma fan but had joined a group of SS Lazio Ultras as they crossed the
Duca d’Aosta bridge. At that point he was advised by one of the Ultras leading the group that he was
better-off not getting involved with them. He was only 16 years old and did not share the “hardened”
appearance of most of the Ultras who were out that night. He stayed around the stadium to look for
friends and, as he put it, “to see how [he] could help.” As we walked he spoke of his disgust at the
news coverage that had replaced soccer for the day. “The Ultras are always [presented as] animals,”
he said.

Figure 81. Ultras rampage in Rome.
November 11, 2007.

Figure 82. Ultras rampage in Rome.
November 11, 2007.
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iv. The Media Responds
When I arrived home well after midnight the RAI24 news channel was wrapping up the
day’s events. They still called the shooting of Sandri accidental, but by now the shooting was a
distant memory for the press. The real story was what happened in Bergamo and Rome. Various
MP’s had their say. Maurizio Gasparri and Ignazio La Russa of Alleanza Nazionale attacked Amato
for not stopping all the games - if not out of respect then out of concern for public safety. Forza
Italia’s Fabrizio Cicchitto seconded their thoughts, saying that Amato had the power and
responsibility to keep the violence of Bergamo and Rome from happening. Giovanna Melandri
stated her support for Amato’s decision to cancel only Inter-Lazio and to start the others after “a
moment of reflection.”
Rome’s mayor Walter Veltroni received news of what was happening while in Cracow. He
said it was a terrible day for all of Rome, but that the situation again showed that violence of any
sort has no place in a civilized society. Veltroni then asked a group of two hundred students visiting
a synagogue in Cracow to perform a moment of silence for Sandri. Piero Marrazzo, president of the
Lazio Region, said that work must be done amongst children in order to create a culture of sport that
refutes all forms of aggression.
The next day, the press was universal in its condemnation of the Ultras. The major dailies
sold in Rome (Il Messaggero, Il Tempo, La Repubblica, Corriere dello Sport. Corriere della Sera,
La Gazzetta dello Sport, and Il Romanista) each carried a photo of either Rome or Bergamo. Two
of them used NO as a headline, two others used BASTA (ENOUGH). As the night before, the
reactions to Sandri’s death were more prominently covered than his death. In the morning the name
of the officer and details of the shooting were still undisclosed. By extension the jury was still out
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on Sandri’s culpability for what happened. The facts that were available seemed tame given the
images of the previous evening: three arrests (of which one was a female), twenty policemen with
minor injuries, and four policemen under medical supervision in a Rome hospital.
Most of the news consisted of negative moralistic profiles of the Ultras. A typical article in
La Gazzetta dello Sport identified the Ultras as “misguided thugs with a warped reality . . . who
show up to games hoping for trouble.” The author added that the Ultras are “dangerous rabble with
power over the peace-loving masses who just want to enjoy soccer.”6 The Italian media used teppisti
and even “hooligan” instead of “Ultras” when talking about Rome, understanding well the moral
implications of the switch in descriptive terms.
At a café in Monteverde the morning regulars all spoke of the previous day and night. The
vast majority parroted the press in the assumption that the events of the morning and the evening
were unrelated. This assumption could only be made with no understanding of the Ultras’ mentalità.
The owner, who was aware of my involvement with the Ultras took me aside and explained to me
in his best Italian (he usually spoke Roman dialect) that the Ultras were criminals who were killing
the game. He suggested I come with him on Saturday mornings to watch his young son play if I
wanted to see what was important in sports: sportsmanship, fun, innocence. The Ultras, he
explained, with their “stupid rivalries and war against the police,” had nothing to do with soccer.
The midday TG1 newscast on RAI1 led with an update on the shooting and the subsequent
violence. The state news agency ANSA identified the police officer who shot Sandri as 35 year-old
Luigi Spaccatorella of Arezzo. It was assumed that he would be facing charges of omicidio
preterintenzionale (involuntary manslaughter). Through his lawyer he issued a statement calling the

6

La Gazzetta dello Sport, Nov 12, 2007, pg. 1
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shooting a terrible accident. According to the statement, a warning shot from two hundred meters
was made, followed by an accidental firing as the gun came down. He said he was not aiming as he
was running from two hundred meters.
But on the 5:00 PM broadcast, the Police Chief of Arezzo, Vincenzo Giacobbe, stated that
numerous witnesses saw Luigi firing with both hands, apparently in the belief that Sandri’s car had
just robbed the petrol station at the rest area. The bullet (perhaps shot at the car’s tires) hit Sandri
in the neck as he sat in the back driver-side seat. Back in Rome, the police injury list reached forty,
with the most serious being an officer assaulted with an iron bar during one of the station raids.
v. The Ultras Explain
Talk amongst the Ultras was much like that amongst non-Ultras. Everyone wanted to know
what had happened and why. There was great disparity, however, in how the previous day was
explained. Whereas the general public, politicians, and those involved in the business of soccer
(including the media) spoke about Sandri’s death as a tragic accident unrelated to soccer and of the
Ultras holding the game and its fans hostage for the sake of their anti-social war against the police,
the Ultras spoke about honor, sacrifice, commitment, brotherhood, and, indeed, warfare.
As I briefly explained above, the Ultras’ mentalità utilizes a model of history that deploys
and creates heroes. Monday evening, a large group of Ultras from Boys, Ultras Romani, Fedayn, and
Ultras Primavalle-San Lorenzo met at the Cutty Sark Bar near Piazza Bologna. Many of them were
at the stadium the previous evening. They were reluctant to talk about anything, and more
importantly, anyone they had seen. My presence at the gathering was because I had shown myself
to be trustworthy and of no threat to them in the previous months. This was a group of older Ultras those who had seen the Curva become not only more ideologically influenced and violent, but also
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the prey of the police and various “governmental agendas.”
The Ultras feel that they are used not only to justify the creation of a police-state, but also
the creation of myriad divisions and offices within the governmental bureaucracy that are charged
with controlling soccer-related violence. The most vocal of those gathered allowed themselves the
pleasure of being in the company of other Ultras. Unable to speak freely during their work day, they
asked each other, among other things, “cosa vogliono da noi?” In other words, “what do they want
us to do?” It was in situations like this that the hegemony of the state and media in control of the
image of the Ultras was most telling.
Despite the Ultras’ attempts to create public awareness (through banners, choreography,
websites, offices, and even radio shows), they were still an isolated minority. And despite their selfrepresentation as an elite phenomenon, in the aftermath of the Raciti death and the killing of Sandri,
what the media and state say of them is far more powerful than what they say of themselves. Instead
of merely speaking past one another, however, the more the media described the Ultras as a violent
mob which threatened the security of the state, the more the Ultras acted as a violent mob, albeit one
incapable of threatening the state. For the Ultras present at the Cutty Sark, this was also apparent.
“They speak, we act,” said Fabio of Boys, “and this shows their cowardice and our courage.”
The state of affairs also demonstrated that against the state, in the person of the police, the
Ultras have an opponent that will at least confront them with arms, so to speak. It is never a fair fight
when one battles with guns and teargas and the other with stones and bolts, but it is a battle
nonetheless. Against the power of the media, dissident groups such as the Ultras find the rules of
engagement far less equal, if no less consequential (Massumi, 1992, pgs. 104-105). Oddly enough,
the Ultras are perfectly equipped to fight on both fronts. They will be violent, which suits the first,
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and they understand imagery, ideas, and how they interact in the production of information (even
if many of them are verbally unaware of the connection) which suits the second. Although the Ultras
made it clear that they understood what happened the day before, and what was happening to them
as a phenomenon, they were still incapable of making anyone beyond other Ultras listen to their
position. This is because of the distance between their values and those of their opponents.
In the entirety of Italy, they said, there were only two groups who had acted honorably and
nobly: us (the AS Roma and SS Lazio Ultras) and the Atalantini (the Ultras of Atalanta BC, the team
of Bergamo). The Ultras in Bergamo had risked much to show their disapproval at the games being
allowed to continue. They had acted not out of uncontrolled aggression but out of respect for Sandri,
honoring his sacrifice with one of their own. It is rare to hear AS Roma Ultras speak positively of
the Bergamaschi, as people from Bergamo are known, for the rivalry between the groups is deep,
politically-driven, and violent. Despite both sets of Ultras being of the far right, those of Atalanta
BC are also aligned with the Northern League. As the League has gained notoriety, so too has its
vehement denunciations of Rome as a cauldron of corruption and southern backwardness. When the
two curvas meet, no punches are pulled. But these AS Roma Ultras were sympathetic to their
Atalanta counterparts because they acted beyond themselves and stood up to the greed and might
of Calcio Moderno.
Not just the state, nor the police, but Calcio Moderno. As Fabio of Boys explained, “the
games continued not to benefit the communities in which the games are played nor the youth or
families, which the media claims are the true victims of our [the Ultras] behavior. They continued
for SKY, Mediaset, Telecom Italia, and the other corporate sponsors of soccer on television.” And
now, the Ultras, who understand themselves as the only true fans of the game, as well as the only
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ones fighting (literally) to keep the game connected to its roots, expected to face a lengthy, perhaps
permanent, ban from the stadiums.
Speaking in this way made them think, too, of their situation. They were certainly facing a
lengthy stadium ban. Their response, though, was sobering. “Macchì se ne frega un cazzo?” (Who
gives a damn?) Who cares about soccer or AS Roma when an Ultra was killed for doing nothing
more than supporting his team? What does any of it matter when the game is in the hands of those
who care only about maximizing corporate sponsorship and then making that sponsorship as
profitable as possible? Thus, the Ultras echoed the cries heard in the media and from the offices of
FIGC, although looking at the situation from an opposing point of view: we are witnessing the death
of Italian soccer.
II. Consequences
A. Raciti and the Policing of the Ultras
i. The Decreto Amato and Osservatorio
To better understand the thoughts of the Ultras, we must return to the aftermath of Raciti’s
death in February, 2007. Following the actions of the Catania Ultras, all of Italy’s Ultras were
demonized. It was impossible to watch television, listen to the radio, enter a piazza or café without
hearing someone speaking of the Ultras. There was no mention of the life devoted to honor,
commitment, and sacrifice that I had come to know, but instead talk of criminals, hoodlums, and
delinquents. I took it upon myself to wear a Boys Roma hat around Rome after the killing and was
asked to remove it one morning by a barman at Tazza d’Oro (one of Rome’s most venerated cafés).
Ironically, on January 31, 2007, just two days prior to Raciti’s death, and on an evening when AS
Roma played AC Milan in the second-leg of the Coppa Italia semi-final, Curva Sud unfurled the
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banner asking “You (all) write in newspapers, and talk on the radio, but when do you (all) come to
the stadium?” (figure 66). Even before the media barrage surrounding Raciti, the Ultras understood
themselves to be at war with the media.
More important than the press, the government post-Raciti was talking about the Ultras,
making it clear that life as the Ultras had known it before was officially over. Not only, they were
told, would organized travel to away games be outlawed, but also all of the performative elements
of the Ultra form of life: bombs, flares, banners, and (certain) songs. Those speaking most
vociferously against the Ultras were Giuliano Amato (Minister of the Interior), Giovanna Melandri
(Minister of Youth and Sports), and Antonio Matarrese (President of Lega Calcio). While Matarrese
spoke of cracking down on delinquency and making soccer safe for families, Melandri spoke of the
ills of Italian sport (especially when compared to England’s policing of hooliganism) and of her
desire to implement a modello Inglese (English Model) based on strict and aggressive policing, allseated stadiums, and zero-tolerance of violence. For his part, Amato spoke of ridding soccer once
and for all of the Ultras.
On Thursday February 8, Amato announced that he and the Osservatorio Nazionale sulle
Manifestazioni Sportive (National Observatory of Sporting Events) had devised a set of amendments
to Legge 401 (Law 401 - the set of laws dating from 1989 that set the terms and conditions of
policing and penalizing violent acts relating to sporting events). The Observatory is a governing
body made up of various governmental departments, including the Ministry of the Interior, the
police and the Carabiniere, as well as Trenitalia and Autogril (restaurants and gas-stations located
along Italy’s highways) that has advised policy and policing decisions for sporting events since
1999. Until 2007 it had only an advisory capacity regarding the reduction of “soccer-related

188

violence” but now was given the authority to change the face of Italian soccer. Autogril was
included on the Observatory board because, as violence was defeated in the stadiums, and organized
travel to-and-from away games became more diligently policed, the Ultras began traveling in
smaller numbers and using these highway stops as the setting for their conflicts.
The proposal motivated by Raciti’s death, quickly dubbed the Decreto Amato (Amato
Decree), consisted of seven points:
1. Any act of violence against a public official will be punishable with a prison term of between 4
and 10 years. Any act resulting in grave bodily harm will be punishable of a prison term of
between 8 and 10 years.
2. The displaying of any banners containing incitements to violence, racial, cultural, or bodily
insults or insensitivity, will be punishable by expulsion from all Italian stadiums for between
1 and 5 years. Further, all banners must be pre-approved by the club hosting the event in
question. Approvals are based upon the criteria set out by the Amato Decree. Displaying of
unapproved banner will result in expulsion from all Italian stadiums for 3 years.
3. The “statute of limitations” for arrest after the event of soccer-related violence is extended from
36 to 48 hours.
4. Any stadium unable to reach the security plan set forth in the Amato Decree will be prohibited
from hosting spectators. Included in this section is the prohibition of the selling of blocks of
tickets (more than 4) to traveling supporters. Any club found to be doing so will face
financial penalties and possibly criminal charges.
5. All tickets must include the holder’s name, location of purchase, and, if applicable, a codice
fiscale (fiscal code - similar to American Social Security Numbers). Also included is the
instruction that seat assignments must be respected and adhered to.
6. The creation of the designation DASPO (Divieto di Accedere alle Manifestazioni Sportive Prohibited from Entering Sporting Events) assigned to persons prohibited from attending
sporting events, including criminal charges that can result in prison terms (see 1).
7. The mandatary placement of one steward for every 200 spectators in a stadium, a move that
subtracted seats from spectators in a stadium’s various sections.
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Many Ultras, if not all of them, understood the Amato Decree as not having the intention of
diminishing soccer-related violence, but of destroying the organizational bases of the Ultras. As
Fabrizio of Boys Roma explained it, it was a declaration of war against the Ultras, done so with the
conceptualization of the Ultras as hooligans - maleducati (ill-bred or bad mannered) hoodlums with
no interest in soccer or cultural traditions, but only in causing trouble. When asked about the cultural
traditions upheld by the Ultras he explained:
“The new measures seek to make everything illegal. No more political flags, songs,
or messages in stadiums; no more flares, smoke bombs, or bombs; no more standing
with your group - organized or of friends; no more songs against the other team. We
are now to come to the stadium to buy overpriced beer and watch in silence as
overpaid illiterates kick a ball around. Instead of the beauty that is ‘il calcio’ (soccer)
we now get organized intermixing of ‘real fans’ in the expensive seats (Il Romanista,
a local AS Roma-only newspaper, devised a scheme whereby AC Parma’s fans could
sit in the Tevere grandstand intermixed with AS Roma’s fans), calls for changes to
Italy’s culture, and a stadium experience that would seem like those of the United
States in its sterility and anonymity.”
When I pressed him on what was in fact being outlawed, he answered “politics, theatrics,
community, and fierce rivalry.” We talked some more about la bellezza del calcio (the beauty of
soccer) and Fabrizio explained the Ultras as the encapsulation of what was greatest in Italian history.
The country’s greatness was not cultural production (in his mind a material phenomenon) but “the
unrestrained passion for, and celebration of, something greater than ourselves (indicating me and
him).” This was not the first time one of my Ultra informants spoke in extreme terms about the
importance of the Ultras, but it was the first that I heard this theme connected to a general model of
Italian history.
I pressed him further, asking how the Ultras embodied this greatness. “There are two things,”
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he said, “we live like children of an old mentality. For us the first thing is rivalry. I am Roman and
for me Rome is the preeminent city in the world. I don’t give a damn about other Italian cities. And
two, we dare to risk our lives every week for Rome. For this we are Ultras.” He continued a while,
talking about Ancient Rome, Renaissance rivalries with Florence, the Lega phenomenon, and even
the Decima Flottiglia MAS, a special forces division of the Italian Royal Navy. “In all these,” he
said, “are the examples of how a Roman and how an Ultra is to live: daring, honorably, fearlessly,
defensively, passionately and exaltedly.”
What the Ultras exalt, he continued, is not violence or drunkenness, as do hooligans, but “the
willingness to suffer to defend the honor of Rome against the infidels. When they say that we can
be adversaries and not enemies they are saying that our culture is dead. Do you understand? Italy’s
is a history of rivalry, division, suspicion, indeed hatred. Why should we change what has made us
so particular and beautiful?”
Fabio’s conceptualization of himself as an Ultra and a Roman matches the Ultras’
monumental use of history in that it operates selectively. For Fabio, the Ultras are connected to, as
he said, the greatest things about Italian history. Rivalry and campanilismo aside, however, he made
it clear that what is greatest about Italian history is Rome. Nor is Fabio alone to be enveloped in a
world that simultaneously exalts Rome and the Ultras; all of the Ultras with whom I developed a
relationship are. What became clear in the moments of crisis, after Raciti and Sandri, was that the
Italian state was seen by them as an imposition which attempts to break the connection between
Rome, or more specifically Romanità, and being an Ultra.
This of course would not be the case for an Ultra in Genova, for instance, but this points to
the fractured and highly local nature of being an Ultra. For the Romans, the strength and courage
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they speak so much about as central to being an Ultra is inspired by Rome. The state’s attempt to
destroy the Ultras is in essence the attempt of a modern, bourgeois nation-state to destroy something
primal, a spirit of Romanità, which predates the state. In other words, the state is a foreign
imposition seeking to impose its will upon the “true Romans,” as they call themselves in song.
Federico, formerly of Antichi Valori, does not believe the state’s desire to eliminate the
Ultras is motivated by their violent proclivities. Mirroring the comments of Fabio concerning Calcio
Moderno’s culpability in the death of Sandri, he argues, rather, that the Ultras are bad for business.
“We are the last voices of freedom connected with soccer in Italy,” he said via telephone in 2010.
“We have been in the stadium since 1972 teaching the youth and anyone who could hear us about
the evils of consumption and the joy of a pure connection between city, people, and team. We protest
everything the new business of soccer attempts to do, be it foreign ownership, hyper-advertising,
teams as commodities, and most importantly, fans as consumers. Besides,” he concluded, “I used
to fight every-other weekend, from 1999 to 2004, and often during the off season (he told an
incredible story of some unsuspecting foreign tourists wearing AC Milan gear in Rome whom he
and the rest of Antichi Valori set upon near Piazza Navona), but no one I know has been in a fight
since. Ultra violence is over.” “Because of the state?” I asked. “Yes,” he said, “but more importantly
because the Ultras who would fight are all outside the Ultras now. The state is fighting ghosts if it
is truly fighting the violent Ultras.”
Indeed, the Observatory’s own documents show that violence related to soccer, at least in
Serie A, is largely a thing of the past. During the 2004-2005 season, there were 35 games at which
fighting occurred between fans. In 2005-2006 the number was were reduced to 16, rising to 18 in
2006-2007. The total number of injuries occurring during these encounters was 51 in 2004-2005,
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44 in 2005-2006, and 32 in 2006-2007. Injuries occurring to police officers fell from 117 in 20042005, to 15 in 2005-2006. They climbed to 48 in 2006-2007, the season in which the large-scale
violence in Catania claimed the life of Filippo Raciti. Arrests have remained steady. In 2004-2005
and 2006-2007 there were 37 arrested. In 2005-2006 the number dropped considerably to 17.
Despite consistency in arrests, the number of charges filed climbed from 143 in 2004-2005 to 176
in 2006-2007.7
At the halfway-point of the 2007-2008 season, CNIMS (Centro Nazionale di Informazione
sulle Manifestazioni Sportive - National Center for Information on Sports Events) released a brief
statistical summary showing the success of the Observatory in reducing fighting and violence
(CNIMS, Campionato 2007-2008: Girone di Andata). Even as the numbers are higher than those
quoted above, because these show all leagues from Serie A to D, it is clear that the Observatory was
pleased by its efforts to regulate fan behavior. From the same period of the 2006-2007 season, games
with fighting fell 35%, the total number of fan injuries fell 6.06%, injuries to police officers fell
45.26%, arrests climbed 3.2%, and charges-filed fell 28.29%. The document makes a special note
that the use of teargas fell 62.5% (from 16 occasions to 6).
With the state’s own statistics demonstrating a diminution of violence between Ultras and
the police, it makes the stark measures and strong words aimed at marginalizing the Ultras after the
deaths of Raciti and Sandri even more conspicuous. The deaths and the Ultras’ responses to them
were used by the state as excuses to repress the Ultras. The state even considered the violence of the
Roman Ultras on November 11, 2007 to be an act of terrorism aimed at overthrowing the
government (see Chapter 5). As preposterous as this sounded to the Ultras, such language served
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the purpose of legitimizing the crackdown on all forms of Ultra action, even those as benign as
carrying flags and colors into a stadium. Similarly, any acts of coordinated Ultra action, such as
manifestations against club malfeasance or potential foreign investment, are roundly attacked in the
press.8 It is easy to conclude, therefore, that the state is using violence as an excuse to rid the
business of soccer of the Ultras.
From personal experience, it is clear that policing methods are working to reduce violence
at matches. In the approximately 60 games that I attended during 15 months of research (from
October 2006 to January 2008) I did not witness any incident that could be called fighting by the
Ultras or police. I saw posturing, heard insults, and occasionally felt menaced because I was at the
mercy of home fans with a position of strategic advantage (to throw items into the guest section).
Despite standing amongst the hardest of the most reviled Ultras in Italy (according to another
Observatory document from 2002, AS Roma’s Ultras were involved in 15% of all fighting in Italy,
regardless of league) there was simply nothing to report in terms of actual violence (Inserto Polizia
Moderna n.9, 2002, pg. 10). However, the attitudes toward violence I observed were another matter
and will be examined below.
ii. Whistlegate
As the days passed after the February 2007 death of Raciti and the polemics and promises
piled up, the Ultras were in limbo. They knew from past experience that tough talk was followed by
little action and even less change. Still, they worried that this time it was not an Ultra who was
killed, but one of the state’s own, which might incite retaliatory action. This prompted a variety of
actions. One longtime Ultra I met during the week when the games were cancelled (to plan for a
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soccer without Ultras as well as honor Raciti) was at once convinced that nothing would change and
that the Ultras were now a dead phenomenon. He was not speaking thus because of the bankruptcy
of the Ultras’ mentalità, as some older Ultras had said, but because “the government will not allow
us to be Ultras.”
On February 11, 2007, the games recommenced. AS Roma hosted Parma FC, and because
the Olympic Stadium had long ago implemented the electronic ticketing system with corresponding
turnstiles, AS Roma was allowed to “host its public.” Outside the stadium there were long lines
waiting to enter Curva Sud. The police were frisking every entrant, as well as unfurling all flags and
banners (figure 41). In Curva Sud there were a few more stewards visible than normal, but
otherwise, nothing had changed. The fear that the groups would be destroyed de facto by an army
of stewards enforcing seating assignments was, in the end, unfounded. If anything, the pre-game
mood was festive. All the groups hung their banners and unfurled their flags. Friends hugged and
laughed. Food was shared, and many beers.
It was just as the Curva is meant to be. Then something incredible happened. After the
players entered the field to the stadium’s singing of “Roma Roma” (the club’s anthem) by Antonello
Venditti, they gathered around the center-circle. It was announced that a moment of silence for
Filippo Raciti would be observed. Within seconds, the Curva was awash in a cacophony of whistles
- an act of supreme disrespect, and one which forced the rest of the stadium to clap for the minute,
in the hope of salvaging the dignity of the occasion. (It is customary in Italy to clap during moments
of silence, but the press claimed the authorities had hoped instead for stone silence in order to
accentuate the solemnity and seriousness of the occasion.) After the game Francesco of Fedayn
agreed that the whistles were disrespectful. They were meant, as he said, to match the disrespect
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shown the Ultras by the state and media during the week. From my position in the Curva, I could
tell the whistles began in the upper-left section occupied by Fedayn. However, according to radio
reports of the whistles, they were begun by Boys. For their part, Boys silently turned their backs on
the proceedings in another premeditated protest at their being forced to join in the commemoration
of Raciti’s death and the degradation of the Ultras.
The media described the Ultras as “disgraceful,” “stupid,” “idiotic,” “a minority of barbarity
in a sea of gentility,” “ungrateful,” and, finally, “defeated.”9 Callers to post-game radio shows said
the Ultras should be banned for life from attending games. At a meeting between some members of
Boys and Ultras Primavalle-San Lorenzo in midweek, the discussion was dominated by the press
reactions to what I was calling “whistlegate.” Matteo of Primavale was dismissive, saying that “it
was of no consequence to the Ultras what was printed in newspapers, as the journalists know
nothing and invent what they write.” It was expected, then, that they would strumentalizzare
(instrumentalize, or exploit for profit) any situation against the Ultras.
“The press,” Matteo said, “has an agenda, to promote the interests of Calcio Moderno, and
to moralize against the Ultras. This happens all the time - well, anytime there is violence. We see
the world from opposing vantage points: when they say virtue (virtu`) we say cowardice (vilta`),
when they say moderation (moderazione) we say mediocrity (mediocrità).” Jean-Paolo of Boys
agreed, giving me some examples of how the press “has sided with a form of life (modo di vivere)
which seeks to diminish the hardness (durezza) and clarity (chiarezza) of the Ultras. Among other
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things,” he said, “the press had been pleased that Prodi and his government of neo-liberals and
communists had passed [sic] a law that forces the state to recognize gay marriages, while the nation
was aghast at such a defeat of the holiness of the family.10 It had also been silent when three Italian
women were gang-raped, stoned (intentionally to death), and buried alive in Cape Verde by the very
people to whom it would willingly give the nation in an effort to show how multicultural and liberal
it can be.11 The same press had celebrated when Prodi was in India attempting to create more ways
to import cheap fabrics from people that would hammer another nail in the coffin of [Italy’s] own
legendary textile industry.12 So it is only natural that the Ultras are the true enemy of the press,”
Jean-Paolo said.
iii. Protesting Calcio Moderno
With the resumption of the season came the return to normal routines as well, except that the
Amato Decree forced the closing of all but four stadiums expected to host games in Serie A. Even
Milan’s famed San Siro was to be closed to the public for failing to install electronic turnstiles.
However, around-the-clock work crews insured the stadium could at least host season ticket holders.
AS Roma played four consecutive away games in empty stadiums as a result of the closings. The
first of these, at Empoli, was attended by members of Fedayn and Ultras Romani, who hung their
banners from a fence outside the stadium and listened to the game on a car radio. Their being outside
the stadium was meant as a reminder to the players that, “noi, non ti lasceremo mai” (“we will never
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leave you,” as goes a popular song of Curva Sud Roma), and to Amato, the government, the police,
the press, and the monied agents of Calcio Moderno that, despite the bans and laws, the Ultras were
going nowhere. Lorenzo of Ultras Romani, present in Empoli, prophetically (considering the killing
of Sandri nine months later) made the point: “they will have to kill us to be free of us. We risk
everything for the things in our hearts and because of this we are dangerous to the system [of Calcio
Moderno] that wants passive consumers.”

Figure 83. Curva Sud announces 15 minutes of silent
protest. February 25, 2007.
Each home game in that 8-game span began with 15 minutes of silent protest by Curva Sud.
The first was against Reggina Calcio, the team from Reggio Calabria. As the game began, the Curva
was instructed to remain seated and silent for a protest by way of a banner reading “15 min di
silenzio ... sono urla di rabbia.” (15 minutes of silence ... [as] shouts of rage). As no other sections
of the stadium sing, cheer, or clap like the Ultras, it was noticeably quiet. Somewhere close to 10
minutes into the proposed 15 minute protest, however, groups of fans in Distinti Sud, the section
next to Curva Sud, began to sing. Their songs were quickly met with derisive whistles and a barrage
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of insults from the Curva. The Ultras were instantly as furious as I ever saw them in my time of
study. Their derision began as whistles and yelled insults (destined to fall on deaf ears). It progressed
into organized chants of “Distinti, Distinti, Vaffanculo” (Distinti, go fuck yourself), and then,
“Cantate solo quando volete” (You only sing when you want) - the latter being an insult designed
to show the bourgeois nature of those fans who do not support AS Roma as a duty. The Ultras ended
the 15 minute protest with chants of “Curva Sud Alè,” (Let’s go Curva Sud).
The short scene captured many elements of the Ultra phenomenon. First, the Ultras
understood that they were protesting the media and its ability to portray them in unflattering ways.
They had been portrayed as expendable for weeks. What better way to show what they bring to the
games than by remaining seated and silent? Second, they must be well-organized to get a section
of 17,000 people to go along with a protest that was unannounced to the vast majority of those in
the curva. Third, the distance between the Ultras and the “normal fans” was made apparent. The
song sung against the Distinti section was designed to show them the vacuity of their singing only
“when they want” instead of the Ultra-style of singing for the entire 90 minutes (and more) of the
game. To sing at one’s leisure removes the sacrifice and commitment from the act. Fourth, the act
of silence as protest is difficult for the Ultras. Contrary to how they had been portrayed in the press,
their actions as fans are most dear to their movement, so much so that many long-time Ultras
condemn anyone who puts political affiliations or ideologies above performance in the Curva.
III. Conclusion
The Ultras, as we are beginning to see, live and act within a distinctive form of life driven
by a language of honor, sacrifice, glory, and daring - what they call “antichi valori” or a “vecchia
mentalità.” They use a form of history that promotes the celebration of heroes and heroism while
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at the same promoting the particular at the expense of the universal. Thus, Romans and Ultras are
glorified and magnified while others are ignored or vilified. As we will begin to see, the Ultras’
mentalità takes its clearest form as an understanding of the world in starkly oppositional or agonic
terms.
Their monumentalism keeps history alive and present in their every action as Ultras. Whether
it is the memory of fallen Ultras, friends, and colleagues, the glory of Ancient Rome, or the long
history of Italian intercity rivalry, the past plays a powerful role in the way they understand
themselves. On the evening of Gabriele Sandri’s death, when the Ultras of AS Roma and SS Lazio
united to confront the police and rampage through the streets of Rome, they did so believing not
only that Sandri’s death deserved a violent response but also that they were making their own history
in doing so. In other words, they would not have acted as Ultras if they stayed passively at home,
nor would they have set a proper model to be emulated by later Ultras.
The night of what the media called the “sack of Rome” as well as the months following the
February 2007 death of Filippo Raciti begin to make clear the relationship between the Ultras, the
state, and media. The Ultras are adept at using the media for their own ends. The media coverage
of performance of fandom, be it choreography, flares, smoke torches, or banners, is counted upon
in order to gain notoriety for groups and curvas. For the same reasons it is also hoped that the media
will acknowledge the Ultras’ social initiatives and protests. However, there is a great distance
between these and the expectation that the media will attempt to understand the complexity of the
Ultras, their worldview, or their critique of modern bourgeois life. Likewise, the state had long
accepted the Ultras and the small-scale violence they perpetrated amongst themselves. They made
great shows of force in attempted to quell these, but made no moves to prohibit Ultras’ access to
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stadiums. However, after the death of a police officer and a night of what was also called domestic
terrorism, both in 2007, the state finally moved to rid soccer of the Ultras. Although the media and
state play peripheral roles for the Ultras, whose self-conception, while political, is so insular that the
impossibility of being understood by non-Ultras is often assumed, they are critical in determining
the discourse of being an Ultra and the freedoms thereby advanced.
In the coming chapters, the media’s power to moralize situations will be analyzed more fully,
as will the state’s ability to determine which forms of violence are legitimate and which are markers
of subversion. All the while, the Ultras, their agonistic culture full of the language of pre-modern
warriors, and their connections with neo-fascism, Rome, and political philosophy will be examined.
What emerges is a kind of cultural movement, very political and critical of modernity, also violent,
and dedicated to preserving the traditions they feel sustain them and the people of Rome.
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CHAPTER FIVE: Ultras, the State, and Violence
In the previous chapter I described some of the most extreme moments during my research
period. The deaths of Raciti and Sandri became the bookends of this project because they brought
to light so many elements of the Ultras: their mentalità; violence; and their relationship with the
Italian state, soccer, and Calcio Moderno. In this chapter, I continue the discussion of their
relationship with the state, this time focusing on the distance between the Ultras and the state and
media. While the Ultras maintain an ethic that focuses on the virtuous and heroic aspects of violence
that are said by Sorel and Nietzsche to lead one beyond the bourgeois form of life, the state and
media combine to create and disseminate, against the Ultras, a counter-ethic that promotes the
legitimacy of state violence and condemns instances of interpersonal violence. Because the chapter
requires an examination of the discourses and moralities of violence I also explore the attraction of
Nietzsche to AS Roma’s Ultras.

Figure 84. AS Roma’s Ultras call Inter’s Ultras “servants of
the state.” Milan. August 2010.
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I. AS Roma’s Ultras and the State
In the Introduction, I explained that the state and media exist as meta-natural opponents of
the Ultras for two reasons - they are not amongst the natural or soccer-related rivals of the Ultras,
and they are able to comment upon and define the context of all of the Ultra rivalries. In order to best
understand the contention between the Ultras and the state, it is crucially important to understand
the ways in which the physical power of the state is bound up with the morality of bourgeois
liberalism. Through both of these, the hegemony of the state is legitimized and maintained.
Sorel distinguished between the violence of a revolutionary proletariat and violence in the
name of the state (1999, pg. xvi). Interestingly, Sorel includes the capacity of intellectuals and
bureaucrats to act violently in the state’s service. Given their feeble natures, they do so primarily
through the wielding of morality and an ethic that condemns violence. What we find in Sorel, then,
is an acknowledgment that morality is a tool used by the bourgeoisie against any eruptions that
would seek to disturb the peace of the modern marketplace (1999, pgs. 231-238).
Agamben goes further in explaining the links between the state’s monopoly of legitimate
violence and the incorporation of the modern political subject into a system of protection and
happiness. The modern state, he explains, is able to bring all of the “objects” that dwell within the
state’s confines to “subjecthood” by demanding that these (human) objects conform to the state’s
inclusionary/exclusionary model of humanity (Agamben, 1995, pgs. 8-12). As a corrective to
Foucault’s “bio-power,” which proposed that the state lords over the care of the individual,
Agamben says that in the modern state, the bare life, or natural life, along with morality and truth,
coincides to the point of “irreducible indistinction” (1995, pg. 9).
Once the state makes a political issue of something formerly excluded from the political -
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the bare life in the classical period, for example - it then has the right to decide in its interests and
to bring these interests in-line with those of the state (Schmitt, 1976, pg. 7). The state then becomes
the sole interpreter of a political meta-language which includes not only narratives of self but also
“the ability to define ‘good and bad,’ ‘victim and aggressor’” (Sunic, 2007, pg. 125).

Figure 85. A police line below Curva Sud Roma. June
2001.
Within this system, which by definition is totalitarian - in that it offers promises of personal
redemption and happiness, thus providing completely for the individual’s well being, at the price
of mere unthinking devotion to the bourgeois form of life (Agamben, 1995, pg. 10) - the state and
individual are mutually affirming. What is good for the one is good for the other. However, Deleuze
and Guattari (1987) propose that at the edges of modern states - if we momentarily conceive of their
territoriality as a metaphor for zones of inclusion and exclusion - there are also marginal spaces or
thinkers who offer cracks in the order and critiques of its functioning and systemic completeness.
They call these “derelict spaces” because they are contiguous to every one of the state’s spatial
coordinates, yet offer sites of such unorthodoxy that they cannot be brought within the state’s system
of reality (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987, pgs. 388-389). One of the most important of these spaces,
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according to Brian Massumi, is the thought of Friedrich Nietzsche, which he calls “an immanent
outside,” because it signals a plane of exteriority to, or a moving beyond the realm of, bourgeois
capitalist modernity (1992, pg. 105).
In thinking of the relationship between the state and the Ultras, Curva Sud Roma exists as
a derelict space. The contiguous nature of such a space to the reality of the modern state is important
because of the circularity of power and discourse that exist between the state and its dissidents
(Wolf, 1999, pgs. 252-257). This circularity is predicated upon the state and its media having the
ability to control the dissemination of knowledge about its subjects (Wolf, 1999, pgs. 44-45), who
then respond with a counter-vision informed by their dissident status. For their part, AS Roma’s
Ultras respond to the state and its bourgeois prohibition against violence with a discourse informed
by Counter-Enlightenment philosophy that promotes the positive value of violence and aggression precisely because of their opposition to bourgeois peace and security.
Not only is there a circular nature to the discourses of the state and the Ultras, but also of
power and the use of force. According to Maurizio Stefanini, when the state began cracking down
on Ultra groups following Raciti’s death in February 2007, there began an exodus of the hardest and
most politically motivated fascist Ultras from the Italian curvas in order to act politically beyond
them (2009, pg. 74). The same phenomenon was witnessed in Curva Sud Roma.
Because of the ability of the state to make life difficult for Ultras whose political affiliations
threaten the state’s security, not all Ultras responded in this way, however. Many of the smaller or
politically unaligned groups, shunned political commitments beyond the Curva or AS Roma, fearing
danger to the future of the phenomenon. Those in Boys Roma and Padroni di Casa argue instead that
the Ultras are threatening to the state regardless of political affiliation. Manuele, a 31 year-old
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member of Padroni di Casa who works as a paralegal in a small industrial law firm, told me in 2010
that “the Ultras represent a ‘free space’ in Italy that calls into question the rationale of consumption
and civic irresponsibility that is becoming the norm.” As the state closed in on that free, or derelict,
space, bringing the curvas within the domain of its legitimacy, rightist Ultras felt compelled to act
more aggressively in the outside world. This was the argument supplied by Fabio, one of the current
leaders of Boys Roma. “Many of the previous generation of Boys Ultras,” he said, “didn’t bother
coming back to the stadium after the policing increased in 2007. It was easier to go in the streets,
or to join Forza Nuova or Fiamma [Tricolore]” - radical parties of the extreme right. “It is easier to
be a political extremist in Italy than an Ultra,” he told me.

Figure 86. Police outside Rome’s Olympic Stadium after
violence between AS Roma and SS Lazio Ultras. 2004.
What we see then, is that the state’s policing measures might open up spaces of possible
Ultra action that are unintended but also more extreme and threatening to the state. It is too soon to
tell. What is knowable, and what the rest of this chapter will demonstrate, is that the Ultras offer a
form of life that is a direct challenge to the legitimacy of the modern state, even if they are so
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without having (politically) revolutionary intent.
II. Violence, the State, and the Media
Each of the above theorists, Sorel, Agamben, Schmitt and even Deleuze and Guattari, have
been influenced by Max Weber’s understanding of the modern state. “A state,” says Weber, “is a
human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force
within a given territory” (1958, pg. 78 - emphasis in original). The right to use force, he continues,
is restricted to those authorized by the state to do so (Weber, 1958, pg. 78). Thus, Sorel says, true
power is held by those authorized to use violence, and political subjects of the “dangerous classes”
(i.e. proletariat and sub-proletariat, but in reality anyone who stands against the bourgeoisie) exist
largely as those capable of being victims of violence (1999, pgs. 185-187). If we take this as a given,
that the state exists as the sole right to legitimate violence, what are the consequences for groups like
the Ultras who practice a form of violence, often against the police, that, when coupled with a
critique of the bourgeois form of life, puts them at odds with the legitimacy of the state?
The Italian state has had an ambiguous relationship with the far right since the fall of fascism
in 1945. Although fascism and its symbols have been outlawed since that time, the intellectual
currents that flowed through the fascist regime and ideology remained. By 1969, when the
international student movement formally identified with the summer of 1968 reached Italy, the far
right was re-organized as bands of urban guerrillas and terrorists (Ferraresi, 1995, pgs. 16-50).
Although the Christian Democrats, led by Giulio Andreotti, were firmly entrenched in control of
Italian politics, this control was based on a shifting coalition of centrist parties of the left that came
to include the Partito Socialista Italiano (Italian Socialist Party - PSI). In the early 1970s, however,
the socialists’ involvement was shaken by increased tension between unionized industrial workers
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and the state, causing Andreotti to move temporarily to the right for coalition partners before turning
back to the left in 1973 (Ginsborg, 2003a, pgs. 333-337). In this environment, guerilla groups of the
far left and right (including anarchist groups that fit with neither) began exchanging terrorist acts
in Italian cities, highlighted by the 1978 abduction and murder of Christian Democrat leader Aldo
Moro by the leftist Red Brigades (Ginsborg, 2003a, pgs. 383-386) and the 1980 rightist bombing
of Bologna’s central train station that killed 85 people (Ferraresi, 1995, pgs. 159-160). The rightist
guerillas, however, were often aided, or at least not hindered, by the state, which sought to use the
destabilized environment caused by domestic terrorism to shore up support for the Andreotti
government (Ferraresi, 1995, pgs. 116-143).
It was in this milieu that the first groups of Ultras originated. Despite having groups in major
cities being founded along extreme political lines (Fedayn and Boys Roma in Rome, Fossa dei Leoni
and Boys SAN in Milan), the state did not conceive of these groups as a threat. Instead, the Ultras
were allowed to thrive as soccer fans, seemingly at a remove from the political instability of the day
(Stefanini, 2009, pgs. 11-16). However, that idyllic period came to an end when the Italian curvas
began shifting from leftist or apolitical leanings toward the far right in the mid-1990s (Podaliri and
Balestri, 1998, pg. 89). Ferraresi explains that, while the far right was able to thrive in the crisis
years of the Christian Democrats, it has been seen as threatening to the stability of the rightist
neoliberal regime of Silvio Berlusconi. Additionally, the right of the “years of lead” (1969-1980)
had attempted to connect the right with a “movement ideology.” The rightist radicals who developed
in the 1990s instead sought a more extreme ideological form to which victory was less important
than “being beyond” the state (Ferraresi, 1995, pgs. 190-194). It can be surmised that the state
officials felt the Ultras belonged to this new form of the right, especially as Ultra violence became
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endemic to soccer matches during the same period. And as the police presence at soccer games
increased steadily from 1994 to 2004, so to did the tension between the Ultras and the police
(Roversi and Balestri, 2002, pg. 43).

Figure 87. AS Roma Ultras throw flares onto the Olympic
Stadium running track. 2006.
During this same period, organizers of Serie A, Italy’s top professional soccer league, began
to seek greater profits from the game. England’s Premier League, the paradigm of modern, consumer
based soccer (Calcio Moderno - discussed in Chapter 9) began in 1993 and reaped immediate
financial gains by way of domestic and international television rights contracts. Serie A did in fact
become the world’s richest league by 1999, paying the highest player wages, as well as becoming
a popular advertising vehicle for Italy’s most important industries (Foot, 2006, pgs. 489-495). The
Ultras, with their organized mob violence and manifestoes and protests against Calcio Moderno,
appeared to be “bad for business” (Garsia, 2004, pg. 36); that they attracted more police attention
in the 1990s could also be because they threatened the stability of soccer, Italy’s most stable industry
(Foot, 2006, pg. 7).
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What is certain is that the interactions between the state and the Ultras have been defined by
hostility. Returning to Weber’s understanding that modern states must control the use of violence
in their territories, Agamben (2005) argues that modern liberal states utilize states of emergency or
a “state of exception” to strengthen the security of the state at the expense of individual liberties.
During a state of exception, the “well-being of the state” is used to justify an increase in suspicion
and surveillance of private individuals (Agamben, 2005, pgs. 32-40). For the Ultras, just such a state
of exception exists. Each professional soccer game that takes place in Italy is a militarized zone, as
the police make use of the “show of force” technique to enforce the peace. Surveillance is also a
normalized part of the Ultras’ experience of soccer, especially after the 2005 Pisanu Decree
demanded that Closed Circuit Television systems be installed in all Italian stadiums hosting
professional matches.
The consequences of this militarization of soccer games can be deadly, as both Raciti and
Sandri attest. However, it is important to remember what it tells us of the state and its responsibility
toward the Ultras - some of whom are professionals, students, and even fellow police officers. With
soccer games being militarized, they are essentially states of exception. Therefore the Ultras, by
definition, lie beyond the moral obligation of the state (Agamben, 1998, pg. 18). The state alone is
able to define what is included and therefore excluded from its purview. In doing so it also defines
the expectations of those who are excluded. As Agamben argues, the policing of any “agent of
chaos” becomes part of the legitimation not only of state violence but of the state itself (Agamben,
1998, pgs. 17-29). In this way the physical repression of the Ultras comes to mirror the terms of their
condemnation by the media (delineated below).
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Figure 88. Ultras fighting amongst
teargas. Rome. 2002.
Agamben was motivated to interrogate the liberal state in these terms by the juridical
scholarship of Carl Schmitt regarding how the liberal state defined its enemies and violence. The
state must be free, as sovereign, to determine who and what is the political and mortal enemy of its
people (Schmitt, 1976, pgs. 35-36). What the Ultras question are these very definitions. By seeking
hostility and extremely restricted modes of altruism, they challenge the basis of liberal consumerbased passivity and freedom (Sorel, 1999, pg. 216). In so doing, though, they also take exception
to the state’s legitimate power to maintain such a state of passivity amongst its populace.
Through the media, the state is able to maintain its hegemonic grip upon public (liberal)
discourse on violence, inclusion/exclusion, and the enemies of the state. As Gramsci explained, it
is not simply a matter of enforcing discipline upon the public, because the state’s discourse of “the
public good” is already based on a high level of consent within civil society (Spanos, 1993, pgs.
158-160). In other words, hegemonic ideas are already received as natural truths. But, when the
hegemonic fabric is torn - when consent is withdrawn (as in the “derelict spaces” described above) state policing is justified in maintaining hegemony over the main body of the public sphere (Spanos,
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1993, pg. 159). The relationship between the state (and its repression of the Ultras) and the media
(and its condemnations of the Ultras) is seemingly contradictory. If the press is in business to sell
newspapers or gain viewers and listeners, then Ultra violence is conceivably “good” for the press.
However, the press is also in business to maintain the hegemony of the bourgeoisie over the
“subaltern classes” who threaten its dominance of the “cultural and political” fields (Crehan, 2002,
pg. 104).
In describing the circularity or mutually dependent nature of the discourse and violence of
being Ultras with the media discourse about the Ultras, I do not intend to give the impression that
the former’s self-understanding is merely reactive. Instead, their knowledge, and use, of the CounterEnlightenment philosophies of Nietzsche, Sorel, and Evola demonstrate a high level of awareness
of the image they project as well as the historical nature of what they are doing. The rest of this
chapter will focus upon the discourses and ethics of violence and inclusion/exclusion that the Ultras
and state utilize against each other.
III. Discourses of Violence and Morality
A. Sorel and Ethics of Violence
Just as Nietzsche provides a rationale for rejecting the morality of the modern world,
Georges Sorel provides justification for maintaining a counter “ethic of violence” to that of the
modern West. Countering the modern aversion to violence with the “cruelty ... [and] brutality of past
times,” Sorel explained that, by example, the Roman celebration of strength and dominance was
accompanied by “uprightness, sincerity, a lively sentiment of justice, [and] pious respect before the
holiness of morals.” Instead, the modern democratic world is characterized by an extreme aversion
to violence - so much so that any violators of passivity may be considered insane - but also by “lies,
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duplicity, treachery, the spirit of deception, the contempt for property, [and] disdain for instinctive
probity and legitimate customs” (Sorel, 1999, pgs. 187-188).
Sorel’s analysis stems from his considering violence only from the position of its
“ideological consequences” (1999, pg. 178). Thus, the violence of the capitalist class, for instance,
is justified, as is that of the proletariat. Elsewhere, he borrowed from Paul Bureau to relativize the
modern aversion to violence. He explained that in Norway it was possible to find populations which
subscribed to strict moral systems but who were also averse to passivity. “A stab given by a man
who is virtuous in his morals, but violent, is a social evil less serious and more easily curable than
the excessive profligacy of young men reputed to be more civilized” (Sorel, 1999, pg. 176).
Sorel’s examination of modern precautions and prohibitions against violence began, though,
where the Ultras, like the fascists, based their critiques of modernity. Industrial societies, he said,
are favored by modern thinkers over military societies, because peace, while being essential to
consumerism, has “been considered the greatest of blessings and the essential condition of all
material progress” (Sorel, 1999, pg. 175). Fascism condemned pacifism and neutralism as properties
leading to the creation of “economic men” at the expense of “heroic men.” Thus, it praised the
purifying effects of war and dynamism (Koon, 1985, pg. 3). The Ultras, likewise, understand that
occasional violence can be useful in reducing the value of Italian soccer to those attempting to
engulf it within Calcio Moderno. For the soccer of the Ultras is a soccer full of rivalries, hatred,
aggression, and violence - the characteristics associated with the heroic life (Koon, 1985, pgs. 3-5).
Although the Ultras have shown an ability and willingness to think through the “ideological
consequences” of violence, it must be remembered that violence is more useful to the Ultras as a
salve of sorts against modern life. For this reason, Sorel and Nietzsche provide important lessons
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on the possibility of violence to coexist within a moral-ethical system (like the Ultra mentalità) that
is enmeshed in myth and narrative - significant when we consider that the Ultras reject the world
of wealth, materialism, and consumerism.
B. The Moral Prohibition Against Violence
There are two intertwining elements that will alternate as the focus of this important section:
one, the morality of the Italian political class and media which seeks a prohibition of violence; and
two, the Ultras and their understanding of violence. Both of these combine to make knowable what
I, following Sorel, am calling an Ultra “ethic of violence.” In other words, both sides of the
opposition have developed ways of talking about violence. And, both of these distinct ways mirror
the visions held by each side of the optimal state of soccer (and life in general): egalitarian and
sporting for the one and hierarchical and warring for the other. Where one speaks of delinquency,
the other speaks of vivere pericolosamente (living dangerously), contemptuous that modern life has
been stripped of confrontation.
i. The Media and Violence
The Italian press has an ambiguous approach to the Ultras. On the one hand, they are
presented as the color and excitement of soccer. Most broadcasts of games begin with a montage that
include Ultras with flags and flares, even as the latter are now banned from stadiums. Additionally,
journalists occasionally praise the social initiatives, and even the commitment to fandom, of the
Ultras. However, these occasions are offset and rendered strange by press hostility toward the Ultras,
which centers on its violent aspects. Past aggressions against one another and current aggression
toward the police are frequent media topics.
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Figure 89. A car burns after AS Roma’s Ultras clash
with police after AS Roma-SS Lazio. 2009.
That the media presents the Ultras negatively is not a concern for many Ultras. Indeed, many
take responsibility for the image, entranced by the media attention they received in the 1990s. Most
Ultras, at least those in the large cities or those of teams in Serie A, were conscious of the media and
even strategized how best to make it into newspapers and news telecasts. The notoriety of many
groups like Boys Roma or Irriducibili Lazio was established by media coverage, leading these
groups, among others, to be revered and feared throughout the Italian curvas. The clippings from
various newspapers of their history of violent encounters fill two notebooks at the Boys Roma office.
By focusing only on the aggression and violence, the media fails to understand or clearly
present the Ultra mentalità or to specify their targets of enmity, which come across only as rationales
for violence. In many respects, the Ultras are what the press makes of them: aggressive, violent, and
driven by agonism and rivalry. Nor would they deny this. Where there is a glaring contradistinction
between the Ultras of the media and the Ultras’ self-understanding is in the press’ moral oppositions
to rivalry, violence, and aggression, and associated utopian vision of soccer - a vision without the
Ultras. In the end, the media demonize the Ultras as a way to moralize against aggression, violence,
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and conflict, leaving these beyond the legitimate concerns of Italy’s liberal social subjects.
From the perspective of the Ultras, what the media wants is a world in which all are seated
and clapping politely as 22 actors present an evening of entertainment; in which the peoples and
cities of Italy and the world exist in perfect harmony; in which communities no longer appear
homogeneous and teams are made up only of low-priced Africans and Asians; and in which games
take place at times and places only designed for a television audience - in short, the world of Calcio
Moderno.1
The Ultras’ understanding of the media’s motivations is formed by the daily coverage of
Ultra activity in the Italian press. For the purpose of brevity, only two periods of media coverage
will be analyzed here: the immediate post-Raciti period of February 2007, and the period before AS
Roma’s Serie A meeting with SSC Napoli in October 2007 (just one week before the killing of
Gabriele Sandri).
a. How To Cure A “Sick Culture Of Sport”
After the death of Filippo Raciti in February 2007, the press was united in condemnation of
the violence which led to the officer’s killing. As explained in the Introduction, many opinionisti
(columnists) worried that Italy was suffering not only a hooligan problem but a generally negative
culture of sport. Their view was supported by government ministers like Giovanna Melandri,
Minister for Youth and Sports under both Prodi and Berlusconi. Melandri, a member of the left
parties that emerged after the collapse of communism - Democratici di Sinistra (Democrats of the
Left - DS) and subsequently the Partito Democratico (Democrat Party - DP) - was one of the most
vociferous opponents of the Ultras’ view of soccer (as a system of rivals and enemies) in the days
1

Translated from notes taken by former Antichi Valori member Federico during an AS Roma Ultras
meeting on the media and Calcio Moderno which ultimately produced the group’s manifesto on the subject.
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after Raciti’s death. What she proposed in place of Italy’s too extreme sense of rivalità (rivalry) was
an “English model” of sport in which sportsmanship, tolerance, multiculturalism, and
deterritorialization replace rivalry, discrimination, Italianness, and localism.2
In Rome, this attitude was championed most loudly by the local sports newspaper, Il
Romanista. In a week’s worth of editorials, the paper’s director Ricardo Luna, a former editor with
the center-left Espresso group (which includes La Repubblica, the leading center-left newspaper in
Rome), made it clear that “rivalry was killing Italian sport.” The tradition and cherished practice of
vociferous “tifare contro” (rooting against) on the part of many Italians was “archaic in a world
striving for oneness.”3 Luna took up the theme of a “sick culture of sport” the day after Raciti’s
death. His answer to this problem (for no one in the media was asking if this was perhaps a positive
element of Italian life) was “education;” not of the current generation of fans, which included the
Ultras, but the next. “The next generation,” he said, “should be made to see that ‘si può essere
avversario, non nemico’” (one can be an adversary without being an enemy). A few days later Luna,
buoyed by the positive response to his understanding of the problem, gave his vision of what could
be done to facilitate this utopia.
First, rid soccer of the Ultras. For while Italy itself was sick, the Ultras were sickest of all.
Second, fill the curvas with children. And third, close all guest sections and allow fans to intermix.4
While the first two were unlikely to be accomplished, the third was worth trying, according to Luna.
For one week, Il Romanista promoted the idea of integrating fans. As the February 11, 2007 game
2

The Independent, Friday, February 9, 2007, sec. C, pg. 1 “Neo-fascist suspected of killing that has thrown
Italian football into chaos”
3

Il Romanista. Anno IV, n. 39. 9 February 2007, pg. 1, 4

4

Il Romanista. Anno IV, n. 35. 5 February 2007. Pg. 1
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against FC Parma approached, Luna realized that AS Roma was powerless to change the Italian
Football Federation’s ticketing policies, so instead of insisting that the guest section be closed, he
invited Parma fans to buy tickets in the Monte Mario grandstand as a demonstration of support for
this new vision of sport and soccer in Italy.5 Although only a handful of Parma Ultras attended the
game, standing in the designated guest section, it was reported that some of them did sit in Monte
Mario.6 In the end these matters were overshadowed by Curva Sud having whistled during the
moment of silence to remember Raciti.
ii. AS Roma-SSC Napoli: A Braccia Aperte (With Open Arms)
The AS Roma and SSC Napoli Ultras share a vehement hatred for one another. Although the
games on the field tend not to manifest the aggression and combativeness characteristic of the derby
games between AS Roma and SS Lazio, for the Ultras the rivalry with the Napolitani is more
intense. Both sets of Ultras boast of provocation of, and victory over, the other; for AS Roma’s
Ultras Naples has value as the dark pole in a Manichean scheme. Indeed it represents or symbolizes
the lowest value one can have and still be Italian. I asked Maurizio of Romulae Genti to clarify,
especially as his father’s family hails from a small town between Naples and Rome. “There are
zingari (Roma or gypsies), stranieri (strangers or foreigners) like Africans and Muslims,” he told
me, “and then Napolitani. It is enough to be from Naples to be disliked.”
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Figure 90. UC Sampdoria Ultras waving trash bags at SSC
Napoli supporters in reference to the garbage collection
crisis in Naples. Genova. 2007.
For example, the insults AS Roma’s Ultras sing to other Italians tend to be structural or
situational. The Juventus fans, whose team has long been owned by the Agnelli family (of FIAT),
are insulted for being “slaves to the Agnelli.” Livornesi (people of Livorno) are insulted for being
communists. Veneziani (people of Venice) are insulted for living in a lagoon. Milanesi (people of
Milan) are insulted for being Lombards and former Roman slaves. Napolitani are insulted, however,
just for being from Naples.
Compared to other rivalries, AS Roma’s Ultras are less articulate when explaining their
opposition to the Napolitani. Whereas the songs they sing against the other fans point to the above
mentioned specific reasons for rivalry, and whereas they speak with a sense of irony or playfulness
against other cities, teams, and curvas, when asked about the Napolitani, many say matter-of-factly
that they hate Naples and Napolitani and leave it at that.
So it was that the Roman Ultras were looking forward to hosting their biggest rivals and to
opportunities to make the SSC Napoli Ultras pay for past disputes. The media treated the October
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20, 2007 game as the biggest test yet of the post-Raciti security measures. The common assumption
among the Ultras and the press was that the authorities would simply prohibit the SSC Napoli fans
from traveling to Rome for the game. Although it is unconstitutional to ban travel itself, the
government is able to ban ticket sales beyond the city or region hosting the game. They can also
prohibit selling tickets for the designated guest section.
Il Romanista began covering the October 20, 2007 game against SSC Napoli on October 6,
2007. On that day, Felice Ferlizzi, the President of the Osservatorio Nazionale sulle Manifestazioni
Sportive (National Observatory of Sporting Events - Observatory), was interviewed, saying in
essence that AS Roma’s Ultras had behaved impeccably in the young season’s games, but that one
misstep and AS Roma would face a stadium ban. This was because of their past reputation for
incidents, in spite of previous promises by the Observatory that each team would begin the season
with a clean record and that it would act only to punish current wrongdoing.7 A warning was issued
that even singing racist songs would be considered grounds to close the Olympic Stadium or ban
travel. Two days later AS Roma’s Ultras traveled to Parma and caused no problems. Therefore, the
next game against SSC Napoli was under no threat of being played entirely behind closed doors. The
same day, though, Inter Milan’s Ultras unfurled banners calling Napolitani “tubercolosi”
(tuberculosis sufferers) and “colerosi” (cholera sufferers), which implied that Naples was a Third
World city (figures 91 and 92).
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Figure 91. “Hi cholera sufferers.” Inter
Milan-SSC Napoli. October 2007.

Figure 92. “People from Naples have
tuberculosis.” Inter Milan-SSC Napoli.
October 2007.
Normally Il Romanista devoted itself to AS Roma on the morning following an AS Roma
game. On the morning of October 9, 2007 however, well before October 20th, the headline screamed
“Siamo Tutti Italiani” (We are all Italians) and the banners from Inter Milan-SSC Napoli were
displayed on the cover (figures 91 and 92).8 The tone of the issue was that the “anti-violence laws”
enacted after Raciti were failing. There had been no fights in Milan, it is true, but this was because
there had been no SSC Napoli fans. (Actually, there was a small group seated in the grandstands
with SSC Napoli scarves and flags. They were obviously not Ultras but their presence in Milan was
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noted - as defiance of the travel ban - in the decision to ban the Napolitani from traveling to Rome.)
Yet, the media had understood the banners as a form of provocation.
For the next two days the local media turned on the AS Roma Ultras who had gone from
destroying train cars two years earlier (during a trip to Naples for a Coppa Italia game) to doing little
more than eating and sleeping in them. Nonetheless, the Roman media, led by two center-left papers,
La Repubblica and Il Romanista, went into attack mode. By October 11, 2007, Ultras were writing
to Il Romanista saying they, as Romans and Ultras, were not to be co-identified with the Napolitani,
and that they hated Naples. Finally, one Ultra wrote that if the Napolitani arrived in Rome the Ultras
were prepared for WWIII.9 Of course, normal fans wrote to say that hatred was abhorrent and that
the Ultras were animals. For every opinion supporting the Ultras there were two opposing. The back
page of the issue said simply, “Sono Romanista ed odio nessuno” (I am an AS Roma fan and I hate
no one). The question of the day on the newspaper’s website asked if one hated Naples, to which
more than 90% responded “no.”
Also on October 11, 2007, La Repubblica published an expose on politics in Italian curvas.
According to the article there are 268 political Ultra groups in Italy and all of these share a common
enemy: forces of law and order. It said that political extremism and its concordant violence are the
biggest concerns of the Observatory and other forces of Italian law and order; and that extreme
political parties like Forza Nuova seek fertile ground in the curvas today amongst young males
between 14-16.10
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Figure 93. Image of AS Roma and
SSC Napoli fans exchanging flags in
the 1980s. The photo was useful in
media condemnations of the rivalry
between the Ultras.

La Gazzetta dello Sport, the nation’s most popular sports daily, joined in. On October 12,
2007 it announced that the “good times are over for the Ultras.” It explained that the forces of law
and order had begun a new strategy which ultimately bans away travel if the Ultras misbehave (by
fights with Ultras or police, unfurling unauthorized banners, or singing offensive songs); or the game
is considered too risky for fans. The paper also announced that this new state strategy, called
Operazione Curve Pulite (Operation Clean Curvas), would keep the ten worst offending curvas in
the country under constant surveillance. The Ultras of AS Roma and SSC Napoli were first and
second on the initial list of 10.11
The next day, October 13th, La Gazzetta explained the inclusion of the ten Ultras under
surveillance. SSC Napoli was on the list because of the 15 or so of their fans who were at the Inter
game, as well as an ongoing investigation into Curva A, the home of Napoli’s Ultras, extorting
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tickets from the club. AS Roma was on the list because “it is a curva of the far right” (the same
rationale that landed Serie C1 team Lucca on the list). It singled out Boys Roma as being the most
violent group in Italy and cited as evidence that they turned their backs on the Raciti moment of
silence back in February.12
Meanwhile on October 12, 2007, the Observatory decided that the game would take place
without SSC Napoli supporters. Five days later, after conferring with Roman police authorities, it
was decided to have only AS Roma season ticket holders in the stadium. As expected by the Ultras,
this was met with disappointment by the media, who desperately wanted a mixed stadium with no
guest section in order to show the world that Italy was a civilized nation.13 With this in mind, Il
Romanista created an issue devoted entirely to distancing what it called “true fans” (the bourgeoisie)
from the “delinquents” (the Ultras). On the cover was an open letter written by AS Roma’s beloved
coach Luciano Spalletti.
Under a headline saying “we must unite to defeat the violent fans,” he wrote that the game
should be a party and not an opportunity for partisanship. He asked all fans to help Italy move
beyond the need to have police forces outside stadiums in order to keep the peace between the
opposing fans. He concluded by saying that the only way forward for soccer was without any
“divisions and barriers, either ideological or material.”14 Inside, one found two full pages devoted
to fans pledging their allegiance to stop the Ultras from destroying the game with their violence.
They were, as the headline said, “tutti uniti contro i violenti” (all united against the violent). For two
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days Rome and Italy spoke in glorious terms of Spalletti’s letter. He was “courageous,” “correct,”
and “a real man” for having stood up to the Ultras and their “delinquency” (according to RAI’s TG2
on October 15, 2007).
Then on October 16, 2007, Il Romanista allowed a counter-voice to the moralism against
violence and published an interview with Giuliano Castellino, co-founder of Padroni di Casa.
Castellino wasted no time in pointing out that the “a braccia aperte” (open arms) theme that the
media had taken with AS Roma-SSC Napoli was not only utopian but also “moralistico”
(moralistic). He said that Padroni di Casa was disciplined and organized and thus rarely involved
in violence. But, he added, the 2001 game in Naples was “like Iraq” and included the mistreatment
of AS Roma’s Ultras by the police. Because of this AS Roma-SSC Napoli could never be contested
as if the fans were “brothers.” When asked about Spalletti’s letter, Castellino chastised the manager
for being manipulated by the media against the Curva, saying that “Spalletti should concentrate on
training the team.”
As for those who condemn the Ultras for being political, he explained, just as he would to
me months later, that “life is political. Life does not end when one enters the curva but is more
amplified. After all, Padroni di Casa loves Rome above all else and thus works to help Romans who
are without homes or meals. Some come to the stadium and are enraptured for 90 minutes and then
go home and do nothing. For us [Padroni di Casa], that energy remains throughout the week and
it is used, along with the efforts of Fiamma Tricolore (Tricolor Flame - one of two popular
movement-based neo-fascist parties in Italy, along with Forza Nuova [New Force]), to make Rome
a better place for Romans and Italians to live.”15
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Turning to the press, Castellino accused reporters of turning a blind eye toward the positive
things that Padroni di Casa and other groups had done in various Roman neighborhoods, only to
descend upon the Ultras, even when the only thing to report were whistles, as if they were criminals
and “mafiosi.” He asked specifically why, although no one came to file a report after 15 armed
leftists ransacked the group’s office, when four SS Lazio Ultras of the far right were caught with
weapons the entire national press “sono ai ferri corti” (have their knives out).
As for the police, he said only that the Ultras are against any form of arrogance and
overbearingness, whether it be by police or a fan who, for instance, insults someone in the presence
of his wife and children. The Ultras, he said, are about being extreme, or “beyond” as he called it beyond the law, beyond the state, and beyond the stadium. As for the whistles against Raciti, the
Curva was protesting not Raciti but the moment of silence and the arrogance of a state which insults
dead Ultras every weekend.16
The bourgeois fans exploded in indignation over the interview. The cover of Il Romanista
on October 17, 2007 announced that, “the curva that had insulted the Napolitani [Inter’s Curva
Nord] is closed for one game,” and that “the Ultra [Castellino] is no fan of AS Roma.”17 Both
headlines were followed up inside with articles saying “clean up this shame” in reference to Inter
Milan’s Ultras and “a chorus of ‘shut ups’ to Padroni di Casa.” An ex-police chief of Rome said that
having people like Castellino in Rome was justification for closing the doors to the stadium for good
- that way they could “keep the animals out.”18
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Although one would have to turn all the way back to the emergence of Judeo-Christian
morality in order to find the moment when it became hegemonic in the West, it is clear from the
discourse on violence, rivalry, aggression, and hatred that enveloped the build-up to AS Roma-SSC
Napoli in 2007 that there is a fundamental distance between how these are understood by the Ultras
and the media. For as Nietzsche argues, there was a form of life and morality that pre-existed the
morality of the modern West. Below I will demonstrate how the morality and ethics of the Ultras
more closely resembles Nietzsche’s pre-modern morality than the modern. What we must
understand first is that the model of soccer and bourgeois life espoused by the media and private
individuals who interacted with it through polls and letters is on the level of a “common sense” that
cannot be separated from the practical, everyday behavior of modern bourgeois subjects (Crehan,
2002, pgs. 173-174). After all, Castellino had not demanded that all of Italy understand soccer as
do the Ultras, only that the Ultras themselves be allowed to understand it this way. He had not
defended the Ultras’ right to violence, but instead their right to hatred and discrimination. In the end,
this is exactly what Il Romanista and the media could not abide. As Riccardo Luna wrote, “there is
no room in soccer for these kinds of ‘prejudices’.”19
C. Ultras, Violence, and Nietzsche
i. The Purposes of Violence
Although I am arguing, based on the evidence I gathered, that the ethic of violence
employed by the Ultras is more prevalent than actual violence, it must be remembered that the
history of the Ultras in all parts of Italy, but especially Rome, shows it to be a violent phenomenon.
Returning to Sorel, who asks us to think of the purposes of violence, we see that the purpose of state
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violence against the Ultras is to maintain the state’s monopoly of legitimate violence in the Italian
territory. At the same time, and more mundanely, the state is violent against the Ultras in order to
protect the monied interests of the business of soccer. In later chapters I will examine the diminution
of soccer-related violence in recent years. For now, it is clear from public statements and actions that
the state is intent to eliminate all forms of violence from soccer matches, and especially violence
between Ultras and the police.
As with the statistical data on violence between soccer fans reported in the previous chapter,
according to “Campionato di Calcio 2007-2008 - Punto di Situazione,” a document produced by the
Centro Nazionale di Informazione sulle Manifestazioni Sportive (National Center of Information on
Sporting Events - CNIMS) in conjunction with the Observatory, violence between soccer fans and
the police has lately been severely diminished. From 2003-2004 to 2007-2008 violence between fans
and the police is down 79%. After reaching a high of 257 incidences in 2004-2005, by 2007-2008
the incidences of violence between police and fans was 53. In that period, injuries to police have
also plummeted, from 181 in 2004-2005 to 22 in 2007-2008. However, while injuries to fans have
also dropped, from 76 to 31, 2007-2008 showed more injuries to fans in violent encounters with the
police than to police officers. Concurrently, arrests for acts of violence against police or other forces
of law and order are up from 58 in 2004-2005 to 73 in 2007-2008. This has also happened as
attendance has plummeted 23% in the same period.20 In examining these statistics, the Observatory
proclaimed that the state is winning its battle against soccer-related violence.
Returning to the purposes of violence, this time of the Ultras, we see the crux of the issue.
The Ultras use violence just as Sorel proposed for the French sub-proletariat: as a way to maintain
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the distance between themselves and the bourgeois form of life (Sorel, 1999, pg. 85). They use
violence as a way to distance themselves from the state and its morality of peace, tolerance, and
inclusion. But, because the Ultras have no revolutionary intent, that is, beyond the all important
“hearts and minds of men [sic],” as Antichi Valori’s Mario told me, they remain too closely bound
up with the state and the industry of soccer to be able to practice their ethical violence with
impunity. As the examples above demonstrate, the media is as concerned with the Ultras
conceptualization of soccer and their form of life as it is with their actual violent encounters.
ii. The Ultras’ Nietzsche
a. The Anti-Liberal Nietzsche
Through their politics and deeply ideological mentalità, the Ultras find themselves aligned
with Nietzsche’s critiques of modernity and “the modern man.” Nietzsche’s place in this study is
complex. Not only does he offer the researcher instruction for understanding clashes of morality,
but he offers the Ultras a way to formulate and create distance between themselves and modernity.
It is where these intersect that the affective power of the dissertation lies. That being said, Nietzsche
plays an active role in how the more ideologically committed rightist groups understand the Ultra
phenomenon. The leadership of Boys Roma, Romulae Genti, and Padroni di Casa all utilize a
Nietzschean reading of the distance between the Ultras and the bourgeoisie. In the large groups
(Boys and Padroni di Casa) these ideas are disseminated through volunteer study and discussion
sessions which occur at the group offices. For Romulae Genti, the small size of the group (less than
twenty people) and exclusive membership ensure that each member is already familiar with
Nietzsche before joining. Some of these are former members of Antichi Valori, which used to read
from The Gay Science in order to find inspiration. Beyond these groups, AS Roma’s Ultras acted
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in accord with Nietzsche’s philosophy, regardless of how deeply he was known by the mass of
Ultras. Most fundamentally, AS Roma’s Ultras’ critique of modernity parallels that of Nietzsche.
For the Ultras mentioned above, this is purposeful.
For Nietzsche, modernity was problematic because of three foundational features: the
relentless process of democratization; the tendency to exalt compassion and pity; and a cult of facile
painlessness. These three combined to act as corrupting agents turning European civilization into
a rest home for sheep-like herd animals (Cate, 2002, pg. 472). To arrest the corrosive influence of
modernity, Nietzsche attacked the moral and ethical system which he argued provided the
intellectual, spiritual, and philosophical impetus toward mediocre standardization. He did so not to
leave Europeans without value but in order to further the re-establishment of pre-modern values.
These he consistently identified as strength, honor, discipline, spiritualism, hierarchy, distance, and
veneration (among others) (Nietzsche 2001, pg. 241).
Because his critique was designed to destroy so as to create, Nietzsche proposed that the
weakness promoted by modern life could be overcome in the present. Modern weakness he
characterized by “indolent peace, cowardly compromise,” preoccupation with triviality, extreme
tolerance, and a desire to forgive all through “understanding” (2005, pg. 173). To combat these
instincts of modernity, Nietzsche demands that one “thirst for lightening and action . . . to stay as
far away as possible from the happiness of weaklings” (2005, pg. 4). Modernity, he explained, and
its normalization of middle class mediocrity, has diminished the species and made “us” smaller. Our
goal is now a soft life of comfort, with hands for mediocre work but unfit for making fists (Cate,
2002, pg. 440).
This reading of Nietzsche has been called “the political Nietzsche” by Appel (1999) and
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Detwiler (1990). It is an area of his philosophy that is largely unknown amongst “Anglo-American”
readers of a more “postmodern Nietzsche” (Appel, 1999, pgs. 8-12). While there is much to be
gained from Nietzsche’s (postmodern) deconstruction via genealogy of modern hermeneutic
concepts, his rationale for pursuing such a project is often lost when one ignores the political aspects
of his motivations. Put somewhat differently, by ignoring Nietzsche’s “great politics,” wherein he
distinguishes between higher, aristocratic and noble, and lower, democratic and cosmopolitan, forms
of life and urges his readers to liberate themselves from the latter at any cost, writers are able to use
Nietzsche to support the most liberal of projects which he himself would never have countenanced.21
Nietzsche’s works in Italian (published by Adelphi) are, in my view, much more consistent
with the Cambridge University Press editions of Nietzsche’s works - which promote the political
Nietzsche - than with the Modern Library editions translated by Walter Kaufmann. According to
Appel, Kaufmann set out purposely to make Nietzsche incompatible with any forms of fascism,
eclipsing the philosopher’s appreciation for having enemies and exercising violence against
mediocrity (Appel, 1999, pg. 9). The gap between Kaufmann’s translations and the various
translators for Cambridge University is most apparent in each’s explanatory notes. For example, in
Kaufmann’s Zarathustra, he explains that the section “On War and Warriors” is a discussion of
intellectual warfare, in which people fight “for their thoughts” and can revel in the triumph of truth
even when their position is defeated. This, he says, is “far from fascism” and emblematic of
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perspectivism (Nietzsche, 1995, pg. 6). Meanwhile, Robert Pippin, commenting on the same section
in his Introduction to the Cambridge edition of Zarathustra, focuses more on the Nietzschean fight
against modernity’s lack of desire in the face of decadence (Nietzsche, 2006, pg. xxiii).
Staying with Zarathustra, there is a telling section in the book’s third part called “On Virtues
That Make Small.” The section addresses how modern Christian virtue has, by design, rounded the
edges from the potential greatness of man - a greatness which requires harshness and scorn for pity
and weakness. The small ones, the modern herd animals, desire modest virtues because these are the
virtues that suit contentment. “At bottom,” Nietzsche says, “these simple ones want one simple
thing: that no one harm them” (Nietzsche, 2006, pg. 135). In the Adelphi Italian edition of Così
Parlò Zarathustra the same line has similar meaning: “In fondo alla loro simplicità essi non
vogliono, prima di tutto, se non una cosa - che nessuna gli faccia male. (Nietzsche, 2003a, pg. 198).
In the Kauffman edition, the line substitutes simpletons for simple ones and hurt for harm. Most
important, Kauffman notes that Nietzsche was describing a “state of being” and not a “syllabus of
behavior” (Nietzsche, 1995, pg. 149). In the Cambridge and Adelphi editions, the reader is free to
discern for him or herself the literalness of Nietzsche’s words.
b. Nietzsche, Ultras, and Conflicts with Fascism
The Nietzsche used here is hierarchical, violent, attacking, and demanding that one “live
dangerously.” This is the same Nietzsche that inspired both Gabriele D’Annunzio in his
interventionist position on World War I and Mussolini in the formation of the pro-war fascist
movement (Schnapp, 2000, pgs. 40-41). However, there is a current of elitism that runs through
Nietzsche’s philosophy that is at odds with fascism (2001, pg. 160). This is because his thought is
presented primarily to individual readers and with a deep suspicion of mass-based political
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organization.22 He demands readers who are able to cast-off the need for broad co-identification,
especially in the terms of modern liberal politics. Thus, Nietzsche’s ideas come at the cost of some
level of social disengagement. Although I am unable to say whether it is the influence of Nietzsche
that makes AS Roma’s Ultras less inclined to unite with other Ultras or with the Italian political
process, I can say that the Ultras mentioned above in connection with the study of Nietzsche are
aware of the tension between his philosophy and mass politics.
Boys Roma might seem an awkward fit, as it is legendary as a fascist group and primarily
concerned with Evola’s neo-pagan version of fascism. However, I found the Boys leadership to be
the most interested in Nietzsche as an intellectual influence on the Ultras phenomenon. It was one
of them, Fabio, who suggested in our first meeting in October 2006 that I understand Nietzsche in
order to best explain the Ultras - this despite the group’s associations with organized fascism and
the fact that Paolo Zappavigna, legendary leader of the group in the early-2000s, used to ask the
most dedicated of Boys Ultras to read Julius Evola’s Gli uomini e le Rovine (Men Amongst the
Ruins - 2002) in order to be considered for leadership roles.
Then, at the December 2, 2007 Ultras protest against the killing of Gabriele Sandri and
attempts by the state to remove the Ultras from soccer stadiums, held at Rome’s Circo Massimo
(discussed at length in chapters 8 and 9), the group Romulae Genti formed. This group of former AS
Roma Ultras, Monteverde, and Antichi Valori members calls itself a “Fascio Nietzschiano”
(Nietzschean band, but also in the sense of a fascist organization) in an attempt, as Federico, one of
its founders told me, “to bridge the gap between Nietzsche’s noble superuomo (superman) and the
fascism of Romanità, order, hierarchy, discipline, and squadrismo. In this way,” Federico concluded,
22
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“we have an Ultra [group] that is committed to Rome and to understanding the city as a site in the
war against the modern world.”
A longtime acquaintance of Federico is Lorenzo, a 28-year old political science graduate of
La Sapienza University who now works for a multinational consulting firm but spends many free
evenings at the office of Foro 753, a fascist social-cultural education center on Rome’s north side.
In January 2008 Federico and I met Lorenzo at a nightclub just off of Piazza Navona. Although
Federico was there to celebrate his fiance’s birthday, he and I were able to speak with Lorenzo about
the new group (Romulae Genti) and Federico’s conception of the Ultras as a form of the Nietzschean
superman. However, where Federico understood the superman to have fascist possibilities, Lorenzo
related the superman to a form of anarchism. “This is the man,” he told us, “that has overcome the
morality of others and can create his own ideas and thus his own freedom.”
D. “Odio Napoli” (I Hate Naples)
Returning to the media build-up to AS Roma- SSC Napoli in October 2007, the Ultras of
Boys Roma understood the situation, particularly the offensive between the press and the Ultras, as
a war between a “moral regime” against the Ultras’ right to “tifare contro” (root against) and to
“odiare Napoli” (hate Naples). In the offices and locales of these Ultras I heard one word above all:
“moralismo” (moralism - a form of discursive control akin to “political correctness” in the USA).
According to Jean-Paolo of Boys, “what is at stake in this battle is our rivalries, not our ability or
willingness to throw punches, flares, or rocks at one another. What the media, and Calcio Moderno
have always wanted,” he continued, “is a soccer without enemies.” To make sure I really
understood, Melo, also of Boys, went further. “Just as the hyper-capitalists want an Italy without
defense against foreign invasion or cultural destruction,” he said, “the soccer industry wants to be
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rid of those who will defend the ‘old ways’ and ‘old times’ when being Roman and Romanista (fan
of AS Roma) actually meant something.” Melo, so-called because of his love of the National
Basketball Association and Denver Nuggets player Carmelo Anthony, is a typical Boys Ultra. He
is 21 years-old, lives at home with his parents and older sister, and attends La Sapienza, majoring
in history. He began going to games with Boys when he was 17 and was convinced to major in
history by Paolo Zappavigna who told him “the only way to make the future you want is to know
the past.”
When pressed to explain his comments about Rome and capitalism, he gladly did so. “Only
last week,” he began, “there was a police raid on a Roma camp in which dozens of underage
prostitutes were arrested and no one wanted to talk about anything but the Ultras.23 Or that Muslim
women are allowed to cover their heads because ‘we’ have to respect their difference.24 Yet if we
[Italians] respect ourselves we are racists.” The same, he said, was true for the Ultras. “We are now
violent criminals if we hate Naples.”
On October 20, 2007, as AS Roma hosted SSC Napoli, the lower half of Curva Sud Roma,
including Padroni di Casa, silently protested against the decision to refuse the SSC Napoli fans the
right to travel to Rome. The other groups of Curva Sud decided not to protest during the game,
focusing instead on the one thing that was being denied them: their hatred for Naples. In place of
the silence of the lower curva, and the polite clapping for both teams by the bourgeois fans, the
Curva sang “Odio Napoli” (I hate Naples) for most of the 90 minutes. They seemed exceptionally
proud to sing and wave scarves with the same message. The most interesting aspect of the day was
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that the Ultras were singing not to the Napolitani (SSC Napoli fans), because there were none, but
to the rest of the stadium. The press and the people of Rome had two weeks to call the Ultras
animals and delinquents. The Ultras had 90 minutes to be Ultras. After their game that same
afternoon, AC Milan coach Carlo Ancelotti was asked by SKY about AS Roma’s Ultras singing
“Odio Napoli.” “It is a form of racism,” he said.
IV. Conclusion
The Italian state is fighting a war with the Ultras over the right to the legitimate use of
violence within its territory. It is in the interests of the state to limit the Ultras’ aggression and
opportunities for violence. Thus, the Ultras are increasingly prohibited from attending games away
from their home stadium. This chapter utilized a narrative of events and statements surrounding the
AS Roma-SSC Napoli game of October 20, 2007 as a way to demonstrate how the media
disseminates a bourgeois “political meta-language that includes not only narratives of self but also
the ability to define good and bad, victim and aggressor” (Sunic, 2007, pg. 125). It used the
philosophy of Agamben and Schmitt to explain how the modern state reduces the lives of its citizens
to “subjecthood” by demanding that they affirm its model of inclusion and exclusion. In this way
the interests of the (bourgeois) individual are aligned with those of the state. Conversely, the Ultras
of AS Roma were presented as the inhabitants of a “derelict space” in which bourgeois morality and
ethic against violence are acted against. While the purpose of state violence is to protect not only
the state’s monopoly of legitimacy, but also the interests of the business of soccer, Ultra violence
is associated with a space beyond the hegemonic force of the bourgeois form of life.
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CHAPTER SIX: The Agonistic Form of Life of the Ultras: Opposition and Life as War
The preceding chapters presented various aspects of the Ultras, from the material and
historical organization of Curva Sud Roma, to a description of how Calcio Moderno not only
promotes radical changes to the temporal and spatial aspects of fandom by ascribing it value
primarily within the terms of capital accumulation, but also invigorates the Ultras’ will to counter
the forces of global capitalism with an ideology of local belonging and a counter-modern ethic of
violence.
This chapter continues the discussion of the Ultras’ mentalita`, in order to explain the
agonistic, or “oppositional” form of life of the Ultras. During research it became clear to me that,
above all else, the Ultras’ behaviors are guided by a warring form of life. Antagonism and contest,
as I explained in the first chapter, play crucial roles in determining the mode of Ultra interactions
with soccer. As such, the Ultras mirror the Italian tendency toward national ambivalence that is
marked by the extreme localism called campanilismo.
Likewise, the Ultras engage globalization and other current political issues. These examples
further the idea that division and discrimination are central to the Ultra experience. But these
divisions are themselves better explained as products of the Ultra agonistic form of life, rather than
as material stimulants of the form. To explain this crucial aspect of the Ultra phenomenon I will
begin the chapter with an explanation of what I mean by agonism, then continue with a discussion
of the moral basis of altruism, and the Ultra war against “modern man.” Finally I will explain war
and militarism from the perspective of the Ultras.
1. Agonism
As I noted in the introduction, I have taken “form of life” from Friedrich Nietzsche as a way
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to describe the distinctive characteristics of the Ultra phenomenon. Nietzsche was not concerned
with categorical precision when using the concept, so it is difficult to know the boundaries of a
conglomeration designated a “form of life.” This is because Nietzsche understood forms of life as
characteristics and, more specifically, characteristics of morality and ethics. As such different forms
of life could exist within the same organism or phenomenon. Still, he did use “forms of life” to
explain not only inter-cultural difference, such as between the Classical and Modern worlds, but also
intra-cultural difference, such as between noble and common elements of the Modern West. “Forms
of life” were based primarily in morality and were always at odds with other forms of life or
morality (Nietzsche, 2002, pgs. 151-177). It is this aspect of the concept that I find most applicable
to the Ultras.
A. Agonistic Form of Life
In his essay “Homer’s Contest,” Friedrich Nietzsche begins one of the most vital themes of
his work, the distance between the Classical and Modern understandings of the world, or “forms of
life.” He uses Hesiod’s explanation of eris (jealousy, envy, and grudge) and Homer’s battle scenes
to demonstrate that the Greeks had a “trait of cruelty” which allowed the Greek world to “rejoice”
over the excessively descriptive (to our modern mind) scenes of battle in The Iliad (Nietzsche, 2007,
pgs. 174-5). That we find them disturbing where the Greeks found them elevating and exhilarating
gave Nietzsche cause to reflect on what we can discern from a “form of life’s” view of battle and
victory. He decided, ultimately, that, one, “forms of life” are separated largely by their conceptions
of battle and victory, and two, that early ethics were derived from those conceptions (Van Boxel,
2005, pg. 72).
The Greeks, he explains, lived a life of “combat and victory” in which warring competition
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and pleasure in victory were acknowledged and even colored their ethical concepts like eris
(Nietzsche, 2007, pgs. 176-177). When there were no wars in which to take pleasure, physical
contests between cities were arranged. It was the centrality of contest and strife to Greek life that
prompted Nietzsche’s calling it an “agonic form of life” (Nietzsche 2007 pgs. 174-181).
Living “agonically,” the Greeks valued ferocity and strife. To battle was a means of
salvation, not just for one’s people or city but against the very chaos of the natural world (Van
Boxle, 2005, pg. 72). Perpetual peace, a very modern utopia according to Nietzsche, would not have
been desirable to the Greeks because their lives were given meaning by the struggles and victories
associated with war and contest. Indeed, the “life affirming” qualities of the agonistic Greek “form
of life,” admired so by Nietzsche, were created, in his estimation, by agonic oppositions (Van Boxle,
2005, pg. 78). The very engagement of an enemy on an athletic or battle field, he said, was an act
of strength and courage. The warring nature will seek resistance at every turn and through surpassing
opponents, become even stronger. Thus one needed enemies and not mere adversaries (Nietzsche,
2005, pg. 82).
The value of enemies is another theme central to Nietzsche’s work. As it was proudly put
to me by Antichi Valori founder Federico, consciously paraphrasing Nietzsche’s Ecce Homo,
“poter’ essere nemico, già questo presuppone una natura forte” (to be able to be an enemy already
presupposes a strong nature). Thus, it is only those with a “strong nature” that are capable of
engaging in agon. Although they did not put it in these terms, there was a sense after the death of
Genoa Ultra Vincenzo Spagnolo in 1995 that the Ultras needed to commit themselves to a form of
violence that did not necessitate killing (Roversi and Balestri, 2002, pgs. 47-48). Seeking a form of
mutual engagement between equal powers is central to the Greek agon, as agonistic behavior must
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take place in a setting that allows commensurable “strong types” to “project power outwardly,
assertively, and affirmatively” (Johnson, 2010, pg. 70). Agon, in other words, is “life affirming” in
that it does not depend upon destruction of the enemy but rather in engagement (Cox, 1999, pgs.
232-233). Nietzsche understands the agonist to compete or fight in order to elevate their self-status,
and the status of their city. The fight may well be controlled and even symbolic but the rewards are
nonetheless thought to be a form of salvation (2007, pg. 179). The life and well-being of the city,
and culture, were dependent upon victory.
When the Ultras engage a particularly nasty rival, even if there is no literal intent to murder
there is still violence involved. In many cases, violence is not directed at a person but at a city.
Although it is impossible to properly entertain the idea here, the conflation of civic identities
amongst the Ultras most likely makes the attack of a city block, for instance, congruous with attacks
on a person. In other words, if it is impossible to attack an Ultra of AC Milan, destroying the light
fixtures in a subway station will suffice. This form of violence was not a normal part of Ultra
behaviors away from Rome, but it did occur. As I explained earlier, in 2006 AC Milan Ultras
attacked a group of AS Roma fans, of which I was a part, being led on foot by a police escort from
the San Siro stadium to the nearest subway station. After being restrained, and unable to engage the
enemy Ultras, the AS Roma Ultras instead turned their aggression toward the light fixtures in the
subway station. Once inside the subway car they further attacked the advertising and emergency
bells.
It is this “will to transgression” in the Ultras that the state finds unacceptable. As Valerio,
a ten-year veteran of the Curva and now of Ultras Romani explained, “it used to be that if we
traveled and someone got arrested it was a good trip. Now if we go and no one gets arrested it’s
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good. We used to go to harm and destroy; now we go only to be fans but we get in more trouble for
that.” The Italian state has no choice but to see something sinister in even the most playful of Ultra
violence, as if all Ultra violence were as violent as the Sandri uprising in Rome. This is because the
violence of the Ultras serves no bourgeois purpose. While I am unwilling to speak of Ultra violence
as Sorel does proletariat violence, which in the inter-war context was truly revolutionary, his
understanding of violence against the bourgeois state is applicable here. Violence, he explained,
seems to operate from a different, mythological, vantage than the strict rationality (or myth of
rationality) that unites the individual to the state. It seems, then, to undercut or circumvent the
motivating narratives of the state, leaving a void of responsibility between the perpetrators and
victims of violence. One gets the sense that Sorel speaks of victims of violence with tongue in cheek,
as it is the bourgeoisie that is the only possible victim of proletariat violence; the same bourgeois
whose own violence is normally a tool directed at strengthening, instead of undermining, the state
(1999, pgs. 16-20).
If the Ultras act violently without concern for the consequential breakdown of law and order,
or state legitimacy, they must be dealt with as enemies of the state. As discussed in the previous
chapter, the state is the sole purveyor of legitimate violence in the liberal order. Any violent
individuals or groups are seen as a form of order breakdown. As Foucault demonstrated, the purpose
of state violence is often coercive and is always dispersed throughout the institutions of the state
(2000, pgs. 298-325). The most obvious institution of social coercion is the police, whose task he
identifies with far more than mere “policing.” Simply put, the police “sees to the benefits that can
be derived only from living in society” (Foucault, 2000, pg. 321). The police are charged with caring
for the good of the body, soul, and economy of the state (ibid). What the police are policing amongst
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the Ultras is exactly this idea of order and the bourgeois “good” that comes from the liberal state.
What the state seeks, in other words, is to bring the Ultras within its own model of freedom.
When Dal Lago and De Biasi (1994) identified war as the dominant metaphor in the Ultras’
vocabulary (of fandom), perhaps they said more than they intended. Indeed, I have taken that
metaphor much further and connected it with the overall mentalità and ethical structure of the Ultras.
As war promotes the idea of an organic community united by commitment, suffering, and sacrifice,
as I argue below, it is a threat to the system of rights which legitimizes and normalizes the
relationship between state and individual, especially given the “peacetime” context in which Ultra
violence occurs. From within, a group of Ultras standing their ground and refusing to show fear to
a rival group looks poetic and romantic, like an elite legion defending the honor of Rome to the
(symbolic) death. From without, however, it looks like two gangs of thugs attempting to break the
social contract which maintains the order of the state.
Perhaps this is why I find the Ultras ambiguously concerned with the state. While they
neither explicitly discuss the state, nor desire its overthrow, they still act largely outside its
legitimizing embrace. Weber spoke of state domination by virtue of a general belief in the validity
of legality and the obligations it presupposes in the liberal individual (1958, pg. 79). He also
understood that the warrior castes of pre-modern Europe, with their honor codes, restricted halls of
brotherhood, and heroic form of violence, would have been, and were, out of step with the state’s
technologies of dominance and institutionalization (Weber, 1958, pgs. 257-259). Warrior coercion,
as it was, became anathema to state coercion and its monopolization of violence and warfare, as did
its codes of ethics (Weber, 1958, pg. 260).
It would be hyperbole to say that AS Roma’s Ultras are committed to a war against state
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legality. However, they are at war with the obligations that legality imposes on the person. This is
precisely because their ethics fall closer to the pre-modern warrior than the bourgeois individual.
Thus, physical transgression may have major consequences for the Ultras even as it plays a smaller
role than their ethical transgressions. But while two nights of violence in 2007 were the rationale
to begin the state’s suppression of the Ultras, it is the latter, ethical transgressions, I believe, that set
the state against them to begin with, and the reason I have focused more upon the Ultras’ ethic of
violence than actual violence.
B. The Morality of Altruism
i. Progress Towards the Universal?
The Ultras’ ethic of violence not only puts them at odds with the state’s system of law and
order but with the guiding ethical components of Western liberalism. The Ultras place little value
on safety, security, peacefulness, in short, the values of the marketplace. Yet they are not mere
hoodlums bent on destruction for its own sake, but are guided by reverence for a form of life that
simply does not fear violent confrontation. Because of this, and because of the rarity of violence in
the lives of bourgeois subjects, the Ultras are condemned as criminals.
However interesting is the criminalization of non-legitimate violence, I find more so the
ways in which violence makes knowable the relationship between truth and morality. This
relationship was central to Nietzsche’s works and, oddly enough, has become a major aspect of the
Ultras’ conflict with the liberal state. This is because of the moralistic nature of the media’s
portrayal of the Ultras’ agonistic form of life. As I demonstrated in the previous chapters, the Ultras
seek to maintain a high level of rivalry and hostility in Italian soccer, primarily because these point
to a form of interaction and experience that transcends the marketplace (Nietzsche, 1995, pgs. 17-
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21). The system they call Calcio Moderno, however, seeks to mitigate enmity precisely because it
destabilizes the marketplace, as well as the peace and well being of the bourgeois soccer fans.
For example, when AS Roma’s Ultras explained their desire to “hate Napoli” and to sing “I
hate Napoli” during the 2007 game between the two teams, they were condemned in the press as
“racists” and as representatives of a non-evolved and not-quite-modern aspect of Italy’s collective
unconscious that the liberal cosmopolitan press found abhorrent (see Chapter 4). Seemingly as a
consequence of the weeks of discourse around the AS Roma-SSC Napoli game of 2007, one of
Italian soccer’s major sponsors, Volkswagon, produced a pamphlet that was handed to those entering
Italian stadiums during the tenth round of games on October 31, 2007 (two weeks after AS RomaSSC Napoli) (figure 94). Called the “Handbook of the Good Fan,” it consisted of ten points, among
them to “go to the stadium ‘armed’ only with enthusiasm,” to “never express joy in an aggressive
fashion,” to “never assume a racist attitude,” to “appreciate the nice play of the adversary,” (in other
words, to clap for the opposition) and to “not imitate those who act in an ‘incorrect’ and
‘miseducated’ way.”
Aside from cynicism about the intentions of a corporate sponsor seeking only profits from
their involvement with soccer, the Boys Ultras with whom I spoke during the game understood the
moral implications of the pamphlet. “The system,” said Manuele, a lithe 23-year old member from
the ancient neighborhood Testaccio (figure 16), “is telling children not to be Ultras, plain and
simple. Each of the things presented as good are the opposite of what we do. The children are being
told to live as good, modest, normal people.” Fabio, standing next to us but facing the crowd and
not the action on the field, as do most leaders so they may direct songs to their group, made the point
more eloquently. “The children are to be good - that is enough to say multiculturalists, consumers,
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and desirous of comfort, fun, and peaceful coexistence even with mediocrity. But they will discover,
at least some will, that the promises being made [by the marketplace] pale in comparison to the
traditional Roman life.” He then, referred to a list of Roman characteristics made by Evola that the
Boys leadership had been discussing in the week prior to the game (discussed in Chapter 7).

Figure 94. The Volkswagon Handbook of the Good
Fan. 2007.
With the pamphlet of the model bourgeois subject converging, in one place, with the raging
fandom of Curva Sud Roma’s Ultras, I again began to wonder about the relationship between truth

245

and morality, or more correctly, morality and altruism. I wondered how it made sense to the liberal
world to propose ecumenicalism as a way to live a fulfilling life. As the bourgeois fans clapped
politely, the Ultras supported AS Roma as partially as possible - as partisans. The distance between
them was so great that Nietzsche and his understanding of the pathos, or great sensation, of distance
came to mind. Forms of life, he said, were distinguishable, all things considered, by morality and
valuation. This was certainly true of the distance between the Ultra and bourgeois forms of life; one
seeking extremes of emotion flowing from a small cohort, and the other a steady mild stream of
emotion flowing from a universal cohort.
Linguist Philip Lieberman (1991) sought to explain the relationship between valuation and
altruism by discovering from where the two entered the human experience. Resulting from the
biological development of the brain and supralaryngeal tools needed to produce human speech, a
new type of cognitive capacity evolved. This was the human ability to construct linguisticallyencoded behaviors such as those controlled by systems of morality and ethics (Lieberman, 1991,
pgs. 22-35). “These developments enabled us to induce the modes of altruism that bond us together
as groups. In consequence, ... in place of the genetic programs that regulate the behaviors of all
organic species, we developed ... culture-specific programs by which our human behaviors cognizing, affective, and actional - came to be . . . regulated” (Wynter, 1995, pg. 7).
Interestingly, this is the same conclusion reached by Nietzsche. After first exploring the link
between language and consciousness, and concluding that conscious thought, that which takes the
form of language, is the shallowest form of thought because it is designed only to connect one
person to another, Nietzsche then seeks to understand how consciousness is connected to human
social forms. “Consciousness,” he says, “belongs not to man’s [sic] existence as an individual but

246

rather to the community and herd-aspects of his [sic] nature; it developed only in relation to its
usefulness to the herd. Consequently, we may only know ourselves through what is average and
knowable from the herd’s perspective. We know exactly as much as is useful to the human herd”
(Nietzsche, 2001, pgs. 211-214).
Lieberman continues his explication of the development of altruism to demonstrate how
technology has allowed the human to burst outward from its small (pre-modern) communities to
populate every continent and harness the forces of nature. We have done so, however, having
surpassed the still operational altruistic models of previous centuries (Lieberman, 1991, pg. 172).
While slavery, for example, was once a universal component of human forms of life, it is now
“universally outlawed” (thanks to our ever advancing moral and ethical systems). Race, the bane of
one of its later variants, American racial slavery, is still “unconquered” (Lieberman, 1991, pg. 172).
In arguing thus, Lieberman demonstrates not only that ethico-behavioral systems were
narratively driven, but that they continue to be. For nowhere in his book on the evolution of altruistic
behaviors and their relationship to morality does he feel the need to quantify his own moral positions
- nor his use of these positions to justify the idea that the species is progressing because of its moralethical aversion to slavery. Nor, obviously, does he need to explain that “racial prejudice” is
abhorrent.
Indeed, language is not epiphenomenal to the social structures in which it acts, but a very
part of those structures. Fernand Hallyn agrees, proposing that “frames of signification” organize
“poetically,” that is, through language and grammar, to provide, among other things, the boundaries
and boundary markers between “us and them”. He terms this process the “poetics of the propter nos”
- the “us” on whose behalf “we” act (Hallyn, 1990, pg. 55).
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Sylvia Wynter, herself utilizing a largely “epistemic” version of culture (focusing on systems
of representation), explains the importance of the propter nos as the contextual basis of human
altruism (Wynter, 1997). She explains the history of various “propters nos,” showing how categorial
models, such as those that came to be disciplines in the modern Academy - geography,
anthropology, psychology, ecology, economics, etc. - are often the barriers that must fall in order
for altruistic advances to be made.
What drives this form of human advancement is intellectual revolution or “epistemic shifts”
(Foucault, 1970, pgs. xx-xxvi). However, like Lieberman, Wynter assumes that progress is made
only when our altruistic models become universalized, or universally inclusive. She proposes that
the motivation of an epochal shift in human understanding (in our lifetime) should be the
universality of our “nos,” wherein all forms of life are equally valid and valued, thereby
conceptually cancelling discrimination between human “forms of life.”
ii. Or, Progress Towards the Extremely Restricted.
The Ultras represent instead another model of what we may call inter-altruistic coidentification - one which is exaggeratedly restricted. If the altruism of globalization is driven by
a morality of total inclusion, wherein the universalization of women and men is made complete in
a global market, the altruism of the Ultra is one of exclusion, exclusivity, and local particularity.
These motivating forces will be made clear as the chapter progresses.
I have described Curva Sud as a “kingdom of the word” because there, at the center of the
Roman Ultra universe, I found a place where language, rhetoric, and ideology was paramount
(Koon, 1985, pg. 4). It is for this reason that I chose to use Sylvia Wynter and others who focus on
the narrative element of human existence to explain the moral basis of altruistic behaviors. But
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where the moral thrust of the West is more and more associated with liberal civic and social
principles like peace, stability, comfort, happiness, and equality, those of the Ultra can be identified
in the words of Counter-Enlightenment thinkers like Nietzsche and Evola, for whom liberalism’s
values lead to cultural degeneration (Sunic, 2004; Berezin, 2009).
“I brought a copy of La Gaia Scienza (The Gay Science, by Friedrich Nietzsche) to Antichi
Valori,” I was told by Mario, a former member of the group. “In that book is Nietzsche’s greatest
lesson to the Ultra mentalità: that all good things come from oppositions. ‘La guerra è la madre di
tutte le buone cose,’ (war is the mother of all good things) he said. Our mentalità was to practice this
everyday - not through fighting but through understanding. By giving up aggression and rivalry we
thought that the great and beautiful energy of life would wither away.” From Nietzsche, Mario went
on to say, Antichi Valori learned to love hatred and have no fear of danger.
As if writing a description of the Ultra agonistic form of life, Evola explained that “what is
needed is a new radical front with clear boundaries between friend and foe. The future does not
belong to those of crumbling and hybrid ideas but those of radicalism - the radicalism of absolute
negations and majestic affirmations” (2002, pg. 113). The idea of embracing “absolute negations
and majestic affirmations” is accepted whole-heartedly by the leadership group of Boys Roma.
On a sweltering summer evening in late-July, 2007, I met this group of four, plus other
members of Boys, to discuss Evola and the new government initiatives against the Ultras for the
upcoming season. (Soccer season in Italy is from late-August to mid-May.) On this night, the topic
of discussion was the opening section of Evola’s Imperialismo Pagano (2004b), in which he
dismisses the “petty aims” of the liberal state and its economic, military, and industrial foundations
but without embracing European fascism as such. Instead he proposes a fascism based on the Roman
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Imperium, an ancient right to rule based on spiritual superiority. This Imperium Romanum, he says,
“can only be attained by those who have the power to transcend the petty lives of petty men and their
petty appetites, national pride, values, nonvalues, and gods” (Evola, 2004b, pg. 62 - my translation).
In a room of young, impressionable Ultras who considered themselves European style fascists, this
was a bold choice of discussion. Fabio, second-in-command at Boys, explained to me beforehand
that he hoped Evola would “decenter” the group’s understanding of fascism and even its affiliation
with neofascists like Forza Nuova. “We must put Rome at the center, not fascism. I want our Ultras
to be critical of the world but in a way that puts them and their future in focus. Roberto Fiore
[founder and leader of Forza Nuova] might be a good guy, but Forza Nuova will always do right by
him, not Rome. No, it is up to us to look out for Rome,” he told me.
Looking back, I missed a perfect opportunity to discuss the absence of the state and
nationalism in the world view of a Roman fascist. At the time it just seemed obvious that Rome and
the Romans would be the basis of the type of radicalization and political action the Boys Ultras were
pursuing. As Michael Herzfeld described, Rome has a unique ability to (still) feel like the center of
the world (Herzfeld, 2009, pgs. 1-12). To the Romans, especially those thoroughly imbued with
Romanità, there is very little of value in the world beyond Rome’s walls. Ecumenicalism and the
relativity of forms of life are recipes, I was told, for living without pride (see chapters 4 and 8).
David Nugent described the ways in which Peruvian peasants sought to diminish the racial
categories imposed by colonialism in order to fully embrace, and be embraced by, the nation. As he
called it, they “erased race to make the nation” (Nugent, 2002, pgs. 137-174). These Ultras were
taking the opposite approach, openly embracing the idea of a Roman race, in order to disconnect
themselves from the nation and the “empty promises of liberalism.” Indeed, it was not just Boys
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Roma which was pursuing such a course. Two small political groups, Razza Romana (Roman Race)
and Romulae Genti (The Race of Romulus), invoked the same ideal of the Romans and what it
means to carry such a marker of identity today.
C. The Ultras - Being Made Hard
i. A Mass Amongst Warriors
In the third chapter I explained that the Ultras use a conception of history that places high
value on myth and tradition. Their history is a monumental history, not only because they live closer
to heroism and memorialization than other fans, but because it is highly selective. As Nietzsche
explained, monumentalism makes use of neither objectivity nor linear narratives but instead picks
and chooses aspects of history to celebrate and diminish (1997, pgs.59-123).
How the Ultras use history is exemplified by their in-stadium activities like unfurling banners
or devoting the act of fandom to the honor of fallen Ultras or Romans. One can observe it, too, in
their actions beyond the stadium, such as the 2007 mass commemorating the most important capo
(boss) in the history of Boys Roma, Paolo Zappavigna. At this mass, which took place in the Basilica
San Lorenzo Fuori le Mura, it was clear that the level of respect for the Ultra being honored went
far beyond compassion. It was true veneration by those who were witnesses to the life lost.
After the mass for Paolo, I sat in a dingy San Lorenzo café as a cold rain poured outside,
speaking to Augusto of Boys Roma and Marcello of Padroni di Casa. These were two Ultras I did
not know well at the time. They stayed to speak with me for two reasons. One, it was raining too
hard for their journey home by scooter to be comfortably made; and two, because “Duce,” the boss
of Boys Roma had encouraged them to do so.
I revisited, with them, the respect and commitment I felt I had witnessed earlier as
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approximately 100 tattooed, t-shirt and jean clad Ultras performed the mass. The ceremony had been
standard until the priest said something about the excesses of youth which had misled Zappavigna
into a dark period of violence - words that provoked the congregation to erupt with whistles and
shouts of derision, just as a stadium might at a hard foul by an opposing player. The shocked look
on my face was met with a shrug of the shoulders and a “pezzo di merda” (piece of shit) murmured
by Filippo the long-time Fedayn member whose flags I waved in Parma and Milano.
After the mass the leadership of Boys Roma stood next to a photo of Zappavigna, accepting
the hugs, kisses, laughs, and condolences of all who approached them. Fabio, my main contact in
the group, introduced me to Signora Zappavigna, Paolo’s mother. She thanked me for being there
to honor her son. I asked her why she had not spoken about her son, or stood with the Ultras after
the mass. “These were his brothers,” she said. “They built something special together; so much that
they organized this mass for Paolo to honor him - just like they do every Sunday” (the traditional
game day for soccer).
Even to a relative outsider - although had I been a stranger I would never have been allowed
in the church - the afternoon was emotional. As a researcher it was invaluable. In the ritually and
emotionally charged environments of the stadiums, I knew them to be eager to sacrifice and suffer.
But to see them come to mass to honor one of their own with the same passionate commitment that
they show at the games somehow seemed more important. I was beginning to understand that being
Ultra was not something to be experienced only on weekends.
Upon telling the Ultras at the café how impressed I had been with the mass, they explained
to me that the Ultras are not normal people. They are given to extremes of emotion, being at home
with both great love and hatred. These extremes alone, I suggested, did not fully explain the outburst
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during the mass. “Certainly,” Marcello, a 34-year old baker and member of Padroni di Casa said,
“each of us in the church today had either been in battle with Paolo, or grew up in an Ultras group
hearing stories about him and his courage. He was fearless and never turned his back. When you
went into battle with Paolo there was no chance of being left behind.” “Restare indietro (being left
behind)?” I asked for clarification. “To be taken advantage of - by enemy Ultras or the police,” he
continued. “We are warriors steeled by war. Therefore we understand the importance of the war.
Otherwise, what the hell are we to do?”
The talk of war surprised me and they could tell. Augusto, a recently married 31-year old
waiter at a nice pizzeria off Via Veneto and member of Boys broke in, “Five years in the Curva made
me hard, especially at the end of the 1990s (when fights were a regular part of the Ultras
experience).” “We have done and seen things that normal people would cower against,” he said. “As
such there is an incredible distance between us and those outside the Ultras [phenomenon].” I asked
if there was difficulty relating to those outside the Ultras. “Those who live that way are already
dead,” answered Marcello. I asked if theirs was an extreme position. “Absolutely,” said Augusto,
“we are perhaps most extreme, but all Ultras are extreme. That is why they are Ultras.”
“Per essempio (for example),” said Marcello, a phrase that I would come to identify with
him, “we in Padroni di Casa understand that the war of the Ultras is not one for the politics of the
state, nor completely for the honor and security of the city or the Ultra movement. In a much bigger
way it is ultimately for liberation from [bourgeois moralism]. We cannot be at the stadium everyday,
but our experiences there prepare us for when we are not. I padroni (members of Padroni di Casa)
are Ultras in all aspects of life.”
Marcello and Augusto went on to explain that the Ultra, the true Ultra that is, those like
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Paolo Zappavigna who devoted their lives to Curva Sud, demand “unconditional sacrifice” from one
another. In return the Ultra is united in confraternity with others who can be counted on in any
situation. For many hundreds of Ultras, what happened at the mass was the culmination of times
spent in defense of their brothers and sisters and in the protection of Paolo.
In exchanges like this, it was again made clear that I needed a way of understanding the
Ultras that went beyond their merely being a subculture with its own values or characteristics. I
wanted to find a way to understand how experiences in Curva Sud, the various cage-like structures
comprising guest sections, and in Ultra dominated social settings, came to create and transform the
ethics of many (Ultra) men and women (the few women who were, primarily as girlfriends,
involved). The idea that oppositions are the driving force of the Ultra phenomenon was already
clear. However, what I added to this during my time in the field was the idea that war played a
crucial role. Not only does warfare need warriors, it also needs an ethical approach to conflict. The
Ultras have both.
II. The Ultras: An Ethic Against Bourgeois Ideals
During my fieldwork, particularly the periods immediately following the 2007 deaths of
police officer Filippo Raciti at the hands of Catania’s Ultras and Gabriele Sandri, Roma-born Ultra
of SS Lazio, at the hands of Arezzo police officer Luigi Spaccarotella, the Ultras made it clear to
me that they hated and were a direct contrast to “il modo di vivere della borghesia,” or the bourgeois
form of life. From Evola and Nietzsche, as well as the contemporary far right, many Ultras have
been given, in their minds, a clear understanding of the forces at work within the bourgeois
phenomenon. Nota bene, however: the Ultra critique is hardly “class-based,” focusing instead, as
does their critique of globalization, on “spiritual” issues.
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A. The Emptiness of the Universal and Bourgeois
The Ultras’ use of Nietzsche ultimately focuses on his critique of the forces of modernity,
through which he demonstrated the “emptiness” of universal values and concepts such as equality
and democracy. I found Nietzsche useful in thinking through the distance between universal and
particular values and specifically how such a distance is maintained by the Ultras’ critique of
globalization.
Although the Ultras are against the economic and political aspects of globalization, at least
those which impact upon soccer (in the form of Calcio Moderno), their revolt against this form of
modernity is primarily against its “spiritual” or intellectual aspects, which they understood to be
hedonism, multiculturalism, rights-based movements like Gay Pride, and universalist assumptions
of culture based on the market (Sunic, 2007, pg. 155). It might be more clear to discuss these things
under the rubric of postmodernity, as does Baudrillard, who explains postmodernity as a “glandular
corpse” that celebrates “handicaps, weirdos, degenerates, and asocial persons” at the expense of the
“heroes” of previous forms of life (Baudrillard, 2008, pg. 79). In the language of the Ultras,
however, postmodernity hardly figures, although globalization is a big concern.
Instead of dismissing their rhetoric, I suggest that the Ultras, by focusing on the intellectual
or epistemic aspects of globalization, point to a different way of understanding the phenomenon and
how it impacts, or is understood to impact, local cultures. What the flourishing of American fast
food would mean for Roman cuisine and culture is more upsetting to them than merely the specter
of a McDonald’s on every Roman corner.
Additionally, how they understand the issues connected to immigration and “minority rights”
is not the vulgar racism, xenophobia, or sexism that many expect of them, but something closer to
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issues of sovereignty and counter-modern writings on the degeneration of culture. In other words,
the Ultra rejection of the form of modernity promised by globalization is not motivated by saying
No, as some who study such phenomena assume, deploying labels like “parochialism,” “racism,”
and “discrimination” (Cole, 1997, pg. 11; Sniderman et al, 2000, pgs. 34-39). Instead it is a Yes that
is put into action by preferring and loving their own form of life, even if that means refusing and
even hating the life forms of others.
The Ultra are opposed to a bourgeois life - that is, a life devoted to concerns of the market
at the expense of spirituality, values, and ethics. According to Evola, the bourgeois type lives a life
dominated by concern for safety, well-being, and material wealth (2002, pg. 193). In the inter-Ultra
discourse on Calcio Moderno, one continuously hears laments that soccer is being made the domain
of those who are unwilling to fight for anything - those who seek to purchase a connection to AS
Roma, rather than getting their hands dirty or putting themselves in danger.
It is this part of the crowd, the consumerist bourgeois fans, that is referred to as just “fans”
by the Italian media. According to Claudio of Ultras Romani, this “manipulation of our
understanding of who is and isn’t a fan is another aspect of the game’s coming to be considered in
the American style, as mere entertainment [without any ludic or even affective value]. One need
only have money to be worthy of taking part.” The Ultras consistently speak of the normal fans, the
bourgeois who live vicariously through the Ultras so long as there is no violence, and who castigate
the Ultras at the first sign of unrest, as those “without spirit.” As Claudio explained, “these fans like
the passion we bring to the stadium but they want us to have that passion only while the game is on
and only in forms which conform to their morality. They want us to live orizzontalmente
(horizontally) and passivamente (passively) as they do.” “This is strange, ” he continued, “because
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certainly they understand that our courage is foreign to them.”
B. Living Dangerously and Heroically
Claudio made it clear that the normal bourgeois fans lack courage because, from the Ultra
perspective, they thrive only within an environment of neutrality. It could be said that they “swim
in a sea of moderation, diluting their passion for life in the gently flowing current” (Cate, 2002, pg.
111). “If there is one thing we Ultras despise it is neutrality,” said Claudio, which they equate with
a deficiency of conviction; or with a life devoid of what Evola called a “transcendent reference
point” (Evola, 2004, pg. 11).
Months after we had originally spoken in the San Lorenzo café I met Augusto of Boys Roma
outside the guests section in Livorno. We hugged and complimented each other for coming to an
away game of the highest seriousness and symbolism for many of AS Roma’s Ultras. AS Livorno
Calcio plays in the city of the same name. Their Ultras are fiercely of the far left, matching the
political affiliation of many of the townspeople. The Partito Comunista d’Italia (PCI) was founded
in Livorno in 1921 and the left has been entrenched there ever since. Naturally, the rivalry with AS
Roma’s Ultras is intensified by the political right dominating Curva Sud. When the clubs meet, the
chanting, flag waiving, and banners often have less to do with soccer than with political affiliation.
Indeed, without politics, the clubs have no relation whatsoever. AS Livorno has played in
Serie A for only 3 seasons since 1949. Many non-Ultra fans of AS Roma know little of Livorno and
care not for the rivalry, understanding it as an “Ultras thing.” For the Ultras it is a rivalry that defines
the Ultra phenomenon. To get to Livorno in 2007, AS Roma’s Ultras filled a special train, three
charter buses, and numerous cars. Two thousand of the most committed Ultras made the trip. Most
of these, it seemed, went to chant “Duce! Duce! Duce!” for 90 minutes and then return to Rome.
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When AS Roma scored, the Duce chants rang out in place of their various songs in devotion to
Rome and AS Roma. There were several flags of the Repubblica Sociale Italiana (Italian Social
Republic - the German-backed Mussolini government that opposed the “occupation” of Italy by
American troops and Communist Italians in the last years of WWII [1943-1945]). A few of Nazi
Germany also flew in the guest section. Additionally, sometimes clapping was replaced by Roman
Salutes. These were countered in the Livorno Curva Nord with raised fists, chants of “Stalin Vive!,”
flags of the USSR and PCI, and a large banner announcing that Il nostro tricolore è con la stella
rossa (our tri-color [Italian flag] has a red star, in reference to the international symbol of
communism) (figure 95).

Figure 95. Livorno banner celebrating a communist Italy. Livorno. 2007.
When I mentioned to Augusto that I never see him away from Rome and had not seen him since the
mass for Paolo, he told me why. “Livorno is all or nothing,” he said. “For us fascists there is nothing
like this game. You will see. This has nothing to do with soccer, just pure hatred.” I told him that
it was the away game I had most looked forward to experiencing.
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“Games like this,” he told me, “made Zappavigna the legend he is. He used to tell us ‘Onore
e nobilità vengono da odium et bellum’” (honor and nobility come from hatred and war - he used
the Latin purposefully). Later he explained to me how, for many of the older members of Boys, this
was a motto - something to keep in mind in violent and intense situations. I asked if he thought about
it beyond his life as an Ultra. “That’s impossible,” he said. “The Ultras’ understanding of soccer is
the Ultras’ understanding of the world. It makes sense when you use ‘strength, honor, rivalry, and
Romanità’ to see how to live. Such values, he went on, had given him something for which to fight,
and a willingness to do so, making him stronger and more “Ultras” than other normal people.1

Figure 96. Boys Roma Ultras display Italian flags.
Livorno. 2007.

Those who willingly commit their lives to a form of life that frowns upon rivalry and
discrimination are seen as weak-willed seekers of comfort and coddling. What is worse, to the Ultras

1

Just as mentalità is ubiquitous amongst the Ultras for explaining why they act as they do, so is Ultras as a

way of explaining what it means to be an Ultra.
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this bourgeois form of life seeks the diminution of exaltedness. Whether the Ultras reach those states
in stadiums following AS Roma, in violent encounters, or through organized action in their
communities is less important than their ability and willingness to seek occasions rich with meaning
and seriousness. These moments are part of the Ultras’ commitment to live a life “a rischia il tutto
per tutto” (all or nothing).
For the Ultras, danger, adventure, and even pain are the most valid parts of life, for they
require a commitment and resolve that most people would not consider worthy of our modern liberal
societies (Nietzsche, 2007, pg. 66). Just as the Futurists and fascists of the early 20th century heeded
Nietzsche’s call to “live dangerously,” the Ultras of today are using the same ideas to place distance
between themselves and the bourgeois.
In his Gay Science, Nietzsche suggested that by living dangerously one would expand the
horizons, or conditions of possibility, of existence. The modern world had made of life a struggle
only to avoid struggle, strife, danger, pain, and discomfort. Conversely, by living with contempt for
safety, security, and caution, one could re-invigorate life with commitment, bravery, and nobility
(Nietzsche 2001, pgs. 160, 184, 199-248). As Mario, formerly of Antichi Valori and now Romulae
Genti, explained to me, the love of hatreds and lack of fear of dangerous situations have set the
Ultras apart from non-Ultras. “The days we live together, like going to a big game in Milan or going
to Brescia (another of the political rivalries of Roma’s Ultras), are deeply felt. None of us will ever
forget these battles,” he said.
As many journalists point out, attending soccer games can be dangerous. However, it was
my experience that they are not exceedingly dangerous, and not dangerous at all for the bourgeois
fans. Nonetheless, in comparison to spectating live sports in the United States, the Ultras experience
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is downright frightening. While boarding a train, arriving at a “hostile” city, entering their stadium,
and exchanging insults and projectiles with the locals, there is an element of the unknown that keeps
one alert and tensed for contact. Add to that the aggressive nature of all interaction with those
outside the group of AS Roma fans and after a handful of away games one begins to feel like a
warrior marching into battle. It certainly amounts to very little compared to actual wartime
experience, but it still offers considerable distance from passing one’s afternoon on Via del Corso
(a popular shopping street in Rome).

Figure 97. AS Roma Ultras banner. “The friends of
Bologna are our enemies.” Udine. 2004.
i. Evolan Heroism
In this environment, where one sings “songs in honor of hostility,” a feeling of heroism and
virtue emerges (Nietzsche, 2006, pg. 79). Evola outlined the two foundations of heroism in Men
Among The Ruins. The first is that “the measure of what one can demand of others is dictated by the
measure of what one can demand from oneself”. The second is that “those who cannot be their own
masters should find a master outside of themselves” (Evola, 2002, pg. 141). Both principles are

261

entrenched in the ideas of dedication, discipline, and sacrifice. They were presented to me by Fabio
of Boys Roma as we drove to witness the ritorno (return game) of the Coppa Italia final in Milan.2
He explained that the groups that maintain themselves over time, such as Boys and Fedayn
(both in existence since 1972), are aware that leadership is crucial. As a younger leader of Boys
under Paolo Zappavigna, Fabio was given a copy of Men Among The Ruins and told to understand
it if he expected to have more responsibility within the group. Paolo’s sudden death prevented Fabio
from being pressed on the contents of the book. Nonetheless, Paolo took Evola’s varied messages
to heart and continues to ensure that they are central to how the Boys Ultras understand their
organization.
For other Ultras, though, there seems to be an unthinking devotion to the first of Evola’s
foundations of heroism. Their amount of self-mastery is measured in unflinchingly defending
themselves and their group (and whatever group of AS Roma fans they are standing with at any
moment). The Ultras most respected by other Ultras are those who have been witnessed standing
their ground when under attack. Violence and the Ultras’ ethic of violence were explained in the two
previous chapters. As we saw then, aggressive oppositions occur only with great sacrifice and sense
of duty toward other Ultras.
ii. Nietzschean Distance and Ultras at Away Games
The heroic principles are supercharged with value in Evola’s work because they oppose the
strict utility with which the “merchant class” approaches life. For Evola, the heroism of the warrior
functions by way of deep interpersonal commitments and sacrifices, while the utility of the merchant

2

Some competitions involve two games, one at home and one away, with the winner having the highest
accumulative score. The ritorno is the second game of two.
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functions only for vulgar self-preservation (Evola, 2002, pg. 142); those who live with a code of
honor act from a sense of duty, responsibility, and “love of distance” (Evola, 2002, pg. 2). It was
repeated often to me that the essence of the Ultras’ mentalità was the experience of the away game;
there one felt an intense brotherhood with fellow AS Roma fans and an undeniable hatred for the
enemy. Importantly, one felt hated by the enemy in return. “At away games there is only aggression.
We sing against them and them against us. The people in the curva or tribuna (sideline seats) seem
so far away from us. Like this, it is difficult to imagine what they think of us or the game,” Fabio
of Boys explained.

Figure 98. AS Roma Ultra gesturing to Inter
Milan fans. Milan. 2007.
Distance was one of Nietzsche’s favorite concepts, having used it to promote methodological
clarity as well as separation of the noble form of life from that of the modern herd (Nietzsche, 2003,
pg. 68). Within the noble form of life, lived with a feeling of distance from others, the duties and
responsibilities spoken of above only apply to one’s equals: in the case of the Ultras, one’s group
or other Ultras (Cate, 2002, pg. 464). This is important for the Ultras, as their form of inter-group
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“nobility” cannot be earned by shirking one’s duties.
Nor can it be earned by avoiding conflict. This is where the distance between the Ultras and
others is greatest. Their form of warfare, conceptual (in the form of the culture of opposition) or
literal (in the form of violent encounters), is explicitly non-utilitarian. It is always in defense of some
cherished values, even if these are applied after-the-fact. In this way, their rivalries are always moral
endeavors - always involving an investment of moral energies (Leed, 1979, pg. 61). Loyalty,
courage, and commitment are the demands made of Ultra upon Ultra. These are never more on
display than when AS Roma’s Ultras are away from Rome.

Figure 99. AS Roma’s Ultras in Genoa. 2006.
It is away from Rome that the Ultras act in a particularly militaristic way; marching together,
singing and gesturing menacingly, insultingly, and defiantly. There happens at these moments a form
of cohesion built from the euphoria of fear, adrenaline, and pride. Away games unfold like “an
education of the will” (Nietzsche, 2003, pg. 200). After years spent traveling together and facing
down rival Ultras and police, as well as their own fear, a transformation occurs of which many
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Ultras are aware but know little how to describe.
The arditi (assault infantry soldiers) and other soldiers of WWI became banded together in
what Mussolini called a trincerocrazia (a union of the trenches). These were men bounded together
by consciousness of war, not class. They were united by the experience of fighting, killing, and
surviving together. Italy was divided, wrote Mussolini, “between those who were there and those
who were not there; those who fought and those who did not fight; those who produced and those
who were parasites” (Farrell, 2003, pg. 72). This feeling, and the arditi legend, are well known by
many Ultras of the left and right, and is reproduced when Ultras, away from Rome, distinguish
themselves, in knowledge and identity, from those who remain outside (Leed, 1979, pg. 36).

Figure 100. Boys Roma Ultras in the 1990s.
Brian Pronger updated the phenomenological understanding of embodiment by adding an
ethical element in order to more fully explain not only the consequences of living within a form of
life but also the possibility of moving between forms. Using Deleuze and Guattari’s explanation of
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how flows of desire are affected by the reterritorialization of human energy (puissance) under
capitalism, Pronger explained that one becomes conscious of one’s body through what MerleauPonty called “means of representation.” But, he added, those representations are actually creative
of the body’s reality, through not only description but inscription (Pronger, 2002, pg. 233). Thus,
representation is not a deep enough concept to explain how profoundly we are shaped by not only
material culture but knowledge systems as well.
In this way, the ethical aspects of behavior discussed above make their mark on the body.
The Ultras, like soldiers or warriors, learn war not only from language but from immersion into
war(like) events. Thus, the language of war, and talk of contestation, opposition, commitment, and
sacrifice, becomes the reality through which their acts come to be understood as aggressive, ironic,
or worthy of feelings of honor.
This process is experienced as an ethical transformation. Many Ultras associate and socialize
only with other Ultras. This is because non-Ultras have no idea what “truly motivates or interests”
them. With other Ultras there is no need to explain the experience of being an Ultra; one just is
Ultra. Thus, they feel themselves as having been initiated into a new life, with the aggressive actions
taken as a group acting as a “baptism of fire,” much like a moment of conversion or illumination
(Griffin, 2007, pg. 157).
Victor Turner explained such feelings of non-material confraternita as “communitas,” a new
existential community built from common passage through states of transition (Turner, 1995, pg.
126). Gabriele, an unaffiliated Ultra formerly of AS Roma Ultras, explained to me the “love of life”
and exhilaration he felt every time he arrived in Milan’s central train station with a large group of
AS Roma fans. He said it was like going into a war knowing you were unlikely to be harmed, but
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for which you still had to prepare mentally.
“Milan is interesting, he said, “because you arrive there with normal people who
come to shop or whatever. And there we are, looking at the group of policemen
advancing up the platform. Some of us would love to fight each and every one of
them, but others just want to get to San Siro (the stadium). Regardless, we know that
the police could attack us if they want, and, what usually happens, they could lead
us to the Milanisti (the enemy Ultras) so they can beat on us. But we always expect
an attack from someone. So when the train arrives, you have to be ready. We might
sing when we get off the train, but otherwise we are usually quiet and intense.”

Later I asked Giorgio of Padroni di Casa about Gabriele’s awareness of the distance between
the Ultras and the non-Ultras on the platform. “It’s true,” he agreed, “It’s very easy to think to
yourself, who are these people and what are they doing with their lives? They speak of freedom but
they seem like slaves.” Why do they seem like slaves, I asked. “Because,” he responded, “if you
only do what is expected of you then you are not free.” Because of the particularity and extreme
nature of such experiences, they are difficult to reconcile with a non-Ultra form of life. As Eric Leed
explained, “the personality, once adapted to war, is incommensurate with civilian society” (Leed,
1979, pg. 2).
III. Life as War
“Antagonism between peoples or a state of war between them is in itself not the
cause of a civilization’s collapse; on the contrary the imminent sense of danger, just
like victory, can consolidate, even in a material way, the network of a unitary
structure and heat up a people’s spirit through external manifestations, while peace
and well-being may lead to a state of reduced tension that favors the action of the
deeper causes of a possible disintegration” (Evola, 1995, pg. 56).
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The Ultras clearly understand the Nietzschean correlation between veneration and despising.
In short, to do away with strong oppositions is also to do away with strong love. As says one of the
favorite shirts of AS Roma’s Ultras (sold by curbside merchants near the stadium), “Odio Tutti” (I
hate everyone). But, that same shirt also carries the message on its back-side, “Aut Roma Aut Nihil”
(Rome or nothing). In other words, their hatred of others stems from the same motivation as their
love of Rome.
The Ultras have chosen war as their normal mode of interaction with others. Through war,
they feel a constant tension, or seeking of battles, and the thrill of engaging in hostilities with others
- be they verbal and ironic, as is often the case with the Ultras mode of tifare contro (rooting
against), or physical and violent.
Tifare contro (rooting against), as the preceding chapters have demonstrated, is the
normalized mode of being a “fan” for the Ultras. Giovanni Francesio (2008) used the concept to
describe the Ultras’ in-stadium behaviors. However, he stopped short of using the concept to
understand what it is in the Ultra phenomenon that buttresses those behaviors. As is clear, I am
arguing that the oppositions for the Ultras do not end at the stadium but are only most obvious there.
It is in the spaces and activities of the Ultras that are far removed from the stadium lights that the
depth of the commitment to their form of life becomes apparent.
A. Commitment and Organic Community
Just as Eric Leed explained the idea of war held by many veterans of WWI, the Ultras
employ an understanding of war and society which is romantic and non-economic (Leed, 1979, pg.
6). The romanticism of the Ultras’ use of war is seen in two ways: their promotion of an organic
community, and their devotion to honor, sacrifice, and suffering as markers of status and distinction.
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The Ultras believe themselves to be an organic community. One particularity noticed by
scholars of the Ultra phenomenon is its trans-class nature. As Roversi and Balestri explained, the
Ultras have always welcomed the participation of all social classes, even in cities with large
industrial workforces and working classes, like Turin or Bologna (Roversi and Balestri, 2002, pgs.
131-142). They explained this the way many do in Italian piazzas, by the overall level of passion
for soccer that exists at all levels of society. My interactions with larger groups (with over 100
members) like Boys Roma and Ultras Romani supported this claim. However, it was made more
clear by Padroni di Casa, which, while sharing the fascist ideologies of Boys, does not share their
skinhead aesthetics.
I asked Daniele (a new member of Padroni di Casa) about the multi-class makeup of the
group and the Ultras. “Who gives a damn about class stratification,” he responded, “We are fascists,
therefore the bourgeois is a question of mentality. I have a little money, I went to the university, but
above all I believe in a fascist life. We don’t think about money for money’s sake, no. Instead we
think about a heroic and radical life.” Daniele’s attitude about the class composition of the Curva
was seconded by others in Padroni di Casa, who told me one need not be poor to fight for fascism
or the Ultras. Instead one needed “le palle” (“the balls,” or commitment and determination) and
“coraggio” (courage). In 2010 Gianluca Iannone, the group’s co-founder, also addressed the
seeming contradiction between the bourgeois economic status of most of Padroni di Casa and the
critique of the bourgeois form of life at the group’s core.
Blending Mussolini and Amilcar Cabral, Iannone told me that “if one discounts the historical
nature of the critique of liberalism - if one ignores the fact that Nietzsche, Evola, Pound, Sorel,
Spengler, and all the others were professional academics or thinkers - then it might appear a form
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of ‘class suicide’ is necessary in order accept that capitalism is leading us to an abyss. You are an
American. I have seen that you benefit greatly from American imperialism and global capitalism.
As an American you must know that, regardless of the destruction of other peoples so you may live
in comfort, you too are being destroyed - turned soft and impotent.”
According to materials I obtained in 2007, Padroni di Casa’s political agenda is not to fight
against socialism and capitalism but against “what materialism and the marketplace do to humanity.
The logic of profit and marketing destroy any community or culture that confronts them.” I asked
Iannone about the vagueness of the group’s agenda. “We do not challenge the alienation inherent
in any form of labor. Socialism does not solve this problem. What we concern ourselves with is the
debasement of life that materialism proposes. We are all going to die. Our goal is to die with dignity,
but also with a deep connection to our culture and civilization.” I asked if that included small-firm
capitalism. “Capitalism of this form was optimal here because Italians developed a culture of
expertise, not because we wanted to lead the world in [flex-time]. A craftsman and apprentice were
the basis of something noble, not just something profitable. Regardless, our concern is a revalorization of Italians. One can work in a store and still be strong, competent, cultured, and hard.
Let the bosses take care of the work and we will take care of the rest.”
Instead of a class-based critique of the bourgeois form of life, then, the Ultras believe
themselves committed to a spiritual or cultural struggle. Being committed to something greater than
oneself and one’s personal gain is important because it demonstrates a move beyond the
individualism that is inherently bourgeois. Primarily limited to the Ultras, AS Roma, and Rome,
their commitment is shown in the willingness to fight and to stand against the will of others. It can
be argued, as did Bromberger (1993), that the fighting and defending are merely symbolic or even
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rhetorical. However, this critique would have to ignore the extraordinary value placed upon rhetoric
and symbolism by the Ultras. To see the world through the eyes of an Ultra is to see “us against
them” at every turn. They use this value to create of themselves a community whose basis lies
beyond the material - in the realm of will, sentiment, volition (Leed, 1979, pg. 92). This is their
mentalità.
B. Sacrifice and Struggle
Part of the romanticism of the Ultras is how they create and understand their community.
Another is the basis of that community - the sanctity of honor earned through sacrifice and struggle.
An extension of Evola’s ethics of the warrior, the nexus between sacrifice and warfare is explained
by Allen Frantzen as a dominant theme not only of traditional Indo-European knowledge of warfare
but also of the narratives of WWI veterans. In these narratives, the invocation of self-sacrifice as a
path toward redemption is common (Frantzen, 2004, pg. 261). AS Roma’s Ultras use these
narratives to create their very community, but more so to create a hierarchy within that community.
They are a community of people who are expected to defend and fight for the things that are dear
to them. The more accountable one shows oneself to be, the more “Ultra” one may be seen to be.
In other words, no one may buy their way to group leadership or to respect within the Curva.
One must be worthy of these. It serves this model of “cultural capital accumulation” to have one’s
actions be understood as sacrifice and struggle. As Mario of Romulae Genti told me as he waited
tables in a center-of-Rome restaurant, “one has to be committed to be an Ultra. It is not something
you can do once and then claim to be. The groups are too serious about this - if you come in as a
tourist and then get caught talking about how hard you are, it can be trouble.” I asked how the
groups might know. “We are everywhere in this city and we know everyone,” he responded wryly.
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I asked Mario about the constant references to sacrifice amongst AS Roma’s Ultras and how
this related to how much fun the Ultras seemed to have. “Even though it is fun,” he told me, “no one
else will do it. [The bourgeois fans] will not sing, follow AS Roma away from Rome, and would
never fight. Even though it is fun, there are many times when it is not. Look at Manchester,” he said,
referring to a 2007 Champions League quarterfinal game in which AS Roma lost 7-1 to Manchester
United. There, “we had the humiliating defeat, hooligans seeking revenge on us for what happened
in Rome [a number of English fans were stabbed before the first game between the clubs], and police
on horseback that were more interested in beating us than protecting us. Singing that night was
difficult, but by singing and supporting AS Roma we showed that we have honor. By standing up
to the rushes of the hooligans we showed courage and that Romans are not to be trifled with.”
In terms of performance, the act of singing even when AS Roma is losing is seen as sacrifice
because one is acting when the “spirit” is unwilling. Traveling great distances is sacrificing because
it takes considerable time and involves discomfort. Facing a group of Carabinieri with machine guns
and a small tank is a sensation that other “normal” fans are unwilling to feel. Certainly facing
another group of Ultras armed with bricks and bottles or police officers with night-sticks, and doing
so with coraggio (courage) and in sprezzo del pericolo (defiance of danger), is beyond what others
are willing to do in the name of Rome. Willingness to do these things is the root of honor. The
unwillingness of others to do them is what creates the distance between Ultras and others.
IV. Conclusion
The Ultras understand that warfare is redemptive. Nietzsche explained warfare as the “father
of all good things” because, as he said, it makes life poetic. It brings raw emotion and an affective
sensibility to the fore (Nietzsche, 2007, pg. 90). The Ultras seem to understand the poetry of which
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Nietzsche spoke, as they experience so much of life in states of euphoria or raging disgust. The
Ultras life is extreme, as is made evident by their rivalries. From their perspective, the bourgeois life
of safety and security, in which thrills are provided by consumerism, is a life castrated of its passion.
In the years they were active in Curva Sud, Antichi Valori unfurled many banners which spoke of
these ideas. One of the most concise, Contro Tutto e Tutti (Against everyone and everything),
explained the Ultra mentalità perfectly. This refusal to reconcile or compromise was seconded by
Boys Roma. Their 2004 banner reading Sempre Schierati Mai Omologati (Always in [military]
formation, never homogenized/standardized) is a declaration of war against Calcio Moderno and
standardization. It can also be read as a life of war, danger, and confrontation in defiance of the
“homogenized form of life” that opposes the Ultras.
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CHAPTER SEVEN: Romanità and the Ultras
This chapter examines the concept Romanità, an extreme identification with Rome and
things Roman, and what Rome means to the Ultras. Through its history, culture, and cultural
symbols, Rome is the main inspirational entity for the Ultras; it makes knowable their deep
affection. Even in the nastier elements of their politics, witnessed in the preceding chapters, the
Ultras are not motivated by a narrow, or parochial, fearfulness, but instead an intensely positive and
prideful feeling of connection to place. Their discursive understanding of themselves and the rest
of Italy and the world is filtered through Rome, and their relationship to the city’s past, present, and
future glory and greatness. This chapter examines the theoretical aspects of Romanità and then turns
to examples of how the Ultras use and present their own vision of the intense connection between
themselves and the city.
I. Romanità
A. Romanità as Campanilismo?
Campanilismo, or localism, is understood as an excessive attachment to one’s town or
birthplace (Barzini, 1996, pg. 13). It can lead to a particular identification and process of
differentiation that can ultimately result in fragmentation and conflict (Poppi, 1992, pg. 81; Allum,
2000, pg. 43). Although generally used to describe the process through which many Italians interact
with nationalizing trends, it is perfectly incorporated into the mentalità of the Ultras (Putnam, 1993,
pg. 27). Thus, campanilismo could be used as an introductory element of a general mentalità of
Italian Ultras, as the phenomenon is deeply linked with strong associations between glory, team, and
town throughout Italy.
Romanità is a highly exaggerated version of campanilismo, for Romanità is at base a hyper-
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identification with Rome and things Roman which causes fragmentation and conflict. I have already
explained how extremely limited is the altruistic inclusiveness, or propter nos, of the Ultras and how
this impacts their political ideology and behavior (Hallyn, 1990, pgs. 55-56). Based on my research
and the behaviors of Ultras which I have witnessed, it is clear that a strong attachment to their city
exists. Indeed, the national movement-based Movimento Ultras highlights “local particularity” as
the primary aspect of soccer under attack by Calcio Moderno.1
However, as connected as they might be, there is more to Romanità than campanilismo; there
is also fascism. I demonstrated in previous chapters that Nietzsche and Evola, the two primary
ideological influences of AS Roma’s Ultras, have given the Ultras an “aristocratic” sense through
which they relish the distance between themselves and others. This “aristocratic” sense, I explained,
also makes the Ultras improper fascists, in that there is little desire for unity (even amongst the
Ultras themselves) or sense of being part of a movement. In other words, most of the Ultras are
lacking a feeling of responsibility that would allow the phenomenon a truly political function.
There is a similar tension between Ultras, Romanità, and fascism among leftist groups, which
also have a strong association with Romanità. This is because the leftist and self-described apolitical
groups, themselves interacting with Romanità, acknowledge the role played by historical and current
fascism in keeping alive not only Roman political discourse but also Roman self-conception.
Manuele, a founding member of Fedayn, explained Romanità to me in simple terms.
“Romanità,” he said, “is the thing that makes AS Roma’s Ultras different from and superior to any

1

Movimento Ultras is a loose confederation of various ultra groups across Italia. It was started in the mid1990s after the death of Genoa Ultra Vincenzo Spagnolo at the hands of AC Milan Ultras. It released a manifesto
and several press releases from 1996 to 2006 but has been quiet since. Federations of this type are unpopular
amongst Roma’s Ultras because they presuppose an amount of unity with enemy Ultras that is often impossible to
achieve. Movimento Ultras can be accessed at www.noalcalciomoderno.it
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others. It links the Ultras with the past and future of the city, and our city is more steeped in glory
and conquest, in veneration and honor, than any city in the world. Other Ultras love their cities, as
they should, but when looking for glory, they have no choice but to envy us.” I suggested to
Manuele how similar was his understanding of Romanità to that of Ultras on the right.
Like the Ultras, fascism sought to link itself with the past and future of the city through
Romanità. It also understood Rome as a city of glory and conquest, as well as of honor and
veneration - ideals that drove Mussolini’s project to transform, aggrandize, and render more fascist
the center of Rome (Painter, Jr., 2005, pgs. 1-5). Indeed, Rome, as home to both the unification of
Europe through imperial conquest and Catholicism, was for fascism a universal symbol (FalascaZamponi, 1997, pgs. 90-91; Koon, 1995, pg. 7).
Manuele responded with brevity: “It’s true because fascism is also Roman,” an attitude that
will be explained in the next chapter. However, there is an important distinction between the
Romanità of the Ultras and that of fascism. Fascism utilized Romanità not only to lend legitimacy
to itself by linking its rule with Imperial Rome, but also to undermine the power of campanilismo
in the provinces. Romanità was to be the unifying narrative of the Italian fascist state. Thus, its
universal aspects were highlighted (Falasca-Zamponi, 1997, pg. 90).
Romanità motivates an inversion of the universal mission of Rome for the Ultras, being
reserved, rather, as the rarified domain of Romans. It is not a universal phenomenon or mission, but
what separates them from someone in Milan, for example, who can no better understand Rome than
a foreign tourist. Nor is it a will to unity as part of Italian nationalism. Instead, fascist Ultras of AS
Roma seek to make little more than Curva Sud fascist. I will now turn to a deeper explanation of the
differences between the Ultra and other uses of Romanità.
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B. Understanding Romanità
i. Liberal and Fascist Italy
Romanità is primarily studied and theorized by scholars of fascism and the unification of
Italy. The study of the uses of Rome by fascism parallels that of the uses of Rome by the Ultras
inasmuch as the Ultras understand themselves as a continuation of the fascist project of creating a
Third Rome (Farrell, 2003, pg. 222). While this will be discussed in Chapter 8, it is important to note
that the political project of AS Roma’s Ultras is an attempt to replace the liberal bourgeois order of
the present day with a recreation of the largely mythologized values of the warrior society of
Ancient Rome.
Romanità was defined by Piergiorgio Zunino as a pre-modern and mythical (as opposed to
historical) form of collective mentality best expressed in nostalgia for ancient Rome (Fugo, 2003,
pg. 23). Claudio Fugo found this definition useful as he attempted to explain how an idea of Rome
operated in the fascist understanding of history. Fascist history, according to Fugo, was structurally
dependent upon a break with the past. He argued that fascism did not seek a continuation of
Classical Roman identity within a fascist context. Instead, fascism sought to use Rome, through
Romanità, to lessen the influence of a modern, linear view of history amongst Italians. In other
words, fascism used a concept of history that aimed at diminishing the conceptual import of the
meta-narratives creative of modern political subjects (Fugo, 2003, pgs. 20-23).
Tracy Koon, meanwhile, was less concerned about the functioning of history and
historiography during the fascist era. Instead, he linked Romanità first with liberal Risorgimento
thinkers and their desire to find a unifying discourse for all peoples of the peninsula. Secondly, he
pursued Romanità through to the fascist period to show how then, as well, the greatness of Rome’s
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imperial power was glorified as a unifying discourse.
Thus, he presented Romanità as a discourse which, contrary to Fugo, created links between
the Classical and modern periods. By focusing more upon Mussolini’s speeches and the symbolic
finery of fascism, Koon understood Romanità as a powerful tool in Mussolini’s drive to create (via
fascism) a Third Rome (after the Classical and the Papal). Indeed, part of the power Romanità was
that it (as a discourse) demonstrated the supposed Classical origins of fascism (Koon, 1985, pg. 19).
By presenting identification with the past as a fundamental element of the creation of a new
civilization, itself based on the values and historical successes of Classical Rome, fascism not only
desired to universalize amongst Italians the celebration of their Classical origins, but also to make
all actions, not matter how banal, historical (Koon, 1985, pg. 20). According to Koon, children in
classrooms and Balilla (or, Opera Nazionale Balilla, the after-school and weekend youth groups
which were intended to increase physical fitness and understanding of fascism) organizations
learned the proper moral and spiritual value of their Roman heritage. Through the Balilla, the
children were not only to learn valor and military discipline, but also that “Rome is alive” through
each of them (Koon, 1985, pg. 21).
ii. Evola
Unsurprisingly, given his own uses of Rome as an idealized entity, Evola had much to say
about Romanità. In Men Among The Ruins, he demonstrated that Rome is unique among cities
because it can be used as a forceful affect (Evola, 2002, pg. 115). Rome, he explained, as might the
Ultras, is an ideal. As such it demonstrates the fallacy of the political left’s reduction of life and
politics (one and the same for Evola) to the interests of economic class. Rome must be part of a form
of life (and State) seeking to transcend the vulgar economic determinism of materialism. That the
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previous generations of “conservatives” sought to defend their economic interests at all costs, even
at the expense of “a higher right, dignity, and . . . legacy of values, ideas, and principles,” made them
unworthy of being revered by the generation of “revolutionary conservatives” which Evola hoped
to mold. Instead, it would be the traditions and principles of Classical Rome that would guide their
war (Evola, 2002, pg. 114).
Evola was influenced by Nietzsche’s distinction between “acting unhistorically and
suprahistorically” against the power of linear “modern” history to destroy one’s “will to life as art”
(Nietzsche, 1997, pg. 115). Acting unhistorically allowed one to forget history by enclosing oneself
within a bounded temporal horizon. Acting suprahistorically was, by contrast, a more powerful
option and one that inclined practitioners toward the greatness achieved in all periods. The
suprahistorical bestowed “the eternal” unto the actions and existence of the mortal (Nietzsche, 1997,
pgs. 115-116).
For Evola, Romanità was a suprahistorical agent. He acknowledged that the radical left
perpetuated an idea that Romanità was “antihistorical” in that it motivated attachment to ideology
at the expense of commitment to class conflict, and was thus an example of irrational reaction to
historical dialectical processes (Evola, 2002, pg. 181). Even as he used the concept “antihistorical”
to attack the liberalization of the world, however, he described Rome and Romanità in Nietzsche’s
terms. There are immutable principles, he said, that have been useful in creating ascending cultural
forms. These principles can only be found by looking toward the past, toward tradition. “Tradition,”
he said, “is neither servile conformity to what has been, nor a sluggish perpetuation of the past into
the present. [It] is something simultaneously meta-historical and dynamic: it is an overall ordering
force, in the service of principles that have the chrism of a superior legitimacy” (Evola, 2002, pg.
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115).
Romanità had value, then, for Evola, because it does not seek to re-establish the institutions
of Classical Rome, but the principles of which such institutions were expressions. Some of the
principles to which Evola gave so much power were visible in the Roman cultural and psychological
characteristics to be striven for in the present. These were self control, an enlightened boldness, a
concise speech and determined and coherent conduct, a cold and dominating attitude; virtus (virile
spirit and courage, not moralism); fortitudo and constantia (spiritual strength); sapientia
(thoughtfulness and awareness); disciplina (love for self-given law and form); fides (loyalty and
faithfulness); dignitas (studied and moderated seriousness); religio and pietas (respect and
veneration for the gods); deliberate actions; realism as love for the essential, not the material; the
ideal of clarity; inner equilibrium and suspicion of confused mysticism; love of boundaries; and
unity in pursuit of higher goals (Evola, 2002, pg. 259).
In remembering, and desiring, all of these, one does not seek a teleological and
transcendental law in which the past mechanically determines the present. Instead, one would seek
only to properly distinguish subversive and degenerative cultural elements from those capable of
sustaining greatness (Evola, 2002, pg. 181; Evola, 2003, pgs. 107-109). Evola’s highly Nietzschean
model was itself also highly modern. Emilio Gentile explains that the form of modernity sought by
fascism was a mythologized modernity, in which a symbiosis between “art and life, culture and
politics” would be made possible by adherence to an “activist conception of life” (Gentile, 2003, pg.
59). Fascist modernity’s focus on vitalism, daring, faith, mythic thought - and its disaffection with
reality - was designed to promote a moving forward while carrying a slightly heavier load than that
demanded by other, more liberal forms of modernity. It also became the basis of its use of Romanità,
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but in the form of myth dramatically celebrated by Sorel as a “spur” to courage and faith (Gentile,
2003, pg. 60).
II. Ultra Uses of Romanità
A. Romanità as Counter-Modern Discourse
Having just stated that Romanità, and its uses by Evola and fascism, is a form political
modernism, I must make clear why I continue to call it counter-modern. As I explained in the
Introduction, fascism is a complex mixture of political modernism and counter-modern, or CounterEnlightenment, philosophy. In other words, it seeks to actualize a way of living that is an
aggrandizement of the radical edge of modernity, with its fetishes for change, movement,
industrialization, and efficiency (Gentile, 2003, pg. 60), while at the same time constructing a
cultural core around a scathing critique of the intellectual bases of such social change, namely
egalitarianism, marketization, and individualism (Sternhell, 1994, pg. 3). Romanità might be useful
as a means of motivating the “actualization” of modern life, in the guise of political and social
change, but in its championing of selected elements of Rome’s intellectual heritage, demonstrated
above by Evola, it is essentially counter-modern.
To take the matter further, Evola explained his use of Romanità in terms that countered the
metaphors of collective human aggregates found not only in the origins of liberalism (the people,
the nation) but in Hegel (the state). Instead of these concepts, which subsume the individual human
will to a system that counter-balances the potential for individual greatness, Evola proposed the
Roman and Nordic systems of Tradition. These, he felt, “do not recognize the voice of the leveled
multitudes, but instead beat down and mock these idols of clay, these modern ideologies, and
organize themselves on the ... recognition of the irreducible differences among men, which define
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themselves in the natural and dynamic relation of their intensity” (Evola, 2007, pg. 62). The
idealized elements of Roman character, then, are not attainable for the multitude. As we have seen,
the Ultras conceive of themselves in the same terms, as an elite element that is separated from the
bourgeois masses by their own devotion to Evola’s ideals.
It was suggested in previous chapters that the Ultras’ mentalità, while containing aspects
common to all Ultra groups in Italy, is better developed in AS Roma’s Ultras than in other curvas.
It is, perhaps, no accident that the phrase “mentalità Ultras” was coined by the founders of
Commando Ultra Curva Sud in 1977. This is because of the extraordinary depth of feeling they have
for the city of Rome as well as the depth of historical and mythical narratives to be found in the city.
Rome, its history and symbolic universe, confer upon Ultra thought and action a sense of “the
eternal” or extreme importance.
In 2004 Vincenzo Patanè Garsia interviewed Etore, one of the leaders of AS Roma Ultras.
He spoke of AS Roma’s Ultras as “rappresentati di Roma città, e di tutto ciò che vi sta dietro ...
millenni di Storia e di cultura” (representatives of the city and all which that entails ... millennia of
history and culture). He continued to explain the pride and responsibility this conferred on the
Ultras. “Come eredi di un Impero, come figli della Lupa, come gente Romana, fieri e orgogliosi
andiamo in giro [...] a sostenere i colori della nostra squadra e sopratutto della nostra città, la più
bella del mondo” (like heirs of an emperor, or children of the Lupa [Capitolina], or the Roman
people fierce and proud, we go on tour to support the colors of our team, but above all the colors of
our city - the most beautiful in the world) (Garsia, 2004, pg. 209).
While I was unable to interview Etore for this project I met others who know him well. One
of these was Federico, founding member of Antichi Valori, and former member of AS Roma Ultras.
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He described Etore as a “bravo ragazzo,” (good guy, one of us) one of those always present and one
who never turned his back to the enemy. I asked about his statement, quoted by Garsia, hoping to
understand the rarity of his love of Rome. Federico shrugged his shoulders and told me, “ci sentiamo
tutti così - è normale ... se qualcuno trovarsi così sia un Ultras” (we all feel this way - it is normal if someone is this way they are an Ultra). Sensing my next question he interrupted, “anche se non
si va allo stadio” (even if one does not go to the stadium). In other words, not only is Etore’s feeling
for Rome and what it means to be Roman not unique, but it is enough to agree with him in order to
be considered an Ultra by those who see themselves as the “keepers of the faith,” the most proud and
fierce of the Ultras. Federico’s analysis points to an interesting question. If one may be an Ultra
without going to a stadium, what is the purpose of the game of soccer within the Ultra phenomenon?
And this raises the prior question of why soccer is important to the Ultras.
Why a sport is popular in particular time and place is often impossible to answer. Soccer
holds a special place in any debate on the subject, as the United States, the taste-maker of the vast
majority of popular culture in the West, is virtually bereft of passion for the game. Avoiding the
psychological aspects of aesthetics or fandom, Markovits and Hellerman (2001) provide a
social/material explanation for the popularity of sports in time and place. The main factor they
identify is the presence of a sport for a long period, and crucially, at the moment of industrialization
and the creation of mass society (Markovits and Hellerman, 2001, pg. 15). Another factor is that a
sport must be played, and not just watched, by a large percentage of the population (Markovits and
Hellerman, 2001, pg. 12). Finally, a sport should have enough media coverage that it becomes part
of the “hegemonic sports culture” of the nation. It should be discussed long after the games are
finished (Markovits and Hellerman, 2001, pgs. 10-12).
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The popularity of soccer tends to be a given in countries where it is hegemonic. That it is
hegemonic is demonstrated by the connection of national character with the playing style found in
each nation. For instance, the Brazilians connect “beauty and art” with the ways their professional
and national teams play (Williams, 2006, pg. xiv). Similarly, the Dutch want their teams to play
beautifully rather than “doing anything” to win (Winner, 2000, pg. 60). The Italians, instead, seem
to have always associated soccer with warfare. Simon Martin reports on the failure of Serie A to
unite the peninsula, as Mussolini had intended, because of the extreme partisanship of local fans
(Martin, 2004, pg. 27). Similarly John Foot summarizes the origins of Italian soccer by explaining
the exacerbation of civic rivalries by the game (Foot, 2006, pgs. 1-41).
The Ultras and their understanding of soccer fit nicely within this understanding of soccer.
The game was imported to Italy in the 1880s and became nationalized in the 1920s, meeting
Markovits and Hellerman’s criteria. Likewise, Italians obsess over the game in midweek and it is
no doubt the dominant sport in the country from a media point of view. And, every Ultra of AS
Roma and every fan of soccer I met in Italy played the game in some form. Turning to the national
character of the Italian game, the element of warfare and rivalry, as I have shown, is absolutely
central to the Ultras as fans and as a unique social phenomenon.
But if soccer is important and available enough to be the sport of choice for the Ultras, what
purpose do they see it serving? Following Allen Guttman’s research of Ancient Roman spectators,
the Ultras are perfectly consistent with the purpose of Roman sports for their most passionate fans:
as an opportunity for partisanship. Guttman uses ancient sources to explain that Roman spectators
were extremely partisan, to the point that partisanship seems to have been the point, or at least the
draw, of spectating sports in the ancient city. Pliny the Younger, Guttman tells us, had difficulty
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understanding the passions of the masses for sports. If the masses would have had a genuine
appreciation for the skills one needs to properly control a speeding chariot, perhaps he would have
been more sympathetic to their passions. Instead, Pliny said, “it is the racing colors they really
support and care about, and if the colors were to be exchanged in mid-course ... they would transfer
their favor and enthusiasm. Such is the popularity and importance of a worthless shirt” (Guttman,
1981, pg. 11). Guttman continues, explaining that team loyalties were so deep that often a man’s
funerary inscription would mention his partisanship (1981, pg. 12).
So deep were the passions for chariot teams that violence between sets of fans was common,
with certain rivalries being so inflamed that the rival cities were prohibited from hosting games
(Guttman, 1981, pg. 12). Further, identification as a fan of a certain team bound one to a common
body that had political clout. Certain colors, as teams were divided by color, were historically
affiliated to certain parties. This was true regardless of social rank. “Whatever differences in
behavior and even social class there may have been,” Guttman explains, “partisans of both colors
moved in much the same world” (1981, pg. 12).
During research in Rome it never occurred to me to ask the Ultras why they liked soccer. I
never even asked myself why I like it, which for me, as an American male raised in a family of
athletes of American football and baseball, was far less likely than Italian males who grew up
playing the game. Later, however, when the research demanded an answer to the question, I
contacted Federico of Antichi Valori. Predictably, he was stumped when I asked why he liked
soccer. He had no answer, as if I asked him why he liked oxygen. When I explained what Markovits
and Hellerman proposed, he seemed mildly interested but ultimately just said, “it makes sense.”
However, when I told him about Guttman’s portrayal of Roman spectators, he was dumbfounded
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that he “had never known this deep connection between [the Ultras] and the Romans.” He asked for
Guttman’s sources so that he could find them in Latin, excitedly telling me “Rome amazes me
almost everyday, even after 37 years.” Sociological theory was one thing, in other words, but Rome,
and an Ultra’s connection to Rome, was something else entirely.
Sorel distinguishes between the “mere observation of facts” and the “inner reason of things”
which is found in the myths that motivate “the will to act” (1999, pgs. 24-28). Romanità is attached
to the latter. These types of myths, Sorel argues, are strong enough to safeguard utopias that have
no just reason to survive, such as the French Republic (Sorel, 1999, pg. 29). Interestingly, Sorel also
explains that myths are even capable of guarding against the “invasion of ideas and morals” of the
“hostile” bourgeois class (1999, pg. 32). Romanità is certainly used by the Ultras as a bulwark
against the bourgeois form of life.
Through Federico I was introduced to other former members of Antichi Valori. As I
explained in Chapter 2, Antichi Valori are amongst the most dedicated of the Ultras - they are not
completely fascist nor communist, but are dedicated instead to Rome. Unlike the imposing and
rather menacing skinheads and ideologues of Boys Roma and Padroni di Casa, to be re-visited
below, the four former leaders of Antichi Valori are “clean-cut” professionals and students. Their
backgrounds are similar: they are well educated (each having achieved the baccalaureato, or
bachelors degree), have steady jobs, steady girlfriends, and live at home with working parents. They
spend as many hours together as possible during the week, often dining out or going to bars to play
calcio balilla (table soccer). On summer weekends they go to the beaches near Rome, where table
soccer is also widely played. In August they travel abroad or in Trentino.
What separates these young men from others (outside the Ultras phenomenon) is Romanità.
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Integral to each of the activities that they undertake together is a sense of pride in being Roman and
a sense of duty or responsibility to “defend her honor.” I knew from the history of Antichi Valori
that they were extremely steeped in the history of Rome, but through passing time with them away
from the stadium I learned just how deeply being an Ultra and living according to its mentalita` can
impact one’s life.
For instance, discussing Romanità with Federico and Fabrizio (another of the founders of
the group) in a Monteverde bar the day after AS Roma won the 2006-7 Coppa Italia, Fabrizio made
it clear that it was only Romanità that made them different. I had begun by suggesting that
willingness to fight was quite important in placing distance between them and non-Ultras. He
explained to me that fighting was not a random exercise for the Ultras. Sure, he said, there are some
who are “fatto da ferro” (made of iron) and just enjoy fighting but a true Ultra does not fight without
cause (for more on this see Chapter 5).
“We only fight because of Romanità,” he said. “Fight as Ultras?” I asked. “Yes, fight as
Ultras,” he replied. Federico interjected something I found most interesting. “We are sons of a
vecchia mentalità (old/ancient worldview),” he said. “Fighting is a big part of being an Ultra
because we seek a glory that is not provided by the modern world. Instead, we seek an old glory, one
made with virtu` (virtue) like Nietzsche described (virtue free of “priggish morality” [Nietzsche,
2003, pg. 182]; also virtue that leads to the strength necessary to do difficult things [Nietzsche, 2003,
pg. 176]).” Again, Federico, as had Etore (of AS Roma Ultras) and Manuele (of Fedayn) invoked
a Romanità that was prone to violence, a vision distinctly at odds with the Rome of neoliberal Italy.
Because of its unique history, Romanità is perfectly suited to sustain the Ultra mentalità. As
a fascist discourse, Romanità was replete with a model of glory and tradition that made both of these
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a function of aggression and conquest. The Terza Roma (Third Rome) of Mussolini was to be an
imperial Rome, beginning with colonies in Libya, Ethiopia, and Eritrea. This Rome was an ideal to
be made real by way of controlling the Mediterranean, or Mare Nostrum.
The Ultras have been more influenced by this form of Romanità than the Liberal nationalist
form explained by Fugo. For AS Roma’s Ultras Italy matters very little, except as a terrain of Roman
conquest. From Rome, the Ultras are able to feel themselves heir to a culture and a system of traits
(such as those described by Evola - above).
Returning to Federico’s statement that the Ultras were “sons of an old worldview,” it must
not be understated how Romanità in this form acts to motivate behaviors. Even as the Ultras’ love
for Rome is often made known through creative acts such as choreographies and articles in fanzines
(see Chapter 2), these are but the outward manifestations of a mentalità that coincides with the list
of Roman traits given by Evola. Those traits were designed to celebrate a virile form of life that has
been destroyed by the “effeminacy of modernity,” and they are made natural to the Ultras through
the Roman qualities appreciated by Evola and even Mussolini.
Choreographies and banners arise from the same energies and desires as do the fights and
acts of aggression or disrespect derided by the Italian press. Maurizio of Padroni di Casa explained
this best. “We are men who remember well the words of the Duce. For us Rome is the reference
point of a victorious life, the myth that gives us hope for a life that is strong and wise (he is
paraphrasing a Mussolini speech popular among Roman fascists for its discussion of Rome as the
vision of a fascist Italy). It would be impossible, then, to live in fear of fights or of the police. Our
Rome is that of the true Romans.” In upholding aggression, honor, discipline, and the idea of glory
through violence, the Ultras feel themselves upholding the true spirit of Rome.
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One sees here a process similar to the theatrical politics analyzed by Kertzer. Theatrical and
cultish politics, he explained, are functioning in modern societies just as they did in what were
assumed to be “traditional” societies. These political forms are based on ritual practices and liturgies
which attach great meaning to action. They are also based on mythical or ideational discourses, like
Romanità, which “give meaning to the world around us” and provide the fabric of order in the face
of chaos. Far from lulling their audiences to sleep, these discourses and narratives transform ideas
into a lived reality (Kertzer, 1988, pg. 13). Or, as Mussolini said, “for us ideas are not abstractions
but physical forces. When the idea seeks to become reified in the world it does so through
manifestations that are nervous, muscular, and physical” (Duggan, 2007, pg. 350).
Returning to Sorel, who was one of Mussolini’s main intellectual influences, the value of an
idea or myth is singular - in its ability to motivate action (Farrell, 2003, pg. 30). The provocation of
thought is a function of which both knowledge and myth are capable. However, it is the domain of
the latter to provoke action in the form of violence (Sorel, 1999, pg. 46). And, because of the
bourgeois aversion to violence, when one acts violently (more clearly in a revolutionarily violent
way), one is able to move beyond the form of life defined by liberalism. In thinking this way, Sorel
revealed the influence of Nietzsche, whose own “new man,” the over-or-super-man, was to be born
from a thorough rejection of modernity and its values.
B. Romanità as Inhibitor of Universal Altruism
Romanità is useful for the Ultras as a discourse that limits the scope of altrusitic
inclusiveness. It is apparent that the Ultras celebration of themselves as Romans is done at the
expense of feelings of inclusiveness with others. Although many scholars, and what Luca of Boys
Roma called “giornalisti morali” (journalists of morality), lament the Italian tendency to identify
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with narrow altrusitic scopes (hence the concept campanilismo), the Ultras understand this part of
their mentalità to be entirely positive.
Luca, a thirty-three year-old member of both Boys Roma and Forza Nuova (the neo-fascist
party led by Roberto Fiore) works for Ryanair, a low-cost airline with routes between Ireland and
the continent. As such he speaks English with much enthusiasm, smiling while discussing topics that
would make others grimace. He learned English at La Sapienza University (neither of his parents
speak anything but Roman dialect) and enjoys reading certain titles in English literature. His
favorites? “[Burgess’] A Clockwork Orange, [Easton-Ellis’] American Psycho, and [Palahniuk’s]
Fight Club.”
“Almost too perfect,” I say. “Yes, it is,” he says, “knowing [English] allows me to know the
subtleties of what is being said. For example, all three books understand that the prohibition against
violence is just a [bourgeois] moral phenomenon.” Returning to the point, I asked, “just like the
prohibition against Romanità and extreme rivalry in soccer?” “Exactly!” he replied. “Why would
anyone have a problem with our love of Rome? Only if they feared being excluded.” I asked him
to explain. “There are many people who believe that the world belongs to them del tutto (full stop)
and that anywhere people build a wall against them is a sign of ignorance.” “And not pride or
protection,” I interject. “We are not allowed pride. Our pride is what you (Americans) call racism.”
Having interviewed a handful of Forzanovisti (members of Forza Nuova) and many rightist
Ultras, I was prepared for his understanding of the cultural politics of neo-liberal globalization.
However, for the first time I asked, “do you find more Romanità in Forza Nuova or Boys Roma?”
Without hesitation he replied, “In the Ultras there is far more Romanità. Fascists are mostly
nationalists - they want a pure Italy while [AS Roma’s] Ultras want a pure stadium or a Roman life
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that, for us, is much deeper than the American life.” We spoke for a few more minutes on the topic
but finally he said something monumental. “At Boys Roma we talk about the Coliseum and how it
was built. Do you know where the money came from to build it?” he asked before continuing.
“Discover this and you will know why it is beloved by ‘true Romans.’ [The Coliseum was built by
the Flavian imperial dynasty with riches taken from the sacked city of Jerusalem. As such it is
perhaps the ultimate symbol of Rome being enriched at the expense of its enemies.] Anyway, with
the fascists we do not discuss this so much. Fascism is important because without political struggle
we are only consumers. But the Ultras are important because I am Roman,” he said, touching his
heart.
Many Ultras share an active love, piety, and fidelity toward Rome. Its past and present, every
wall, porta (door/gate), via (street), vicolo (small street), and piazza are venerated and revered. To
be considered a “figlio della Lupa” (son of the she-wolf) is an honor that many celebrate like a
working title.2 It is not conferred upon them, but something they feel. For some groups that are well
versed in the history, culture, and traditions of the city, like Antichi Valori, to be figlio dell Lupa,
un vero Romano (a true Roma), or un legionario (legionnaire), was a particularly extreme mark of
distinction - almost liminal. A young Ultra called a “true Roman” by a group leader was in essence
being called legitimate and someone to be respected and regarded.
In this way, Romanità may be understood as a positive force. If it acts as a bulwark against
the outside world, it is doing so to protect valued traditions. If it stems the influence of foreign
peoples, it does so to prohibit cultural degeneration. Thus, for AS Roma’s Ultras, Romanità is a title

2

The Figli della Lupa were elite fascist youth groups as part of the Opera Nazionale Balilla, the
afterschool indoctrination and exercise camps of the Italian fascist state. The Ultras use the term in the same way, to
distinguish themselves from others less aware of the history and traditions of the city (or of fascism).
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for their mode of altruism. This is why the Ultra consider so much at stake when they protest against
Calcio Moderno or a Roma omologata (Rome standardized, or brought within the sphere of
globalization/multiculturalism). Their community is composed of and defined by their commitment
to understanding Rome as the greatest accomplishment in human history.
Fabrizio, a longtime Ultra who has been in both Monteverde and Tradizione Distinzione
Roma, lives in Monteverde. I saw him every morning at the Pulcini pastry shop, a neighborhood
institution. Fabrizio sells small machinery to farmers just outside Rome. As such, his job takes him
in the opposite direction of the many commuters who come into Rome’s center for work. “I
wouldn’t have it any other way. I can’t stand to be around the tourists who take our city to be a big
playground or some kind of joke,” he told me. The first week that we lived in Rome, my wife and
I entered Pulcini during the morning rush. Fabrizio was there, and made a nasty comment about
tourists invading even their neighborhood. He muttered “pieces of shit” in our direction as he left.

Figure 101. Monteverde Ultras tag on the Pulcini pastry
shop. Rome. 2007.
It took another three months for us to go back to Pulcini. When we did, however, it was
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every morning; often enough for us to be considered locals by the owners and other regulars. We
were embraced by the local pharmacist, herbalist, shoe store owner, sunglass store owner, and so
on. Eventually word reached Fabrizio that I was someone he should meet. After a cagey introduction
by Luca, Pulcini’s manager, Fabrizio and I met and talked every morning for one year. He admitted
to being hostile to my presence in Monteverde and to assuming I was “just some tourist who was
coming to treat [his] city as a toilet.” His aversion to tourists and tourism allowed me to work this
aspect of localism into our discussions on the Ultras. “Tourism,” he told me, “is the most vulgar
thing a person can do. These people come to Rome knowing nothing and they leave knowing
nothing.”
I spoke to him about tourism’s impact on the Greek island of Skyros, which has seen tourism
become the basis for what is presented as “traditional” in style of housing and products sold as
artisanal, and has upset the traditional hierarchical relations with the land. To combat this, the local
population of the island began to treat tourism as a necessary evil, whereas before tourists were
treated as guests and “part of the family” (Zarkia, 1996, pgs. 87-109). “Rome has always been a
tourist destination, even for the ancients. So it is hard to know what is ours and what is just a facade
created to make tourists happy. The historic center [of Rome] is largely of the latter variety for us.
We [he began speaking for Monteverde] want to walk our streets and hear our language, not the
hysterical cackling of Americans and Germans.” I asked him about the monetary influence of
tourism in Rome, and the way the city caters to tourism. “When drunken Poles swim in the Trevi
[fountain], or American students destroy Trastevere, the city is enslaved by them.”
“There is nothing else for the Romans to do but open a shop or work in a restaurant selling
horrible food to people who know no better,” he continued. “Is this the equivalent of what happened
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on Skyros?” I asked. “It must be,” he responded, “as we would never eat pizza for lunch or drink
cappuccino in the evening. Yet, this is what passes for our food now. At least,” he added, “the
[Roman] Forum is still ours. It is too abstract for the tourists so they do not spoil it for us. The rest
of the center they can have, as it is just a shopping district now. All the history and Romanità have
been stripped away.”
Fabrizio’s comments were clearly examples of tourism creating distance between the local
populations of tourist destinations and the tourists who visit them. For an Ultra, though, this distance
acted to increase the sense that Rome was under siege. Tourists have a high impact on the lives of
locals, from overcrowding infrastructure to higher prices for food and housing, and Fabrizio lumped
them in with immigrants as well (Pedregal, 1996, pgs. 45-62). “The economy can fail. I will have
no problems when it does. What I worry about, and what Monteverde worried about, was the
destruction of culture under the weight of these people,” he told me. I asked if he thought Roman
culture was not strong enough to withstand a few immigrants and a lot of tourists. “Fair enough,”
he said, “I should have more faith in my culture. It is just that we have seen so much of it change.
Romans used to be proud but happy, even my parents were like this until recently. Now, we are
proud and angry. We are defensive because we see that in a few more generations, the city might
be more immigrant than Roman and more commercial than cultural. We’ve already lost political
autonomy (because of the European Union) and the right to keep our city ours.”
I asked about his parent’s influence on his activities in Monteverde. “They loved
Monteverde,” he responded enthusiastically, “for we were doing something they wanted to do but
could not because of responsibilities. Truly, we were never violent, we just kept our neighborhood
as we wanted it. Now, had there been tourists we would have spilled blood!” Fabrizio’s parents, he
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went on, were part of a generation that saw Rome flourish as a tourist destination and that likewise
flourished itself. However, his parents, like other Ultras’ parents I encountered, became disillusioned
with the price of the changes tourism brought. Especially given Monteverde’s proximity to
Trastevere, his parents often lamented that small restaurants and Roman butchers had closed shop
to make way for “Indians selling postcards and gaudy t-shirts.” Their desperation fed Fabrizio’s
passion for the Ultras, which he, like many others, saw as a way to connect with something Roman
that was not tainted by the bourgeois form of life and to keep soccer from befalling the same fate
as the tourist areas of the city.
The parents’ desperation points as well to a process of “cultural dispossession,” wherein the
economic and political system is aligned with foreign interests that ultimately eliminate the options
for local people to live in a locally meaningful way (Creed, 2011, pgs. 1-27). The sense of
dispossession is strong among Romans, as Herzfeld (2009) has also discovered. Whereas the
celebration of self-hood amongst Europeans is often unacknowledged before it is irrevocably under
attack (Southgate, 2010, pgs. 124-131), there are other possibilities - most notably the experiences
of post-colonial peoples who actually achieved peoplehood as a result of a struggle for cultural
survival (Said, 1993, pgs. 97-111). Romans resemble the latter, in some ways, having long been
keenly aware of not only their patrimony but also how their inheritance entitles them to feelings of
distinction (Herzfeld, 2009, pg. 3). There is a birthright to Rome that Romans often feel is
undermined by the city also being a world capital (Herzfeld, 2009, pg. 3). Instead of turning their
backs on the intellectual and material heritage that comes to define being Roman, the many Ultras
I met embrace it to the point of rejecting what Rome may mean to anyone else.
Neither their propter nos (the “us” on whose behalf “we” act) nor their ambitions are
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indeterminate (Hallyn 1990. Pgs. 55-56). Like the Greek youths described by Nietzsche in Homer’s
Contest, the Ultras act for the good of their city (2007, pg. 179). They seek to aggrandize Rome
through the means at their disposal: singing, choreography, colors, and violent encounters. The
contest between cities may have changed but the mentalità that fueled their rivalries is maintained
by the Ultras. For the Ultra, then, Romanità is an inspiration not to dwell in an enervating dead
history but to be active in the present (Griffin, 2007, pg. 222). What Calcio Moderno threatens is
not only the Ultra form of life, but the Roman form of life as well. By seeking to extinguish the
Ultras, the “keepers of the faith,” it threatens the eternal timelessness of Rome.
III. The Ultras and Rome
A. Roman and/or Fascist Symbols
In the nervous and uncertain days between the death of Gabriele Sandri on November 11,
2007 and the beginning of the Ultra protest on December 2, 2007, there was news which brought
other conversations to a halt in Ultra circles. On November 20, archaeologists found what they
assumed to be the fabled Lupercale. The next day’s Il Romanista, screamed from the front page,
“Romolo, Remo, e la Lupa: Trovata la Grotta” and inside pages two and three were entirely devoted
to the discovery.3 The Lupercale was the cave believed to be the spot on which the Lupa (she-wolf)
fed Remus and Romulus. It was found 16 meters below the ground near the house of Augustus on
the Palatine.
At dinner with a group of Ultras and their girlfriends and wives the conversation was about
the cave. I proposed that the cave was more a shrine to the narrative of the Lupa than the actual cave
in which the twins were saved and reared, adding that the shrine (obviously) had a long history but

3

Il Romanista, Anno IV, Numero 321, 21 Novembre 2007. Pgs. 1-3
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probably served a more public purpose in Augustinian Rome than before. To which someone added,
“Just as Augustus served a bigger purpose in fascist Rome than in other of Rome’s periods.” The
Romans then began discussing the merits of the Richard Meier museum at the Ara Pacis, as well as
the complexity of the Piazza Augusto Imperatore where it is found - the most fascist spot in Italy,
I was told. Eventually the conversation turned toward Mussolini’s transformation of the city,
including Monteverde -where the dinner and conversation took place.
i. La Lupa Capitolina (The Capitoline She-Wolf)
The three most common uses of Roman history by the Ultra each have fascist associations.
The first is the Lupa Capitolina (figure 102). La Lupa, as she is affectionately known, along with
the twins Remus and Romulus whom she suckled, is the symbol of the city. It represents an origin
narrative that has been popular in Rome at least since the fifth century BC. The story of Remus and
Romulus has approximately sixty variations, all of which conclude with Romulus founding the city
upon the Palatine hill in 753 BC (Forsythe, 2005, pgs. 59-74). The symbol can be found all over the
city, on statues, garbage bins, lamp posts, drainage grates, bridges, buildings, etc. It can also be
found upon the shield (or crest) of AS Roma. The placing of the yellow and red shield “over the
heart” on the AS Roma jersey signifies for the Ultras loyalty and dedication not just to AS Roma
but to Rome. The Lupa was placed on many of the buildings, bridges, drainage grates, and statues
by the fascist government. As part of Mussolini’s Romanità campaign, it became a crucial symbol
linking the fascist era with Classical Rome. Through the Lupa, Romans and other Italians were
transported to a period when the eternal ideals and values of Rome were the guiding forces of life.
Thus, it was celebrated as a sacred symbol (Gentile, 1996, pg. 76).
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Figure 102. La Lupa Capitolina. Rome. 2006.
For the Ultras the nurturing Lupa is the essence of the city. This is because of the
historiography the Lupa promotes. As Fabrizio of Antichi Valori explained, “The gods established
the city, true? Anyway, who the hell knows. It seems beautiful to me to believe the city is divine.”
In other words, it is impossible to maintain the mystical and mythical bases of life when ecology is
the narrative used to explain the city’s origins. The Lupa, though, is the product of a monumental
history - one that has ebbed and flowed in the city’s long duration, and one that does not fail to
understand the power of narrative in human behavior.
Coincidentally, SS Lazio’s symbol is the imperial eagle, another Classical Roman symbol this time of military aggression, as the eagle standard was more popular amongst the legions than
the Lupa. Likewise, it too was a symbol put to great use by fascism, leaving both sets of Ultra to
revere symbols which link them with Classical and fascist Rome.
ii. XXI Aprile 753 aC
The “mystery of Roman continuity” is embedded in the second of the three Ultra symbols:
the 21st of April. This date, XXI Aprile 753aC, records the moment when Romulus founded the city.
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As noted in the second chapter, one of the longest running groups in Curva Sud (although today the
group meets in the Tevere Grandstand) was XXI Aprile 753 aC. Each season, the game played in
Rome nearest April 21st is celebrated like a birthday in Curva Sud. Banners from many or all of the
groups are displayed, each with its own message of best wishes for the city. In 2006 the occasion
was marked on April 22nd when AS Roma hosted UC Sampdoria from Genova. Messages like
“Buon natale Urbe Immortale” (Happy Birthday Immortal City) dotted the Curva (figure 103). In
the Tevere Grandstand, XXI Aprile laid a long banner for the duration of the game which read “2759
Anni di Storia, Auguri Mamma Roma” (2759 Years of History, Best Wishes Mother Rome).

Figure 103. Curva Sud Roma wishing Rome a Happy Birthday.
April 22, 2006.
April 21st was made an official holiday in Italy by Mussolini beginning in 1926. It was the
first fascist holiday, intended to replace May Day. April 21st was meant to symbolize the power of
“work and discipline” (Falasca-Zamponi, 1997, pg. 92). It was also meant to be a point of transition
from the Italian (liberal) past of pacifism, cowardice, comfort, and peace to a future of aggression,
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heroism, conquest, and struggle (Falasca-Zamponi, 1997, pg. 91). The postwar period witnessed the
re-establishment of May 1st as a national labor holiday and April 21st is mentioned only amongst the
Romans as a day of celebration. For the Ultras, it is better this way. “For other Italians,” Giorgio of
Ultras Romani explained to me, “the day is only an abstraction, if they are even aware of its
significance. If they do not live the greatness of Rome everyday then they are undeserving of joining
a celebration in its honor,” he said.
iii. Giallo e Rosso (Yellow and Red)
The third most common use of Roman history by the Ultra are the colors yellow and red. The
two connote oil and wine, blood and gold, and the sun and the heart. In any case, they were the state
colors of Classical Rome and are still the official colors of the city. And they are the colors of AS
Roma. For the Ultras, they are sacred because of all three connotations.

Figure 104. The crest
of AS Roma.
When AS Roma was founded in 1927, it was as an act of Romanità. Mussolini desired
another squad, besides SS Lazio, to represent the city in the Italian championship. The name AS
Roma and the Lupa Capitolina were chosen, as were the yellow and red colors, in order to
deliberately invoke the links between fascist and Classical Rome (Martin, 2004, pg. 170).
IV. Romanità and Curva Sud Roma
A. www.asromaultras.org

300

It was no surprise for me to be confronted with Ultras impassioned by some aspect of the
city’s history. The website for AS Roma Ultras made it clear to all who visited it that the Ultras are
benefactors of the glory of Rome. In the section titled “Roma e Romani,” (Rome and Romans) the
history of the city is presented from the particular mentalità of the Ultras. One is greeted by a quote
from Stendhal’s Voyages en Italie (1826): “Il Romano mi sembra superiore sotto tutti gli aspetti alle
altre popolazioni d’Italia. Ha più forza di carattere, più semplicità, e, incomparabilmente, più
spirito. Dategli un Napoleone per venti anni e Romani saranno sicuramente il primo popolo
d’Europa” (The Roman seems to me superior by all accounts to the other peoples of Italy. [He] has
more strength of character, more simplicity, and incomparably more spirit. Give them a Napoleon
for twenty years and the Romans will absolutely be the finest people of Europe). One then proceeds
through the 2761 years of Roman history, beginning with various versions of the city’s origin
narrative; the aggressive expansion of the city and civilization throughout Italy , Europe, and the
Mediterranean; explanations of SPQR; and the uncertain origins of the Lupa Capitolina. The
architectural wonders of the city are explained, from the Coliseum to the Pantheon.
The Classical period ends with an account of the Roman passion for sport which mirrors the
analysis of Guttman (1981). The section is entitled “gli Ultras dell’antica Roma” (the Ultras in
Classical Roma). Unsurprisingly, sport is presented as an extremely partisan affair, with the various
zones and political factions determining for whom one was a fan. This interpretation is continued
to explain the relations between Romans and other Italians from the Renaissance to today. Vignettes
and quotes are provided which proclaim the superiority of Romans to all other peoples, and Rome
as superior to all other cities.
Lorenzo, author of the website, including the section described above, was forced out of
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Curva Sud when AS Roma Ultras collapsed. He now attends each home game in the Tevere
Grandstand, where he uses his camera to capture the activities of the Curva. Even though he is not
“della Curva” (in the Curva) he is still an intensively devoted Ultra. His life consists of family (he
is married and has a newborn daughter - one of the few Ultras I met who has children) and the
Ultras.
Professionally Lorenzo is an attorney who specializes in helping Ultras who are arrested as
a result of Ultra-related activities. In years past - he began practicing law in 2003 - this involved
advising Italian Ultras arrested for fighting and, especially, those arrested in foreign countries. These
days, however, due to the crackdown on Ultra behaviors that followed the death of Raciti in
February 2007, he strives to be a leading advocate of freedom of expression in Italian legal circles.
When I asked him about the history presented on the website he said, “This is our city and our
history. Nothing beyond my family means more to me than being Roman - and my family is Roman
so it is equal.”
B. Fanzines and Choreographies
i. Vecchie Maniere (Old Ways) and History Lessons
This approach to the history of the city was extended to Vecchie Maniere, the “fanzine” of
AS Roma Ultras as well (figure 105). Each month this group published a small periodical for
distribution within the Curva. In addition to information on upcoming AS Roma games and travel
options to away games, there was a feature called “Roma Vrbs Nostra” (Our City Rome) which
detailed some aspect of the city’s “art, history and civilization.”4 The articles were written by
Federico, one of the founding members of Antichi Valori. With no irony he explained to me that the

4

AS Roma Ultras, Vecchie Maniere, Martedi 18 Febbraio 2003. Pgs. 8-9
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Vrbs Nostra feature was “just a part of being Ultra and Roman. They were not written to
demonstrate our intelligence to those who did not know us, but because ‘Roma è la luce’” (Rome
is the light).5

Figure 105. A 2003 issue of
Vecchie Maniere, the
fanzine of AS Roma Ultras.

Among fascist Ultras, it was common to find some, especially the group leaders of Boys
Roma and Padroni di Casa, who spoke of fascism in the same emotive terms as they did Rome. It
was common to hear these Ultras say that “Mussolini loved Rome,” or that “Mussolini built Rome.”
This was explained to me during a bus ride to Milan with Boys. The acting “capo” (boss) sat next
to me and explained that fascism was Roman and therefore to be cherished and respected.
Named Maurizio but called “Duce” by the Boys Ultras, not only because of his association
with fascism but also his uncanny similarity in appearance to Mussolini, he is the most imposing and
menacing Ultra I encountered (figure 106). He looks as if he could walk through a wall, having a

5

The saying comes from the film The Gladiator. Maximus, the main character, is asked what Rome means
to him. He replies that, having seen that most of the world is brutal, crude, and dark, Rome, for him, is “the light.”
The saying is popular amongst AS Roma’s Ultras.
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thick muscular body and a large bald head. I never saw him without large aviator sunglasses and a
t-shirt with a fascist-inspired message (All Blacks and 1934 World Cup being two examples).
Conversely, he is generous with his time and resources, always making sure that his Ultras act with
proper dignity and discipline.

Figure 106. “Duce,” the leader of Boys Roma. May 2007.
Upon being told by Fabio (the second-in-command at Boys and one of my most informative
contacts) that I was knowledgeable about the history of fascism and Rome, Duce insisted that I sit
next to him for the 8-hour trip to Milan. He explained to me that Classical Rome as we recognize
it today is only thanks to Mussolini and fascism, which sought to re-establish the greatness of Roma
Antica. I talked to him as best as I could, considering he spoke only Roman dialect, about
Mussolini’s destruction of the medieval quarter that stood around Piazza Venezia and covered parts
of the forums (Painter, Jr., 2005; Herzfeld, 2009). “He destroyed what was weak and decadent in
our history,” he added.
After a while it became clear to him that I was quite knowledgeable about many subjects that
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he enjoyed - Nietzsche, current fascism, AS Roma, la cucina Romana. He began calling others to
gather around us, explaining to them incredulously that I was an American who knew more about
their history than they did. From that moment there was nothing happening in and around Boys
Roma of which I was not made aware.
ii. Choreographies and the Use of Romanità
In Chapter 3 I explained that the Ultras employ a monumental form of history, in which
linear history is less important than the myths and narratives of greatness that can be generated by
history. The Boys Roma leader’s explanation of Mussolini’s Rome was an example of this approach.
Vast stretches of Roman history are dismissed by the Ultras; Medieval, Baroque, Renaissance, and
Liberal periods pale in relation to the Classical and fascist periods as sources of “their Rome.”
Augustus, Julius Caesar, and Horatius Cocles have all made appearances in Curva Sud in recent
years.
a. Horatius Cocles
Horatius Cocles was the subject of a choreography created by Boys Roma for a game against
SS Lazio in 2002. Horatius was a hero of early Republican Rome. He singlehandedly saved the city
from an invading Etruscan army by defending and then setting fire to a wooden bridge across the
Tiber. The Etruscans had already captured the Gianicolo hill and were making their way down
toward the bridge to advance into Rome. As Roman soldiers deserted their positions, he took up his
shield and sword, crossed alone to the far side of the river, and ordered the deserters to destroy the
bridge. Alone, he faced the Etruscan forces, “one man against an army.” After killing many of the
enemy, he jumped into the Tiber and swam to safety (Livy, 2002, pgs. 118-120).
Boys depicted Horatius as a marble statue with the shield/symbol of AS Roma carved over
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his heart (figure 107). Horatius was bathed in red and yellow as Ultras throughout the Curva held
small cards with the colors aloft. Below the painting depicting Horatius were the words “Oltre la
Morte,” beyond the grave (Cacciari, 2004, pg. 15). In other words, Curva Sud, acting in the name
of Horatius, was ready to defend the city from foreign invasion. In doing so, the Ultras conflated
themselves with Horatius, as heroes who were destined to sacrifice themselves in service to Rome.

Figure 107. Boys Roma choreography with image of Horatius
Cocles. March 2002.
For that 2002 derby (as games between local rivals are called), AS Roma’s Ultra were
determined to make it understood that they shared the city with no one. Hence, the reference to
Horatius defending the city from foreigners. Since the 1999-2000 season, when SS Lazio won the
Italian championship, SS Lazio fans had an increased presence in the city, or so it seemed. It became
popular to speak of “the two Capitoline (Roman) teams” much to the chagrin of Curva Sud. There
were many banners in the Curva that night which questioned the right of the Lazio fans to call
themselves Roman. For instance, one read (in Roman dialect) “Lazzià guardate la carta d’identità
poi ce parli de Romanita`”(Lazio fans, check your identification cards and then speak to us about
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Romanità).
b. Roma ai Romani (Rome for the Romans)
In 2000, SS Lazio were the defending champions of Italy. When they matched up against AS
Roma, Curva Sud made a choreography depicting the seal of the city - a crowned red shield
emblazoned with SPQR in gold flanked by the flags of Italy and Rome (Nini, 2007, pg. 42). Below
was written “Nome, Colori, Tradizione, Roma Resta Giallorosso” (name, colors, tradition, Rome
remains yellow-red) (figure 108).

Figure 108. Curva Sud choreography. March 2000.
Regardless of SS Lazio’s success, the city remained the property of AS Roma fans. The
Ultras demonstrated this not from spite but because they believed that SS Lazio had no claim to the
city. They were formed in 1900 as a regional team, 27 years before AS Roma, and had willingly
chosen to ignore the colors and history of Rome when deciding on their own name. And anyone
whose loyalty lies with the region or any other abstraction at the expense of Rome is considered a
foreigner. The name, colors, and traditions of Rome were coterminous with those of AS Roma and
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Curva Sud.
Still another year earlier in 1999, AS Roma Ultras presented another choreography that
conflated Curva Sud with the Classical history of the city. With the Curva bathed from side to side
in yellow, red, and white cards, the center section held aloft a painting of a centurion and ten
legionaries marching behind shields adorned with “ASR” and under a standard of the Lupa
Capitolina (figures 109). In the sky overhead, evoking the cross envisioned by Constantine, was the
shield/symbol of AS Roma (Nini, 2007, pg. 43). Below this scene was written “Tu Non Vedrai
Nessuna Cosa al Mondo Maggior di Roma”(You will never see anything in the world greater than
Rome). Not greater than AS Roma, but Rome. The choreography was the best example of the Ultra
connection of city, team, Ultra, and glory.

Figure 109. Curva Sud choreography and
detail. November 1999.
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But it was not the only one. The 1995 derby fell on April 23rd, and to celebrate Rome’s
birthday Curva Sud was again a sea of yellow and red cards. Instead of a centralized image,
however, the main elements of the choreography were spread across the entire bottom of the curva.
Supported by a length of aqueduct were the arch of Constantine, the Pantheon, the dome of San
Pietro, the Coliseum, Piazza Navona, and the temple of Hercules (Cacciari, 2004, pg. 31). Below
this image was written “Quanto Sei Bella Roma” (Rome, how beautiful you are) (figure 110).

Figure 110. Curva Sud choreography. April 23, 1995.
In December 2000, Curva Sud presented a monumental choreography of hundreds of red and
yellow vessilli, or standards. Group leaders held aloft vessilli bearing the name and symbol of the
group. Other members held aloft either yellow cards or red standards with SPQR, the Lupa
Capitolina, or “Ave Roma” (Hail Roma). The central image was set below a large striscione reading
“Urbs Nostra” (Our City). It was of a large vessillo featuring the Lupa Capitolina in front of a red
and yellow shield. Written below the Lupa were the words “Gens Julia,” or Julian people, in
reference to the descendants of Julius Caesar (Cacciari, 2004, pg. 35). Below the Curva ran a banner
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saying “Nel Nome di Roma si Innalzano i Vessilli dell'Impero” (In the name of Rome, the standards
of the emperor are raised) (figure 111). It was another opportunity to remind the SS Lazio fans that
only Romanisti (AS Roma fans) were Caesar’s people. More importantly, it demonstrated that the
Ultras understand themselves in those terms: as descendants of Classical Romans.

Figure 111. Curva Sud choreography. December 2000.

Figure 112. Curva Sud choreography, detail.
December 2000.
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On another occasion, Curva Sud chose to connect the eternal (Roman) law which guided the
rise to dominance of Rome over all other Mediterranean cultures to the victory of AS Roma in the
Italian championship of 2000-2001. During that season’s game against AC Milan, the Curva held
aloft the crowned SPQR shield which acts as the crest of Rome (Cacciari, 2004, pg. 16). Below, the
Curva announced “Legge Eterna di Roma Eterna...la Vittoria!” (Eternal law of eternal Rome ... to
victory!) (figure 113).

Figure 113. Curva Sud choreography. May 2001.
In case any Milanisti (AC Milan fans) might miss the point, AS Roma Ultras unfurled a
banner just after the game started which read “Siamo Noi Romani, Siete Voi Schiavi” (We Are
Romans, You Are Slaves). There is no contradiction or contradistinction between Rome, AS Roma,
and the Curva. There is no level of abstraction that the Ultras justify by presenting the crest of the
city as their own. Nor is there a contradiction in their having signed the anti-immigrant graffiti on
Via della Lupa with the words AS Roma Ultras (figure 6 - to be discussed in Chapter 8).
The mentalità of AS Roma’s Ultras was perfectly summarized in a banner displayed by
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Tradizione Distinzione Roma during an unknown game. It connected the good of the Ultra and AS
Roma with the good of the city. It enmeshed the classical glory of Rome with its own. It reveled in
the agonistic form of life maintained by the Ultras, and connected it with the good of Rome, past
and future (Garsia, 2004, pg. 1). It read simply “Contro Tutto e Tutti. Gloria a Roma” (Against
Everything and Everyone, Glory to Rome). Again, not AS Roma, but Rome. The Ultras rarely, if
ever, feel the need to distinguish between the two.
V. Conclusion
In this chapter, it was shown how Romanità resembles and is distinguishable from
campanilismo (extreme localism). Although it too is a discourse of localism, Romanità also has a
history as a concept meant to unite the Italian nation, in both liberal and fascist contexts. For the
Ultras, it is, instead, a discourse of localism, but one which incorporates the fascist period of the
city’s history while promoting a critique of the universalist values of liberalism. More important
than it discursive uses, though, are the ways in which Romanità is a salient feature of the Ultras’
general worldview. Not only is it prominently displayed in the choreographies of Curva Sud Roma
but also in its use of Roman symbols like the Lupa Capitolina. These symbols are designed to
promote “Roman values” in a way that distinguishes the Romans from all other peoples. In this light,
their politics are given meaning as the positions and actions of a population who understands itself
as under siege from forces that seek to diminish the value of Rome and being Roman.
VI. Coda: Three Songs of Curva Sud Roma
The most common means of expression for the Ultras is through song. Each Curva in Italy
has its own songbook, featuring songs of devotion, insult, threat, irony, and scorn. Curva Sud Roma
is no different. During any game the Ultras may perform between twenty and thirty songs, with the
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higher number usually being reached by songs which insult specific teams. For reasons already made
clear, AS Roma’s Ultras sing many songs which insult SS Lazio, AC Milan, FC Juventus, and SC
Napoli; but sing very few against smaller provincial teams and cities. Overall, the majority of songs
performed by AS Roma’s Ultras are of their devotion to the squad and city.
There are three songs created by Curva Sud Roma in recent years that demonstrate their
understanding of Rome, Romanità, and themselves. In each of them the Ultras are above all else
defenders of the city - either the actual city or its honor. The songs demonstrate how aware, and
prideful, of the city’s history and traditions are the Ultras, who, in addition, present themselves as
a line of defense against those who would reduce its value to that of a marketplace.
Dai rioni, dai quartieri (From the districts and neighborhoods)
siamo venuti fino qua, (to here we have come)
siamo gli ultras della Roma (we are the Ultras of AS Roma)
onoriamo la città (and we honor the city)

Siamo gli ultras della Roma e fieri (We are the Ultras of AS Roma and fierce)
centurioni e cavalieri, a difendere la città (centurions and knights, to defend the city)
orgoglio della nostra storia (proud of our history)
Ave Roma, Roma vittoriosa, (Hail Rome, Victorious Rome)
com'è scritto nella storia (as it is written in history)
il vento gelido del Nord (the cold wind of the north)
non ci potrà fermare (cannot stop us)

Semo romani trasteverini, (We are Romans from Trastevere)
semo signori senza quatrini; (we are gentlemen without money)
er core nostro è 'na capanna (our heart is a mere hut)
core sincero che nun te 'nganna (an honest heart that does not seek to fool you)
si stai in bolletta noi t'aiutamo (if you are without money we will help you)
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però da micchi nun ce passamo (but we are not to be considered stupid)
noi semo magnatori de spaghetti (we are spaghetti eaters)
de le trasteverine li bulletti (the cocks of Trastevere girls)
Roma bella, Roma mia (beautiful Rome, my Rome )
te se vonno portà via (they want to take you away)
Campidojo co' S. Pietro se vorebbero comprà (they'd like to buy Campidoglio
and St.Peter’s)
qui se vonno comprà tutto, (and everything else besides)
pure er sole e l'aria fresca (even the sun and the fresh air)
ma la fava romanesca je potemo arigalà (but we can present them instead with a
Roman fava)
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CHAPTER EIGHT: Globalization and Local Particularity
In the previous chapter I demonstrated how Romanità motivates the Ultras to celebrate the
rich history, culture, and cultural symbols of Rome. It explained that the Ultras’ self-understanding,
as well as their understanding of the world-at-large, is filtered through Rome, producing an
aggressive awareness of discourses of glory and greatness. This chapter continues these ideas, but
applies them to the political ideology and actions of Ultras belonging to groups of the far right. The
chapter is limited in this regard because of the nature of the research. As I explained in the
introduction, it would have been difficult to deeply examine both the left and right in Curva Sud
Roma. And, because the right predominates, I chose the latter.
Likewise, I was unable to witness the most extreme political actions of some Ultras, like the
raiding of Roma camps or the storming RAI’s studios. Instead, I witnessed Ultras talking about
them. Because of this, much of what follows is rhetorical. I am not suggesting that discourse is
apolitical, however; on the contrary, in the pages to follow, I present acts of thinking and speaking
that they are presented as political actions. In instances where I was present, such as the MTV Day
protest, Family Day, and the Gay Pride parade, what the Ultras had to say about what they were
doing seemed more important than what they, in fact, did. By focusing on discourse, though, I was
able to get a clear sense of how localism was used by the Ultras - not as a discourse, per se, but as
a framework for interpersonal relationships and for understanding the postmodern present’s right
to expect or demand change in Rome. In other words, the Ultras’ “local” was so glaring, and, as I
will demonstrate, so permeated with ideas of classical and fascist glory, that change was understood
as something that had to come from outside - something imposed upon the city by the forces of
liberalism that they associated with globalization.

315

The chapter begins by demonstrating how Romanità operates as a discourse, inculcating the
Ultras with a critique of modernity which aims above all at protecting Rome from the influences of
postmodernity and globalization. I then discuss the impact of the organized far right on Curva Sud
Roma before examining the political interests of the Ultras. To do so I detail Ultra protests against
MTV, a Gay Pride parade, African immigration, and the presence of Roma in Rome.
I. Postmodernity and Globalization
Coinciding with the “liberalization” of many radicals of the 1968 generation, postmodernism
marked a break with late-modernity. In the 1980s many Italian thinkers who had previously been
anti-American communists found themselves arguing that America and Americanism were far from
destructive but “all that is creative, modern, open, universal and liberated” (O’Meara, 2004, pg. 20).
It became an act of intellectual and social duty to reject the stifling contours of “traditional European
values.” These were now understood, without irony, not as core aspects of a collection of distinct
“local cultures” (as non-Western, previously Other, cultures would be celebrated), but as racist and
exclusionary. The call was to embrace the Third World, multiculturalism, and ecumenical visions
of globalization (O’Meara, 2004, pgs. 20-22).
Lyotard explained the onset of postmodernity as an intellectual movement which destroyed
the sanctity of the “grand narrative” in general, and in particular the Western civilizational narrative
of universal well-being and material salvation through rationality (Lyotard, 1999, pg. 16). Seeing
this model of salvation as mere narrative, and one amongst many at that, “progress, freedom, and
objectivity” were de-sanctified as subjective and illusory (Connolly, 1993, pg. 10). Man, as a
narrating subject, was cast out from his objective security into a world in which signification and
representation are the rule, in which canons of knowledge are considered more exclusionary and
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destructive than affective and creative.
Further, because all knowledge is held to be reflective and mediated, there can be no grand
narratives but only myriad micro-narratives (O’Meara, 2004, pg. 22). This collection of micronarratives operates as the new truth, which is itself a form of radical pluralism, reflecting the new
array of relative identities possible to the postmodern subject; each with equal value and unable to
critique the others. “For this reason, ... racial minorities, trance freaks, lesbian bikers, squatters,
immigrants, and grunge rockers all register ... while Basque nationalists, Swiss Communards, and
Lombard regionalists, whose communities are ancient and intergenerational, are generally suspected
of being ‘closed’ or repressive variants of the [grand] narrative” (O’Meara, 2004, pg. 23).
This motley collection of perspectives, or the intellectual push toward their creation and
celebration, is the new model of the universal human (Baudrillard, 1994, pg. 107). And just as the
universal is given more economic value than the local, the global human outweighs the local, via
the discourse of multiculturalism, with immigrants seen as the new model citizen in place of the
pampered, scared, tired, and resentful (Western) native. And, through the explosion of
communications technologies, and the “computerization [and] digitization” of humanity,
placelessness and deterritorialization are becoming optimal states and are making of local
particularity the domains of niche tourism and marketing (Naylor, 2007, pg. 23).
With this perspective in mind, one may begin to understand the conditions which guide the
political interests and choices of the Ultras. Simply put, the Ultras come to know and interact with
the political world through the intense narratives of the Ultra mentalità. Strength, honor, discipline,
virtue, sacrifice, and loyalty are just a few of the themes contained in this worldview that I have
described. These lead not only to a highly fascist interpretation of politics but also one that is
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moralized. In the Curva the Ultras create a tableaux of local gestures and performances that directly
challenge the homogenizing tendencies of Calcio Moderno. They give greater value to local
particularity than to multi-national corporate interests and the understanding of the game as a televisual product. Beyond the Curva this same commitment to local particularity dominates, but here
they are also able to expose the moral bases of the forces that they believe are aligned against them.
II. The Ultras and Politics
While the Ultras are intensely, aggressively, and radically political, the “political behaviors”
to which they commit are largely extra-parliamentary. In other words, organizing, voting, holding
office and campaigning for political parties is not what they have in mind when thinking or acting
politically. Instead, Ultra politics is largely about putting the Ultra mentalità into action in a larger
context than the Curva. In this, the Ultras’ use of politics mirrors the “ritual and cultish” aspects of
other forms of Italian politics (namely the radical left and Italian Communist Party) (Kertzer, 1988,
pg. 13). As David Kerzer explains, politics of this kind are not solely interested in transforming
society, but also with acting strictly within the terms of the cosmological myths that buttress the
movement in question (1988, pg. 13).
A. The Ultras and the Presence of the Far Right in the Curva
Nonetheless, the Ultras have contacts with, and are influenced by Italian political parties and
movements. At this moment in Curva Sud Roma’s history, the far right is the most important of
these. As explained in Chapter 2, AS Roma’s Ultras shifted from a mix of political ideologies at
inception to being dominated by the far right in the early-1990s. This shift coincided with the
general shift in the Italian working class from the left to the right, making it consistent with larger
trends in Italian society (Ginsborg, 2003b, pgs. 17-35). The far right still dominates today, yet it is

318

difficult to ascertain why this is so from the Ultras.
According to Ultras from both the left and right, there is no mystery as to why fascism took
over the Curva. “The right,” said Massimiliano, an Ultra of Fedayn who grew up in a family
committed to leftist parties and concerns, “is the more powerful force in Rome’s history. If one looks
at history, Rome has almost always been in their hands. The only Curva Sud I’ve ever known has
been in their hands too.” I asked how his family resisted the rightist persuasion. “My father is from
a small town in Campania between Rome and Campobasso,” he answered, “where everyone is
Communist. I was born in Rome in 1979 and would hear many things in school about Communism
and fascism. But for me it was just normal to follow my family’s understandings.”
“And in Curva Sud?” I asked. “Fedayn was the only strong leftist group when I began going
to the Curva in 1996,” he said, “and I knew some of the guys from school. It was natural to go to
Fedayn, even beyond politics in the Curva.” Like many of the leftist Ultras, Massimiliano is
convinced that politics should have no place amongst the Ultras. “Ultras is a commitment to AS
Roma, not to politics. The beauty of being an Ultra is the purity and focus it gives - there is only AS
Roma!” he said with a smile.
Conversely, those on the right feel that politics is the central thrust of the Ultras. “To be a
Roman is basically to be a fascist,” Stefano, a former member of the disbanded Monteverde
explained. “But to be a proud Roman is absolutely to be a fascist. We Ultras did the same things that
fascism is doing today. We had an office, we cleaned our streets (referring to the neighborhood
cleansing of drug dealers, illegal street vendors, and Roma panhandlers mentioned in Chapter 2 for
which Monteverde was notorious amongst the Ultras), we fought Communists in school and in the
piazzas. Curva Sud was just an extension of that because it was our advertising. We could support
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AS Roma but also demonstrate the joy of being a proud fascist and proud Roman.”
Similar to Massimiliano, Stefano’s household had a political outlook, but this time of the far
right, “just as was the entire Monteverde neighborhood,” he said. And, similar to Stefano I had to
prompt Massimiliano to discuss the place of the right in the Curva. “I found Monteverde here on my
street,” he said, “so coming into the Curva as a fascist was something I never decided. I was an AS
Roma fan and fascist just like my friends (in the group).”
It is unclear if anyone besides the Ultras and the fascists have made Romanità such an
integral part of their politics or general world view. That the Ultras of the right equate fascism and
Romanità begs the question whether an intermediate source of inspiration for their passions is
available. In the years between the fall of fascism and the rise of the right amongst the Ultras, was
there any movement or cultural element keeping the two alive? Certainly, Julius Evola comes to
mind, as do scholars of fascism like Emilio Gentile, professor of history at Rome’s La Sapienza
University. I have already demonstrated the prevalence of Evolan thought amongst the rightist Ultras
but cannot do so for Gentile. However, his model of how fascism used Romanità is perhaps the most
useful for fully explicating how the politics of the Ultras evolves from a love of, and desire to
protect, Rome to a will to act violently in this regard.
B. Romanità, Ultras, and Fascism
According to Gentile, the fascist state was implemented with the idea that the human
character is malleable, “as an expression of a historical tradition, of the customs, beliefs, and ethic
of a whole people” (Gentile, 1996, pg. 96). The state, then, felt it could create the content of its
subjects’ character. Romanita` was central to this project. Fascism taught of a Rome that was
“grounded in virtue, knowledge, and discipline, the secret of greatness” with the expectation that
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modern Italians would become worthy heirs of their Roman forefathers by embracing these same
ideals (Gentile, 1996, pg. 76). The metanoia, or change of feeling, amongst the Romanizing Italians
would demonstrate that Romanità was an active agent in modern fascist Italy. “This was no idea
petrified in this or that traditional form, but alive and in action - belonging to our own current
awareness of politics and history” (Gentile, 1996, pg. 77). Romanità was a part of the mythologizing
impetus of fascism, which saw no limits to the power of ideas and ideals to motivate behaviors. And
it is this affective power that the Ultras have put to use. But, just as with the teachings of Evola,
Nietzsche, and Sorel, and the legacy of fascism, the Ultras have made use of Romanità in a way that
uniquely serves their purposes.
If Ultras on the left and right seemed to agree that fascism was just a normal part of their
experiences of Rome and the Ultras, why was this so? The question was never adequately answered
by my informants. However, Stefano (above) had alerted me to the correlation between Roman pride
and fascism. I asked Federico, formerly of Antichi Valori and now of Romulae Genti, if he agreed
with Stefano’s formula. “Absolutely,” he said, “but only because the fascists have always used
Romanità as a way to legitimize fascism. And today, look at how Forza Nuova uses Rome and its
imagery. It is no accident that the Forzanovisti (members of Forza Nuova) use the Lupa (Capitoline
She-Wolf) and Stadio dei Marmi (stadium of marbles - created by the PNF for parades, sporting
events, and other public displays, it is a small oval surrounded by hyper-masculine neo-Classical
statues) in their publications, as well as celebrating April 21st (as noted above, the birthday of
Rome). Aside from us (AS Roma’s Ultras) the fascists make the most use of Romanità.”
“Is that why the fascists dominate the Curva?” I asked. “I think so,” he said, “but also
because when I and others of my generation became active in the Curva, the left was discredited in
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the wake of the wall (the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989). At school the fascists had the only critique
of capitalism that we felt had not been discredited. It may have been defeated in war but it was not
discredited as ideology. Plus,” he continued, “Boys Roma and Opposta Fazione were the best Ultras
and they were the best fascists. When we looked for the one, we saw the other.”
It was most interesting that when the Ultras discussed fascism they did so in ways which
mirrored their political consciousness as Ultras - in terms of ideology, history, and mentalità.
Conversely, when the media discuss fascism in the Italian curvas it is normally a discussion of
parties. Interestingly, of all the Ultras in today’s Curva Sud who openly discuss fascism, the two
most important and influential groups - Boys Roma and Padroni di Casa - have deep connections
to fascist political parties. More importantly, though, they demonstrate how fascism preexisted the
fascist political parties in the Curva.
Boys Roma has been a fascist-based Ultra group since 1972, although for long periods, with
no official links to parties. Padroni di Casa has only been in Curva Sud since 2007, but their
pedigree reaches back to the rightist-oriented Opposta Fazione and then Tradizione Distinzione
Roma. Here too this was without any outward connection to political parties. Today, however, both
have open connections to the two dominant parties of the Italian far right: Forza Nuova and Fiamma
Tricolore.
C. The Parties of the Far Right and Today’s Curva Sud
Even though these parties, both of which understand themselves as movements, are of the
right and share a similar critique of communism and liberalism, they each consider themselves an
enemy of the other. Those from Forza Nuova speak of those in Fiamma Tricolore as something akin
to zingari (slur for Roma) who are compromising the spirit of fascism - and vice versa. Fiamma
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Tricolore was started in 1995 by members of Movimento Sociale Italiano (MSI) who refused to
compromise their radical credentials by participating in the move of the more moderate successor
party, Alleanza Nazionale, toward the center. Fiamma Tricolore is active at the community level in
most of Rome’s working class neighborhoods, and through its leader Luca Romagnoli it also seeks
parliamentary legitimacy and influence.
Forza Nuova, by contrast, seeks no parliamentary power. Its actions are movement-like in
that they focus on community presence and local organization via a series of offices. Forza Nuova
was founded as an organic extension of Roberto Fiore’s Terza Posizione organization which was
outlawed in Italy after being associated with the 1980 bombing of the Bologna Central railway
station. Its Roman members understand themselves entirely as radical activists and many seek
opportunities to confront others, whether in “la piazza” (dialogue and outreach) or in “la strada”
(violent attack).
Of the two, it is Forza Nuova which has the most influence in today’s Curva Sud. This is
difficult to ascertain, however, because both Forza Nuova and Fiamma Tricolore have members in
the various Curva Sud groups. When Tradizione Distinzione Roma disbanded in 2007 it was because
some members, including its founder Gianluca Iannone, desired to spend more time outside the
Curva. The new group they founded, Padroni di Casa, was immediately associated with the political
right, specifically Fiamma Tricolore.
On the day that Padroni di Casa introduced themselves to Curva Sud, I was with Boys Roma.
The leadership of Boys was comprised of three men at the time, two of whom are actively involved
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in Forza Nuova.1 The other is of Fiamma Tricolore. Some within the group speculate that the current
inability of Boys to prosper as in the days of Paolo Zappavigna is due to this crucial rift. That day
in the Curva, one of the leaders affiliated with Forza Nuova watched derisively as Padroni di Casa
entered the curva as a group just after the game had begun. He leaned into me and said only, “sono
da Fiamma” (they are [members] of Fiamma Tricolore).
Since that day in February 2007, Padroni di Casa have twice switched their party allegiance
- first to Forza Nuova, and then, several months later, to start the now nationwide movement Casa
Pound Italia. Named in honor of the fascistic American poet Ezra Pound, Casa Pound Italia seeks
to be a new type of fascist movement - one that is just as active in acculturating as in activism. At
Padroni di Casa’s office Casa Pound, the original office of the nationwide movement, weekly
lecture, film, and cultural events are held. They have affiliations with Roman futurist artists and
poets, Evolan and Nietzschean students, and a host of fascist Romans of various professions.
The movement’s ultimate goal, according to it’s leader Gianluca Iannone, is to become an
autonomous voice of “truly radical fascism in a way that the post-war fascists have been unable to
maintain.” He explained that fascism had to take the beauty and passion of the Ultras and apply them
to the piazza. On 3 November, 2008, three gentlemen identified as members of Casa Pound stormed
the studio of RAI 3, Italy’s main left wing television network, as the program Chi l’ha Visto was
preparing to air a video of the previous day’s violent encounter between activists on the far right and
left in Piazza Navona.2 The fight was related to ongoing polemics and street battles due to the left’s
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These Ultras have been discussed in previous chapters. One of them, Fabio, was one of my key
informants. These three were later replaced by the man known as “Duce.” Fabio now acts as his second-incommand.
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protests of proposed school reforms. Casa Pound Italia released a statement saying it would no
longer tolerate the violence against fascist activists by their leftist counterparts. Two days later Il
Messaggero linked Casa Pound Italia to Padroni di Casa, as the founder of both, Iannone, was
among those arrested for the assault on RAI 3.3
Neither representatives of Fiamma Tricolore nor Forza Nuova admitted to using the Ultras
as a site for recruiting. During a brief conversation with a Fiamma Tricolore contact provided me
by the third member of Boys’ leadership, it was explained that Fiamma Tricolore does not officially
enter the Italian curvas. Any shared membership between the two, Ultras and fascism, is
coincidental, he explained. “In the past, though, the curvas were fertile ground for the organized
right, and many Ultras became involved in Fiamma Tricolore through being Ultras - myself
included,” he told me.
A longer conversation at the Piazza Vescovio office of Forza Nuova was similarly dismissive
of the Ultras. I was told by Martin Alvaro, a well-known Forza Nuova activist, that the Ultras are
of no interest whatsoever to their movement. Even though some members of Forza Nuova hailed
from both SS Lazio’s Curva Nord and AS Roma’s Curva Sud, the Ultras, he said, had never been
a large part of Forza Nuova’s recruitment scheme. When asked why, he explained that the curvas
were unreliable, being more full of hedonists than fascists. Whatever the position of Forza Nuova
on the Ultras, my research pointed to deep cross-overs between their form of political activism and
that of the Ultras. These connections will be explained in the two following sections.
In contrast to what Martin Alvaro told me, that there are only coincidental members of both
the Ultras and Forza Nuova, I can attest to there being a number of AS Roma Ultras who follow the
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actions of Forza Nuova closely. While these persons did not speak of Fiore or other national leaders
of Forza Nuova, they all knew of those who were attached to “Piazza Vescovio,” as Forza Nuova
was called (because of the location of their Rome office). On the rare occasions when I was with
Ultras and Forza Nuova members away from a strictly Ultra related activity (such as an AS Roma
game or an office of one of the groups), neither the Ultras nor soccer were discussed. For the Ultras
this is rare, as it would be hard to converse with an Ultra for five minutes without the discussion
turning to either the Curva or AS Roma.
One can conclude, therefore, that the parties of the far right and the Ultras of Curva Sud
Roma are two overlapping constituents that intersect without necessarily uniting. While issues that
concern these parties are certainly important to the Ultras, from alleged immigrant crime to the
national trade deficit with China, it is most likely that the large majority of Ultras have become
devoted to these concerns without the intervention of the organized far right. There are certainly
Ultras who are active in organized fascism, as will be made clear below, but there seemed to be
many more who consider themselves fascist without being dedicated to the fascist parties. As I said
above, it was common to speak with Ultras like Federico, Mario, or Gabriele of Romulae Genti who
knew Martin Alvaro of Forza Nuova and the goings on of that party but who otherwise never made
serious contact with organized fascism.
That Ultras like them were dedicated to the ideology of fascism and were familiar with
leading Roman fascists but never committed themselves to Forza Nuova, for instance, might play
a role in the ways my contacts in the extreme rightist parties disparaged the Ultras. Meanwhile, odd
as it seems, the Ultras in the post-Raciti/Sandri era are castigated in the media more severely than
the fascists. It could be that the fascist parties have chosen to distance themselves from the Ultras
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given their present conflict with the state. Nevertheless, even without formal connections to the
parties, the rightist Ultra groups operate with fascism in mind, adopting squadrismo (action in the
form of fascist paramilitary squads), an ethic of violence that celebrates engagement and aggression,
pageantry as a form of political action, and a critique of modernity. It could be said, then, that the
Ultras are another form of fascism.
III. The Ultras as Political Actors
A. MTV Day
In the early Fall of each year, MTV holds a one-day festival in Rome called MTV Day. In
2007, it was held in Piazza di Porta San Giovanni and was attended by a group of 30 Ultras
belonging to Padroni di Casa. They were there along with a sizable contingent of Roman university
students belonging to Forza Nuova’s student wing, Lotta Studentesca. The purpose was not to enjoy
the festivities but to protest them. They marched into the piazza behind a banner reading “Boicotta
MTV” (Boycott MTV). Behind the banner the Ultras distributed handbills explaining their presence:
MTV completes ten years? Ten years of brainwashing millions of children. Ten years
of dishonor, relativism, materialism, and hedonism! In the media society that shapes
how we think, MTV has for years influenced the ideas and style of life of the young,
promoting a process of homogenization that annuls particularity and identity. Lotta
Studentesca and Padroni di Casa retain the right to our own characteristics and the
differences between these and a society that is becoming more Americanized by the
day. For this we have entered the piazza today, to contest the ever-present
Americanized media, and to stimulate a desire amongst the youth to desire and hold
dear our true identity and traditions of our people. To be revolutionary today is to
love Tradition.

The terms of the protest were typical of the Ultras’ understanding of globalization and what
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is at stake in its triumph. MTV is perhaps the greatest purveyor of American values on Italian
television. It is a 24 hour-a-day promoter of what the Ultras called leisure, avarice, and vulgarity.
As in the US, its shows like “Cribs,” “Pimp My Ride,” and “The Fabulous Life Of ...” present a
constant stream of, as said the Lotta Studentesca/Padroni di Casa leaflet, “relativism, materialism,
and hedonism.” Through its original shows like “Buzzin’” and “Nabari,” MTV Italia promotes the
idea that Italy is a multicultural and multiracial society in which all groups share friendship and
understanding despite their differences. Black Africans, burkha wearing Muslim girls, and Italian
teens share experiences and interests. On other shows, like “A Shot at Love with Tila Tequila,”
Italians learn of the thrills of bisexuality and sexual promiscuity. Padroni di Casa’s banner and
handbills expressed outrage at this cluster of messages.

Figure 114. Fascists at MTV Day 2007. Rome.
B. Family Day and Gay Pride
The Ultras’ protest against MTV Day showed a highly moralized understanding of the terms
of globalization. The protection of institutions and traditions, however they are defined - in this case
as the bulwark of “particularity” against “homogenization” - is not a goal for the sake of the Italian
state, but instead is part of a moral issue against multicultural-and-globalization-based change -
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change imposed either from without or from the perspective of liberal or modern “progress.” In
either case, the Ultras understand both as a shameful flight from their own culture. These were also
the terms with which they engaged Family Day and the annual Roman Gay Pride parade.

Figure 115. Alleanza
Nazionale poster against
DICO. Rome. May 2007.
Family Day was the Church-organized day to protest Diritti e doveri delle persone
stabilmente convivente (DICO - Rights and Obligations of Permanently Cohabiting Persons), the
bill proposed by members of the 2006-2007 Prodi government which sought rights for cohabiting
couples, including homosexuals. Held on a warm May day in Piazza di Porta San Giovanni, the
rally brought together hundreds of Catholic organizations from all around Italy. The far-right parties
were there as well, with Alleanza Nazionale urging all parties to carry no colors so as not to risk
making the family seem a “political object.”

Figure 116. Family Day. Rome. May 2007.
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Concurrently in Piazza Navona there was a rally in support of purely secular government
(figure 117). Here, demonstrators sought to keep the church from being involved in political issues.
At the time of these demonstrations “Ratzinger” (as most Ultras called Pope Benedict XVI) was in
Brazil proclaiming the need of the church to be unconcerned with the political issues of the day.4
The irony was not lost on Federico, the former member of Antichi Valori with whom I attended
Family Day. Even though he grew up in the shadow of The Vatican, worked in its museums as a tour
guide, supported Family Day, and approved of Ratzinger, he noted that it made sense for the Pope
to say this in Latin America, as the conservative elements in the church had struggled to eradicate
that continent’s Liberation Theology since the 1960s. For Federico, the Church was and is extremely
political. It is not always that he, and other Romans, agree with the Church’s politics, but on this
occasion, he said, he and many others did.

Figure 117. Newspaper discussing “Family Day: Italy in
two piazzas.” Rome. May 2007.
The Ultras who attended Family Day did so for much the same reasons other Ultras had
attended MTV Day. At the latter, they were protesting a celebration of turbocapitalism, hedonism,
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and hyper-materialism; at the former they joined a celebration of tradition, idealism, and
protectionism. Thus, the events were two sides of the same coin. The Ultras talked about Family Day
not as an anti-gay statement, but as an opportunity to show the Prodi government that his will to
make of Italy one grand market, as the US and UK are understood, is opposed by Italians. It was
explained to me that the problem of the Italian left is that it is always too ready to undermine Italian
traditions in order to please the international community. “They attack proud and strong Italians on
behalf of immigrants and silly pleasure seekers,” Federico told me.
The Pope pronounced on the issue in the week before Family Day. Where the Ultras spoke
of tradition, he spoke of sin. Nonetheless, there was little distinction between their arguments. The
materialist philosophies, Capitalism and Marxism, had torn away our ability to be more than vulgar
matter, he said.5 When secularism is embraced, a wholly abstract human follows. Ratzinger did not
continue in this way for long, but I mentioned it to the Ultras for a reaction. I was told by Mario,
now of Ultras Primavalle but formerly of Monteverde, “[not to] worry about traditions collapsing
in Rome. The rest of the world lives without tradition because their history, culture, existence itself,
are not real. But here in Rome, the past is so important that you cannot even live in it. We have a
perpetual present (il presente permanente) that stretches back 2700 years.”
Mario’s statement demonstrates the depth of the Ultras’ commitments to Rome as a place
in which history, culture, and existence (to use his words) operate differently than elsewhere in the
world. Romanità is more than just a weekend-only ideological dalliance for the Ultras. Instead, it
acts as the basis for their understanding of cultural and historical processes. It ensures that culture
and history form a visible and knowable “web of significance” through which the mundane everyday
5
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is made knowable. As he said, the past is important in Rome because there really is no past - all is
lived presently and immediately. Mario assumes that this does not happen elsewhere in the world,
because beyond Rome, culture and history are not real - playing no true role in how people live.
I was reminded of Michael Polanyi’s struggle to justify the forms of knowledge generated
by zealotry, through which violence and terror are given fuel. Borrowing from Hannah Arendt, he
explains that revolutionary education is designed to abolish the line between truth and fiction,
thereby making every knowable thing a “statement of purpose” (Polanyi, 1974, pg. 242). Leaving
aside his epistemology (and political aversion to extremism), his understanding of knowledge
serving a purpose but also being pliable is reflected in Mario’s statement. And, there is no mistaking
that this devotion to Rome is a form of extremism. Rome’s visibly multi-layered history makes the
city’s historical importance a constant reminder of what is “at stake” for the Ultras. In effect, their
feelings of proprietorship are manifested in every evening stroll they take.
The church was less at issue on Family Day than was taking a stand against the liberalization
of Italian society. The media coverage of Family Day made it an issue of “gay rights” and the
“grettezza” (close-mindedness) the “traditional Italian” that keeps Italy from “making progress.”
For the Ultras, Family Day was less about these immediate concerns than with an opportunity to take
exception to the very idea of the liberal, rights-based human to begin with. Nietzsche wrote about
“breeding strength” as an ideal for his radical aristocratic nobility. Strength, like nobility itself, was
to be achieved through struggle and hardship. It was to oppose the very idea that “man” is given
value by virtue of his ability to participate equally in a marketplace (what Nietzsche called
“mechanical virtue”) (Nietzsche, 2003, pg. 176).
Strength, instead, was to be created through isolation (Nietzsche, 2003, pg. 166). Elsewhere,
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Nietzsche explained that one can only maintain what is one’s own by maintaining adequate distance
from one’s neighbors (2006, pg. 42). The Ultras have used this formula to great effect against other
Ultras and fan bases, but it also motivates their oppositions to globalization. The adoption of more
liberal and secular understandings of the human is not a problem unless it is being imposed, or being
popularized due to the influence of what they see as degrading elements within society. Certainly
MTV Day, and MTV in general, was singled out as an insidious influence on Italians. In seeking
distance from the form of life being promoted by MTV the Ultras also make arguments for an
organic understanding of society.
The idea that the state is an organism that thrives and declines in conjunction with its
population is central to Counter-Enlightenment thought. Although the fascists saw in this a material
rationale, and thus promoted the general health of the population, Sorel, following Nietzsche, was
more concerned with how the weakness of a political class - one ashamed of ruling - leads to a
toleration of weakness that ultimately effects the policy decisions of a state (Sorel, 1999, pg. 182).
Michael O’Meara has discussed the implications of such an idea amongst those who are opposed
to liberalism today. Far from the biological justifications for nation-or-people-hood, the organic state
idea hinges upon “common heritage and tradition” for relevance and survival (2004, pg. 104).
Tradition, he proposes, functions as a skeleton upon which peoples constitute themselves. While
modernity and rationalism propose that traditions are contextual, and thus fluid and less valuable
as markers of human behavior, O’Meara counters by explaining that tradition, like history, is more
about the present than the past. Thus, one can act through a market-driven, homogenizing liberalism
or one can act through something else. That something else, the Ultras believe, is their “own Roman
culture.” I asked a group of five Ultras Romani Ultras if the state or the Church could be considered
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part of this culture. They responded, only the Church.

Figure 118. Family Day banner. “Without God the
family does not exist.” Rome. May 2007.
The Church was also at the center of discourse surrounding the Gay Pride parade. And, like
DICO and Family Day, the issue was around “rights,” pitting the Prodi government against the Pope.
It was not surprising that this was so. Along with the family, the Church is often presented by
scholars and journalists as reason for Italy’s notoriously weak state (Ginsborg, 2003b, pgs. 129-134).
Because of its ability to act as a political sovereign, the Church was historically able to control
understanding of the issues that, in the summer of 2007, were in danger of becoming the domain of
“rights.”
It seemed Italy was struggling to accept that the state was actually to be responsible for
defining the family. The family as a legal and material entity was something different from the
family as the basis of human life. The sanctity of the family, said the Church, came from God; the
impositions of a secular state were out of place in relation to an institution given the species by its
creator.
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Figure 119. Anti-Gay graffiti. “Homosexual, for you
no rights.” Rome. June 2007.

The days leading up to the June parade were contentious. On June 15 the Northern League
continued to agitate against Prodi, as their 22 MPs stormed the Lower House, demanding the
government clear out. This was part of Fini, Bossi, and Berlusconi’s new initiative against Prodi in
the wake of vast rightist victories in regional elections, as well as the consequence of uninterrupted
bickering, disunity, and indecision within the Prodi coalition. The latest flare up was caused by the
government’s decision to allow various ministers to march in the Gay Pride parade. Catholics within
the government were outraged as the parade was set to embrace calls for rights of gay marriage,
adoption, and even assisted fertility.
The right was quick to expect a full assault on the Church’s control of public discourse on
the family (an issue that had been debated since DICO was unveiled in February 2007), while the
left said it must support any demonstration calling for greater secularization and bans against
discrimination. Leftist MP’s had even called for more rights for Chinese immigrants, after a number
of them attacked police in Milan upon being ticketed for illegally unloading trucks in a public street.
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Figure 120. Anti-Gay graffiti. “Gays to the ovens.”
Rome. June 2007.
Saturday morning, in Piazza Bologna, Piazza Vescovio, and Piazza Dalmazia (near
Mussolini’s former residence at Villa Torlonia), were found fascist graffiti against the march (and
gays as well): “Gays, Rome does not want you,” “Italy needs children, not gays,” “Gays, no rights
for you,” and the particularly nasty, “Gays to the ovens” (figures 119 and 120).
The parade was more disputatious than had been Family Day and its counter demonstration
in Piazza Navona. The paraders aggressively condemned the Church and the Pope. They rode on
floats laden with men in drag, transsexuals, and nudity. They called for an end to discrimination
against gays. Commentators noted that Italy was far behind other Western countries in its attitudes
toward homosexuality and in addressing equal protection issues.
This time with twelve Padroni di Casa Ultras, I witnessed only a few minutes of the parade.
The group of Ultras met with a large group from Forza Nuova on Via Cavour. Aside from
occasional slurs against gays, the meeting was mostly to complain against Prodi and the “rights
seekers” who were attempting, it was argued, “to hold Italy and its history, honor, and traditions
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hostage for their own benefit.” The left, they said, had, as usual, aligned itself against anything of
value or tradition, anything Italian, in order to shame the country into “keeping up with some
universally defined progress.”

Figure 121. Gay Pride
parader. Rome. June 2007.
The Ultras attacked the paraders within the terms of their general attack on liberalism and
globalization. “Who were these people,” asked Luca, a 38-year old veteran of Tradizione Distinzione
Roma who now was well-respected in Padroni di Casa, “to make demands on the Pope? What had
they done to be worthy of insulting a Roman institution?” “On whose behalf, and to whose benefit,
did they expect Italy to change? If things were better for them in other parts of Europe, why not
leave?,” he asked.

Figure 122. Gay Pride paraders. Rome. June
2007.
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The other Ultras answered angrily, showing their disgust that Italy now had “minority”
issues. Luca spoke of “spineless weaklings who made demands without having made themselves
worthy of demand.” They complained bitterly that Italy had not been like this before the European
Union. But now, it was changing life for the worse. Two things were especially interesting about
their complaints: their continual questioning why policy makers were dismissing what Italians
wanted; and their anger at the assumptions driving “minorities” to demand “their rights.”
When I proposed to them that plurality is demonstrative of progress in liberal societies, Luca
told me in response that “gli Ultras sono i veri subalterni” (the Ultras are the true subalterns). “It
seems that one can be anything in Italy except an Ultra. And you are telling me that these people
bring more to Italy than us? We want Italy to be strong, virile, and proud but instead we get an Italy
determined to be a cesspool,” he said. Poetically, on the same day as the Gay Pride parade it was
announced that soccer-related violence had fallen dramatically after Raciti’s death, showing the
value of the crackdown on the Ultras. As already noted, attacks on police were down 93%, while
violent encounters between fans were down 44%.6
Luca insisted upon driving me back to Monteverde as evening fell. While driving, he
identified three crucial “political enemies” of the Ultras: American-based popular culture, “which
celebrated above all vulgar materialism and ignorance;” the Italian state, “which, in the hands of the
left was intent on making Italy a melting-pot, diminishing the value of Italian culture and history at
every turn;” and the European Union, “which debilitated culture for the sake of a free market that
demanded consumerism and inclusiveness from all.” The EU would be center stage in the true bane
of Ultra politics, immigration and the Roma.
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C. Immigration and the Roma
i. Perspectives on Rome and Immigration
In November 2007, Massimo D’Alema, then Minister of Foreign Affairs, was in Turkey to
demonstrate the Italian government’s support for that country’s entrance into the European Union.
When asked in a press conference about his position on the issue, he did not use a cultural-historical
argument. Instead, he chose multiculturalism as rationale for Turkey being a part of Europe. While
others in Europe were debating Turkey’s cultural and historical connections to Europe, D’Alema
chose to put the onus on Europe itself to be worthy of Turkey. As he put it, Turkey must be admitted
“out of a commitment to creating a Europe based on inclusion and tolerance.”7
His words stung the ears of Curva Sud’s Ultras. For again, the idea of tolerance and
inclusiveness were being wielded against those who saw in Europe something worth protecting from
dilution. That same week, I walked in the neighborhood south of The Vatican called Borgo but
which the Ultras who live there call Gregorio Settimo (figure 16). The area, like other established
Roman neighborhoods, is a self contained universe. It has a fresh market, wine bars, small
restaurants, cafés, clothing stores for men, women, and children, pastry shops, gelato shops, banks,
and insurance offices. Almost every corner is covered in Ultra graffiti and the area’s Ultras walk the
streets with a sense of pride (figure 123). Most of them know everyone, from the merchants to the
men and boys standing in front of each café or mechanics shop. In two hours, one might only walk
two blocks, as the Ultras stop and converse with their neighbors.
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Figure 123. Antichi Valori graffiti in Borgo. “The Ancient
Values rebirth in me!” Rome. 2006.
The neighborhood is also home to a recent addition, a kebab stand. Typically associated with
Turks, kebab stands are opening throughout Rome. The owners of this particular stand are not Turks
but Indians. The first time I encountered the stand with Ultras there was derision and a dismissive
silence. The only comment made was that “a few years ago there were no kebab stands in Rome.
Now they are everywhere.” I asked if anyone had eaten kebab and they acted as if I had suggested
cannibalism.
A few weeks later I received a call from Danillo, one of the dismissive Ultras. Danillo, a 29
year-old waiter in a restaurant near Campo dei Fiori, lives in Gregorio Settimo with this mother and
father. His aunt lives in the same building several floors below. His girlfriend lives on the next block
and they are usually inseparable. They met when she was a student in need of a Latin tutor. (Being
in the same neighborhood both sets of parents knew of the other; thus, hers were aware that Danillo
might help their daughter learn Latin.) Now they work together in her family’s small restaurant. She
even occasionally attends games with him now that he is no longer affiliated with Fedayn but
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attends games in the Tevere Grandstand. According to Danillo, “the Curva is no place for women
because it is dangerous.” He often chastised me for taking my wife to games.
He was never a member of Fedayn because he didn’t live in the Quadraro neighborhood,
but was close friends with many in that group, and thus stood behind their banner. Danillo is not a
fascist, per se, but is well versed in the history of fascism, especially as it pertains to Rome. He is
interesting for his proximity to Fedayn (a formerly leftist group but now only mildly political) and
for his less-than-zealot ideological commitment to fascism. Like Federico of Antichi Valori,
Danillo’s parents are extremely proud Romans, even going so far as to show me their modest
collection of antique espresso cups adorned with images of Rome at the turn-of-the-century.
Danillo told me that he had eaten kebab from the stand after a recent game (as no restaurants
were open at the hour on a Sunday night). He had enjoyed the kebab and said the people were
friendly. He was quick to add, though, that this did not signal a change in his negative attitude
toward the proliferation of kebab stands in Rome.
“Rome,” he said, “is opening up to foreigners because the government and the EU are
forcing it to do so. [The Roman people] are left to lament the changes in their neighborhoods and
an influx of people who neither speak our language nor take an interest in our culture. How do these
people have the right to come here and do very little to be accepted,” he asked, “and those who have
been here for generations, who can trace their Roman heritage seven generations (as he could, his
mother proudly told me) have no right to defend the form of life that we have created in that time.”
He went on to say that Rome was his city, not theirs. He would never dream of going to another
country to set up shop. Such a move would be “the most vulgar (form) of materialism.” I asked him
what he feared in the presence of the Indians. “The eventual destruction of Roman culture,” he said.
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Danillo, like Luca and so many others, was exaggeratedly aware of the sanctity of Roman
culture. He had been given a responsibility toward Rome as a birthright from his parents and family,
but also from the Ultras. The most common mode of discussing Rome amongst the Ultras with
whom I had the most contact was in terms of pride, protection, honor, and sacrifice. From Ultras of
various ages and numbers of years of involvement with Curva Sud, as well as from various
neighborhoods, I heard self-descriptions as “cavalieri” (knights). Lorenzo of AS Roma Ultras
explained that it comes from an old CUCS-era (1972-92) song that speaks about proud knights in
defense of Rome’s honor. The Ultras seemed to have taken to heart this message and earnestly see
themselves in these terms. Danillo made clear his commitment. “I would be an honor to die serving
Rome but I don’t give a damn about Italy,” he said.
Regardless of the effect this kind of sentiment has on the Italian military, Danillo’s comment
points to the ongoing predominance of campanilismo in the Italian worldview. In fact, it would be
difficult to find anything more to an Italian world view than an extremely local, or at best regional,
focus. Allum and Diamanti point out that the anti-Italian views of those involved in the Northern
League are barely enough to unify that party across the regions of the north. Instead, there is the
sense that, while Italy is bad for the people of the north, the Northern League might be too broadly
focused to truly promote the best interests of all northern peoples (Allum and Diamanti, 1996, pgs.
152-154).
Although not to the same extreme, one even senses regionalism amongst the chapters of
Forza Nuova. Despite a missive from Roberto Fiore, national leader of the party, proclaiming the
solidarity of “Forzanovisti” (members of the party) and explaining the lack of need, therefore, for
regional or local chapter websites (as all news could be coordinated through the main Forza Nuova
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site), members have still created local websites devoted to their activities. These, such as the
members of “Forza Nuova Roma,” often use blog sites which operate free of charge and slightly
under the radar of the party bosses.8 Even amongst the nationalists, then, there is a strong
undercurrent of regionalism and localism.
Anthropological studies on prejudice against immigrants in Italy rarely present the
justifications of natives in terms that would be coherent to those natives. Sniderman and Peri, for
example, explain that refugees are struggling for acceptance in Italy because of “skinhead violence”
and the “extreme prejudice” of marginalized Italians (2000, pg. 4). They spend considerable time
redefining “prejudice,” taking it from a psychological model to one that incorporates the creation
and dissemination of discourses of difference. They wanted to know, in the end, what made
otherwise intelligent people succumb to the idea that immigrants are somehow different from them
(Sniderman, et al, 2000, pgs. 8-11). In the end, the issue was more about intolerance than prejudice.
Some Italians, they argue, were being made intolerant of others because they were manipulated to
be so by the media and far right parties. Those parties had used manipulated statistics to fan flames
of fear against immigrant crime and a specious argument against cultural dilution to rally honest
Italians to their cause (Sniderman, et al, 2000, pgs. 91-119).
Elsewhere, Jeffrey Cole studied the attitudes of Sicilians toward African “new immigrants”
in the 1990s. Like the Sniderman and Peri study, Cole views the intolerance of “new racists” on the
far right as evidence of ignorance and manipulation. However, he presents a more accurate model
of Sicilian interaction with immigrants and immigration than do Sniderman and Peri. This is because
he explains how attitudes change depending on place and economy. His research shows that
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bourgeois merchants and college students think most favorably about immigrants, both being
influenced by “market rationality” (Cole, 1997, pg. 92). Unfortunately, neither of these studies leave
space for attitudes toward immigration such as those of the Ultras.

Figure 124. AS Roma Ultra with a smoke candle. 2004.
The Roman Ultras I met showed no signs of being xenophobic. In fact, their justifications
for desiring stability in cultural form showed the emptiness of xenophobia as a concept. They had
no fear of outsiders, others, or foreign cultural traditions. Their fear, instead, was that Rome was to
become a cosmopolitan multicultural “guazzabuglio” (mishmash). Even as a great number of the
Ultras of Curva Sud could be assumed to be children of a previous generation of migrants, more than
likely from the Italian south, there is, interestingly, no discursive awareness of the fact in their selfunderstandings. While the city was not an industrial center, as were Milan, Genoa, and Turin, there
was enough money (in tourism, service employment and shop keeping) and cultural allure (in La
Dolce Vita) to make Rome a viable option to Southern provincial life (Zamagni, 2000, pgs. 55-61).
Throughout the 1950s and 1960s Rome’s population was swelled by one-third with migrants from

344

around Lazio (the region of which Rome is capital) and the Southern regions (Ginsborg, 2003a, pg.
220).

Figure 125. AS Roma Ultra with two
flares. 2004.
Nonetheless, the overwhelming cultural identifier for AS Roma’s Ultras is Rome and “being
Roman.” While there could be a process of “invention” here, whereby an artificial community is
created through narratives that promote the cohesion of disparate groups (Hobsbawm and Ranger,
1992, pgs. 1-12), I suspect it is the “truth” of Romanità that renders the ideology of Roman greatness
and the “the Rome of the Ultras” nearly isomorphic - so much so that one’s pre-Roman genealogy
is less relevant than one’s current commitment to Rome and Curva Sud. The “inventedness” of
memory (see Chapters 3, 4, and 5), or, its metaphorical and monumental form, often allows for
omission and invisibility in specific areas (usually associated with some form of moralism - as in
truth and reconciliation) (Crapanzano, 2004, pgs. 156-157). Just as the Ultras discriminate between
the various strata of Roman history, they often willingly ignore their personal sundry backgrounds.
Romanità is a feeling, another mentalità to be sure, but it is also something material and
recognizable in the physiology of the Ultras. These are often men of the hardest order, with muscles,
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tattoos, and extreme self-discipline, who will shed tears while gazing upon Rome from the Gianicolo
Hill. As a caveat, however, I must say that having a deep Roman pedigree is extremely important
to those who have it. The Ultra with the longest Roman genealogy I met, Danillo of Antichi Valori,
boasted seven-generations, but only through his mother’s line. His father is a migrant from
Campagna. Even so, Danillo stakes his claim to Romanness on his Romanità and years of service
in Curva Sud, as he says, “per difendere l’onore di Roma” (in defense of the honor of Rome).
With regard to the Ultras’ militarism, explained in Chapter 6, their actions “in defense of
Rome” are more determinant of Romanness than their respective backgrounds. To sacrifice and,
potentially, suffer for Rome’s honor, is considered heroic, and, as will be demonstrated in the next
chapter, the conferring of “Roman” status is of the highest seriousness. That being said, Ultras must
demonstrate their willingness to “be an Ultra” for an extended period before being honored thus.
The “Ultra” honored with “Romanness” was myself. My being American was an issue in that
it gave my new status even more gravitas (seriousness, weight). But the Ultras used my
Americanness to make points to me that might not otherwise ring true. One was their use of “melting
pot” to explain the distance between their Rome and the Rome of the rest of the modern world. With
no melting pot ideology of their own, the Ultras wondered why the liberal world expected them to
open their arms to anyone who wanted to set up shop in Rome. Their identification with Rome was
something to be admired, they said. Their identification with Rome was their model for how other
peoples should interact with their cities.
Luca (introduced above) and a group of 16 Ultras at Padroni di Casa were dumbfounded
when I explained that it was not part of being American to have strong connections to where we
were born or lived. On their behalf (metaphorically), Luca asked (in my favorite moment as a
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researcher amongst the Ultras), “come si puo vivere così, a testa in giù” (how can one live like this,
with one’s head down). For them, to live was a matter of pride; so much so that it seemed never to
have occurred to them that others might not feel about their place of residence the way they do about
Rome. Further, the idea of “hanging one’s head” conjures images of shame, weakness, and defeat the antithesis of what the Ultras form of life is about.
For them, the issue of immigrants had little to do with rejection of others through ignorance
but of protecting something they cherish from diminution. Again, they wanted to know “how many
immigrants came to Rome because of their undying passion for Rome and to become Roman.” I
relayed numerous stories about American students proudly displaying their ignorance of Rome, its
history and topography, on the 8 tram from Trastevere. The Ultras were not surprised. “Trastevere
is ruined. It’s no longer Roman but full of foreigners,” I was told dismissively.

Figure 126. A tourist bathing in the Trevi fountain. Rome. 2007.
On other occasions I was also told what Trastevere was like as little as 20 years ago.
Needless to say, their understanding of Trastevere, even if driven by nostalgia, mirrored their
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understanding of the rest of the city. Romans who still lived in the neighborhood suffered everyday
at the hands of unfeeling and mobbish tourists and immigrants, Daniele of Giovinezza said as we
walked the area on a summer evening. Again, with my being an American a focal point of
conversation, he wanted me to “tell the world” that grandparents and elders who were the nobility
of Roman society were now just victims of rowdy American students and vulgar immigrant
merchants.
ii. African Immigrants
The two types of immigration of most concern to the Ultras are the arrival of African illegal
immigrants to Lampedusa and the legal immigration of Roma from Eastern Europe. While they are
ambivalent about the Africans, they are downright hostile to the Roma. Despite having ample
opportunities to witness Ultra hostilities to African immigrants, I saw none, aside from the instance
described in the Introduction. Migrants from Africa were most commonly encountered in Rome as
sidewalk salesmen of counterfeit purses, CDs, and DVDs. Perhaps because they tended to be seen
in the centro storico (historical center) and not in other neighborhoods, the Ultras had little to say
to them. That being said, they often wondered aloud why they had come to Rome. The only answer
they knew of was “da fare soldi” (to make money). To make money was the worst answer they
could have come up with. For the Ultras ask of each and all the same that they ask of themselves not to diminish ourselves by reducing life to a series of opportunities to make or spend money. This
critique of life as a marketplace was clearly consistent with their critique of Calcio Moderno.
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Figure 127. Typical image of African immigrants arriving in
Lampedusa. 2007.

For all of the ambivalence of how the Ultras interacted with African immigration in Rome,
there was little sympathy for those arriving in Lampedusa, an island off the southwestern coast of
Sicily. From early-spring to late-fall, it was normal to read daily in the morning papers or to see on
television that a boat or raft carrying Africans had made its way to Lampedusa (figure 127).
According to ANSA and Istat, 20,450 Africans made their way to Lampedusa in 2007. Through 9
October, 27,417 had arrived there in 2008 (since 1998, roughly 265,000 Africans had arrived in Italy
by boat).9 Coming in from 25 to 450 at a time, the Africans were seen literally as a flood by the
Ultras. And, with each arrival, the left and right politicians argued publicly about how to properly
handle the situation. Predictably, the left sought the more compassionate approach, saying that not
only would denying the Africans entrance be inhumane, it would be illegal. In March 2007, Romano
Prodi even went so far as to commend his government for having “an open door policy on
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immigration.” Immigrants, he explained, were “a true blessing for businesses, for less skilled
workers and in helping care for the elderly and disabled.”10

Figure 128. Clandestine immigrants being held in
Lampedusa. 2007.
Even as it was illegal to deny asylum seekers the right to a hearing, the Paris-based
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development announced that, while legal aliens were
arriving in Italy and Europe in record numbers - 31,000 in Italy in 2005 alone - those applying for
asylum had dropped to 15% of total arrivals.11
The most extreme gesture in support of the Africans was reported by the German newspaper
Der Spiegel, which covered the plans of Amani, an Italian nonprofit, to erect a monument in
Lampedusa commemorating those Africans who died at sea attempting to illegally enter Italy.
According to officials at Amani, the thousands of Africans who seek to reach Lampedusa and other
European ports each year are “victims of unscrupulous human traffickers who pocket hundreds of
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euros to take them on rickety boats unfit for the journey.”12
The right rejected the economic and humanitarian discourses, choosing instead to focus upon
the cultural and social affects of immigration. Jole Santeli of Forza Italia accused Prodi of ignoring
the feelings of Italians on the issue. He explained that the presence of immigrants was causing
tension in Italian cities, as even few immigrants give the impression that the country is changing
beyond recognition.13 TNT Sofres, a French research institute, found that the majority of Italians
feared immigration because of the cultural change it must entail. While they were less concerned
about the economic impact of immigration, 50% of 4900 respondents saw immigration as a threat
to the country’s cultural identity. According to the same survey, 75% saw illegal immigration as an
important problem, 57% said that there were too many foreigners living in Italy, and 53% said
failure to assimilate was the fault of the immigrants.14
In response, Interior Minister Giuliano Amato, author of the Amato Decree (see chapters 3
and 4), said that it would be dangerous to put limits on immigrants. Thanks to an extremely low
birthrate (1.23 children per woman), Italy’s population was in steady decline, and immigrants were
an important source of labor. The real worry, he said, were “ideological prejudices” against
immigration, as had been witnessed in Holland, where the native population demanded that
immigrants speak Dutch and show knowledge of Dutch culture and history.15 The Ultras were as
incensed over these comments as they had been over the Amato Decree.
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“How,” I was asked by Giulio, a 28 year-old Monte Testaccio nightclub bartender and
unaffiliated Ultra formerly of AS Roma Ultras, “could someone feel no unease about selling-out his
culture and history in order to appease multinational businesses and mercenary foreigners who only
want to exploit our country?” According to Mabel Berezin, when exogenous threats to national or
cultural identity arise, most people will turn to the state or to “law and order” as allies against the
xenos (stranger) (Berezin, 2009, pg. 34). The Ultras and others on the right had no such ally in the
center-left government of Romano Prodi. This was not only because of policy decisions that aimed
at more fully connecting Italy to the global marketplace, but because the Prodi government readily
adopted the neo-liberal language of immigration justification couched solely in terms of
demographic decline and economic benefit (Berezin, 2009, pgs. 30-31).
iii. The European Union, Immigration, and the Roma
In the summer of 2007, the European Parliament consistently utilized a neoliberal
understanding of the world as a marketplace, saying that it would be tantamount to suicide if Europe
closed its doors to immigrants. Being chaired by the Italian Socialist Lili Gruber, the European
Parliament urged the European Union to make immigration easier, rather than more difficult.16
Romano Prodi made similar comments soon after, arguing that “protectionism” of any kind was
suicidal. “Italy is not afraid to open its borders,” he said.
Speaking about successful cuts to Italy’s 18.6 billion euro trade deficit, Prodi explained that
it was only due to embracing globalization that the country was re-establishing itself as an economic
power. Being competitive was the biggest challenge and biggest responsibility, he said.17 This came
16
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weeks after the European Union lamented Italy’s budget deficits. With Stability Pact budget limits
set at 3%, the European Parliament urged the Prodi government to make drastic cuts to services and
to make the bureaucracy more efficient. Despite having debts totaling 105% of GDP, Italy was
expected to have zero deficits by 2010. The only way to achieve that goal was by cutting
expenditure on services and applying tax revenues to the debt.18
It was particularly galling for the rightist Ultras to hear Prodi and representatives of the
European Union speaking to Italians about globalization and immigration. “It is the will of these
forces,” Fabio of Boys Roma told me, “that Africans and Muslims praying in mosques be the face
of Italy.” Of Prodi, little more was expected, despite his being Italian. “He is a communist,” he said,
despite Prodi having been a former member of the center-left and right Christian Democrats. The
European Union, though, had become an enemy in ways that few expected. The economic hardships
of membership had been expected by many in Italy. As a country that had historically used currency
devaluation to stem the onset of inflation, Italy was now at the mercy of the powerful French and
German economies. Inflation figures were reported each evening on RAI’s TG1. 2.4% was the norm
for late-2007 (a three-year high). Pasta and bread prices had increased 300% in one year.
While waiting for a table in a Monteverde pizzeria, Luca of Padroni di Casa and I glanced
at the news on the pizzeria’s bar area TV. It was the week before Christmas, 2007. The only news,
it seemed, was bad news. The Ultras were still on strike following the Circo Massimo protest (see
Chapter 10), Italian soldiers were dying in Afghanistan, and the alleged Roma crimes were
prompting popular cries for their deportation to Romania. At that, Luca sneered, “that will never
happen.” I agreed that it would be difficult, assuming they were Romanian in origin, given
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Romania’s member status in the European Union. “Exactly,” he told me, “we have lost our
sovereignty to these people.” “Which people - the European Union or the Roma?” I asked. “Well,
the European Union,” he laughed, “although I guess one could say both. Anyway, we have lost the
right to defend ourselves.”
In 2007 four high-profile crimes committed by Roma captured the public’s attention. The
first was the April 2007 murder of Vanessa Russo by two Roma prostitutes. The second was the
murder of four Roma children by their parents near Livorno in August 2007. The third was the
October 2007 brutal rape and murder by beating of Giovanna Reggiani by a Roma with a history of
violent crime. And the fourth was the rape of a Roman woman in December 2007. The response to
each was similar. Romans, not just Ultras, were outraged. They wanted the Roma out of Rome and
without haste.19
The government’s responses were less uniform, there being little it could do initially. There
was no legal precedent for expelling the Roma, it was said, now that Romania, home country to most
of the Roma in Italy, was a member of the European Union. A hastily drawn decree after the
Reggiani rape and murder was held up to the public as proof that the government was aware of
public demands that something be done to rid the country of Roma. But, because the authors of the
decree had also included measures to decrease crimes against homosexuals, President Napolitano
refused to sign it into law. After the rape and knifing in December, a new version of the bill was
drafted which allowed for the deportation of violent immigrants, even if they had come from
European Union countries.
Walter Veltroni, then mayor of Rome (before leaving the post to form the American-style
19

http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-492802/Savage-murder-brought-backlash-Italys-migrants--lawsexpel-them.html

354

Partito Democratico (PD- Democratic Party in 2008), addressed public outrage by claiming that “in
the first seven months of 2007, 75% of arrests for murder, rape and robbery [had] been Romanian
Roma.” “Roma committed 76 murders in the last year and a half - a record which surpassed the 48
committed in a similar time-frame by Albanians a decade ago. In the same period, from January
2006 to June 2007,” Veltroni explained, “almost half of rapes were committed by Roma. They also
topped the statistics for people trafficking and forcing women and girls into prostitution - while they
were second to Senegalese nationals for robberies.”20 Police began sweeping campi nomadi (Roma
camps) nationwide soon after. Arrests were made of Roma without proper identification or proven
criminal records either in Romania or Italy.
On 1 November, two days after Giovanna Reggiani had been found clinging to life in a ditch
near a Roma camp along the Tiber, six to eight men (and perhaps one woman) with metal bars,
knives, and chains attacked a Roma camp near Tor Bella Monaca, a suburb on the eastern outskirts
of Rome.21 The same camp had been the target of a Forza Nuova manifestation in October.
Even earlier there were raids against other Roma camps in Rome. On consecutive nights in
late September 2007 a camp near Ponte Mammolo was attacked by young Italians with not only
knives and metal bars but also Molotov cocktails. The camp had been burned but no one was injured
(figure 129). One arrest was made.22 It was revealed by La Repubblica five months later that the
arrested youth was an AS Roma Ultra.23 Raids of camps in Milan and Naples also occurred.
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Figure 129. The Roma camp near Ponte Mammolo burns
after a fascist raid. Rome. September 2007.
The extreme action of the raiders was condemned by the media, the government, and by
charitable organizations. La Repubblica a center-left newspaper based in Rome, published a series
of appeals for reason and tolerance as well as condemnations of hatred and violence.24
Representatives of Veltroni’s government expressed solidarity with the victims of the raids, saying
that peace and tolerance was the true face of Rome, not violence and xenophobia.25 A Rifondazione
Comunista party member, Massimiliano Smeriglio, was horrified that “racist Romans” were
attempting to eradicate from their communities “rom, migranti, lavavetri, e prostitute” (Roma,
migrants, squeegee men, and prostitutes).26
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Figure 130. Il Messaggero graphic
on Roma in Italy. 2007.
An immigrant rights group called EveryOne said that, as usual, Roma were the victims of
racism, while only one man had been guilty of murdering Reggiani.27 In December Linda Laura
Sabbadini, the head of Istat, addressed the Global Forum on Gender Statistics. Speaking on the issue
of Roma crime in Italy, she explained that the perception of Roma as criminals was due more to
stereotype than fact. In fact, Roma only committed 10% of the rapes in Italy, she said.28 She failed
to relate that number to their percentage of the population, however, which, according to Il
Messaggero, a center-right Roman newspaper, was 0.3% in 2007 (figure 130).29
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Not only were the Ultras not impressed by the discourse of tolerance and peaceful
coexistence; they were, in some cases, openly committed to ridding their communities of Roma,
prostitutes, squeegee men, and migrant workers, as Smeriglio had said. From the perspective of the
Ultras, it is difficult to interpret the responses to Roma crime as being motivated by prejudice,
xenophobia, or racism. They desired to maintain strong connections with their communities, with
their narrowly defined altruistic co-identifiers. A failure to do so seemed a form of self-abasement
in the name of a multiculturalism that could promise them nothing but the diminishment of their
form of life.
IV. Conclusion
AS Roma’s Ultras are a political phenomenon. Within the Curva, the themes and scenes of
their aesthetic displays often invoke the fascist and ancient past of Rome. Beyond the Curva, they
are sometimes involved with the leading neo-fascist parties in Italy. Even when unaligned with these
parties, however, the Ultras make use of a critique of the contemporary world that puts them at odds
with the political issues of neoliberal globalization as well as the concurrent morality of pluralism
and inclusion that globalization promotes.
In this chapter, I demonstrated that the Ultras are politically active. More importantly, I
explained that these activities are buttressed by a world view that links Romanità with protectionism,
a will to violence, and a vision of society based upon the narrow confines of their altruism.
The deep affection for Rome carried by AS Roma’s Ultras links them with fascism and the
uses to which it put Romanità. According to members of both Ultra groups and neo-fascist parties,
it is the former that promote a use of Romanità in the present. As such, the political concerns and
actions of the Ultras are given meaning by the devotion to Rome. Their protest against MTV, their
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presence at Family Day, and their opposition to Rome’s Gay Pride parade each showed a concern
more for the modernization of Rome in neoliberal terms than an aversion to the constituents whose
rights were being advanced.
Likewise, the Ultras take an oppositional stance to immigration. Clandestine Africans
arriving in Lampedusa are the most visible examples in the Italian media. More locally, it is the
Roma that have become the symbol of anti-immigrant feeling. However, as I demonstrated above,
it is less the xenophobic aversion to the Roma that drives Ultra opposition but a sense of
helplessness in the face of systemic obstacles to removing the Roma from Rome.
The chapter was a critique of anthropologists who assume that prejudice, xenophobia, and
resource competition fully explain the interaction between locals and immigrants. Moralistic
assumptions about the local benefits of immigrants are, I suggested, often connected to an
unquestioned belief in the neoliberal economic model that promotes flexible cheap labor and hyperconsumption. In place of these assumptions, I allowed the Ultras to speak for themselves, using the
terms that are coherent in their local context.
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CHAPTER NINE: Circo Massimo and the Ultra War Against Calcio Moderno
In the third and fourth chapters I described responses by the State and the Ultras to the deaths
of Fillipo Raciti and Gabriele Sandri. The government, riding a wave of popular outrage at the
violent outbursts of the Ultras, implemented policing measures that seem more suited to ending the
Ultra phenomenon than the violence associated with soccer. The Ultras, for their part, acted to
protect themselves, their movement, soccer, and the honor of their cohort from the repression of the
state and from incursions of Calcio Moderno.
This chapter continues the discussion of Chapter 4, as well as those in-between, acting as a
crescendo of the various aspects of the Ultras, from mentalità to their political commitments and
actions. The chapter focuses on the Circo Massimo protest of December 2, 2007, which was a
protest not only against the killing of Gabriele Sandri but also the highly moralized war against the
Ultras that had been escalating since the killing of Raciti in February 2007. It then discusses the
changes to the game and to fandom that have occurred in Italy and other European countries as a
result of the explosion of the televising and marketing of soccer.

Figure 131. Ultras sticker demanding freedom for the Ultras, no pay
television, and no games on Saturday. 2007.
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I. Il Perchè di Una Protesta (Why We Protest)
Lorenzo Contucci’s AS Roma Ultras website announced a sciopero (strike) by Curva Sud’s
Ultras on the morning of 29 November, 2007. Instead of attending the upcoming game against
Udinese Calcio, the Ultras would gather at Rome’s fabled Circo Massimo. The notice reflected their
dedication to a form of life at odds with the bourgeois ideals of the Italian state which, as the protest
unfolded, came to be talked about as an “avvento vuota della vita Italiana” (a coming emptiness of
modern Italian life). In it we see how the Ultras understand the interstices between justice (and
injustice), the media, and the new interests in soccer that are moving the game away from its
attachments to local populations and cultural forms.
Fan of AS Roma, Ultras of Curva Sud, simple customer of this industry of calcio, or deluded
and romantic supporter of an ideal (and style) of life, to you we write this notice in order to explain
why next Sunday, when AS Roma hosts Udinese, Curva Sud will remain empty of people and passion.
The death of Gabriele Sandri is already being forgotten, exceeded by and buried under a system which
safeguards its own interests and disregards those of others. All that happens will be distorted,
destroyed, or reconstructed with the objective of being made instruments for the powerful. This is
what is happening, now as always.
In a country where “the law is equal for all,” but all are not equal before the law, we are once
again spectators of a new injustice. W e see ourselves for the umpteenth time the targets of a public
opinion manipulated by the press, the mass media, and the instruments of power. The Ultras are being
destroyed because the curve are oases of free thinking and spaces counter to the increasing
homogeneity of a lobotomized society devoid of values. They are lands not yet standardized and
directed by the usual binaries of the interested - lands not made comfortable with those in control.
Once upon a time, there were choreographies, colors, flags, and banners. These are
characteristics of how the curve had always been. But because of today’s repression they will become
only faded memories.
At this moment, in light of our reflections and above all our consciences, we must leave and
remain outside the Curva but also this state of affairs. W e ask each of you to reflect, to remember, and
to begin to behave more justly, in these decidedly delicate times.
You will not find us outside the gates of Curva Sud this Sunday because then others would
be able to say that it is only our bullying that has kept the Curva empty. The only possibility we have
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of saving our dignity and rights is that each of us, as both accomplices and victims of this situation,
chooses to leave behind that which is designed to ensure our extinction.
The appointment is for Sunday [2 December 2007] at 14:00 in the Circo Massimo. Come
with scarves and flags united with the thoughts, passions, and ideals of being Ultras della nostra
Roma.
The spectacle has begun, but without us.
The Groups of Curva Sud 1

The document was signed in deference to the spectacle that would take place on the field, referring
to the feeling of sacrifice being made by those who would choose to attend the protest instead of
supporting their team. Indeed, the proprietorship of soccer was the main issue of the protest. Was
it to be the soccer of the fans and locales where it was played or the soccer of television and global
capitalism?

Figure 132. Curva Sud choreography, part 1, “The Curva that
[the state] would like.” AS Roma-SS Lazio. 2009.
In the days between Sandri’s death and the decision by the Curva to protest, the Ultras had
learned that they were banned until further notice from travel to away games. The Observatory
(National Observatory of Sporting Events) would announce each week which games would be
1

Translated from an original document in the collection of the author.
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available for guests. Given the media’s incessant speculation on the matter, there was no surprise.
On the radio and television, journalists and private individuals directed rhetorical questions at the
Observatory. There seemed to be a campaign against allowing the Ultras to continue to be a part of
the game. Unsurprisingly, the Ultras wondered aloud at the rationale of the decision.

Figure 133. Curva Sud choreography, part 2, “This is Curva Sud!”
AS Roma-SS Lazio. 2009.
At the Boys Roma office as the group decided on participating in the protest, I was
surrounded not only by Ultras of varying ages, members of the leadership of Boys and Ultras
Romani, members of Fiamma Tricolore, but also the widow and son of Paolo Zappavigna.
Conversations were focused on how exactly the Ultras could defend themselves against the press
and the police. What purpose did banning away-travel serve? How were away games related to the
actual killing of Sandri? “Do the police blame us to the point that they cannot help themselves
killing us if we travel to see a game,” Simone, an animated and outspoken Boys Ultra asked. Fabio
answered, “The riots were not because of away games - they were because the state killed an
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innocent person and then did nothing to honor the victim.” “Therefore, why not close rest-stop
restaurants or keep the police from having guns?” Flaminio of Ultras Romani added. They decided
that banning away-travel was irrelevant - unless the real crime was that Gabriele was where he was
when the bullet was fired because he was an Ultra.

Figure 134. Ultras near the Olympic Stadium. Rome.
November 11, 2007.

Fabrizio, a well-respected Boys leader, at 38, the oldest Ultra in the room, who had once
proudly shown me his Fiamma Tricolore membership card, stressed that they analyze how the media
was operating to bend public opinion. “On the same day that we learned of the elevated charges we
also learned that the group of SS Lazio Ultras were armed and that away games were banned,” he
said. He was referring to the news of November 15, 2007, on which it was announced that the charge
against Luigi Spaccatorella (police officer who shot and killed Gabriele Sandri) had been elevated
to voluntary manslaughter, and that knives were found in the possession of the SS Lazio Ultras
amongst whom “Gabbo” was traveling.2
2

http://www.repubblica.it/2007/11/sezioni/cronaca/tifosi-morto-2/omicidio-volontario/omicidio-volontario.html?
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“The media want so desperately to blame Gabriele’s death on Gabriele and the Ultras,”
Fabrizio explained, “that they shamed themselves in front of the entire nation with the claim [on 17
November 2007] that Sandri was found with rocks in his pocket.” Sandri’s brother held a press
conference to say that the accusation was “insane” and that what was found was the type of
limestone pebbles and residue used for aging denim.3 Fabrizio finished with a copy of Il Romanista
in his hand. “The media,” he announced while rifling through the pages, “had even succeeded in
making martyrs of themselves and the ‘civil mass of true fans who are the true victims of the actions
of the Ultras’.”4
As the leaders decided what action to take regarding the proposed protest, many reiterated
Fabrizio’s idea that the media were making criminals of the victims, and martyrs of the criminals.
Even as there is incredible distance between the Ultras and those beyond the realm of their narrow
altruistic bonds, it did not take a zealot to understand that words like rabbia (rage), compassione
(compassion), impegno (commitment), and onore (honor), that play such a large role in how the
Ultras explain the world, have less value for the general public. “In getting the games stopped and
attacking the police, we and the Atalanta Ultras acted with [these things], while the teams and the
league acted only to benefit SKY and its advertisers,” Fabio said.
After the meeting, a few Ultras walked to a bar for a beer. Among them were Fabio of Boys
and Adriano of Ultras Romani, both of whom I knew were present near the Olympic Stadium the
night of Sandri’s death. Both were model Ultras - always present away from Rome, always ready
to confront any opponent, always generous to fellow AS Roma Ultras. In other words, they acted

3
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Il Romanista. Anno IV, n. 301. 16 Novembre 2007. Pg. 1, 3
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in accord with the mentalità, were therefore widely respected, and could speak for their groups (and
really the entire Curva Sud) without fear of reprisal.

Figure 135. Police-line near the Olympic Stadium. Rome.
November 11, 2007.
As I have already demonstrated, the Ultras are serious about, and protective of, their
mentalità, the various components of which have been outlined above. Most of these can be summed
up in a short statement that graced the shirt of an unknown AS Roma Ultra at a game in Empoli.
“Our mentalità knows only hatred and rivalry,” it said (figure 32). Another aspect of the mentalità,
especially applicable to my research and the point I was making about Fabio and Adriano, is
summarized in a piece of Monteverde graffiti: “Our mentalità is called silence. Death to spies”
(figure 136). One acts with hatred and rivalry, then keeps quiet about it so as to keep the state from
obtaining evidence. A short explanation of “acting in accord with the mentalità,” is somewhere
between these two sentiments.
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Figure 136. Monteverde Ultras graffiti. “Our mentalità
is called silence. Death to spies.” Rome. 2008.
I asked Fabio and Adriano, given the state’s argument that Gabriele was killed without his
identity as an Ultra being known, and that, therefore, it was an incident unrelated to soccer (which,
moreover, did not warrant the cancelling of the day’s games), whether there was any action the
league or state could have taken that would have prevented the uprising in Rome. “Nothing,”
Adriano said. Certainly, I added, those making the decisions knew how the Ultras would react.
“They know us because they are experts on the Ultras,” Adriano said sarcastically. “They know us
as criminals, vandals, or mindless fascists made so by the infiltration and goading of political
extremists. One would think that having us together, physically and emotionally, all over the
country, would be the last thing they wanted.” Was he suggesting that the state wanted a violent
reaction from the Ultras? “The state should have cancelled all games immediately and pleaded hat
in hand for peace.”
I asked about the targets of the Ultras during the fighting. “To attack police stations and the
offices of CONI [Comitato Olimpico Nazionale Italiano, the Italian Olympic Committee, a standing
body which has authority over all organized sport in Italy] showed that they knew what they were
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doing. They were not hooligans,” answered Fabio, slyly distancing himself from the perpetrators.
Finally, I asked, half in jest, if the Ultras were terrorists. An unnamed Roman prosecutor had been
quoted by ANSA saying that the Ultras, by “attacking three police stations, were trying to wrest
control from the state.”5 “We cannot even buy tickets, travel to and stay in a different city, or go in
a stadium to sing for 90 minutes, yet the world is at our command?” Fabio bellowed. “Now the
Atalanta Ultras are banned from their own stadium for four months, only for protesting the
‘vergogna dello stato,’ (shame of the state) and we are attempting to take over? No! Non siamo
terroristi ma neanche proviamo vergogna per sentirci onore” (We are not terrorists but neither do
we feel shame for our honorable actions). He continued talking about the Ultras in Bergamo.
“Because there is one thing for certain: the only people in Bergamo who acted with dignity, honor,
compassion, respect, and anything else the opposite of shame were the Ultras who got the game
stopped. The players and the Lega [Calcio] acted with absolute shame, and the country now follows
their lead, blaming this whole affair on us.”
II. December2, 2007: Circo Massimo Roma
The idea behind the protest was to give the authorities what they wanted: soccer without the
Ultras (figures 132 and 133). Organizers thought that if they showed the country what “modern
soccer,” without the passion and pageantry of the Ultras, looked like, Italians would be more
cautious in demanding their removal from the game. Because the Ultras live in a world dominated
by other Ultras and all things Ultra, it struck me on numerous occasions that they were at once
incredibly aware, and also unaware of the distance between themselves and other people and fans.
In this case, their intended audience was the mass who have chosen to watch games on television

5
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rather than at stadiums; that mass of “good fans” who are perfectly suited to Calcio Moderno
because they consume, rather than participate in, the game.

Figure 137. Curva Sud Roma during AS Roma-Udinese Calcio.
The groups amassed instead at the Circo Massimo. Rome.
December 2, 2007.
As I explained in Chapter 6, the tifosi buoni (good fans) as they are often called in the media,
are the consumerist bourgeois fans that see the game as an entertainment, who cheer politely for the
home team, who value sportsmanship over partisanship, who disavow racism in all its forms, who
accept what happens on the field with humility, who experience the joy of fandom minus the
aggression, and who cheer only in a way that displays education and bearing (figure 94). In other
words, the “model fan” is as far removed as possible from the Ultras.
The Ultras, in being denied the right to travel to support AS Roma, decided in meetings like
the one at Boys Roma, that if they could not be a part of an AS Roma game, they would martyr
themselves and not watch it at all. At least that way SKY and its advertisers would not benefit by
their absence from stadiums. It was almost romantic, then, that the Ultras thought they could gain
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a measure of public acceptance by removing their voices and colors from the stadium.
Approximately two hundred Ultras representing various groups amassed near the Ostiense
Station in Testaccio before heading together to the Circo Massimo. The leader of this group,
“Spadino” of Ultras Romani, spoke about what could be expected during the day, as well as what
protocol was expected from the protest’s organizers. “Under no circumstances,” he said, “are we to
engage the police. We will sing and gesture against them, but that is all.” Someone asked what
would happen if the police invaded the Circo. “They will not do so,” he said, relaying to us what he
had learned from a police source. We were told to expect many journalists and photographers.
Again, the directions were to have no contact with them. We were free to insult them in song, but
action against them would not be tolerated.

Figure 138. Ultras gathering at the Circo Massimo. Rome.
December 2, 2007.
“The Circo is a public space, so the public will be present: police, media, tourists, and
Romans. It is up to us to show who we are. We will give them nothing, but the media will
strumentalizzare (exploit) our actions to suit their needs. There will be many Ultras there, even from
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rival groups and from groups long-dead. However, the day is about unity,” he said, “and any group
choosing to participate will be honored in return. Because,” he concluded, “the protest is also an
opportunity to show how great Curva Sud Roma can be.”
We entered the Circo around 1:00 PM. There was little going on except greetings and eating.
Some group members climbed the Aventine-side wall of the Circo in order to place their banners
on the ground (figure 142). Within an hour, the central core of the Circo was full of Ultras. There
were few, if any, normal fans present, but only the most committed and hardened Ultras, like one
would see at a risky away game (like Juventus, Fiorentina, or Livorno). These numbered
approximately 6,000. Instead of the agitated state in which one finds these characters away from
Rome, there were only hugs, smiles, and well-wishes.

Figure 139. Young Fedayn Ultra. Circo
Massimo.
Some of the Ultras brought their children to the Circo. They could be seen standing with their
battle-hardened fathers carrying and waving flags of Boys, Fedayn, and even the disbanded fascist
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group Tradizione Distinzione Roma. Later in the day, the Fedayn child “representative,” a girl of
approximately 7 years, waved the group’s flag as the current members encircled her and sang the
Fedayn anthem (figure 139). Given the group’s “silence” I dared not ask who she was. Frankly, I
felt that taking her photograph was the most dangerous thing I did amongst the Ultras.

Figure 140. The protest begins. Circo Massimo.
10-minutes before game-time, Ultras Romani called everyone together, using one of the
megaphones now banned from stadiums. The Ultras began singing, and a long banner was unfurled
at the base of the Aventine wall, but only after a series of bombs exploded and smoke candles and
emergency flares were lit to announce to all that the day’s activities (and festivities) were beginning
(figure 140). The banner was held aloft for the gathered media and Ultras with cameras and cell
phones to plainly see and capture. “Questa è l’ora de mostra’ quanto valemo,” (This is the time to
show how much we are worth) it read (figure 141). Not only was it part of the chorus to famous
Roman singer Lando Fiorini’s beloved song Forza Roma, which celebrated AS Roma’s
Championship of 1983-1984, but it was also a perfect encapsulation of the goal of the protest.
The list of current groups participating in the protest was a who’s who of Curva Sud Roma.

372

Arditi, Ultras Romani, Tor Bella Monaca, Razza Romana, Ultras San Lorenzo-Primavalle, Fedayn,
Boys Roma, Giovinezza, LVPI, Casa Albertone, Padroni di Casa, Roma Casual Firm, Irish Clan
Roma, and a dozen smaller groups all placed banners on the Aventine or held flags with the intent
that their contribution be noted by those present (figure 142).

Figure 141. The protest’s theme: demonstrate our worth. Circo
Massimo.

Figure 142. Journalists watch the protest. Note the banners on
the Aventine wall of the Circo Massimo. Rome. December 2,
2007
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As game-time approached, groups began forming around those with portable radios and cell
phones (with radio service) so as to follow the action. As if on cue, the sky turned dark and rain
began to fall. Only a few Ultras had been prescient enough to bring umbrellas. A few of them, along
with the media, sought cover under the trees on the Palatine side of the Circo. Most just ignored the
rain and kept following the game. And they sang. Just as if at the stadium, the Ultras began singing
at the kick-off and continued to do so until the first half ended.
Throughout the first half I walked around the Circo, getting a sense of who was there and
who was not. Some in the Curva, who call themselves Ultras, were against the protest because they
were against the participating groups. As I explained in Chapter 2, for some of the smaller groups
that inhabit the lower areas of the Curva, the anti-commercial dimension of the mentalità is so sacred
that to join with “merchant” groups in anything is a betrayal of being an Ultra. Even with their
absence the Ultras filled the central island of the Circo. The distance between Ultras and non-Ultras
is palpable in stadiums, but in the Circo, although a stadium, the distance was heightened to the
point of surreality. Along the edges of the mass of Ultras, tourists looked on curiously with no way
of knowing what they were seeing and local Romans jogged or walked their dogs without being
bothered.
To follow the second half, one of the most respected Ultras in Curva Sud, a longtime member
of Fedayn named Giorgio, used a megaphone to announce to all within earshot what was happening.
Giorgio is covered in tattoos ranging from the Lupa Capitolina to the AS Roma logo to a message
about being an Ultra and carrying Rome in his heart. He speaks in an unmistakable gravelly voice
that sounds impossible to be human. Before the megaphones were banned by the Amato Decree in
February 2007 he carried the Fedayn megaphone used to coordinate their singing. In December 2006
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AS Roma played in Turin against Torino FC. After this somewhat memorable game Giorgio regaled
the entire section of AS Roma fans with jokes and songs, one of which became instantly famous in
Curva Sud. Titled “Bastardo Steward,” it begins with a hummed bar of the Police Academy movie’s
theme song.
The less-than-optimal conditions for following the game were noted with pride by all with
whom I spoke. Standing in the rain and awaiting bursts of cheering or swearing from those closer
to a radio was seen as far superior to watching the game on television. Many vowed that they would
never watch a game on television - only at the stadium or on the radio, just as their parents and
grandparents had done. As always with the Ultras, there was a longing for purity that made sense
of many of their actions, from squadristi raids to acting as the self-proclaimed “conscience” of
soccer. In previous chapters I discussed the idea of sacrifice that is an important aspect of their
worldview. Standing in the rain listening to distant voices describe a game in which one would
normally play an active role certainly falls into the category of sacrifice.
Just as in the United States, radio produced “voices” that were inseparable from one’s
experience of the teams. In the case of AS Roma, the voice of the team is a Roman named Carlo
Zampa. Most Ultras prefer following games with Carlo because he is an obvious partisan. There is
no attempt to be diplomatic, professional, or even decent when Carlo Zampa broadcasts. His job as
the public address announcer for AS Roma’s home games ended in 2004-2005 because he used the
PA to insult a Juventus player who had demanded a “transfer,” or trade, from AS Roma the previous
season. Partisanship was one of the guiding principles for which the Ultras in Circo Massimo were
protesting.
All told, the Circo protest was the most important event during my time doing field research,
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even as it occurred in December 2007, my last full month in Rome. Not only did it afford me the
opportunity to meet and speak with the most important and influential Ultras in Curva Sud, it also
gave me credibility and a high level of acceptance amongst the Ultras. Before the Circo there were
Ultras whom I had seen at away games and in Rome who were reluctant to accept my presence.
Many of these barriers were diminished that day. It was explained to me that they and I had faced
the same choice. I, with little to gain by associating myself with the hardest and most committed of
Ultras, nor from actually choosing to miss an important game, had nonetheless done so.6

Figure 143. Ultras in the Circo Massimo.
I had stayed under the rain with no umbrella and participated in a protest that meant, in their
eyes, the survival of the Ultras and of, as Stefano of Padroni di Casa explained it, “libertà al’ Italia”
(freedom in Italy). Indeed, none of them knew that many of my closest allies and friends beyond the
Ultras had passionately voiced their displeasure at my decision to attend the protest instead of the

6

I had presented myself as a fan of AS Roma, which I was, knowing that without a sincere devotion to
what they hold most dear, I would have been seen as just another interloper attempting to make a name off the
Ultras.
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game. It was made clear to me by many in Monteverde that those at the Circo were not fans, that
they only went there to bate and hate the police, that they have ruined the Curva, once open to all
fans and even the opposition but now exclusionary, and that their silly hatred was killing the game.
In the end, I had chosen the Ultras over AS Roma.
As I mentioned in the previous chapter, in addition to giving me legitimacy and credibility
amongst the Ultras, this decision also prompted some of the leaders of Boys and Padroni di Casa
to proclaim me a Roman. This romantic move was made with a simple but affectionate hug by
Giulio of Boys midway through the game’s second half. In the weeks after, though, word must have
spread because I received text messages from more than 20 Ultras wishing me well and sending me
off into the world as a Roman.

Figure 144. Ultras in the Circo Massimo celebrate AS
Roma’s victory.
From a distance, the Circo probably looked like a party. At the final whistle of the game
which AS Roma won 2-1, it was full of song, emergency flares, bombs, and smoke candles.
Members of Ultras Romani created a large mosh-pit, and the assembled crowd began pushing and
shoving while singing. The groups who brought flags spread out along the base of the Aventine and
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“put their colors in the wind.”
From within the Circo, it was in fact a party. The flares and smoke candles blanketed the
evening sky with an otherworldly red and yellow glow. Smoke was thick and so was the singing.
The Ultras Romani mosh-pit poured forth to a song from 2002-2003:”Siamo gli Ultras della Roma;
e fieri Centurioni e cavalieri; A difendere la città; Orgoglio della nostra storia; Ave Roma, Roma
vittoriosa; Com’è scritto nella storia; Il vento gelido del nord; Non ci potrà fermare.” (We are the
Ultras of Roma, fierce Centurions and Knights, we defend the city, glory of our history, Hail Roma,
Victorious Roma, As history has shown, the cold northern winds cannot stop us.)

Figure 145. Ultras in the Circo Massimo as dusk falls.
The flags, smoke, bombs, flares, and songs were manifestations of the soccer that the Ultras
are determined to save. But they are only the physical manifestations of their mentalita`. As the
words to the Centurioni song make clear, there was more going on in the Circo than partying and
creating a spectacle. Just to make sure that the media and less-than-committed Ultras understood the
importance of the day and how it represented the triumph of the Ultra mentalita`, at the end of the
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protest, in the late-dusk light, group leaders appeared with trash-bags and the Ultras cleaned the area
they had inhabited of any trash that they or others had been so careless to drop. “The city is ours,”
cried Adriano of Ultras Romani, “show anyone who comes here how to care for it.”

Figure 146. Ultras in the Circo Massimo with flares and flags.
For many Ultras the Circo was the culmination of 40 years of Ultra history. It was an
acknowledgment of from where the Ultra had come and to where they were going. This was evident
in the respect given to the older and extinct groups who attended. One of these was CUCS, which
was represented by its founder Stefano Malfatti. After a touching ovation, he held court with an
umbrella and a megaphone during the first half. Malfatti, with his gray mop of hair and slight build,
looks nothing like today’s hard-edged Ultras. Nor does he look like he ever could have.
Courageously he urged the Ultras to change, saying that they need to end the war against the police,
as it is a war they cannot win. He would never have been harmed or shouted down in that
environment but he still took a position unpopular on the day.
He said that violence had always been a part of the Ultras, but that before they made war on
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other Ultras, which the police were happy to accommodate. He concluded by saying that one is born
Ultra and one dies Ultra, and that both of his children will be in the Curva when they are old enough.
Malfatti affirmed the Ultras’ form of life, making it clear that it is a way to live with honor, values,
and dignity. He seemed to understand his role as a father figure to most of those present. For it was
the CUCS that created the idea of a “mentalità Ultras” that Curva Sud Roma was still bound to
protect and serve.
In addition to Malfatti I heard various active Ultras speak. Amongst these were members of
Padroni di Casa, Fedayn, Boys, Razza Romana, LVPI, and Primavalle-San Lorenzo. By the end of
the game, I had compiled a list of themes which they used to explain the current aims and attentions
of the Ultras. The list became the basis for this dissertation. I divided what had been said to me and
to those near me into two categories: either affirmation or negation. The affirmations outweighed
the negations, which even if unintentional, perfectly promotes the “life affirming” nature of the
Ultras. For even the “protest” was more a celebration of being Ultra than a negation of what they
do not want to be.

Figure 147. An Ultra with a freshly lit flare. Circo Massimo.
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The Ultras in protest at Circo Massimo said Yes to: flags (bandieri), banners (striscioni),
bombs (petardi), smoke candles (fumogeni), flares (razzi illuminati), love (amore), enemies
(nemici), loyalty (fedeltà), hatred (odio), aggression (aggressione), honor (onore), rivalry (rivalità),
commitment (impegno), sacrifice (sacrificio), laughter (riso), tears (lacrime), romance (fascino),
strength (forza), virtue (virtù), brotherhood (confraternità), adventure (avventura), conquest
(conquista), danger (pericolo), discrimination (discriminazione), passion (passione), tradition
(tradizione), glory (gloria), war (guerra), and, finally, Rome.
By contrast, they said No to: egalitarian soccer (equalitario), standardized soccer
(standardizzato), moralized soccer (moraleggiarato), soccer only for the selling of advertising (da
fare pubblicità), soccer without particularities (senza particolarità), soccer without connection to
place (senza rapporto di posto), soccer without passion (senza passione), soccer for consumers (da
consumatori), and soccer for a TV audience (dal pubblico di TV).
III. Calcio Moderno and the Business of Football
A. Origins
Calcio Moderno is the postmodernization of fandom and commoditization of soccer. It seeks
to diminish the primacy of the live audience in order to focus on the television audience, and to
make of the game a marketable commodity, so as to generate advertising revenues. The concept
itself began appearing in the Italian curvas in the late-1990s. The first organized protest against it
that involved AS Roma’s Ultras was in 1999.7 It was prompted by changes to the format of UEFA’s
Champions League competition that went into effect for the 1998-1999 season, giving the
impression of UEFA being desirous of creating a TV based European “super league.” Why this idea
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was particularly threatening to the Ultras will be explained below. First I will detail some of the
recent trends that have combined to make soccer more important to many as a business than as a
cultural experience.8 This section focuses mainly on the English Premier League (EPL) and how it
has led to far reaching changes in the English experience of the game. I will make use of the
information given here in the following sections as well, which will depend on comparisons between
English and Italian soccer for clarity. These comparisons are important because the monied interests
of European soccer (including Italian) see the EPL as the model that will best insure profits and
minimize crowd trouble (Andrews and Ritzer, 2007, pg. 40).
The idea that the game was becoming more overtly commercial began with the International
Federation of Football Associations’ (FIFA) decision to have the United States host the 1994 FIFA
World Cup. Given its history as one of the few countries without a discernable “soccer culture,” as
well as its position at the forefront of the globalization of consumer culture, warnings of the game’s
demise, or at least corruption, are rampant in literature from the period (Giulianotti and Williams
1994). English tabloids decried the “Coca-Cola-ization” and “media-ization” sure to follow the
game’s grandest stage being erected in a country with “more world renowned serial killers than
footballers” (Giulianotti and Williams 1994, pg. 9). The feeling was that FIFA had made a final
greedy move to take the game’s popularity and presentation to a new level.
This is not to suggest that soccer was not already associated with advertising, celebrity, and
multinational corporations. However, even at that late date, the game was far more locally based,
even given its broad international popularity, than American sports had been since the late-1950s
8

Although it is not part of this dissertation’s scope to describe the relationship between the English
language media and the particular understanding of the game in English-speaking countries, the discussion that
follows is largely based on English examples and statistics, because these issues are being explained by English
language scholars.
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(Markovits and Hellerman, 2001, pgs. 128-161). The fears of many seemed to be realized when,
with the purpose of making the 130 year-old game more charming to the uninterested US market,
FIFA proposed using 25-minute quarters to appeal to advertisers and, in a bid to attract American
viewers, making the goal size larger to promote higher scores (Giulianotti and Williams 1994, pg.
7).
Given the audacity of these proposals, which rendered the game a malleable form of
entertainment rather than a deeply ingrained aspect of local cultures, it was a short slippery-slope
to envision its further Americanization (Sandvoss, 2003, pg. 161). The most extreme form of the
expected transformation was a lowering of the game’s topophilia (deep connection with place).
From Britain and Europe, scholars and fans saw in the US experience of sport a lack of symbolic
fixity. This was evident in the football, baseball, and basketball teams (not to mention players) that
had moved from city to city; sometimes, as with New York’s baseball Giants and Brooklyn’s
Dodgers, leaving behind devoted fans and historic stadiums in order to seek higher profits thousands
of miles from where the teams began. With this lack of connection to their surroundings, American
sports was seen as the domain of mere franchises which lacked the depth of memory that had made
football clubs synonymous with the populations of which they were a part.
B. The Bosman Ruling
Almost 15 years removed from the 1994 World Cup, British and European football is not the
freak-show many envisioned, but neither is it the game it once was. FIFA, UEFA, and the European
Union have combined to set in motion a system which many see as damaging the local particularities
of the game. The first two began working together (and with member nations) in the late-1990s to
amend citizenship requirements and taxation statutes in order to make transfers of players less

383

cumbersome - in effect, to ensure their legality. They did so in order to synchronize international
transfers, or player moves, with the 1995 European Court of Justice’s Bosman Ruling. According
to “The Bosman Rule,” soccer transfers are subject to the same rules as Article 48 of the European
Community Treaty, which states that no European national (provided they are a citizen of an EU
member state) can be prohibited from working in any member state. In other words, soccer players
must be considered part of the free movement of labor between states. The ruling also declared
illegal (because discriminatory) any attempts to place quotas on the number of foreign players in a
given club, league, or nation.9
C. Global Clubs
In Europe, it is the clubs that have the most to gain and lose from globalization. Although
the majority of Europe’s clubs remain attached to a fixed locale, relying upon the loyalty of fans and
local businesses to provide enough profit to stay in business, there is a noticeable trend wherein
certain clubs have gained tremendous stature and power, thus placing their connections to place in
jeopardy. These are the so-called “global clubs,” those which rely on a global, as opposed to local,
fan base and globally recruited players.
There are seven truly global clubs: Manchester United and Liverpool of England,
Internazionale, AC Milan, and Juventus of Italy, and Real Madrid and Barcelona of Spain.10 These
clubs formed the core of the G14, a group of the largest clubs in the world, which united with the
intent of lobbying FIFA and UEFA collectively for restitution from national associations in the event
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Recent changes in the ownership and spending power of two other clubs have lead to their having
“global” aspirations. These are Chelsea FC and Manchester City FC (both of England).
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of player injuries occurring on “international duty” (when the player is playing for his national
team).11
Soccer in this context is understood as big business. This has rendered community focus, not
to mention community ownership (which had been a part of the English experience until the secondhalf of the twentieth century), as counter-to-progress. Of the teams mentioned above, four are owned
by foreigners. Indeed, of the 20 teams which played in the English Premier League (EPL) in 20072008, 7 were owned by foreigners. Two of them, Manchester United and Liverpool, are owned by
Americans (Malcolm Glazer and Tom Hicks and George Gillett, respectively) who acted through
investment banks to gain sufficient funds for their purchases. Chelsea FC is owned by Roman
Abramovich, a Russian oil magnate. Manchester City was owned until September 2008 by Thaksin
Shinawatra, the former Prime Minister of Thailand. At that time it was bought by Abu Dhabi United
Group, a private equity company of Sheikh Mansour bin Zayed Al Nahyan, a member of the royal
family of the United Arab Emirates.
There are no foreign owners in Italy’s Serie A. In May 2008 American hedge-fund manager
George Soros reportedly had his bid to buy AS Roma turned down and in August 2008 an American
group of investors which had attempted to buy FC Bologna also failed in its bid. However,
Giancarlo Abete, president of the Italian Football Federation (FIGC), has often stated that the EPL
is the ideal model to move Italy’s soccer into the 21st Century. Foreign investment, in the form of
ownership and players is key, but more so, according to Abete, is a “professionalization” of the
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G14 disbanded in early-2008 after winning their battle against FIFA and UEFA. The 14 were, in addition
to the seven noted above, Marseilles and Paris Saint-Germain of France, Ajax and PSV Eindhoven of Netherlands,
Bayern Munich and Borrusia Dortmund of Germany, and Porto of Portugal. In 2002 the G14 expanded by 4: Arsenal
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Italian league, and a changing of Italy’s “culture of sport.”12 Leaving aside, for the moment, the
question of culture, the English league has ascended to the top of European soccer by focusing on
profits. These are made primarily through television rights, merchandise branding, and through
winning the UEFA Champions League.
D. The English Premiere League and Television
The EPL has changed the experience of soccer for English, and worldwide, fans. The EPL
was formed in 1991 in order to revolutionize English soccer, which at the time was seen as
“suffering” from old stadiums, dwindling attendances, and widespread hooliganism. The impetus
for the EPL was the 1989 Taylor Report, a governmental investigation into the causes of a 1988
stadium riot and stampede that left 96 Liverpool supporters dead (Armstrong, 1998, pgs. 5-9). Lord
Taylor of Gosforth concluded that the deaths resulted from poor stadium design and limited
supporter policing inside the Hillsborough stadium.
The “problems” of the English game at that time are regularly cited to describe today’s
Italian soccer. It is not lost on the Ultras that they are the only ones at the games. Just considering
AS Roma, game attendance data show significant drops in every year since 2000-2001. In that year,
AS Roma averaged 59,402 spectators. By 2007-2008, AS Roma’s average was 37,276. Serie A’s
attendance from 2004-2005 to 2007-2008 fell from 9,421,549 (an average of 26,098 per game) to
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8,575,314 (an average of 23,887 per game).13 In that time, attendance figures for Curva Sud
remained stable at 19,000 and then 17,000 in 2007-2008 per game (the maximum number of seats).14
In other words, Curva Sud is completely full for every game.
What lies behind the decrease in soccer attendance is debated in every café, piazza, and
newspaper in Italy. The reasons given range from structural to behavioral, but always include 3
things: Ultra violence, TV, and stadiums. For their part, the Ultras agree that the explosion in
popularity of televised soccer and the horrible state of many Italian stadiums are factors contributing
to diminished attendances.
The most important aspect of the EPL is that it negotiates its own television deal. Thus, it
is financially separated from the five (lower) associated levels of the EFA, which are home to
hundreds of local small town teams across England. The first EPL television deal was signed in 1992
with SKY for 191 million pounds over 5 seasons.15 The latest was signed with SKY and Setanta, a
Scottish broadcaster, for 1.7 billion pounds over 3 seasons.16 When combined with highlights
permissions and international rights, the total television related income for the 2007-2010 EPL will
be 2.7 billion pounds (an average of 45 million pounds per team per year).17
In 2003, Rupert Murdoch created SKY Italia as a way to compete with Berlusconi’s
Mediaset for Italy’s untapped television potential. Until the 2003-2004 season, RAI and Mediaset
13

http://digilander.libero.it/stadiapostcardsdgl/attendance.htm. Overall attendance given from 2004 to 2008
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combined to televise a handful of games on free television per week. The larger teams had satellite
distribution contracts with Telepiu` and Stream. It was these companies that Murdoch purchased for
600 million British Pounds.18 By September 2008 SKY Italia had between 5 and 7 million
subscribers. These pay between 30 and 50 euros per month (adding up to between 300 and 500 euros
per season) to watch all of the games of their favorite team, the Champions League, other European
soccer leagues, and special programming such as AS Roma Channel, which broadcasts news,
training sessions, and other activities within the club.19 Meanwhile, a season ticket for Curva Sud,
ensuring entrance (plus the right to purchase the same seat for Coppa Italia and Champions League
games) to 19 Serie A games, cost 155 euros for the 2008-2009 season.20
In order to hasten the creation of EPL-style profits, in 2008 the state agreed to the collective
selling of broadcast rights beginning with the 2010-2011 season. It is estimated that such a deal will
cost someone (either Murdoch or Berlusconi) approximately 900 million euros.21
E. The EPL and Merchandising
American-style merchandising is another way EPL clubs are seeking to increase profits.
When Tom Hicks was introduced as co-owner of Liverpool FC, he told a Sky audience that besides
the UEFA Champions League, he would use merchandising to make Liverpool the “richest club in
the world.” To do so, he explained, Liverpool would be made into a brand that would produce its
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own line of football and sports related merchandise and attract the highest caliber of corporate
sponsorship. The model for such a venture, he continued, was Malcolm Glazer’s Manchester United,
whose superstore was selling literally thousands of Manchester United related items, while AIG paid
56.5 million pounds over 4 years for its sponsorship logo on the player’s jerseys and Nike paid 302.9
million pounds over 13 years to supply the team’s uniforms.22 By contrast, AS Roma’s income from
the Turin-based Italian sportswear firm Kappa is 5 million euros per season.23
F. The EPL and Champions League
Because of their income from television and sponsorships, EPL teams have recently
dominated the third avenue of revenue increase: the UEFA Champions League, whose competition
runs concurrent with the domestic leagues of Southern and Western Europe. It consists of the
champion of each UEFA affiliated nation’s highest professional league, plus finishers from second
to fourth position in the most difficult leagues (i.e. Italy, England, Spain, Germany, Netherlands,
Portugal).
The EPL placed three teams (Manchester United, Chelsea, and Liverpool) in the final four
of the 2006-2007 and 2007-2008 Champions Leagues. Even as Italy’s AC Milan won the
competition in 2006-2007, its victory did not keep Italy from falling further behind the English in
terms of profiting from “the business of soccer.” According to Deloitte’s “Football Money League,”
Italy’s Serie A is worth 40% less than the EPL based on overall club revenues. According to the
2007-2008 list, released each season with details of the previous season, six of the 14 wealthiest
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clubs in the world are in the EPL.24 That includes Newcastle United, which finished the
corresponding EPL season in 13th position.
There is no set prize money. Instead, a club will receive an increased share of the income
generated by independent national television rights agreements, pay-per-view, and internet pay-perview. When AS Roma reached the final-eight during the 2007-2008 competition, they received
approximately 35 million euros.25 Manchester United, winner in 2007-2008, expected revenues of
85 million pounds. Runner-up Chelsea FC expected to receive 35 million pounds. The same article
explained that the final, played in Moscow, was expected to be a financial boon to more than the two
competing clubs. The betting industry, bars and restaurants, travel, consumer goods, and
supermarkets hoped to benefit from approximately 210 million pounds in revenue (consumption
increases comparable with the NFL’s Super Bowl in the United States).26
With this kind of money to be made, the EPL was quick to rid itself of the “problems” it had
inherited. The game experience until the Taylor Report has been described as “chaos” (McGill,
2001, pg. 8). Urination in the stands, pushing, shoving, drinking, smoking, and singing were
ritualized behaviors one expected to encounter at soccer games. The attendance of women and
young children was rare (McGill, 2001, pg. 7). The political voice of the working class was
historically galvanized at soccer matches. Political songs and occasionally banners spoke of local
identities through tales of pride and defiance (McGill, 2001, pg. 7). Fireworks, field invasions, and
fighting were also common. While many sociologists, most notably Eric Dunning, have studied the
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violence and general mayhem associated with English soccer fandom, and concluded that such
behaviors are due to a failure in the “civilizing process” of the English working class, others look
back on the days before the Taylor Report and the EPL longingly (Dunning, 1999, pg. 48).
One of these is Dave Boyle, one-time president of the Football Supporters’ Association
(FSA), an organization that campaigns for fan representation on club boards as well as fans’ rights
such as the right to stand during a soccer match.27 Boyle maintains that soccer has abandoned its
original (and still core) supporters. He says that fans are now understood “merely as consumers with
a ceaseless thirst for all things football related.” The FSA, he explained, was against the FIFA/UEFA
model of big clubs and leagues operating for the benefit of corporate sponsors and spectacular
television (McGill, 2001, pg. 11). What the FSA seeks, then, is a return to a time when local fans
were the driving force behind the game’s popularity.
G. AS Roma and Calcio Moderno
According to SKY News, AS Roma was the tenth richest club in the world as a result of the
2006-2007 season, making 106.1 million British Pounds. 70.3 million of that came from broadcast
revenues.28 With so little money being generated locally (the club brought in less than 3 million
euros from the sale of Curva Sud season tickets during the same season), and with so much of Calcio
Moderno focusing on the financial and business aspects of the game, it is no wonder, say the Ultras,
as self-proclaimed “protectors of the game” (by which they mean its deep connections to place), that
clubs are seeking profits rather than public approval. The close relations between the Ultras and the
clubs (which the 2007 Amato Decree destroyed when it went into effect) were designed to keep
27
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pressure on the clubs to keep in mind their constituents at all times. The two most recent and
damaging large-scale Ultra eruptions (before Raciti and Sandri) were not only attacks on Calcio
Moderno (by disrupting broadcasts and making the game too risky for investment/advertisement)
but also on clubs which had been seen as taking the Ultras for granted while pursuing only the
commercial interests of the game.
Despite AS Roma’s position amongst the wealthiest clubs in the world, and despite it
regularly fielding a team that includes foreign players, the Ultras still feel that the club is an organic
part of Rome’s locality. As I explained above, foreign fans can be accepted into the legion of Ultras
through their display of loyalty to the Ultras, Rome, and AS Roma. Likewise, foreign players who
“play for the shirt” are given a type of “honorary Roman” status, not unlike that granted to me. In
this way, the Ultras negotiate the contradiction between supporting a financially successful
“modern” club and the desire to have AS Roma all to themselves. Although the long-standing (until
2007) relationship between AS Roma and the Curva provided the Ultras a way to actually influence
the running of the club, thus promoting the feelings of proprietorship that guided such a relationship,
it can be argued now that the war that the Ultras are fighting against Calcio Moderno and the
destruction of localism in soccer, is over.
If so, and the Ultras have been “culturally dispossessed” of AS Roma, then they may be
entering the last phase of their history (Creed, 2011, pg. 3). After all, there is little-to-nothing that
is compromising in their make-up, and, as Andrews and Ritzer have argued, within global
capitalism, cultural forms that are “generally indigenously conceived, controlled, and comparatively
rich in distinctive substantive content are a virtual impossibility” (2007, pg. 41). What we might see
instead is the shifting of Ultra behavior to other areas of social and political life (to be examined in
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the concluding chapter).
IV. Issues of Football and Globalization
The disconnection between long-time local fans, the business of football, and what some
perceive as FIFA and UEFA’s vision for the game is consistent with other responses to
postmodernity and turbo-capitalism. In essence, what is being experienced is the deterritorialization
of fandom (Sandvoss 2003, pg. 12). Deterritorialization is a process first theorized by Gilles Deleuze
and Felix Guattari. It occurs when an “event” (thought or action) is detached from its original
environment (of meaning or location) (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987). Postmodern theorists use the
concept most consistently to explain the radical changes to the experience of space since the onset
of postmodernity. The deterritorialization of space through geographical mobility and
inconsequentiality (via the internet and global capital systems), coupled with flexible labor processes
and markets, not only de-territorializes the individual but also re-territorializes him or her within a
meaning system designed to accommodate radical increases in consumption (Castells, 1996, pgs.
1-14). Fandom is impacted similarly.
The features of deterritorialized fandom are multifarious, impacting the non-local fan, the
clubs, and the local fan. For the fan who is part of the global audience, deterritorialized fandom
allows him or her to actually be a fan. Indeed, the act of consuming the game demonstrates the
sometimes positive affects of deterritorialization, namely the reterritorialization of the event as a
personal experience full of meaning and value. As Deleuze explains, each act of deterritorialization
is concurrently destructive and constructive. While the local context is negated, such an act of
negation also opens new “conditions of possibility” (Deleuze, 1995, pgs. 30-31). The process here
is entirely subjective, even as it occurs as a benefit of recent communication technologies (LaFeber,

393

2002).
It is possible to explain reterritorialized fans as a “third culture.” Mike Featherstone explains
“third cultures” as practices and knowledges that are independent of nation-states and particular
locales (1995, pg. 114). Internet and satellite television make it possible to engage in fan activities
for events occurring anywhere in the world at any moment. While this fan is not yet the norm, it is
the target of EUFA’s Champions League. Part of the Champions Leagues approach to transnational
marketing is the use of the “global clubs” discussed above and de-and-re-territorialized fandom.
The disconnection of clubs from their local contexts makes them ripe for the polysemic
narratives so necessary to the promotion of transnational consumption (Sandvoss 2003, pgs. 28-30).
The creation of identities around such consumption is a must if the game is to be experienced worldwide. For their part, fans now have an unlimited number of choices regarding which club or clubs
to support. “Third culture” fandom thus may include an expansion of knowledge, as the
deterritorialized fan may possibly gain awareness of places and political processes otherwise
unknowable (Featherstone 1995, pg. 117). “Third culture” fans might also develop, or enhance, their
appreciation of the game - its strategies and aesthetics - through ever-improved televised images of
the players’ skills.
While for the non-local or global fan, the processes of deterritorialization and
reterritorialization, or of globalization, are experienced positively, it is clear that for others these
processes can be negative and quite destructive. For many clubs, the processes damage not only their
financial viability but also their cultural worth. Smaller clubs, those without the following or
resources to position themselves within the global flow of capital and information, are often
rendered superfluous.
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If a club is unable to compete at a level that allows Champions League qualification, and
their local constituents are able and willing to follow, through the television and internet, a larger
or even “global” club, they eventually find themselves playing to empty stadiums and without the
ability to support themselves financially. This has happened to numerous clubs in Italy. Most
recently, in 2008, FC Messina, club of a small Sicilian city, was declared bankrupt and disbanded.
The club’s history began in 1900 and survived depression, migrations, and earthquakes but it was
unable to compete financially in Calcio Moderno.
Many fans in the United Kingdom (as well as the Ultras of Italy) fear that globalization will
render their clubs contentless. As they lose their symbolic connectivity to place and particular fans,
clubs become the empty signifiers that are thought (and sought) to generate consumptive desires,
but they lose what made them important in the first place (Deleuze and Guattari, 1983, pg. 4). The
language of placelessness and contentlessness forms part of the discourse of deterritorialization. It
argues that experiences of culture are losing their connectivity to space, time, and place, wherein the
local is subsumed by global identities and processes (Hardt and Negri, 2000, pg. xiii).
The decimation of cultural worth occurs as local particularities are replaced by the new
postmodern universals: consumption, multicultural identities, psychology, and increasingly,
genetics. Behaviors are motivated by, and meanings are sought in, the most ecumenical and
bourgeois explanations available (Lipovetsky, 2005, pgs. 29-71). For Europe, the most telling
example is the changing relationship of the two clubs of Glasgow Scotland: Celtic FC and Glasgow
Rangers FC. As Celtic has begun positioning itself as a “global club” it has been forced to distance
itself from the very thing that has made it an institution in Scotland: its identification with
Catholicism. More specifically, Catholicism against the Unionism and Protestantism of its biggest
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rival Glasgow Rangers FC.
Since the 1880s, Celtic has been an institution among Catholic Scottish and Irish soccer fans.
It became a symbol of these communities at an early date, after Rangers became the team of choice
for Scotland’s Protestant majority. Celtic has no prohibition against Protestant players, but until
recently it focused on fielding a team entirely of Scottish players. For their part, Rangers enforced
an un-written rule of not fielding Catholic players. The first openly Catholic player to sign, and play,
for Rangers was Mo Johnston in 1989.
Both clubs, known collectively as the “Old Firm,” are now actively engaged in fighting
sectarianism amongst their fans. Sectarian songs, flag waiving, and aggressively religious support
is now banned in both of the clubs’ stadiums. Celtic has launched numerous campaigns aimed at
calming sectarian passion amongst its fans. One, called Youth Against Bigotry, was an educational
initiative for the promotion of respect for “all races, all colours, all creeds.”29
Not coincidently, it is playing in the Champions League that has prompted Rangers to police
its supporters. Rangers fans were accused of sectarianism by UEFA after a 2006 match against
Spanish club Villareal and the club was ordered to pay a fine as well as to make public address
announcements against religious or nationalist singing or display. They were specifically ordered
to make announcements prohibiting the singing of the song “Billy Boys,” which honors Billy
Fullerton, the leader of a 1930s Protestant gang in Glasgow.30
V. The Ultras and the Spiritual Attack on Calcio Moderno
The example of the Glasgow clubs brings us closer to what is driving the Ultras’ critique of
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a globalized, modern, soccer. While the influx of money into the game has made it harder to win
without money, it is more so the sterilization and standardization promoted by Calcio Moderno on
which the Ultras have declared war. Simply put, it is the encroachment of a vision of globalized
modernity on the particularities of, in this case, the Ultra (and Roman) form of life. It is, then, a
spiritual, rather than economic, issue.
What is at stake for the Ultras is apparent in the shrinking of the earth by televisual
technologies. It is apparent when Joseph Maguire explains that the local and the global are more
interconnected and interdependent now than in the 1970s. Or that the world is “compressed” via a
world economy, global technology, transnationalism, and global division of labor (Maguire 1999,
pgs. 13-14). It is interesting to consider Anthony Giddens’ proposal that social relations are now
world-wide, revealing multidimensional links between local happenings and universal
understandings (Giddens, 1990, pg. 64). However, theorizing such a development cannot prepare
us for the force with which universals destroy particularity, nor for how this destruction is
experienced (Harvey 1990, pg. 117).
Just as Italy’s economy is deemed “structurally unsound” and “uncompetitive” because its
productivity is low and production costs are high, so too is its soccer explained by neo-liberals to
be “uncompetitive.”31 As competitiveness has become a universally valid concept to explain and
justify global capital and production flows, it has also become the mantra of the upper-echelon clubs
seeking “global” status and success in the Champions League. When it was reported that the vast
majority of Italians support the imposition of some form of quota on the number of foreigners able
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to be fielded by sporting teams, it was suggested in the English press that this was a “step back in
time.”32
The same article explained the folly of the Italian attitude, saying that “a plan to make all
clubs field at least six footballers from their own country, a cap if you like, [is] completely against
the laws of the European Union. It would restrict movement, personal freedom and the currents of
globalization.” The anonymous author notes that Italy’s Serie A is still, at this juncture, composed
of 64% Italian players. The Ultras think this compares favorably with England’s Premier League,
which is dominated by foreign players (60%) and coaches (50%). However, the author explains that
the predominance of Italian players in Italy is indicative of the country’s backward attitude or
xenophobia. Without an end to racism and a gain in foreign investment, the article concludes, the
Italians will be unable to compete with the English clubs.
But this form of competitiveness is not the concern of the Ultras, except as a corruption of
the game. There is no question that AS Roma’s Ultras would like to see the team win all of its games
in Serie A and in Europe. They are, after all, fans of AS Roma. However, the issues that a globalized
Calcio Moderno celebrates, be it competitiveness due to television contracts, foreign investment,
or the creation of “third cultures” of reterritorialized fans of global clubs, are understood as too
damaging to how the game is experienced as an Ultra to have any value.
Under a banner reading “Non Omologati, Non Omologabili,” (Unstandardized,
Unstandardizable) AS Roma Ultras presented their manifesto against Calcio Moderno in 1999. It
contained much of what is still argued today. That Calcio Moderno, as an element of globalization,
seeks to render all life in its path standardized, moralized, egalitarian, multicultural, passionless, and
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consumerist. AS Roma Ultras proposed that they coordinate with other Ultras and anyone else to
disrupt the televised product of soccer. They suggested that, in order to do so, the Ultras violate
every limitation placed on their potential behavior by any authority.33
The manifesto explained the future proposed by Calcio Moderno. “Soccer fans must
understand,” it begins, “what is being established by the television industry, FIFA, UEFA, and the
various national leagues: the creation of a European championship open only to the biggest clubs
on the continent. This is being done for the sole purpose of creating profits for those involved. It is
being done with the largest clubs in mind because these are the ones with television followings.
Smaller clubs, those without large television audiences, will be sacrificed. The fight is, thus,
between the television audience and the local aspects of calcio including those at the stadium which are destined to disappear in the future.”
“The industry of soccer,” the manifesto continues, “works in conjunction with local
authorities, bringing in hundreds of police officers to help subdue those at the stadium. No flags,
banners, or songs that may offend anyone in the world-wide audience will be permitted, nor will the
voicing of criticisms of society. The future has already been promised to the moderate, standardized
fan - those who watch from home and are ready to purchase what is being sold - always a
multinational product and never one that is local and artisanal.” It concludes by saying that the
industry promoting Calcio Moderno misunderstands the Ultras as a fringe that can be eliminated
from soccer. “Instead,” it says, “the Ultras are a faith, for whom the symbols of their cities and teams
are tattooed on their bodies, and for whom their cities are worth defending at all costs.”
VI. Conclusion - Calcio Moderno v. The Ultras’ Form of Life, Illustrated
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Figure 148. The bourgeois fan consumes the game in the
comfort of his own home ...

Figure 149. ... while the Ultra suffers and sacrifices such
comforts in order to support his team.
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CHAPTER TEN: CONCLUSION
“Che importa soffrire se c'è stata nella nostra vita qualche ora immortale”
(What does suffering matter if there were some immortal hours in our lives?)
Curva Sud Roma

Figure 150. Curva Sud Roma with flags and flares. AS Roma-SS
Lazio. October 2007.
2007, the year which formed the core period of research for this project, was marked by the
deaths of police officer Filippo Raciti and SS Lazio Ultra Gabriele Sandri. The period between these
two deaths, the first in February and the second in November, was tension-filled for the Ultras of
AS Roma, as the Italian state took a “zero tolerance” approach to the Ultras. Despite years of
conflict between the Ultras and the state, it was seemingly Raciti’s death that exhausted the state’s
patience with the Ultras and their violent and antagonistic form of life. As the state began
implementing laws and policing measures that banned the Ultras’ style of fandom from Italian
stadiums, the Ultras turned inward, becoming more introspective about “being Ultras.” The major
groups of Curva Sud Roma decided to continue attending games of AS Roma in whatever form the
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state would permit. If they did so without flags, flares, and bombs, at least they demonstrated that
the Ultras themselves were going nowhere. However, after the death of Gabriele Sandri and the
night of extreme violence that followed, those same groups began to think more critically about their
involvement with the industry of soccer that was determined to rid itself of the Ultras. Thus, the
Ultras began a 4-week strike period with the protest at Rome’s Circo Massimo described in the
previous chapter.

Figure 151. Fedayn presages its return from strike. AS Roma-UC
Sampdoria. December 22, 2007.
By removing their voices and their passion from the stadium, AS Roma’s Ultras were not
only seeking to give the state, media, and bourgeois fans a vision of soccer without the Ultras, as
was explained above, but were also self-abnegating in an attempt to preserve what is most dear to
them. By withholding their performances, they were also preserving the right to be Ultras in the
sense that the state was removed from any position of authority over them. In other words, the Ultras
decided to remove themselves by their own accord rather than allow the state the power to have
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them removed. In this way, their silence preserved the integrity of the Ultras phenomenon rather
than have it dispossessed by the state.
It was the state’s and the Ultras’ actions in this period of open hostility that formed the basis
of this dissertation. Perhaps oddly, considering the amount of discussion (on both sides) about
violence, there was little physical contact between the Ultras and the state during this time. It can
be said that one death on each side is far too many, and rightly so. However, the lack of physical
confrontation made the discourses of violence being employed by the state and the Ultras that much
more important. To the greatest extent possible I sought to use statements from the Ultras as
empirical data. And, because the Ultras utilize an ethic of violence purposely at odds with the
hegemonic aversion to violence in the modern West, I sought to avoid a sort of paralysis in the face
of their statements that would be generated by my own ethical position. An anthropologist who
claims complete objectivity and detachment from their subjects is being disingenuous given the
creative act of ethnographic writing. This is especially true when the subjects of study stand outside
the bounds of our comfortable notions on violence, morality, and altruistic inclusiveness.
That being said, I have let my subjects “speak for themselves,” even going so far as to use
philosophical and theoretical sources that they themselves use to understand the Ultras phenomenon.
In writing the dissertation this way it made for an interesting slippage between their voices and those
of Nietzsche, Evola, and Sorel. Actually, the Ultras of Boys Roma and Antichi Valori, two of the
most influential groups in Curva Sud Roma’s history, had made their use of Nietzsche and Sorel
clear to me before Raciti’s death in February 2007. It was only to become more evident after his
death to what extent the other Ultras of Curva Sud acted in a way that could be called Nietzschean
or Sorelian.
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It also should be remembered that I presented myself to the Ultras as a fan of AS Roma.
Without having done so (or having been so) I feel that the research would have been impossible to
conduct. The Ultras were simply too guarded and conscious of being exploited by the media to allow
a stranger deep access to themselves, or knowledge of why they act as they do. It was only after they
saw my emotional involvement with the games at hand that I gained their trust, particularly after
seeing me amongst them at away games played far from Rome or in less than perfect meteoric
conditions. However, because the research was not about soccer itself, I feel that my emotional
involvement with AS Roma was of no consequence to the outcome of this project, the
aforementioned benefit aside.
Having presented AS Roma’s Ultras as a highly ideological and ideologically committed
phenomenon, one that blends an understanding of itself as a form of life with elements of a cultural
movement, all the while linked with fascism and political extremism, I will now make some
conclusions about the Ultras that place them in a larger context than their own curva and city.
Looking toward the future, I offer a few more details about the recruitment tactics of the Curva Sud
groups. I then revisit these groups’ hostility toward the Italian state, placing it in the wider context
of the Ultras in general. Finally, I ponder the possible outcomes of the state’s current war against
the Ultras. First, however, I will place my work in relation to other research on the Ultras and in the
context of current anthropology.
I. This Work in Context
A. Studies of Ultras, Hooligans, and Fans
Up to now there has been no study of Italian Ultras in the English language, that blends
ethnographic data collection with a commitment to using “native” sources of critical assessment. In
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fact, there have been no dissertation or book length studies of the Ultras in English, minus the
journalist Tim Parks’ A Season with Verona (2002). Italian sources do include several book-length
studies by renowned scholars such as Roversi (1990), Dal Lago (1990), and Mariottini (2006). While
benefitting from each of these texts, none of them was devoted to a particular curva or to deeply
connecting the Ultras to a form of life and a critique of contemporary politics as in this study.
In English there has been only one ethnography with similar aims. Gary Armstrong’s
Football Hooligans (1998) is the result of a long research period amongst the hooligans of Sheffield
United Football Club. Like this study, Armstrong sought to understand the rationale behind his
subjects’ actions. He rejected the Leicester School arguments about inferior civilizational forces
among the English working class, instead focusing on what the hooligans said about their violent
behaviors. What he learned was that violence was thrilling to his subjects, not only in a pubescent,
hyper-masculine way but also as a break with the mundane world of post-industrial England. The
hooligans’ deep affection for their soccer clubs worked in a similar way. In a deteriorating physical
environment undergoing demographic and economic change, Sheffield United represented to the
hooligans a link to the Sheffield of their fathers.
Armstrong was not researching his subjects’ political involvements, nor did he find them
overtly concerned with the changes being made to the English game that ultimately became the
template for Calcio Moderno. Nonetheless he demonstrated that ethnography is capable of making
knowable not only their worldview, but also the world in which they move. Anthropology must
continue to think and act locally, even as anthropologists are forced to expand the context of
interaction to a global field. Because of this, I believe that this project has more in common with
Michael Herzfeld’s recent (2009) ethnography on the inhabitants of the Roman neighborhood Monti
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than with Armstrong’s study of the English hooligan phenomenon. And because of its subject
matter, this project has more in common with surveys of political extremism (Ferraresi, 1996;
Holmes, 2000; O’Meara, 2004;), extreme political ideologies and modernity (Griffin, 2007; Kertzer,
1996; Lipovetsky, 2005), the imposition of globalization upon indigenous populations (Featherstone,
1995), and the rise of a western television-based mono-culture (LaFeber, 2002; Naylor, 2007;
Sandvoss, 2003), than with studies of sports spectators (Guttman, 1981 and 1986; Murphy, et al,
1990; Wann, et al, 2001).
B. Theory Sources and Research Subjects
Even as this study presents several challenges to anthropology (see below), the biggest
challenge it poses is methodological. I knew that ethnography was a set of methodologies that would
allow my subjects to fully explain themselves. However, I was skeptical that anthropology, as a
discipline in the American academy, would actually allow them to do so. After all, the Ultras with
whom I was embedded are of the far right and they are prone to violence. These were two crucial
strikes against them in an academic climate that tends to discount the legitimacy of fascism and
condemn the perpetrators of violence.
In choosing methodology and theory, then, I had to move beyond an approach to fascism that
would fail to let it speak on its own terms. Likewise, I needed a way to understand violence that did
not psychologize the Ultras or attempt to explain it away via socialization. A common theme in the
anthropology of violence (see below), is that its adult perpetrators tend to be violent as children
(Plesset 2006; Strathern and Stewart 2006; Merry 2009). Regardless of how the Ultras might have
accorded with such a model, it was irrelevant to the uses they put to violence. That violence can also
lend itself to courage, strength, and rites of passage is largely lost to current anthropology. To solve
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these problems, I went to sources that were not only used by the Ultras themselves, but that were
also well beyond the proper sources of most anthropological theory.
Indeed, without having done so it would have been impossible to convey the clash of
moralities and forms of life between the Ultras and the bourgeois state - a critically important
addition to the study of the Ultras (and of fascism). My political reading of Nietzsche, one which
put him, as Fredrick Appel (1999) said, “contra democracy,” was necessary because it allowed the
Ultras’ critique of modernity and its impingement of what they know as their traditions, to flow
forth. Similarly, I am unaware of anthropologists having used Evola as a way to understand the uses
of history and tradition. Yet, his works on the destruction of valor, strength, and honor - the Roman
values - by the forces of modern liberal politics, gave a true sense of what the Ultras despise about
globalization and Calcio Moderno. Finally, Sorel’s theory of “ethics of violence” allowed me to
think and explain the ways in which bourgeois morality could be highlighted as well as contradicted.
Once properly embedded with the Ultras, it became difficult not to see our fear of violence in almost
every human action.
This use of “native” philosophy and theory took me far beyond our scholarly traditions and
normalized interpretative frameworks. Nietzsche and Evola were read alongside the Ultras’ own
words. By engaging all three together, I found similar criticisms posed to all three - they promote
division, discrimination, violence, and a frightening vision of the world. These criticisms had to be
overcome in order to study the Ultras. Had I not done so, however, it would have been impossible
to create this ethnography. The challenge it posses, then, is to study, to engage our informants, and
allow them to make sense of their world - all without laying over them a “web of significance” that
does not belong. In essence the challenge is to let anthropology be just that.
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C. Anthropology of Violence and Politics
Given the obvious ways in which this work expands the purview of the study of sports fans,
be it through its focus on thought, ideology, and violent behavior or the political depth of fans’ instadium behaviors, it seems an understatement to call it a work of sports anthropology. That being
said, it is neither a representative piece of an anthropology of violence, nor an anthropology of
politics. While sport, violence, and politics are all well represented in this project, it does not belong
to any one of them exclusively. Soccer is buried under the political dimension of being an Ultra, as
is violence. Yet neither politics nor violence would make sense in their form of life without soccer.
This is complicated even further by the discourses of mentalità and Romanità, themselves loaded
with the aims and affects of Counter-Enlightenment philosophy and fascism, that provide the ethical
content of Ultra behaviors.
I feel that an anthropology of sport can benefit from having this work amongst its canon
merely as an example of the type of knowledge that can be generated by ethnographic research.
Further, I did not focus upon the game of soccer, nor strictly the Ultras’ acts of fandom, but sought
to contextualize these within their overall, if highly political, form of life. In doing so, I have,
perhaps, given those seeking to work ethnographically with sport a way to expand the study of sport
into the heretofore hidden spaces of extreme fandom in a way that is still intelligible to the extreme
fans themselves.
i. Anthropology of Violence
The idea of expanding the anthropology of sport in ways that make violence and politics able
to be incorporated is not applicable to the anthropology of violence. However, this work is no less
a challenge to the study of violence. First and foremost, this challenge comes in the form of my
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having “reinvested language with value” (Weaver, 1984, pg. 4). Although it has been important
since the late-1960s to study not only the physical act of violence but also the “assaults on
personhood, dignity, and value” (i.e. symbolic violence) that come in its wake, the anthropological
study of violence is still largely indifferent to discourses and ethics of violence as subjects of study
(Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois, 2004, pg. 1). The “value” I have given Sorel’s “ethics of antibourgeois violence” is inconceivable within the current focus of anthropology on (the victims of)
war, terrorism, and gender violence (Strathern and Stewart, 2006, pgs. 1-7). Likewise, the
Nietzschean ideal, taken up by the Ultras, of using violence (and a repudiation of the ethics of
benevolence) as a way to create distance between themselves and the modern bourgeois form of life,
would be dismissed as “barbaric and unsustainable” by scholars such as Douglas Fry, recent author
of The Human Potential for Peace (2005, pg. 168).
And yet, the “meaningful world” is “fluid and ambiguous, a mosaic of narratives,” even
when those narratives are discomforting to our own bourgeois assumptions about the content of
theory and the values of our research subjects (Comaroff and Comaroff, 1992, pg. 3). I have placed
ethnographic writing in this context as well, being forced to contend with sources and ideas that are
beyond the bourgeois norms of the American academy. Valentine Daniel explains that violence is
difficult to study because it cuts to the heart of objectivity by way of creating victims with whom
we readily co-identify. Violence, he explains, is, by nature, “morally illegitimate” (Daniel, 1996, pg.
8). As an American reader, it is obvious that violence is something of negative value. Daniel himself
begins his study of Sri Lankan political violence with a discussion of identity and difference, seeking
to place violence within the context of an always-constructed reality. He does so in the hopes of
diminishing the vitriolic arguments of essential difference between Tamils and Sinhalas. His role
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as an anthropologist, then, goes beyond attempting to understand native conceptions of violence,
seeking instead to establish the grounds for a cease-fire of sorts.
By understanding the Ultras’ justifications for violence, I was forced to acknowledge their
awareness of both Sorel and the concept of revolutionary violence. Later, when mild instances of
violence occurred in my presence, or in the aftermath of the 2007 killing of Gabriele Sandri, I was
able to comprehend both it and the “imaginative horizons” made knowable by their complex
statements on violence (Crapanzano, 2004, pg. 2). While studies by Crapanzano (2004) and
Strathern and Stewart (2006) point to the terror done to “various intra-personal fields” - including
the imagination - of the perpetrators of violence, the Ultras seemed instead fully aware of the
implications of their actions and competent in the ways they understood them.
While this in no way is meant to dismiss or demean the victims of “wife beaters, sexual
abusers, and torturers,” (Plesset, 2006; Merry, 2009) it does point to a void in the acceptable subjects
of research amongst anthropologists. While Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois invoke Malinowski and
his denunciation of the imperial legacy to remind us that we carry a heavy responsibility against
racism and the “imperial gaze,” there seems to be less of a concern to unpack the equally culturespecific and epistemological tendency to create victims and be aghast at violent behavior (2004, pg.
7). In other words, there seems to be a lack of critical awareness of our operative bourgeois ethic
against violence amongst many scholars working within the anthropology of violence. This work
demonstrates that, while the words, thoughts, and actions of our research subjects may frighten or
dismay us, they are more coherent and complex when evaluated on their own terms instead of ours.
ii. Anthropology of Politics
While the anthropology of violence suffers from an inability, or unwillingness, to leave aside
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the altruistic co-identification with victims (of violence) given us by the moral and ethical systems
of the modern West, thereby leaving inconceivable and unknowable the motivations of even the
politically violent, those working in the anthropology of politics seem much more aware of the
creative act of ethnographic writing and the range of assumptions we bring to the study of politics.
As Edward Schatz explains, through participant observation, the researcher is “completely
immersed” in the world of a cohort; and ethnography is designed to “glean the meanings that the
people under study attribute to their social and political reality” (2009, pg. 5). Therefore, the
challenges this work makes to such an anthropology are less methodological and philosophical than
those made to the anthropology of violence.
According to Jonathon Spencer, the incorporation of the study of politics and political
systems into anthropology has not only given ethnographic depth to the study how humans live
under, and with, political regimes, but also undermined the stability of certain anthropological
concepts like culture (2007, pg. 2). In particular, the awareness of how people conceive of, need, and
protect “their own culture,” studied either under the guise of multiculturalism or nationalism, has
forced a reexamination of the breadth and durability of culture and cultures (Spencer, 2007, pg. 6).
In this way, anthropology has been made to value the study of other peoples’ politics. Although my
work is a challenge to the dominance of both multiculturalism and nationalism as avenues into
political awareness and action in the age of globalization, it does work from the same assumptions
as Spencer. The idea of protecting Rome from the forces of globalization, be they social, political,
economic, or moral, is critically important to AS Roma’s Ultras. I have demonstrated the need to
understand the native inhabitants of European cities (or nations) in their own terms when it comes
to issues of globalization, immigration, and multiculturalism.
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I am reminded of a quote attributed to Jean-Marie Le Pen in which he equated Europeans
to Native Americans in the contemporary process of demographic relocation. Although extreme, the
idea points to a shift in moral/altruistic identification in an argument that usually forces Europeans
to defend themselves against charges of racism and xenophobia from those speaking on behalf of
non-European immigrants. This study does not assume the Romans to be natives as much as people
with something to lose in the process of globalization. Too often, the neo-liberal economic
assumptions that immigration is a positive force for the West creep into our anthropological studies
of the situation, which argue not only that the West has a democratic responsibility to the Third
World but also a demographic opportunity (Vincent, 2002, pg. 9). Again, as I have demonstrated,
while the Ultras may shock and disturb, they are far from mindless proponents of racism and hatred.
In this context, I hope to be part of an expansion of knowledge on the process of
globalization. Transnationalism, ethnicity, multiethnicity, nationalism, development, and the politics
of the nation-state, certainly make globalization and current politics knowable, but they are not
enough. Economic, social, and political processes - including world systems - point to a “cultivated
and structured” knowledge of the world (Vincent, 2002, pg. 7). However, there is another knowledge
of an entirely different sort that can give us a more complete picture of these processes; namely, the
goals, perceptions, and conceptions of receiving populations. Through these we may also be faced
with a knowledge that forces us to return to a host of our anthropological notions for re-evaluation.
What is more certain is the challenge to the “pure reason and enlightened self-interest” found
in 19th Century (Enlightenment) philosophy posed by the Counter-Enlightenment sources of political
philosophy used in this project. Nietzsche, Sorel, Evola, and others like Carl Schmitt combined to
form a useful critique of modernity and the bourgeois form of life, not only for me but also my
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research subjects. These thinkers questioned the value of egalitarianism, democracy, the prohibition
of violence, and a life without (political) enemies. Any such vision amongst modern men and
women can be studied on its own terms without their being castigated for noncompliance with our
bourgeois multicultural ideals.
I am aware that these are extreme positions and demands, but anthropology has an
opportunity to make knowable a deep and theoretically sound body of subjects that, like the Ultras,
are of a mind to value and protect what they understand as their “own culture and traditions” - ideas
which already present a challenge to how anthropology studies forms of life. These subjects, among
them the European New Right, the more radical elements of the Italian Slow Food movement, and,
of course, the nationalist neo-fascist organizations of Western and Eastern Europe, are unknowable
without being allowed to speak for themselves.
II. Curva Sud Roma Ultra Groups
A. Recruitment Amongst Ultra Groups
Continuing in the light of the biographical details given above, we may return to the
explanation of the Ultra groups presented in Chapter 2, paying particular attention to their
recruitment practices. For groups in Curva Sud Roma that maintain offices, like Boys Roma, Ultras
Romani, and Padroni di Casa, recruitment largely takes place at their offices and thus away from
the stadium. For the groups without offices, such as Fedayn, Ultras San Lorenzo-Primavalle, and
the smaller groups of the lower-curva, recruitment is more organic, with potential members making
their presence known at the stadium over the course of several games.
In the offices, the groups take advantage of their surroundings to not only impress, but also
attempt to get to know, a perspective Ultra. At the Boys office, the history of the group and its
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relationship with fascism is plastered on every wall and stuffed upon every shelf. One gets the sense
of entering a shrine to the Ultras of the far right. The office is quiet, without music or television, and
was dominated by the discussions taking place amongst the group members. Outside the office, on
Via degli Equi in the San Lorenzo neighborhood, Ultras would congregate to smoke and talk, so that
upon arrival at the office one was often sized-up before entering. Just as the groups without offices
desire to see an Ultra at the stadium on multiple occasions, an Ultra would need to be present at the
office over a period of time before membership would be discussed. This type of soft recruitment
occurred in the Curva as well, although it was not expected that one would stand in the Boys area
unless one were already a member of the group. Instead, it was expected that a prospect would come
to the Boys area before or after a game to say hello or ask questions about the group, the game, or
an upcoming game.
For Padroni di Casa, the situation is different. Like Fedayn, which is a closed group in the
sense that membership is restricted to those in the Quadraro neighborhood, Padroni di Casa is
largely inaccessible at the stadium. Their section in the lower part of Curva Sud is difficult to reach
as it is not bounded by an aisle. To reach them one would have to leave the aisle and negotiate the
other groups that stand between it and Padroni di Casa. Each of these smaller groups is highly
protective of their territory, so that a stranger coming amongst them would be assumed to be stealing
a place to stand from one of their members. Thus, potential members of Padroni di Casa are far
more likely to meet the group at its office, Casa Pound, which stands in sharp contrast to that of
Boys Roma.
Because it serves as an office for the Rome chapter of Casa Pound Italia, a fascist social
movement, it resembles a political party headquarters. There are multiple desks, crisp overhead
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lights, numerous telephones, and a large flat-screened televison that is always tuned to either SKY
News or RAI 24 (both CNN-style 24 hour news channels). There is no Ultra memorabilia and
nothing of Mussolini’s fascism as one finds in the Boys office. Instead, the posters of various Casa
Pound Italia, Forza Nuova, and Fiamma Tricolore initiatives line the walls. As I explained above,
the group was affiliated with both Forza Nuova and Fiamma Tricolore before being involved in the
founding of Casa Pound Italia in 2008. Because of the close connections between Padroni di Casa
and Casa Pound, one is essentially joining one when joining the other.
Whether in Boys, Padroni di Casa, or in groups without offices, the process of becoming an
Ultra was no more difficult than showing a commitment to the group. But because the large groups
are somewhat selective (Boys attempts to avoid problems with alcohol amongst their members,
Padroni di Casa is averse to thuggery, Fedayn is open only to those living in Quadaro) they have
created a process of initiation so that they may become familiar with an Ultra before he or she enters
the group. And to be accepted into a group, the Ultra needs the approval of the group’s leader or
leaders. In the case of Boys, it was enough that one of the four leaders vouched for an Ultra that he
or she be admitted. When the current leader came back into the group in mid-2007, he assumed
responsibility, but also relied on the other hierarchs to approve potential members. In Padroni di
Casa, one had to demonstrate an aptitude with the political platform of the group and Casa Pound
Italia in order to be accepted. This was an informal process that usually occurred over coffee or in
discussion groups at Casa Pound. Once accepted in the group there are no set dues, yet members
are asked to help pay for any choreography and banners the group displays.1 Members are also
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The other large group in Curva Sud, Ultras Romani, is a dues paying group, so that one may join merely
by paying the group 10 euros.
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expected to travel to away games with other members. In the case of Boys, this often means on a
chartered bus at a cost of between 50 and 60 euros.
As I demonstrated in Chapter 2, leaders sometimes move between groups. Although this did
not happen during research, it is clear from past examples that it is a process that can put on display
the hierarchy amongst the groups in Curva Sud. The best example is of William Betti’s
establishment of Ultras Romani with the backing of Boys Roma leader Paolo Zappavigna (described
in Chapter 2). However, when a new group is not being formed by the leader of an established group
I expect that the process would be much simpler, requiring only an agreement between the groups
in question.
There is another variable in the process of becoming a member of an Ultra group and that
is to regularly be seen at AS Roma away games. As I explained in Chapter 3, the trasferta, or away
game, crystalizes the Ultra experience of soccer. It combines all the elements that make the Ultras
what they are: antagonism; aggression; feelings of sacrifice, commitment, and militarism in the
name of Rome; and the sense of “being present” in the face of local hostility and potential danger.
The Ultras who regularly travel to away games - and there are less than 1,000 who can claim to be
at any and every game AS Roma plays - consider themselves the elite of the phenomenon. As I
explained in Chapter 4, these Ultras believe themselves to be part of something that truly distances
them from the bourgeois form of life. To be in this elite class and be unaffiliated with a group is rare,
as these types of Ultras tend to make the best group members. According to Filippo of Fedayn, “the
always-present are the only true Ultras, for we are dedicated, disciplined, brave, and just crazy
enough to follow [AS] Roma anywhere. For us,” he told me, “there is no enemy too ferocious, no
distance too far to travel, and no game that we cannot influence.”

416

It was my being part of this elite group of Ultras in trasferta that led Boys Roma to attempt
to recruit me into their group. Having been to Milan with the group, and having stood with them on
numerous occasions, I was familiar with their leaders and with how the group was organized. In
conversation on the return trip from Milan, “Duce,” the newly established leader, presented me with
a t-shirt of the group. He told me that from what they had seen of me in the stadiums and in
interviews and social occasions at the group’s office, they (in particular Fabio, my most important
contact at the group) knew I was “a true Ultra and someone who is reliable.” I accepted the shirt as
a gift but explained to them that I was leaving Rome in the near future, so my being a member would
be superfluous. “No problem,” he told me, “you’ll be a member until you leave and an honorary
member afterward. You are Boys Roma now and no one can touch you.”
This form of membership did allow me access to the group that, while available before, was
more comfortable to achieve and negotiate. I was forced to explain that, as far as research went, I
was in Rome to study Curva Sud Roma, not only Boys Roma, but even in doing so, I was embraced
in a way that allowed me to understand the camaraderie and belonging that the groups provide.
However, it also allowed me opportunity to see the level of commitment the groups expected of their
members.
At the Circo Massimo protest in December 2007, the former members of Antichi Valori and
other former members of Monteverde and AS Roma Ultras formed Romulae Genti. This group also
asked me to participate, which meant little more than providing English editions of some Nietzsche
texts. I talked to the Duce of Boys about my involvement with two groups in order to better
understand how they interacted. “This group [Romulae Genti],” he told me, “contains some people
that were very hostile to us [Boys Roma] at an important time in our history. If you tell me these are

417

your friends and that no banners will be displayed against Boys you can do whatever you want with
them.” I explained that I could not be responsible for what the group did after I left Rome. He
seemed not to remember my imminent departure. With his memory prodded, he loosened up and I
asked him about how the situation would be handled had I been Roman (and thus not leaving).
“There are two options,” he told me. “You would be forced to decide with which group to stand.
After all, you cannot be at two places at once.” “Duce” referred to where I would stand during
games. Where one stands is where one’s allegiances lie. If one is a Boys Roma Ultra, to stand behind
another group’s banner is an act of treason. “The first option is you being dismissed from Boys and
having your obligations to and from the group cancelled. The other option is only reserved for
important members. In this case we would have attempted to merge the groups with you as an
important person in both.”
In the past this type of group blending took place as a way to expand a group’s profile and
to gain protection from larger groups. Monteverde had once been aligned with Boys in this way, but
they ended their relationship with Boys in order to join AS Roma Ultras. In the current curva, Arditi
acts as a satellite of Boys. Knowing that the members of Romulae Genti would never accept this
proposal, I asked what the options of the new, smaller group would be. “If they are not hostile,” he
answered, “probably no trouble would develop. You would be out of Boys, that is for sure. However,
if hostilities did develop between the groups, you would be in trouble with us. But,” he added with
a smile, “after we beat up you and your friends, you, as a good Ultra, would be asked to rejoin our
group.” “And the others?” I asked. “Those Antichi Valori ‘scemi’ (idiots) would be risking much
to ever return to the curva. We [Boys] have a reputation to uphold and they would have confronted
us twice.”
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B. Maintaining Ultra Groups
With no set method of recruiting Ultras, the groups might seem difficult to maintain over the
course of years. After all, they do not go to college campuses or set up booths in piazzas on Saturday
mornings as do the Italian political parties. Instead, the Ultras advertise themselves in the stadium.
Every banner and choreography is a way of attracting attention to the group. Even the fights before
and after games, or the neighborhood sweeps committed by Monteverde, act as a way of attracting
attention amongst potential members. This works in conjunction with the ubiquity of soccer in
Italian society. Despite the Ultras’ war with the media, they can still be seen during every telecast
of soccer in Italy. Broadcasts of rivalry games are especially incomplete without repeated camera
pans of the opposing curvas. Amongst AS Roma and SS Lazio fans, many derbies, or games
between the two clubs, are distinguished by the choreography presented by each curva.
As I explained in the fourth and fifth chapters, the media plays a central role in the state’s
plan to remove the Ultras from Italian soccer. The traditional media universally condemns the
Ultras’ aggression, rivalries, and violence. Yet, there is a belief amongst the groups that the children
being courted by the industry of soccer to consume the game without aggression (see Chapter 6) will
be enamored enough with the Ultras and their form of life that they will reject the bourgeois model.
They believe this because the same thing happened to them. 90% of the Ultras who responded to my
survey began attending AS Roma games with their parent or parents. When old enough, i.e. between
13 and 17 years of age, that same 90% began attending games in Curva Sud either alone or with
friends. From there, these teenagers were a step away from becoming Ultras.
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Figure 152. Ultras in Bari protest the government’s crackdown on
Ultras. The signs read “One does not ask permission to be free. Bari.
2007.

This points to the amorphous nature of the Ultra phenomenon, despite its being based on
organization and discipline. While the groups are easy to find, the Ultras themselves are sometimes
elusive. Even though the groups do not actively recruit in piazzas as do political parties, the Ultras
are in piazzas. The groups do not enter the schools, but the Ultras are present in large numbers in
the schools. When boarding a train for Milan to take part in a 2007 game between Inter Milan and
AS Roma, I purposely wore my Boys Roma scarf as I approached the platform. As expected, I was
stopped by the police and asked for identification, game ticket, and tickets for the journey to and
from Milan. As I dutifully handed over my information, the 15 Boys Ultras with whom I was
traveling, and amongst whom no AS Roma colors were to be seen, walked by the police and onto
the train. It is this type of cat-and-mouse game that the Ultras have gotten used to when dealing with
the Italian state. However, the post-Sandri position of the state has changed significantly, with away-
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game travel being suspended for all but the most benign of games.
III. AS Roma’s Ultras and Italian Ultras in General
As I explained in the introductory chapter, there has been only one ethnographic study of
Italian Ultras published in the English language. That was the research conducted by Antonio
Roversi (1994) amongst FC Bologna’s Ultras in the early-1990s. Demographically there was very
little difference between what he discovered in Bologna and what I discovered in Rome. Age,
gender, and employment data all coincided with only slight variation despite the distance of almost
20 years and the different social contexts (see Chapter 1). At the end of that study, Roversi
acknowledged that similar studies were needed in other Italian curvas because of the highly local
nature of the phenomenon (1994, pg. 147). Other scholars of the Ultra phenomenon have made
similar claims while also noting the few universals amongst the Italian curvas. Amongst these, Carlo
Podaliri (with Balestri, 1997), Carlo Balestri (with Roversi, 2002), and Rocco DeBiasi (with
Lanfranchi, 1997) have published numerous articles in English about the importance of
distinguishing between Italian curvas.
This study certainly supports their assertions, as it is so deeply rooted in the world view of
the AS Roma Ultras that it might not make sense to Ultras in other Italian cities. The Ultras are
much like the songs they sing. Even though various curvas might share the melodies of popular
Italian songs from the fascist hymn “Faccetta Nera” to Pooh’s “Chi Fermerà la Musica,” they all
change the lyrical content to match their context. What’s more, the curvas will also borrow liberally
from the folk songs of their city, such as Curva Sud Roma’s singing of popular Roman songs “La
Società dei Mangaccioni” and “La Canzone di Testaccio.” Clearly, the content is more important
than the melodies borrowed.
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That being said, there are foundational and elemental characteristics that are shared by Italian
Ultras wherever they are found. Maurizio Stefanini (2009) has identified these broadly as identità
(identity), politica (politics), and violenza (violence). Instead, using the language already established
in this study, I identify these broadly as performance or style of fandom, agonism, and politics. It
is with these three groupings that I will place AS Roma’s Ultras in the context of Italian Ultras in
general.
A. Performance
The Ultras’ in-stadium performances act as a framing device that demarcates the curvas they
inhabit from the other parts of the stadium. This is because there is no reason that the other fans do
not participate in their revelry and rivalry - other than that they are not Ultras. It is the songs, bombs,
flares, smoke candles, and flags that separate the Ultras from the non-Ultras. As we have seen, every
curva in Italy, at least until the death of Raciti, was marked by incessant singing, occasional bombs,
timely flares (such as during pre-game rituals like AS Roma fans singing “Roma Roma,” the club’s
anthem), smoke candles, and constant flag waving.
Bromberger (1993) was one of the first anthropologists to study Ultra performances. Being
a structuralist he discerned in them an entire cultural universe of meanings and oppositions. His most
vivid case study was the dichotomy between the northern, modern, and efficient FC Juventus of
Turin and the southern, pre-modern, and artistic SSC Napoli of Naples. Not only did he contrast the
fans and their devotion to either modern rationality (Juventus) or pre-modern superstition and faith
(Napoli), but also the playing styles of two teams were said to match the characteristics of the fans.
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Figure 153. AS Roma Ultra in Milan.
His scarf reads “I hope that God
strikes you all with lightning.” Milan.
2007.
Instead of a structuralist reading of the Ultras’ style of fandom, I probed the rationality of
their choices, linking them to the context that propelled them. For the Ultras of AS Roma this meant
studying banners and the content of choreographies. It meant, more occasionally, studying the
content and history of songs. Armstrong and Young studied soccer chants and songs as “a collective
expression of social and cultural identity” that often takes the form of a new poetry or folklore
(2000, pg. 180). Aside from deriding the occasional “racist” content of the songs, the Italian media
is fond of referring to them as a form of folklore. Indeed, I frequently heard the same Romans of
Monteverde who chastised me for involving myself with the Ultras humming and signing the songs
of the Curva while they worked. As Armstrong and Young determined, the songs from the stands
become just as integral to the experience of the game as the play on the field.
In the highly policed stadiums of 2007-2008, songs were used to insult or intimidate the
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opposing Ultras in a way that pre-game fights or shows of aggression would have done in the past.
For the big rivalry games of AS Roma, Curva Sud would spend more then half of a game’s 90
minutes singing against the opponent. In special cases, like the AS Roma-SSC Napoli game of 2007
(described in Chapter 5), the curva sang against Napoli and Naples for the full 90 minutes. For AS
Roma-SS Lazio of that season, the curva debuted a new anti-Lazio song, a reworked version of “Old
MacDonald Had a Farm” called “O Bastadro Bianco-Blu.” The Ultras sang this song for a full 20
minute stretch of the game. Afterward, Augusto, an SS Lazio Ultra who worked in a Monteverde
pizzeria, told me how incensed Lazio’s Curva Nord had been by the song and the length of
uninterrupted singing by Curva Sud.
For less important games, Curva Sud Roma, just like other curvas, might use standardized
songs against their opponent. These include stating the opposing city’s name and “vaffanculo” (go
fuck yourself), or stating “Odio” (I hate) and the city’s name. Sometimes these became synonymous
with certain cities, like “Odio Napoli” or “Roma Roma Vaffanculo,” so that every curva would sing
them even when not facing SSC Napoli or AS Roma.
The bombs used by Italian Ultras are usually homemade, or made by a few people in each
curva and sold amongst their peers. They take the form of a pipe bomb although they are made with
cardboard and paper. They are long and skinny tubes filled with blasting powder and have a long
fuse. The flares used in each curva are quick burning emergency flares that are purchased online at
fansshop.eu or in auto supply stores. The smoke candles are also purchased online, normally from
fansshop.eu, and can be procured in a wide variety of colors (whichever are appropriate to one’s
team). The point of each of these is to create a spectacle that will shock, awe, and intimidate
outsiders (see figure 28). The bombs, flares, and smoke candles, however, were also used as
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weapons during fights with the police, which is why the state banned them in the wake of Raciti’s
death.

Figure 154. Ultras amongst flags and flares. Rome.
2006.
Each Italian curva will also have a measure of flags, representing either individual groups,
the team, the curva, the city, or now the region. In Curva Sud Roma, group, team, and city flags
dominate, each one predominantly yellow and red, the colors of both AS Roma and Rome. In Milan,
one sees flags of the teams (red and black for AC Milan and blue and black for Inter Milan) and the
red and white cross of Saint Ambrose, the patron saint of Milan. Amongst other intra-city rivals this
is not the case. Neither FC Torino nor FC Juventus display their city’s flag. In Genova, only Genoa
CFC displays that city’s flag which is identical to Milan’s. Because the flag is incorporated into the
crest of Genoa CFC, the city’s other team UC Sampdoria does not display it during games. In Rome,
SS Lazio’s Ultras are never seen with the Rome city flag for similar reasons. In Lega Nord cities like
Verona, Brescia, and Bergamo, the curvas are often full of that party’s flag.
Likewise, the materials used in Ultra choreographies are similar from curva to curva. 8.5"
by 11" colored paper or cardboard squares often suffice to turn a curva into a backdrop for the
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message of a choreography. This portion is usually printed or painted onto large industrial roles of
paper. As I explained in Chapter 2, designs are discussed and finalized by the group or groups
paying for the choreography. Each group would then be responsible for producing their portion of
the design, which is either created by the group members themselves or by neighborhood design
shops. Perhaps it is an industry driven by Ultra and political activism, but each Roman neighborhood
seems to have an abundance of print shops. Certainly, Monteverde has its fair share. It is rare for
curvas to display choreographies that involve props or materials beyond paper and cardboard.
If the songs, bombs, flares, and flags are the frames by which Ultras are distinguishable from
non-Ultras and these are removed, then what remains? If the Ultras are dispossessed of soccer, yet
still amass in piazzas are they still Ultras? Stefanini (2009) points to Ultras’ style or mode of
sociality as the template for radical political actors like the anarchist Black Block and All Whites
(Tutte Bianche), yet these cannot be said to be Ultras. On one level this points to the importance of
the mentalità as it allows an identifiable essence of “being Ultra.” However, it also leads us to
wonder about the future of the Ultras. If they are dispossessed of the stadiums, is remaining together
in the form of a movement enough to have any relevance as Ultras?
The importance of soccer to the Ultras must not be underestimated. If the Ultras take their
performances out of the stadiums do they still have the same importance or impact? If they amass
at Campidoglio and sing hymns to the equestrian statue of Marcus Aurelius or to Castor and Pollex
would this suffice? In fact they have done so, most recently following AS Roma’s victory over AC
Parma to clinch the 2001 Italian Championship. But this merely underscores the fact that their
performances beyond the stadiums are still motivated by momentous AS Roma victories and thus
by soccer. It should be clear by this dissertation that I am arguing that the Ultras are far more than
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their in-stadium performances. In turning now to agonism and politics I will demonstrate why.
B. Agonism
Just as with performance, the form of Ultra agonism I explained in Chapter 6 I believe to be
common to all of Italy’s Ultras. It is the content that differs from place to place and curva to curva.
Dal Lago and De Biasi studied the Ultra phenomenon as a single cultural entity, but struggled to find
many unifying cultural elements. The one they did identify was a world view centered on “war” (Dal
Lago and De Biasi, 1994, pg. 85). It was with this in mind that I identified agon and agonism as the
central elements of the Ultras’ form of life. Not only does agonism incorporate both the natural,
territorial, soccer-based rivalries of the Ultras, but also and meta-natural rivalries made of the state
and the media.
The idea that soccer is interconnected with the political and social contexts in which it is
played is common to Italy’s Ultras. Although the media and the bourgeois fans of the game are
intent to have it be somewhat displaced from the regional and political divisions so important to
Italian society and history, the Ultras make of these the very rationale for their involvement with
soccer. Just as AS Roma’s Ultras have a visceral hatred for the Ultras of SSC Napoli, AC Livorno,
Inter and AC Milan, SS Lazio, FC Juventus, Brescia Calcio, and Atalanta BC, these clubs’ Ultras
return that hatred for AS Roma. Some of these rivalries are local and historical, like SSC Napoli and
SS Lazio, and others are more recent and political, like AC Livorno, Brescia Calcio, and Atalanta
BC. These latter teams are based in Brescia and Bergamo, two centers of support for the Lega Nord.
The two Milan-based clubs are hated for different reasons. AC Milan is hated because their Ultras
killed AS Roma Ultra Antonio De Falchi in 1989, and Inter Milan is hated because they are a sister
club to SS Lazio. Each of these teams have a long standing political rivalry with AC Milan, which
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is traditionally a club of the political left. And so it continues, until the Ultras make of soccer a web
of rivalries and hatreds.
As figure 90 demonstrates, these rivalries are also marked by the current social and political
topics of the day. In that photo, UC Sampdoria Ultras wave trash bags at the SSC Napoli supporters
on the other side of the stadium in reference to the ongoing problem in Campania with trash
collection. Otherwise, the “tifare contro,” or root against, aspect of Ultra agonism will pick up on
a local enemy of the team being played. For instance, when AS Roma played at FC Messina in 2006,
the AS Roma Ultras sang “Messinese Sei un Catanese” (person of Messina you are of Catania) at
the Messina crowd, not only playing on Messina’s biggest soccer rivals but also Catania’s status as
the “Other” of Sicily (figure 155).

Figure 155. Written in Messina’s San
Filippo stadium: Person from Messina you
are of Catania. Messina. January 2007.
What is distinctive is the content of the altruistic associations with agonism. For each curva
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there will be a concordant “propter nos,” or people on whose behalf they act. I argue that the purpose
of the agonistic form of life is to promote a narrowly defined people or in-group. For Curva Sud
Roma, that people is obviously Roman. In Brescia, by contrast, it may be limited to Brescia or it
might be moving to incorporate the surrounding Lombard region or more fully “the North.” For
certain, though, it does not include Rome and the Romans. Likewise SSC Napoli’s Ultras have an
extremely limited range of altruistic co-identification, being restricted to the city itself. I have been
told that the other small teams of the Campania region despise SSC Napoli as do the Romans.
In Chapter 7, I explained Romanità as a central element of the AS Roma Ultras’ world view.
That chapter also addressed the applicability of Romanità to campanilismo, the form of extreme
localism that is still a powerful socializing force in Italy. From the perspective of the Ultra
phenomenon in general, Romanità is a local Roman form of campanilismo. From within the
concept’s own history, though, it is far more compelling as a political discourse that outweighs the
other forms of Italian localism. Nonetheless, the point here is that, while I identified Romanità as
a crucial part of the experience of AS Roma’s Ultras, it would be unknowable to other city’s Ultras
in the same terms. For instance, whereas AS Roma’s Ultras use Romanità to attack their Milanesi
counterparts as the former slaves of Rome, the Milanesi would not use their relative status under
Roman rule against another curva, say that of Vicenza or Venice.
In any event, this dissertation points to the importance of understanding not only the
performance but also the content of the Ultras’ rivalries; in fact, it has focused upon the Ultras’
rationales for rivalry. The two areas of performance that did receive critical attention were the
choreography and the striscione, or long hand-painted banner with a personal, political, or soccer
related message. These two forms of performance, though, were discussed more as they relate to
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Ultra agonism than as the performance elements listed above. This is because their content is the
basis of their being enacted, as well as the basis of their meaning. In these respects I have gone
beyond the performance studies of Ultras.
An additional area that distinguishes this work is the identification of the media and state as
rivals of the Ultras. This allowed me to consider the political ideologies and the political and social
environment of the Ultras in relation to their conceptualization of agonism. It became clear during
research that the Ultras had proper reasons to be hostile toward the media and Italian state. Often
these reasons went beyond the treatment they themselves received by both. As I found myself deeper
in the world of the Ultras than I perhaps needed to be for research I also became more closely
affiliated with group leaders on the very far right politically. It was among these leaders of Boys
Roma and Padroni di Casa that I became aware of the deep moral divide between them and the
bourgeois press and state. In time, like them, I began to see the conflict between the Ultras and the
media (especially) as a conflict between two competing moralities. This consciousness of morality
came from their readings of Friedrich Nietzsche, who understood morality is the basis not only of
peoples but also of millennia.
It is impossible to say if Nietzsche is a popular theoretical influence on other Italian curvas.
I can say that the bourgeois modern world he describes, in complete contradistinction to the warriorbased pre-modern forms of life that preceded it, makes sense well beyond Curva Sud Roma. In
Juventus’ Curva Sud, for instance, the main groups are Viking and Drughi. Both groups are of the
right and, while the first is an obvious reference to the Nordic anti-Christian raiders of the Middle
Ages, the second is taken from a violent gang in Anthony Burgess’ A Clockwork Orange. Both of
these sources of inspiration are easily transmuted into the language of Nietzsche’s moralistic
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political philosophy.
Aligned with the dominant and Ultra moralities are competing ethics of violence. In Rome,
amongst the leaders of the rightist groups, Sorel’s understanding of violence as a force of change
is combined with Nietzsche’s understanding of violence as a way to transcend the meddling
bourgeois morality of modernity. It thus acts as a tool for understanding the Ultras as a phenomenon
outside or beyond the bourgeois form of life. Again, I cannot say if Sorel is studied by other Ultras.
I can say that both the government and the Ultras believe Curva Sud Roma to be the most violent
curva in Italy (see the Observatory documents sited in chapters 4 and 5). That is not to say, however,
that AS Roma’s Ultras are the only violent Ultras in Italy. They are all violent to some degree,
enough so that each of the book-or-essay-length academic sources on the Ultras used in this study
is either devoted entirely or in-part to Ultra violence. I will now turn to the issue of violence,
especially as it relates to the conflict between the Ultras and the state.
C. Violent Politics
In the early years of the Ultra phenomenon, the 1970s and 1980s, it would have been
difficult, if not impossible, to describe a single unifying political characteristic of Italian Ultras.
While some groups were born of the left and right, either from offshoots of the student movement
or the postwar fascist parties, others were apolitical and genuinely benign (Foot, 2006, pg. 197).
Those on the political edges, though, were organized in a time of political extremism and domestic
terrorism perpetrated by both sides (Ginsborg, 2003a, pg. 107). Even as the leftists were weary of
state repression and the fascists were weary of the state in general, neither set of Ultras was known
to attack the police as became common in the mid-to-late-1990s - and as was witnessed in Rome the
night of Gabriele Sandri’s death (Stefanini, 2009, pgs. 132-136). So it is that most scholars who
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search for the origins of violence between the Ultras and the police begin their surveys between
1994 and 1996 (Mariottini, 2006; Roversi 1994; Stefanini 2009).
Although neither Mariottini nor Roversi point to specific instances that triggered the now-20
year war between the police and the Ultras, relying instead on Leicester School assumptions that the
origins of social violence lie in the psyches of the perpetrators, Stefanini lays the blame clearly upon
the police. “Whenever there was the smallest of incidents between Ultras,” he says, “the police
would come on the scene as hard as possible, with batons crashing down upon t-shirt clad soccer
fans until all movement in the danger zone ceased” (Stefanini, 2009, pg. 132). He goes on to list a
series of beatings into states of irreversible coma and even death by the police - deaths that became
the organizing principle in Brescia and Perugia, whose curvas were re-named after the victims of
police brutality. Amongst the victims he lists 32 year-old Alessandro Spoletini, an Ultra of AS Roma
beaten into a coma by police in Bologna in 2001. The following week, he says, AS Roma’s Ultras
attacked the police on guard at a Champions League game between AS Roma and FC Liverpool
(Stefanini, 2009, pg. 135). He continues in this way, up through the G8 Summit in Genova 2001,
where Carlo Giuliani was killed by a Carabinieri officer. As a result the Ultras developed what he
calls a “ACAB (All Cops Are Bastards) syndrome,” and began to engage the police before the police
engaged them (Stefanini, 2009, pgs. 131-134).
The relationship between the state and the Ultras was hard to define during my research. As
I said above, there was very little violence to speak of between the Ultras and none between the
police and Ultras. The Ultras were, in my estimation, well-policed, in that when they arrived in
opposing cities by train they were met with a large contingent of machine gun wielding Carabinieri.
When they arrived by car they were often stopped on highways and driven en masse with police
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escort to the stadium. In Rome, the police were visible in large numbers both inside and outside the
stadium.

Figure 156. Messages written
inside Florence’s Artemio
Franchi stadium. Florence. 2007.
Because of this, I turned my attention to the ethics and discourses of violence being deployed
by the Ultras and the state. What became clear is that both the state and the Ultras have a purpose
behind their violence. As I said above, AS Roma’s Ultras, at least at the leadership level, are
committed to using violence as a way to create and maintain distance between themselves and the
bourgeois form of life. That, however, is manifested at the interpersonal level. As a group or curva,
their violence is an attack on the forces protecting the industry of soccer from those who wish the
game to return to its communal roots. It was thus that Calcio Moderno was invoked by AS Roma’s
as a rationale for violence.
Calcio Moderno is the Ultras’ moniker for the globalized, deterritorialized, and super-
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profitable soccer that now defines the game in the industrialized world. “No al Calcio Moderno” has
become a rallying cry for Ultras in all parts of Italy and it is the one example of a unified political
agenda or model amongst the Ultras. In Rome, the experience of Calcio Moderno - of globalization
as a destructive force for soccer clubs and fans - politicized Ultras in ways that moved them far
beyond stadiums and the world of soccer. It was also at the core of their ethical aversion to the
bourgeois form of life. Again, the details of other curvas’ involvement with this discourse and
agenda are unknown to me. I have, however, perused numerous websites and facebook pages
devoted to a rejection of Calcio Moderno and have read words very similar to those I heard in Rome.
Elsewhere, the extreme political actions of the Ultras, like raiding Roma camps, were
witnessed in Campania. In one instance an SSC Napoli Ultra was implicated, but never convicted,
for taking part in an attack. In Palermo I saw Ultra graffiti against African immigrants and in Milan
I saw Ultra graffiti proclaiming Lombardy a separate nation. Thus, I can assume that Ultra politics
take the form of issues that are closest to home.

Figure 157. Juventus fans against Calcio Moderno.
London. 2008.
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In Rome, Calcio Moderno meant not only a world where money and the global marketplace
counted more than the interests of localized Romans, but also a world in which the morality of that
marketplace was hegemonic. Multiculturalism, anti-racism, tolerance, immigration, and the
American tropes of democracy and freedom were to be resisted as much as foreign ownership of
soccer clubs. In Rome and in Curva Sud Roma’s rightist Ultras, one also finds a long tradition of
extreme right politics. I cannot say if Forza Nuova, Fiamma Tricolore, and Casa Pound Italia are
as popular elsewhere in Italy as they are in Rome - or at least amongst Rome’s Ultras. But in Rome,
as I was told by a leftist Fedayn Ultra, “fascism is in the air one breathes, and in the cobblestones
that we walk [upon]. Almost every building is fascist and even the monuments to the ‘real Romans’
are fascist.” It was the normalcy of fascism in Rome, at least amongst the Ultras, that I hope to have
made clear in the previous chapters.
Returning to the violence of the state, above I used the work of Giorgio Agamben to explain
the “state of exception” that defines the state’s interaction with the Ultras. These exceptional states,
or states of emergency, are always militarized and place a high value on state security at the expense
of individual liberties. I also used Max Weber’s template of state monopoly of the legitimate use of
violence to explain how the rather inconsequential violence of the Ultras can be construed to be a
threat to the state. These theorists, combined with Schmitt, Wolf, and Gramsci, helped me see how
the bourgeois ethics and morality of the state are legitimized and disseminated by the liberal press.
Against all this, I described the Ultras as inhabiting what Deleuze and Guattari call a “derelict
space,” beyond the hegemony of the bourgeois form of life. Interestingly, Stefanini described the
Ultras’ curvas as “Indian reservations, or spaces where the sovereignty of Italy does not reach”
(Stefanini, 2009, pg. 127).
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Regardless of city or region, the relationship between the Italian state and the Ultras is the
same. The Italian media made it clear during my research that violence amongst soccer fans in any
form would not be tolerated by the state. Regardless of the fascists in Rome’s curvas, as both AS
Roma’s and SS Lazio’s Ultras are dominated by the far right, or the communists in AC Livorno’s
Curva Nord, the state with its troops of Carabinieri, and the media with its ability to define, signaled
after the death of Raciti that the derelict spaces or Indian reservations would no longer be allowed
to exist.
IV. The Future of the Ultras
In Chapter 5 I asked the question, as I did above, what will become of the Ultras if they are
dispossessed of their role in Italian soccer. Returning to AS Roma’s Ultras, it is difficult to say.
There are three discernable possibilities, each of which is problematic from the perspective of the
Ultras.
One, the Ultras are hoping that a change of regime will loosen some of the restrictions put
in place by the government of Romano Prodi and since strengthened by the Berlusconi government.
This seems unlikely, as having virtually banned away-game travel and effectively banned Ultra instadium traditions, the state has finally rid itself of a large part of its problems with the Ultras.
Two, there is a strong enough political consciousness among the rightist Ultras that an Ultrabased social movement might be possible. However, as I wondered above, how relevant would being
an Ultra be to a social movement if soccer is removed from the equation? Fascist Ultras already
mirror the earliest manifestations of the fascist movement begun by Mussolini in 1919. The Fasci
Italiani di Combattimento (The Italian Fighting League) was a small group of arditi (Italian infantry
storm troopers), Futurists, and anti-communist agitators that violently engaged communist and

436

passivist organizers in and around Milan (Farrell, 2003, pgs. 97-103). The rightist Ultras share the
same passion for anti-liberal politics, squadrismo (political action in the form of fascist bands), and
a similar ethic of violence and critique of modern morality. It seems unlikely in any case that the
Ultras, as Ultras, would seek a role in parliamentary politics, as so much of their critique of
modernity rests on a critique of the liberalism at its foundation.
Three, the Ultras have an inordinate amount of faith in their mentalità and form of life as a
viable alternative to the bourgeois form of life and its consumerist pleasures. It is possible that they
could maintain the mentalità outside the stadiums with little damage occurring to either its
forcefulness or relevance. Similar to Slow Food, the movement for a return to Italian culinary habits
and traditions in the face of the Americanization of local cuisines and eating practices, the Ultras
offer a passionate critique of the changes to traditional life being demanded by globalized freemarket capitalism. Resisting globalization, much as it is resisted in the developing world (Falk,
1999, pgs. 1-27; Prempeh, 2006, pgs. 14-39), may be, in my view, their most productive and
sustainable option. However, it presupposes a high level of commitment to the political aspects of
being an Ultra that a large number of Ultras reject.
There is a fourth possibility and that is that the Ultras will be policed out of existence. Based
on my experience, the current generation of Ultras is defiant enough that the state will be forced to
kill far more Ultras than the public is willing to accept in order to make them extinct. I am convinced
that in the immediate future the Ultras will continue to wait and to play a game of cat and mouse
with the state. “Think” said Federico of Antichi Valori and Romulae Genti, “of how many
governments we have seen come and go in Italy, just since I entered Curva Sud in 1995 [there have
been ten governments since 1995]. Think of how many seasons we have seen, how many players
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and coaches come and go. Through it all there has been Curva Sud Roma.” Although Federico
ignored the internal strife within the curva during that same period, his point was made nonetheless.
With stadiums in growing disrepair (according to the Italian Football Federation [FIGC]),
attendances dwindling, the number of low-priced foreign players rising, and the hegemony of soccer
as a television commodity, the Ultras are the one constant in Italian soccer.

Figure 158. CUCS Ultra with a future
Ultra. AS Roma-Catania Calcio. Rome.
November 2006.
Each of these scenarios is based on the Ultras being stripped of their ability to perform in
soccer stadiums. Because I propose that what is essential about the Ultras is their commitment to
their mentalità, which entails a particular critique of modernity and the bourgeois form of life, I
believe that they can continue to exist in some form after the stadiums are closed to them. As said
CUCS founder Stefano Malfatti at the Circo Massimo, “one is born an Ultra and one dies an Ultra.”
Having stripped away the frame of stadium performances, Malfatti answers the question posed
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above. Not surprisingly, as he was one of the first to use the term, the “mentalità Ultras” remains
when the stadium disappears. However, and it is a perhaps fitting conclusion to this project, if that
occurs, and the Ultras are in fact dispossessed of their experience of soccer, what they will lose is
the joy of being an Ultra. Rivalry and hostility will remain, but the unbridled thrill of an AS Roma
goal or victory will be lost. In the end, if the Ultras are able to move beyond the relative safety of
the stadiums and into a more active engagement with political extremism, the state may wish it had
allowed them their fights, flares, bombs, songs, and flags. That the state fails to do so points instead
to another of this project’s conclusions, that the war against the Ultras is ultimately a war against
their world view and critique of modernity. As said Andrews and Ritzer, cultural forms that are
“generally indigenously conceived, controlled, and comparatively rich in distinctive substantive
content are a virtual impossibility” in the realm of global capitalism (Andrews and Ritzer, 2007, pg.
41).
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